


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ROBERT APPELBAUM

Literature and Utopian Politics in Seventeenth- Century England



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LITERATURE AND UTOPIAN POLITICS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

Hundreds of writers in the English-speaking world of the seventeenth century imagined alternative ideal societies. Sometimes they did so by exploring fanciful territories, such as the world in the moon or the nations of the Antipodes; but sometimes they composed serious disquisitions about the here and now, proposing how England or its nascent colonies could be conceived of as an “Oceana,” a New Jerusalem, a “City on a Hill.” *Literature and Utopian Politics* provides a comprehensive view of the operations of the utopian imagination in England and its nascent colonies from the accession of James VI and I in 1603 to the consolidation of the Restoration under Charles II in the late 1660s. Appealing to social theorists, literary critics, and political and cultural historians, this volume revises prevailing notions of the languages of hope and social dreaming in the making of British modernity during a century of political and intellectual upheaval.

ROBERT APPELBAUM is a post-doctoral Fellow in English at the University of San Diego. His articles have appeared in a number of journals, including *Shakespeare Quarterly*, *Modern Philology*, *Textual Practice*, *Prose Studies*, and *Utopian Studies*.

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UTOPIAN POLITICS IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
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ROBERT APPELBAUM



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*To the memory of Sandy Solomon,
a man who tried*

And to my loving and beloved mother

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Acknowledgments

The idea for this book was hatched one afternoon while I was in the midst of working an eighteen-hour shift, harried and cranky, as a limousine driver in the San Francisco Bay Area. The final draft but one was completed while I was unemployed, hopefully “between jobs,” and living on the dole in Cincinnati, Ohio. It has not been easy to complete this project. But along the way I have been the beneficiary of many, many kindnesses and a good deal of direct and indirect institutional support.

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have any chance at all of being published and circulated these days. I am grateful too to Rachel de Wachter and Jan Chapman for taking my amateurish manuscript in hand and making it into a professional book. In addition, I would like to thank Frank Cass Publishers for permission to reprint material from *Prose Studies* that now appears in chapter four. Some of the ideas that show up in chapter two originally appeared in the *George Herbert Journal*, and some of the ideas in chapter five in *Utopian Studies*.

If I could, I would like to conclude by noting once again the importance of the indifferent, impersonal, social domain of the institutional system in our lives, for it is the institution, for better or worse – the unemployment bureau, the foundation, the university, the publishing house – that nurtures our lives as creative workers. But I cannot. I have to conclude by expressing my deepest thanks to Terri Zucker and Meredith Appelbaum, the two loves and twin pillars of my life.

Introduction

“Literature and Utopian Politics.” Or is that “Politics and Utopian Literature”? Either one would do; for utopian politics as exercised in seventeenth-century England – whether in the sublime ideology of the Stuart Court, in the charterism of separatist Puritans, or in the revolutionary agitations of the Levellers, the Fifth Monarchists, and the Diggers – was always grounded in literary expression. And by the same token, utopian literature in the seventeenth century – whether among activists like William Walwyn or among retired scholars like Robert Burton – was always grounded in the political conflicts of the day. One engaged in utopian politics in keeping with impulses and goals articulated in literature; indeed the engagement itself was often primarily literary: a matter of letters, of words, of written “acts,” of poems, of recited addresses from the pulpit, of stage plays and pamphlets and books. But conversely, one essayed an adventure in utopian literature in keeping with impulses and goals derived from the political domain, a domain which was itself, in the seventeenth century, a location of not only the policies and procedures of the state but also the conduct of social life and the dissemination of cultural forms.

This book is a study of the interaction of literature and politics in their utopian dimension from the accession of James VI and I in 1603 to the consolidation of power in the late 1660s during the Restoration under Charles II. In focusing on this shared dimension I concentrate on a pair of complementary phenomena I call “ideal politics” and “utopian mastery.” By “ideal politics” I refer to discourse in any of a number of forms which generates the image of an ideal society – a society that exists predominantly in the imagination and usually in the shape of an optimal alternative to a real society in the here and now. By “utopian mastery” I refer to the power a subject may exert over an ideal society, whether as the author or as the imaginary founder or ruler of an ideal political world. Usually these phenomena are studied in view of the genre of

utopian fiction, a form of writing held to have been invented by Thomas More in his *Utopia* (1516), although it is commonly understood that there were a number of precedents for More's work and even plenty of utopian fictions written before him. In this book, however, I am concerned with the genre only in passing. Instead of taking the genre as a reference point against which other texts are to be measured, so that only those texts with enough affinities to *Utopia* may be included for discussion, I take utopian fiction on the Morean model as only one of several options available to writers concerned to exercise the rights of ideal politics and utopian mastery. I take it as my working hypothesis that between 1603 and 1670 there is traceable, narratable history of the ideal politics and utopian mastery, a history which registers significant changes in political subjectivity over the course of the century – significant changes, that is, in what it means to be an individual capable of thinking about political life and imagining political conditions and ideals. When texts resembling More's *Utopia* appear in the first two-thirds of the seventeenth century, I try to account for them; much of this book, in fact, is devoted to the conventional practice of providing interpretive readings of literary texts, utopian fictions being among the most prominent of them. But after years of studying the phenomenon of ideal politics I have become convinced that there is little stability to the genre of utopian fiction in the seventeenth century, that what it means to be utopian, to write a utopian fiction, or to expand the imagination utopistically is subject to continual dispute and variation throughout the century, even with regard to the difference between what is "imaginary" and what is "real." What is constant is not the genre, the legacy of the Morean ideal, or the particular politics that the people in More's *Utopia* happen to practice. What is constant instead is a disposition. To think and write about an ideal society on any of a number of models (the earthly paradise, the millenarian future, the ancient Age of Gold, the happy constitutional democracy, the world turned upside down, the primitive Church, the ideally munificent court of the ideal monarch) and to assert, while thinking and writing about an ideal society, a sense of one's potential mastery over a social or natural world were goals toward which a surprising number of people in the seventeenth century aspired. The terrain of the ideal, in turn, was a phenomenon over which a surprising number of people thought it important to contest proprietorship. This book tries to tell the story of that disposition and the contestation it inspired, and to trace the development of what I will later define (in chapter one) as "the look of power" among English authors during the first two-thirds of the seventeenth century.

The great utopian impulse of Western thought was first explicated by writers whose sensibilities were formed in the first half of the twentieth century, when Marxian hope was a dominant impetus: Karl Mannheim, Lewis Mumford, Ernst Bloch, and Paul Tillich among others.¹ In these writers the utopian impulse, however burdened by accretions of cultural residue, local prejudice, and historical interest – the stuff not of “utopia” but of “ideology” – was a prime motor force in the story of human liberation and social progress. Beginning among the Greeks, among whom the impulse was widely exchanged, rallying among the Romans, finding rebirth during the Renaissance and coming into its modern form at the hands of the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment and the activists of the nineteenth century, from Saint-Simon to Marx, the utopian impulse challenged and enlarged the horizons of hope of Western humanity, leading toward the self-conscious aspirations of socialist movements in the twentieth century. But such an optimistic and, one is tempted to say, self-satisfied view of the history of utopia and utopianism is clearly a thing of the past by now. More recently, in the last notable attempt to take the measure of the utopian impulse of Western civilization as a whole, Frank and Fritzie Manuel take a more skeptical, bemused, and even sarcastic attitude toward the phenomenon – which comes to an end for them in the realism of Freud, the oppressiveness of the Soviet regime, and the fatuities and failures (as they see it) of the cultural revolutions of the sixties and seventies.² Nor has the attitude been mitigated in the realm of political theory. There is perhaps a utopian dimension to the still widely influential *A Theory of Justice* by John Rawls.³ For Rawls justice begins by virtue of a disinterested act of the imagination, an engagement with a hypothetical ideal. How, if I were to design the rules and principles of a society, would I design them, given the condition that I do not know what position I myself would occupy in it? Thus the imaginary dimension of an ideal politics stands at the core of Rawls’s relatively concrete system of justice. And the example of Rawls may thus remind us that in most of the major traditions of political thought in the West – including the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the Augustinian – political theory always already includes elements of idealization serving utopian purposes. The science of politics, as Aristotle observed, is by nature a reflection both on what is and on what ought to be. Hence it is a consideration of the nature of both political states (as they are) and the ideal state (as it ought to be). But the main tenor of political thought in the last twenty-five years has shed even the last vestiges of an ideal “ought,” having been dominated instead by the idea of what Habermas called

the “exhaustion of utopian energies” in the West.⁴ We live in an age of the End of Utopia. “It seems far easier for us today,” Frederic Jameson writes, “to imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than the breakdown of later capitalism.”⁵ Hence we worry little about what we ought to be, as a whole: even the word “we” has become suspect, while the future in which an “ought-to-be” might be brought to life stands before us more as a memory of futures-past than as a real site of hope and expectation.⁶ If scholars of literature, politics, culture, and society can still reflect on a phenomenon like the history of utopian ideas, they generally begin with the notion that though it may entail a story, it is not *their* story that they are reflecting upon.

For students of the early modern period and especially seventeenth-century England the notion of a discourse of ideal politics is nonetheless inescapable. It was part of the mental landscape of the time. Literally thousands of individuals participated in the discourse of ideal politics during the seventeenth century, if in no other way than in signing their names to the petitions circulating during the days of the Interregnum, or in demonstrating before the halls of Parliament, or in reading tracts attempting to redefine the political and cultural ideals of the English people, or even simply in attending the theater, for as long as the theaters were open. And there were literally hundreds of writings engaged to some extent with the discourse that they could draw upon: petitions and pamphlets, stage plays, court masques, prose fictions, sermons, treatises, platforms, occasional memoirs and letters. Sometimes, of course, writings engaged in ideal politics only to mock or forestall or pre-empt it. And even the most fervent exponents of ideal political agitation were frequently aware that there was something strange about what they were doing – something risible, something unbelievable, something impossible. How *can* one engage in the conversation of ideal politics, after all? The distinction between what is and what ought to be was seldom absent from the minds of educated writers, and the word “utopia” was more often a term of disparagement than encouragement; it signified hopeless impracticality. Speaking of the practice of lending money at interest, for example, Francis Bacon, himself one of the foremost utopists of the century, wrote that “to speak of the abolishing of usury is idle. All states have ever had it, in one kind or rate or other. So as that opinion must be sent to Utopia.”⁷ Utopia could thus be assumed to be a location of idle dreams. Moreover, although the idea of a utopian space in the imagination was common currency, there were few if any indications of a consciousness of the discourse of ideal politics as such. Perhaps

a handful of intellectuals, such as Robert Burton, James Harrington, and John Milton gave evidence of such a consciousness, as when Milton wrote of the “largeness” of spirit exhibited in the work of Plato, More, and Bacon, which taught the world of “better and exacter things.”⁸ But such individuals were exceptional. Ideal politics was neither a generic convention nor a commonly approved, cohesive body of doctrines and goals. In an age when revealed religion was still the primary framework of social thought, many of the most radical political fantasies were derived from the Bible, and the visions they entailed were thus thought to be expressive not of things as they ought to be, of political life raised to the condition of a speculative ideal, but of a hitherto hidden or misunderstood reality, prophetic history, against which conventional, secular political values could be shown to be mere illusions. Utopia was in fact the millennium, whatever the millennium was. So the discourse of ideal politics, again, though a common domain of cultural conversation, was inconsistent and contestatory. Not only contests over the content of the good life, but even contests over the nature of reality and ideality and the relation between the two were at stake when individuals participated in the discourse of ideal politics.

Still, though, individuals and movements participated in the discourse. Something happened in the seventeenth century that led to an outburst of political fantasy and speculation – an outburst related to what became the invention of modern political thought in the period. The ideal states of Independents, Commonwealthmen, and the radical sectarians participated in the same debate over the nature of politics as the very unideal state (in most respects) of Thomas Hobbes. All of these contested positions lie at the heart of Locke’s synthetic *Second Treatise of Government*. Moreover, for all the complexities involved in the political imaginary of the seventeenth century, modern scholars can still find that the study of it resonates with present-day concerns. The many valuable books by Christopher Hill on the seventeenth century, most notably *The World Turned Upside Down* and *The Experience of Defeat*, repeatedly turn, though in empirical rather than theoretical terms, to the prevalence of utopian aspirations among various sectors of the English population during the period; and throughout Hill’s work there echo experiences of utopian, Marxian hope in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.⁹ Revisionist historians, who dominated the scene of British historiography in the generation after Hill’s, either ignored or dismissed the significance of the utopian dimensions of social and political life in early modern England, minimizing the importance of radicalism of any stripe in the history of the nation;

but clearly a sort of presentism was at work in their studies as well, a presentism of reaction, advanced in the name of an astute if unprogressive realism. Silence about utopian hope is a way of causing the past to resonate with the present too. And when members of a new generation of progressively minded scholars have turned to the inescapable reality of utopianism in the period, they also have found resonances with the present. Nigel Smith and David Norbrook, among others, *pace* revisionism, have been reviving our sense of the deeply radical, republican and communitarian strains in English history and letters, a strain which always depended on assertions concerning the visionary “ought-to-bes” of early modern life.¹⁰ J. C. Davis, turning specifically to *Utopia and the Ideal Society 1516–1700*, repeatedly finds in sixteenth- and especially seventeenth-century thought reminders not only of the republican and communitarian traditions and the roots of the modern welfare state, but also of the dangers utopian thought could pose to what Karl Popper called the “open society” – dangers to which we still must be alert. James Holstun, in *A Rational Millennium* finds roots of modernist estrangement, after the fashion of the Frankfurt School’s “Dialectic of Enlightenment” in Puritan utopias of the seventeenth century, as well as in the example set by Thomas More. And Amy Boesky in *Founding Fictions* and Marina Leslie in *Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* have found illustrations and parables of identity politics, early modern style, in the writings of More, Bacon, and their successors, the example of Margaret Cavendish’s *Blazing World* being particularly pertinent for them in this respect. We learn about the conditions of modern science, of modern gender formation, and of modern social stratification by visiting the utopian tracts of the seventeenth century.¹¹

Exactly how my own work responds to literature and utopian politics in the seventeenth century as well as to the scholars who have plowed the field before me will appear in what follows. The most important procedural difference, as I have already indicated, begins with my rejection of the Morean fiction as a primary model of utopian speculation, and my concentration instead on interactions between political life and literature with a view to articulations of ideal politics and utopian mastery. From that procedural departure another kind of field of study emerges, and another kind of story (or history) of the utopian impulse ensues: a field and a story somewhere between politics and literature, somewhere between historical circumstances and the experience of social ideas. What results with regard to the subject matter at hand might be thought of as a new variety of new historicism, where narration becomes the

medium of both textual exegesis and historical explanation; except that in many respects I am returning to the topics and procedures (if not the governing philosophy) of Ernst Bloch in his *Philosophy of Hope*. As I am looking at the documents of an impulse, so I am also looking at the documents of hope: worldly but idealized hope, projected into imaginary spaces and imaginary futures. The mentality not of specific texts and individual authors but of whole movements of thought, of literature, and of political struggle become the dominant concern in this case – movements of the *langues* of the movements as well as their *paroles*. That, in a nutshell, is the difference – and the ambition – distinguishing this study. But two other specific points should be made about my approach to the utopian impulse in the seventeenth century.

(1) In the first place, it proceeds on the assumption that *the first three-quarters of the seventeenth century form a single unit with regard to the history of social thought and the experience of what I call utopian mastery*. This assumption may be controversial, on both empirical and theoretical grounds. What beginnings and endings should we attribute to the lived experiences and ideas of English or European history? For example, is not the politics of sublimity promoted under James VI and I (with which the study to follow begins) a continuity of conventions already well in place in the previous century, in the age of François I and Henry VIII? And is not the whole idea of alternative, utopian politics originally the invention of the earlier humanists, going back not only to Sir Thomas More, who was himself (along with Erasmus and Vives) responding to the long tradition of utopian thought beginning with ancient Greeks, from Hesiod to Plato to Lucian, but also to the civic humanism of early Italian republicanism? And at the other edge of the time period under consideration, are not the utopian fantasies of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, whether expressed on the dissenting side by the likes of Daniel Defoe or on the establishment side by the founders of the Royal Society, a response to and a continuation of the discourses of the mid-seventeenth century? Does anything really come to an end in the 1660s? Is not such periodization as this study assumes at best a convenient fiction, which falsifies the chronological significance of the material in question, arbitrarily cutting it off from the past which preceded it and the future which followed it? My answer is that these objections are valid. Periodization is mainly a convenient fiction, and the study could have begun or ended at different points in time. But even so, if we look closely at what people wrote and said when they entered the terrain of ideal politics, if we look at how frequently they entered that terrain during the first seven decades

of the century, if we look at the patterns of expression and ideation that developed over those seven decades, and if we look at the significance of what they were saying and doing, we find that for all its connections with the past and the future, the period from 1603 to 1670 constitutes a unique epoch, in which literature and utopian politics conjoin in ways both unprecedented and never again repeated.

(2) However, even if we settle on the exceptional character of English history in the seventeenth century – England being in fact the only Western nation where such an explosion of utopian writing occurred (although there are, to be sure, occurrences of utopian speculation in Italy, the Low Countries, Bohemia, and France), not to mention the only one to experience something like a revolution – it is also an assumption of this study that *the phenomenon of utopian subjectivity in seventeenth-century England needs to be understood within the context of the general structure of Western modernity*. It is one of the lamentable side-effects of revisionist versions of English history and even of many of the recent studies in early modern English literary studies that English experience has been cut off from the rest of the world. In spite of the recent growth of early modern cultural studies, work on the English experience is still insular: we study early modern England as if its own rhetoric of nationhood was wholly reliable, and England was indeed a “world apart.” I cannot adequately remedy the situation here; space is limited and even if it were not I am not sufficiently equipped to do the job. But there are occasions when I follow the thread of England’s ideal politics abroad both to the Continent and to America. And throughout, I am trying to place the utopian subjectivities of seventeenth-century England in a context at once historical and theoretical which embraces not just England but Europe and the North Atlantic world: the context of what historians, sociologists, and theoreticians loosely term “modernization.” The history of ideal politics and utopian mastery in seventeenth-century England is a chapter in the history of modernization. This is true both in a political and a phenomenological as well as a literary sense. Though the continuities in English life between the Stuart accession and the Stuart Restoration are not to be underestimated, there are decisive changes in the political and social mentalities of England during this period, as absolutism gives way, under duress, to more democratic, rationalizing impulses. The experiences of colonial experimentation, of religious struggle, of civil war and revolution, and of scientific and literary innovation all have a decisive impact on the mentalities of the peoples of England. Indeed, it is a hallmark of the world of the Restoration, whose differences from earlier

periods in the realm of expression are so obvious to literary and cultural if not to social and political historians, that leading intellectuals argue again and again among themselves how best to assimilate the innovations of the previous decades while avoiding their socially subversive and culturally destructive effects – in the interest of consolidating and safeguarding the very processes of modernization current in the century that might otherwise threaten the social order.

Modernization *per se* was not of course an idea with which anyone of the period could have been familiar, although by the end of the century a commonplace of literary life was, as Swift among others put it, “the war between the ancients and the moderns.” Modernization is a term of art adopted by twentieth-century sociologists. For most of the seventeenth century, as I will emphasize, following a line of thought first proposed by J. B. Bury, the idea of progress and indeed of the possibility of something like progress – the idea of a linear entry into a world of modernity – is only first being born, and only slowly being absorbed into the mainstream of intellectual life.¹² But modernization is a decisive aspect of the literary and political history this study will discuss, especially regarding that expressive threshold of utopian mastery to which I have been calling the reader’s attention. The impulse to join together the eye and the I, to exert a mastery over a world of one’s own invention, to assert at once the originary power of the self and the new look of the rationalized society the self is capable of imagining – what else is this but a paradigmatic structure of modern subjectivity? It is paradigmatic for that “Dialectic of Enlightenment” of which Horkheimer and Adorno speak, and whose applicability to seventeenth-century utopics Holstun has brilliantly discussed. It is paradigmatic for the structure of Cartesian speculation, which, as I will begin to show, is so pervasive in the utopics of the seventeenth century, a structure at the foundation of Heidegger’s invention of subjecthood, of Blumenberg’s philosophical self-assertion or, more sinisterly, of what Jürgen Habermas calls modernity’s mistaken “subject-centered reason,” and what Stephen Toulmin frames as the oppressive of rationality of the Cartesian “Cosmopolis.”¹³ And it is paradigmatic, too, more happily, of that foundationalism that lies at the heart of all successful modern revolutions, including the American Revolution, the charterism whose dignity Hannah Arendt perhaps most convincingly extolled.¹⁴ It is paradigmatic of that dream that only the decline of modernity and the onset of postmodernity has apparently put to rest – the dream that humankind, through an act of self-assertion, in the exercise of reason and imagination, can recreate the conditions

of its world order, and establish in reality what Kant called humanity's objective yet unpracticed "realm of ends."

At this point, the reader may be impelled to object, it is too paradigmatic. But modernity, as Habermas argues, is "a bundle of processes that are cumulative and mutually reinforcing": "the formation of capital and the mobilization of resources," "the development of the forces of production and the increase in the productivity of labor," "the establishment of centralized political power and the formation of national identities," "the proliferation of rights of political participation," "the secularization of values and norms."¹⁵ The joining together of the eye and the I in exertion of utopian masteries – masteries that reproduce realms of ideal politics that eventually foment an ideology of social, scientific, and technological progress – is one of those processes as well. At the very least, it is one of the processes through which the bundles of modernity, as it were, are formulated and encouraged in the seventeenth century. The utopists of the period are concerned with capital formation, with the productivity of labor, with the proliferations of rights, and so on; for want of a suitable language of modernization, indeed, they turn to the language of ideal politics and utopian mastery in order to articulate concerns like these, which are otherwise difficult to imagine and express. Utopian discourse in this period is itself one of the period's primary discourses of modernity. As such, moreover, it exemplifies still another characteristic of what Habermas calls "the highly *ambivalent* content of cultural and social modernity," with its inevitable fusion of "emancipatory-reconciling" and "repressive-alienating" drives.¹⁶ The utopian visions of seventeenth-century writers both liberate and repress, both reconcile and alienate: they try to articulate systems of sociality through which individuals may become more free, but they do so by imagining social totalities through which freedom itself becomes an object of disciplinary supervision; they try to articulate systems through which individuals may be more united with one another, but they do so by imagining totalities where stratification is all the more rigidly encoded. Or again, conversely (because we need to be aware of this ambivalent envisionment as a positive force of progress as well as a negative force of devolution), the beginning of these acts, even if it entails an invocation of a new disciplining of political subjects, also empowers the beginners, broadening the range of the political imaginary at their command; even as it alienates, it also liberates: it makes the beginners of utopian speculation utopian masters, the foundrymen of an imaginary but nevertheless significant political and social world.

What follows, then, is not the history of a form of writing but the history of a discourse. What follows is a study not of the permutations of a literary tradition but of the articulations of a permutating impulse. It is an impulse through which political mentalities are modernized, but only to ambivalent effect. It is an impulse whose expression puts us in contact with sometimes inspiring and sometimes frightening wills-to-power that lie at the core of much that has been constructive in the development of Western modernity as well as of much that has been destructive. Considered locally, in the context of the English state and its early colonies, it is an impulse that motivated both the efflorescence of absolutism early in the seventeenth century and the outbreak of civil war and revolution in the middle of the century, not to mention what was in effect the domestication and aestheticization of utopian hope in the more realistic, politically oppressive age of the Restoration. The rise and decline of this impulse, the discourses through which it found expression, and the hopes it registered and invented are what I now proceed to document, from decade to decade, beginning with the surprising circumstances of the accession of James I.

CHAPTER I

The look of power

I. NEW BEGINNINGS, 1603

Shortly after the failure of the Essex Rebellion of 1601, James VI of Scotland sent his two best political operatives on the long road back to London, charging them to try to repair the damage the Rebellion might have done to his chances for succeeding to the English throne. James himself may have been involved in the Rebellion, which Essex had led in part in order to assure that a Protestant partisan like James would inherit the crown; James had been in contact with Essex about this for some time. But whether or not James had a hand in it – England’s last feudal “rising” in the opinion of many historians – the Rebellion’s failure made him afraid for his chances for succession, and worried about the country’s stability as a whole. So he decided to take action. He was determined to redouble his agents’ efforts at intelligence-gathering and diplomacy, while continuing to try to lobby the Queen. And he was also ready to instigate a number of conspiratorial motions and wrest control of England without the Queen’s blessings, by extra-legal means if necessary. “Find out,” he told the Earl of Mar and Edward Bruce, in secret correspondence,

with which of two sorts of discontentment the people are presently possessed: whether it be only against the present rulers in the court (keeping always that due reservation of love and reverence to the Queen which they were ever wont to do), or [whether] the discontentment be grown to that height that they are not able any longer to comport either with prince or state . . .¹

Next, he says, assuming that “the people” are still loyal to Elizabeth, attempts should be made to get her public support and have her declare him her successor; and barring that, to enter into “private negotiation with the country”:

first, to obtain all the certainty ye can of the town of London that in the due time they will favour the right; next, to renew and confirm your acquaintance

with the Lieutenant of the Tower; thirdly to obtain as great a certainty as ye can of the fleet by means of [Lord Thomas Howard] and of some seaports; fourthly to secure the hearts of as many noblemen and knights as ye can get dealing with and to be resolved what every one of their parts shall be at that great day; fifthly, to foresee anent armour for every shire, that against that day my enemies have not the whole commandment of the armour and my friends only be unarmed; sixthly, that . . . ye may distribute good seminaries through every shire that may never leave harvest till the day of reaping come; and generally to leave all things in such certainty and order as the enemies be not able in the meantime to lay such bars in my way as shall make things remediless when the time shall come. (175–76)

While still hoping to accede to the throne by simple nomination, in other words, James was planning to wrest control of England by mounting a *coup d'état* if necessary. He wanted the support of the mayor and aldermen of London, and the “hearts” of the country gentry, their affection secured by bribes, if necessary; but he also wanted to secure the Tower and the militia it controlled, as well as the navy at various ports and the garrisons scattered through the country. If the nation would not be given to him, he wanted to be able to take it – not by violence so much as by a methodical appropriation of the instruments of state, including its instruments of legal violence.

As it happened, James’s preparations would turn out to be unnecessary, since within weeks Robert Cecil, Elizabeth’s chief counselor, volunteered his support for James and began putting into operation a surer scheme for James’s accession than Mar and Bruce could have effected on their own.² When James came to throne on 24 March 1603 (new style) the transition of power went smoothly; indeed it has long been seen as one of the most peaceful and efficient changes of dynasty in early modern English history. “If ever,” wrote S. R. Gardiner, in a verdict that has seldom been challenged, “there was an act in which the nation was unanimous, it was the welcome with which the accession of the new sovereign was greeted.”³ Within hours after Elizabeth’s death the queen’s Privy Council proclaimed James the new king and sent instructions to magistrates throughout the country to keep to their posts, proclaim the king, and stifle dissent.⁴ The Council’s official representative Sir Robert Carey led a mass scramble into Scotland which has taken on the quality of a national legend, a race to be the first Englishman to tell James the news. Within a matter of days, governing bodies and officials throughout the nation had publicly accepted James as the new sovereign by proclamation; James had been reached – nearly

mobbed – at Edinburgh; a paramilitary retinue had gathered around him, and the monarch was making his official entry across the border into England. A contemporary report put the early sequence of events in this way:

Thursday the 24th of March, some two houres after midnight, departed the spirit of that great Princesse [Elizabeth], from the prison of her weake body, which now sleepes in the sepulchre of her Grandfather. The Councell of State, and the Nobilitie, on whom the care of all the country chiefly depended, immediately assembling together (no doubt assisted with the spirit of truth), considering the infallible right of our Sovereigne Lord King James, tooke such order that the newes of the Queene's death should no sooner be spread, to deject the hearts of the people, but at the instant they should be comforted with the proclaiming of the King.

Being heron determined, Sir Robert Carey tooke his journey in post towards Scotland, to signifie to the King's majestie the sad tidings of his Royall sister's death, and the joyfull hearts of his subjects, that expected no comfort but in and by his Majesties's blessed government. This noble Gentleman's care was such, that he intermitted no time; but notwithstanding his sundry shift of horses, and some falles that bruised him very sore, he by the way proclaimed the King at Morpeth and Alnwick. And on Saturday, comming to Barwick [Berwick], acquainting his worthy brother Sir John Carey how all things stood, poasted on to Edenburgh, where he attained that night, having ridden neare 300 miles.⁵

Eight days later (6 April) James made his way from Edinburgh into England at Berwick, attended by a large retinue of English and Scottish soldiers, officials, and other dignitaries. "Happy day," our chronicler goes on to say, "when peaceably so many warlike English gentlemen went to bring in an English and Scottish King, both included in one person . . . But the King of Peace have glory, that so peaceably hath ordained a King decended from the Royall Blood of either Nation . . ." (62–63).

James himself would remember the occasion of his entry into England and the festivities accompanying his progress to London as a nearly mystical event, where the nation received him as if its lawful husband. In his speech to open Parliament eleven months later, speaking politically with a certain agenda in mind, to be sure, but also no doubt sincerely, he said,

Can I ever be able . . . to forget your unexpected readinesse and alacritie, your ever memorable resolution, and your most wonderfull conjunction and harmonie of your hearts in declaring and embracing mee as your undoubted and lawfull King and Governour? Or shall it ever bee blotted out of my minde, how at my first entrie into this Kingdome, the people of all sorts rid and ran, nay rather flew to meet mee? their eyes flaming nothing but sparkles of affection, their mouthes and tongues uttering nothing but sounds of joy, their hands, feete,

and all the rest of their members in their gestures discoursing a passionate longing, and earnestnesse to meete and embrace their new Sovereigne. *Quid ergo retribuam?*⁶

The language of love would be repeated often in association with James's accession; it would be connected both to the fusion of the nation with its newly proclaimed king and to the unification of the nation with itself. James would be figured as a mender of broken hearts, as a maker of "harmonie" among the "hearts" of the country, and, with flagrant eroticism, as a groom being passionately adored and received by his bride, the English nation. "We / Do Make thee King of our affection, / King of our love: a passion born more free, / And most unsubject to dominion," Samuel Daniel wrote in his "Panegyric to the King."⁷ "Such a fire of love was kindled in every brest," Thomas Dekker would write on the subject of the king's formal entry into London the following year – even the breasts of "little children."⁸ "See how all harts ar heald, that erst were maymed," Sir John Harington wrote in his "Welcome to the King."⁹ During the course of James's progress through London James would be compared to a wide array of more or less eroticized allegorical figures, and his erotic attractions and energies associated with a variety of utopian idealizations of the body politic. He would be imagined as a reincarnation of the nation's legendary founder, the Trojan Brutus, returned to re-inseminate the nation; he would be hailed as a "broade spreading tree" of majestic peace, at once verdant, virile, fertile, and protective; he would be spoken of as a new Phoenix, bringing the state to life out of the ashes of Elizabeth's death; he would be allegorized as a new Caesar Augustus, bringing empire and peace, and as a new Solomon, bringing wisdom, justice, and benign paternalism; he would be figured as a new (masculinized) Astraea, God of Justice (Elizabeth had been the properly feminine Astraea); as a restorer of order over the old world and the new, the whole *orbis terrarum*; and as the bearer, by divine Providence, of "the golden Age Restor'd."¹⁰ The similitude of romantic love, of the healed heart and the passionate embrace, of familial domestic peace and seed-bearing masculine sexuality, is seldom far from the surface of the language of James's entry. "Let ignorance know, great King," says the figure of Electra in Jonson's concluding speech for the progress,

this day is thine,
And doth admit no night: but all do shine,
As well nocturnal as diurnal fires,
To add unto the flame of our desires . . .¹¹

Even James's first Parliament adopted the language of love. "The true cause," the Commons submitted to James in its "Apology" of 1604, "of our extraordinary great cheerfulness and joy in performing that day's duty [of accepting your accession] was the great and extraordinary love which we bare towards your majesty's most royal and renowned person and a longing thirst to enjoy the happy fruits of your most wise, religious, just, virtuous, and gracious heart."¹²

The language of love played an integral part in what may perhaps best be thought of as the "social drama" that the citizens of England performed on the occasion of James's accession.¹³ Faced with the death of the queen who had ruled the country successfully for over four decades, the citizens of England performed a sequence of more or less improvised ceremonies and rituals, which mediated the transition of government and revived the relations of power through which the new government would operate: the proclamations, the race to Scotland, the royal entry, the progresses, the panegyrics, the coronation ceremony, the masques, the pageant through London, the summoning and opening of Parliament. The language of love expressed the willingness of English citizens to participate in the drama and accept the drama's ramifications; it betokened unanimous consent. Since the English had not yet adopted a constitutionally or otherwise legally sanctioned mechanism for the transition of power, apart from the delivering of an "Oath of Coronation" which itself had already been relegated by legal convention to a subordinate role in the mechanisms of sovereignty, the subjects of English government were obliged to improvise a performance which would behaviorally (rather than merely legally) enact, confirm, and consolidate the change of government.¹⁴ There was no other method of succession available to them, and if enough subjects of sufficient means and will had not been able to carry off their performance the nation might have been faced, as it had been during the dynastic wars of the fifteenth century, with the problem of an inadequately legitimated king, vulnerable to popular challenge. The social drama they performed overcame the possibility of contention by a kind of deliberate behavioral and semiotic excess. The language of love was no less a traditional part of the rituals of power than the poetic and rhetorical forms through which it was expressed; but like other discourses surrounding the accession, it was excessively elaborated and recited, excessively appealed to as a grounds for re-imagining the will of the state, as if it might transform the hard facts of James's rise to power into an unopposable "outpouring" of the body politic as a whole.

But the language of love is of course ambiguous, and – although this has probably not been sufficiently observed by political historians – the consent and the unanimity it signified was ambiguous as well. In the hands of the Parliamentarians, as also perhaps in the hands of ambitious court-poets like Samuel Daniel and John Harington, the language of love was used not only to express fusion and consolidation but also to mark a distinction, a separation of powers. The love the Commons bore for James, they were declaring, was freely given; it was bestowed as if it were the passion motivating a marriage contract. If disappointed in its hopes the Commons might as a result be less forthcoming in its relation to the king.¹⁵ “Now concerning the ancient right of the subjects of this realm,” the “Apology of the Commons” goes on to say, immediately after having declared its “great and extraordinary love” for James, “. . . the misinformation openly delivered to your majesty hath been in three things: first, that we hold not our privileges of right, but of grace only, renewed every parliament by way of donative upon petition, and so to be limited; secondly, that we are no court of record, etc. . . .”¹⁶ The waspish tone of the Commons’s language betrays the fact that in expressing love for the king, even a “passionate longing” for him, a number of James’s new subjects were also communicating that they expected something in return.

In a satiric vein, Dekker gave still another interpretation of passionate longing of the people for James and the utopian visions his accession seemed to summon. “Now dooes fresh blood,” Dekker writes,

leap into the cheekes of the Courtier: the Souldier now hangs up his armor and is glad that he shall feede upon the blessed fruits of peace: the Scholler sings Hymnes in honor of the Muses, assuring himselfe now that *Helicon* will be kept pure, because *Apollo* himselfe drinkes of it. Now the thriftie Citizen casts beyond the Moone and seeing the golden age returned into the world againe, resolves to worship no Saint but money. Trades that lay dead & rotten, and were in all mens opinion utterly dambd, started out of their trance, as though they had drunke of *Aqua Caelestis*, or Unicornes horne, and swore to fall to their olde occupation.

Going on to list the sudden wild ambitions of tailors, shopkeepers, blacksmiths, players, tobacconists, and tavern-keepers, he concludes, “*London* was never in the high way to preferment till now.” Preferment, profit, status, protection – that is what it was all about, on this reading, all the hyperbole, the celebrations, the “sparkles of affection,” the “fire of love.” In 1603 it was still true that the monarch had it in his power to make

or break a man's fortune overnight. For a number of subjects, whether aristocrats, country gentlemen, soldiers, scholars, merchants, or "projectors," James's accession seemed to represent an opening of opportunities; it inspired a renewal of wild hopes that under Elizabeth had been "utterly dambd." Monopolists and would-be monopolists looked for the awarding of new charters and grants; importers, exporters, and manufacturers looked for new trade regulations and pricing policies, the awarding of new licenses, and the abolition or at least the curtailment of monopolies; families among the middle gentry – hundreds of them, in fact – looked for nomination to the peerage, and the social status and privileges that entailed; men of letters, both University Wits and self-taught men like Ben Jonson, looked for a new outpouring of patronage, and a new state-sanctioned respect for the Muses. Reform-minded clerics, though Dekker significantly fails to mention them, looked for changes in the management and practices of the Church, as expressed for example in their "Millenary Petition," to which over a thousand clergymen were said to subscribe, and to which over seven hundred individuals did in fact subscribe.¹⁷ Members of the House of Commons, more politically and vaguely, were content to allude, as cited above, to their "longing thirst to enjoy the happy fruits of your most wise, religious, just, virtuous, and gracious heart."

But beneath the consensual and opportunistic longings of James's new subjects, there was yet another reality, which brought with it still another valence to the love of the people for the sovereign. This was the reality of subjection, brought on by the legal, theoretical, and political complexities of James's succession and the combination of *Realpolitik* and idealized absolutism that James and his allies used to overcome them. We have already seen some aspects of this other reality in James's preparations to take England by an armed but hopefully unopposed *coup d'état* and in the swift action taken by the Council of State meeting the night of Elizabeth's death to put James's accession into motion. The crown was not only given to James; it was also taken. "I am the Husband, and the whole isle is my lawfull Wife," James said in the most famous words of his opening speech to Parliament of 1604. "I am the Head, and it is my Body," he added, characteristically giving in to the excessiveness of the political language of the moment; "I am the shepherd, and it is my flocke."¹⁸ If James put himself forward as someone who had received the spontaneous love of his subjects, and who therefore owed them loving kindness in return ("*Quid ergo retribuam?*"), he also emphasized that his solicitude toward his subjects derived first of all from the interest he had

in them as a possessor toward his possessions – as a husband toward a wife, a head toward a body, or a shepherd toward his flock.¹⁹ James had theoretically assumed possession of the English nation, and indeed over the whole isle of what he was beginning to promote, in another innovation, as the united kingdom of Great Britain.²⁰ He had seized the nation – by right, by arrangement with the ruling elite of Elizabeth's government, and unopposed; but he had first of all seized it, appropriated and quasi-erotically enthralled it.

It bears noting that even with the assistance of Robert Cecil and his colleagues (among them, as it will be important to remember later on, Francis Bacon) and even in spite of his grandiose political theories, James's openly legal claims to the English throne were uncertain.²¹ Although his genealogical descent from Henry Tudor was clear, his accession could only be effected in direct contradiction to statutory law and royal proclamation, which expressly favored another family and forbade the Stuart line from assuming the English throne. James's accession, moreover, was held by a number of legal scholars to be in violation of common law, which prohibited foreigners from inheriting property in England. In order for James to come into power a number of conventions and legal niceties had to be circumvented; and the accession itself had to be orchestrated in such a way that James would immediately receive not only the longing of his subjects, but also the tools for enforcing their obedience. Challenges from other pretenders to the throne (there were at least eleven of them, and two of them, the Earl of Suffolk and the Spanish Infanta, had significant followings) had to be thwarted. The instruments of power – legal and extra-legal, non-violent and violent – had to be appropriated. It was not enough that power be transferred; before it could be transferred it had to have been already pre-empted. That James had a few years before developed a political theory that justified and explained the pre-emption of power upon which his accession was based, a theory of divine right absolutism which was already gaining in currency among the ruling elite in England even before the publication of James's *Basilikon Doron* and *The Trew Law of Free Monarchies* made it into a quasi-official doctrine, was a help both to the advance party led by Cecil and the multitude who decided to give their "heart and voice" (as the expression went) to the accession.²² But the social drama that was performed, complex and polysemous as its language and performance may have been, was first of all orchestrated and initiated by a ruling elite which had already pre-empted the instruments of government in the first act and scene of the drama.

Recall the words of the chronicler: "The Councell of State, and the Nobilitie, on whom the care of all the country chiefly depended, immediately assembling together (no doubt assisted with the spirit of truth), considering the infallible right of our Sovereigne Lord King James, tooke such order . . ." The language the chronicler uses here deliberately smothers the possibility of dissent; it at once nullifies legitimate theoretical difficulties ("the spirit of truth," "the infallible right") and promotes its subjects ("The Councell of State, and the Nobilitie, on whom the care of all the country chiefly depended") to a position of authority that they did not in fact legally possess.²³ The language, moreover, deliberately places "the country" under "the care" of its power elite. "[T]he hearts of the people . . . should be comforted with the proclaiming of the King," the elite decides. If the affection of the people is what is at stake, it is a deliberately feminized affection, commanded from above. The first thing the assembled councilors and lords are establishing as they proclaim the king is their own authority to assume "the care of all the country" and take whatever measures are necessary for conserving it. The second thing they are establishing is their determination to use that authority to put the country in the hands of the sovereign whom they have themselves hand-picked, although in doing so they are subsuming themselves under a principle of sovereignty that allegedly transcends them and legitimates their behavior from above.

This is the principle of "free monarchy," as James was calling it, where the king knows himself to be divinely "ordained for them [his people] and they not for him," and kings are "the authours and makers of the Lawes, and not the Lawes of the kings."²⁴ It is also a principle of what the members of Cecil's party were identifying as a "reason of state" or "intent of the state," which they were communicating through the performance of various partly improvised rituals of power. "Notwithstanding his sundry shift of horses, and some falles that bruised him very sore," as well as his haste, the chronicler takes care to mention, Sir Robert Carey, representing the Council of State, took the time to proclaim the king at Morpeth and Alnwick, and then to confer with his brother at Berwick, and inform him "how all things stood." The brother, Sir John Carey, the chronicle goes on to say,

who, like a worthy Souldier and politicke Statesman, considering [Berwick] was a towne of great import, and a place of warre . . . caused all the Garrison to be summoned together, as also the Mayor, Aldermane, and Burgesses, in whose presence he made a short and pithie Oration, including her Majesties's death, and signifying the intent of the State, for submitting to their lawfull Lord . . . (36)

The brothers, the one a representative of the late queen's Privy Council, the other a provincial Lieutenant Governor, shared a sense that the country was in a state of emergency, which it was their responsibility to control. It was urgent that the king be *proclaimed*, not only in London but everywhere possible, as soon as possible, even if it meant that Sir Robert had to pause several times while on his hasty mission to Scotland. It was equally urgent at Berwick, it being "a towne of great import, and a place of warre," that Sir John take command of the situation, the "worthy souldier and politicke Statesman" that he was, and make it understood "how all things stood." Sir John called together the three pre-eminent representatives of power in the district, and comported himself before them with an improvised formality that succeeded in commanding a kind of social compact from above. In a "pithie Oration," he signified "the intent of the State" – not his own intent, nor indeed the intent of any person or party in particular, but the intent "of the State," and ceremonially demanded that all of them publicly declare their acquiescence to it and "submit" to "their lawfull Lord." He was demanding what amounted to an old-fashioned pledge of fealty, following the traditional form of exacting such a pledge, but he was demanding it in the name of the impersonal power of "the State," bearer of an impersonal "intent," although the intent derived from the decision of a small party of councilors and representatives of the House of Lords.

That decision itself, though politic, was legally arbitrary and theoretically presumptive, an act of *force majeure*. The language of the original proclamation issued by the Council of State, which had been prepared in advance by Cecil and authorized by James (Bacon had prepared an alternative proclamation which was less strident and revealing) inadvertently betrays the transgressiveness of the decision to install James on the throne.²⁵ The document, whose intent the Carey brothers were urgently communicating northward, was as marked by rhetorical excess as any text connected with James's accession. From phrase to phrase and from clause to clause it betrayed the anxieties and doubts of the men who issued it no less than it advertised their resolve to appropriate and manage their reason of state.

We do now, hereby [it declares] with one full assent and consent of tongue and heart, publish and proclaim, that the high and mighty James the Sixth, King of Scotland, is now, by the death of our late Sovereign, Queen of England, of famous memory, become our only lawful, lineal, and rightful liege Lord, James the first, King of England, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith; to whom, as to our only just Prince, adorned (besides his undoubted right) with

all the rarest gifts of mind and body, to the infinite comfort of all his people and subjects, who shall live under him, we acknowledge all faith and constant obedience, with all hearty and humble affections, both during our natural lives for ourselves, and in behalf of our posterity: hereby protesting and declaring to all persons whatsoever, that, in this just and lawful act of ours, we are resolved . . .

The language of the proclamation duplicates the copious cautions of a legal deed (“One full assent and consent of tongue and heart,” “publish and proclaim,” “our only lawful, lineal, and rightful liege Lord”) but its double and triple formulas are intended to forestall the contradictions and inconsistencies inherent in what was in fact an extra-legal procedure. A “just” act is not necessarily a “lawful” one; a lawful act need not necessarily be just; but the proclamation is both at once. “Humble affection,” signifying submission, need not also be “hearty,” a term which signifies active choice; but theirs, again, is both at once. “Assent” and “consent,” amount to two different kinds of acts, one passive, one active; “faith” and “obedience” need not coincide. Most importantly, although the idea is embedded within a frame of qualifications so large that its special import could easily be overlooked, a “lawful” Lord, a “lineal” Lord, and a “rightful” Lord are actually three different things. And again, any of these three claims, taken separately, was subject to challenge.

When the council members finally certify what in the case of a legal and rightful transfer of power should have needed no certification, their own legitimacy as the authors of the proclamation, they betray the difficulties of their position by appealing to extra-legal qualifications, to “conscience,” “zeal,” “certain knowledge,” self-sacrifice, and “blood”:

in this just and lawful act of ours, we are resolved, by the favour of God’s holy assistance, and in the zeal of our conscience (warranted by certain knowledge of his undoubted right, as has been said before), to maintain and uphold his Majesty’s person and estate, as our only undoubted Sovereign Lord and King, with the sacrifice of our lives, lands, goods, friends, and adherents . . . to stand to the last drop of our blood. (28–29)

“God’s holy assistance,” the “zeal of our conscience,” and the resources of bloody warfare join together to certify not only the claim of James to the throne, but the claim of the claimers, the authors of a self-proclaimed “intent of the state,” to certify James’s “right.”²⁶ A type of armed, conscience-ratified, Calvinist providentialism, which corresponds with James’s published principles, ultimately takes the place of legal doctrine, and is used both to alter and to authenticate legal procedures.²⁷ Since it was acting on its own authority, although by tradition it had none, and

it could not as yet be so certain of the “hearts” of the people, “the Councill of State and the Nobilitie” perhaps had no choice but to assert their hegemony by right of divine sanction and the pledge of violence; but their language and conduct on the occasion was also a reflection of that larger reality of the “intent of the state” which James’s accession brought to the center of English political life. For despite all the rhetoric and ceremonial behavior that was used to disguise, naturalize, or displace it, and that quickly congealed into a myth of national unanimity, James’s accession was not only an act of peaceful succession; it was also an act of conquest, which brought with it a refashioning of many of the rules, aims, concepts, and socio-economic bases of political life, and a whole new “look of power” – a whole new set of specular conditions under which power might be imagined, arrogated, contested, and deployed. A look of power deriving from Tudor conventions but also supplanting them, which put the monarch at the center of the imaginary of the state and then identified the “intent” of one with the “intent” of the other. A look of power which established a politics of sublimity where the monarch and the state alike were elevated to the status of unobtainable objects of desire, the desideratum of the self-nominated political constituency. But a look of power, at the same time, where the monarch and “the state” were the ones who were doing the looking and emanating political desire. And a look of power in keeping with which the monarch and his ruling elite were laying claim to the rhetoric of political idealism, appropriating a discourse of ideal politics and its utopian implications. “The state” was being conquered by its own consent, for its own good, in keeping with its own aspirations; it was being transformed into what court mythology could now show to be what it had always intended to become. And in doing so, it was finding its own golden age to have been restored, “now in the end and fullnesse of time,” as James was to put it.²⁸ Political imperfection had come to an end. Perfection alone was to be raised to the level of discursive visibility; perfection alone was to be *seen*, and perfection alone was accorded the vantage point of *seeing*.

“His light sciential is,” as Jonson would have it reported of James in his first court masque, *The Masque of Blackness* of 1605. Past “mere nature,” it could “salve the rude defects of every creature.”²⁹ Great Britain, the new geopolitical creature invented with the ascension of James, “*A world divided from the world*,” is “Ruled by a sun that to this height doth grace it, / Whose beams shine day and night.” It comes as the fulfillment of a historical destiny, which is at once the reawakening of an “ancient dignity” and an innovative solution to a vexing problem. It comes as the

satisfaction of an eroticized longing, which finds expression in “sounds of joy,” the music of the dance (“*Here Tritons sounded*,” Jonson writes), and in the dance itself, “their hands, feete, and all the rest of their members in their gestures discoursing a passionate longing.” So “*they danced on shore*,” Jonson continues, “*every couple as they advanced severally presenting their fans, in one of which were inscribed their mixed names, in the other a mute hieroglyphic expressing their mixed qualities*” (235–39).³⁰ The king presides over these “mixed qualities.” He makes them whole. The golden age is finally restored: but only so far as the kingdom keeps dancing, and the king’s pleasure remains (as in the case of the Ethiopian princesses) their predominant object of desire.

2. THE COLUMBUS TOPOS: HOW TO HOPE

Meanwhile, far away from the court, in a work of fiction published in 1605, we hear from another kind of aspirant, speaking from what appears to be a rival outlook. The narrator of the fiction, Joseph Hall’s *Mundus Alter et Idem* (1605), recounts a conversation he had with a Frenchman, Peter Beroaldus, who was complaining about limits – the limits of his experience as a man of culture, the problems he has faced in trying to overcome those limits and experience the new, the “hard,” the “noble,” and in fact even to “travel,” to pass beyond sameness of life one finds throughout Europe and discover something truly different. “Really,” Beroaldus says,

I do not know what it means to travel. For if I were to cross the border of my native land to tread on your neighboring land, or to cross some narrow strait or river (for example the Rhine, or the Tweed), I would receive the name of “traveler” according to popular opinion. Yet one enjoys the same sky, the same stars, and scarcely even notices a change of soil. I do not see what is hard or noble about that.³¹

Beroaldus feels himself impelled to some sort of “heroic venture . . . one that will astonish this age and will make posterity always recall my memory with gratitude” (11). He gives the proper name of “traveler” only to men like Drake, Cavendish, Columbus, and Pizarro, to men “who either discovered new worlds by dangerous investigation or settled such discoveries” (11). And so Beroaldus has a scheme:

It has always disturbed me [he says], to meet constantly with *Terra Australis Incognita* on geographical maps, and indeed is there anyone who is not completely senseless who would read this without some silent indignation? For if they know it to be a *continent*, and a *southern* one, how can they then call it *unknown*? And if it

be unknown, why have all the geographers described the form and the location to me? They are idle men who can say it to be thus and still claim not to know it themselves! And finally, who will not be vexed to remain ignorant of that which it is profitable for us to know? (12)

Beroaldus is determined to go on an adventure to this unknown land, and to take his friends along with him, and he refuses to be deterred by unknown dangers – by the possibility, say, that monsters inhabit it.

We must certainly dare [he says], and certainly hope. Those apparitions of danger may frighten weak minds, but they serve to excite bolder spirits: for if fears were taken into account, no one would know any part of a country, or of a city, or even of a house except his own. It was for this one reason that that American continent was so long hidden, and moreover I believe it would still be hidden today had God himself not lately sent us a dove from heaven, who, plucking an olive branch from this land, taught us that there still remains some land left that is insufficiently concealed by the waves; ought not his name inherit perpetual fame and holiness from the thanks of his successors? Indeed, as long as there is an earth, likenesses of him will be circulated, which we will gaze upon, not without a certain reverence and astonishment. Nor, truthfully, does it sound to me any less honorific to be called *Discoverer of the New World* than to be called *conqueror*. Why shouldn't we win the same success and the same glory? Moreover, the famous and often repeated prophecy of the tragedian Seneca does not a little excite my mind, a prophecy which now rests to be fulfilled by us:

Time will come

After a long span of years, when the Ocean

Will relax the bonds of circumstances

And reveal a great continent. (14)

Beroaldus is an early and brilliant appearance of a figure that will show up often in seventeenth-century literature, an incarnation of what I will call the “Columbus topos.” He is a burlesque of that figure, as it happens, although the unsuspecting reader may not realize this at first. *Mundus Alter et Idem* unfolds into a sour critique of the world-conquering mentality and the utopian illusions motivating it. There is nothing worth discovering in the Terra Australis that the narrator of the fiction, “Mercurius Britannicus,” eventually visits, and nothing worth conquering. All one finds in the southernmost part of the world, the Terra Australis Incognita, the Antarctica of fable, are mirror images and exaggerations of the moral deformities prevalent in one's own society back home; and there is neither material success nor glory to be gained for one's troubles. In “Crapulia” the traveler encounters a land of joyless gluttony and dipsomania; in “Viraginia” he discovers a province ruled by lamentably unruly women;

in “Moronia” he journeys through a land of miscellaneous foolishness, from the institutions of Roman Catholicism to the projections of proto-capitalist schemers and would-be natural scientists, all of whom are ensnared in logical contradictions; in “Lavernia” he visits a land of unheroic thieves.³² At the end of thirty years, having “gazed upon,” having been “astonished at,” and having “laughed at” Terra Australis, “weakened by so much labor of traveling,” as he tells us, the narrator simply goes home (117). But it is one of the hallmarks of the Columbus topos in seventeenth-century England that the figure is contestable; it can be a sign either of precocious courage or, as in Hall, of foolish and pointless audacity; a reminder either that “we must certainly dare, and certainly hope,” or that the age of heroic enormity is permanently over, and the ambitious explorers and conquistadors of the day are condemned to the frustrations of belatedness. “Be careful, Beroaldus,” Hall has one of Beroaldus’s interlocutors interject, “when you erect so lofty a structure on so poor and slender a foundation. That Columbus of yours has fulfilled a long time ago whatever your tragic poet prophesied under divine inspiration. These are the ‘long span of years.’ It is obviously the great American continent that has emerged at this very time. What other age are you dreaming of, what other land?” (14). In point of fact, at the time that Hall’s satire appeared in print, preparations were being made for settling what would turn out to be Britain’s first successful, permanent colony in America; and within a few years one of the colony’s first officials would use the Columbus topos to justify the English colonial enterprise and appeal for public support:

O let heavy things tend to their centre; let light and ayery spiritts salute Heaven, and fly up to the circumference! That great and famous instrument of publishing the gospell and Knowledge of Christ Jesus, Christopher Columbus, as also Vesputius Americus, who (five yeares after Columbus) arrived here, gave this whole country and ymmeasurable continent . . . his own name, may teach us what progresse to make even in this glorious enterprise . . . Have we either lesse meanes, fainter spiritts, or a charity more cold, or a religion more shamefull, and afraide to delate ytself?³³

Admittedly, the author of this last quote, William Strachey, has added something to the Columbus topos which Hall has pointedly omitted, the imperative (with which the real Columbus was himself of course familiar) to propagate the Gospel. But if he had wanted to – if he had had different rhetorical ends – Strachey could just as easily have added material to the topos which would have made it into a sign for excessive

materialism, vanity, and concupiscence.³⁴ The Columbus topos was adjustable and portable, founded though it was in incontrovertible fact: that a single obscure individual had “certainly dared and certainly hoped,” and had ended up changing the world. “When all men rejected Christopher Columbus,” Captain John Smith wrote in trying to round up support for exploration and colonization, “that ever renowned Queen Izabell of Spain, could pawn her Jewels to support him; whom all the wise men (as they thought themselves) of that age contemned . . . [H]ath not England an Izabell, as well as Spain, nor yet a Columbus as well as Genoa?”³⁵

The Columbus topos was so prominent a vehicle of expression that it had a certain significance even when it was omitted, as in John Donne’s famous sermon to the Virginia company (1622), where Donne scrupulously avoided any historical references to imperialist discovery and conquest apart from those to be found in the narratives of the Old Testament. “*Wilt thou restore againe the kingdome of Israel?*” Donne says to the joint-stock holders. “No; not a temporall Kingdome; let not the riches and commodities of this World, be in your contemplation in your adventures.”³⁶

The Columbus topos was in every case, however it was inflected, positively or negatively, a vehicle for exploring the problem of hope. Was it possible to hope? And if so, for what? What was to be hoped for just then?³⁷ In his well known “Ode to the Virginia Voyage” (1606), written to mark the first of the Virginia Company’s sailings, Michael Drayton used the same rhetoric of a golden age restored that Columbus had used in his first dispatches from America, and that professional poets had for several years been applying to the reign of James I. “Ours to hold,” Drayton writes of the land about to be colonized, “VIRGINIA, / Earth’s onely paradise.”³⁸ A few years earlier, however, Francis Bacon had used the Columbus topos not to figure the hope for a return to prelapsarian innocence and leisure, but to indicate a challenge for scholars to surpass themselves, to sail beyond the Columns of Hercules of “a few received authors,” and, following upon the recent opening of “navigation and commerce,” venture upon “the further discovery of knowledge.”³⁹

The Columbus figure was a vehicle for investigating and expressing what hope might be. Hope might be the experience of primitivist yet apparently realistic longings, as in Drayton’s hopes for holding “Earth’s only paradise.” Hope might be the anticipation of an unknown yet prophetic and arduous future, as in Bacon’s hopes for the new science. Or hope might be neither the one nor the other, but rather, from another perspective, a surrender to vanity, delusion, narcissism, and greed, a turning

away from the experience of one's inherent sinfulness and weakness and from one's absolute reliance for salvation on the grace of God. At the opening of the seventeenth century hope could be any of these things and more; sometimes, as in Raleigh's simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic *History of the World*, it could be all of them at once.⁴⁰ But for whom could hope mean what it meant, or be what it was? Who had the hopes? And how especially, it might be asked, was it possible to hope, to occupy the position of a subject of hope, in a society whose authorities and orthodoxies worked militantly against the condition of worldly hopefulness? Orthodox religious teaching – the Anglican brand of Calvinism, developed as an official doctrine by the church leaders under Elizabeth and re-emphasized by James's bishops – taught that "life was necessarily imperfect," that until the Second Coming, at which time a portion of humanity would regain its felicity, humanity "was fallen, nature was harsh and this life could only offer a second-best."⁴¹ "*Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world,*" Robert Burton writes, quoting Scripture and echoing a commonplace of orthodox sermonology.⁴² At the same time, the political ideology that was crystallizing at the time of James's accession, as we have begun to see, provided a contrary, but also stultifying teaching: it taught that an age of wholeness had just been restored to England. It taught that through the agency of James, and by the grace of God, England had been perfected, and the historical destiny of the English-speaking people fulfilled. When John Donne cautioned the Virginia planters against setting their hopes on colonization simply for the sake of worldly gain, it is worth noting, he took the trouble to couple his remarks with a restatement of both sorts of teachings: in the face of redemptive expectations for the venture he urged the official anti-millenarian doctrine of the Anglican church ("It belongs not to us to know *Gods* times"); in the face of political and economic expectations he urged the restrictive idealism of absolute monarchy ("To be a *Kīng* signifies *Libertie* and *independency*, and *Supremacie*, to bee under no man, and to be a *Kīng* signifies *Abundance*, and *Omnisufficiencie*, to neede no man"). He was careful, in other words, to bind the worldly hopes of London merchants to both the otherworldly pessimism of High Church Calvinism and the ideological constraints of a sublimized state, in which only a king could "signifie . . . *Abundance*" and pretend to an autonomous political will.⁴³

But Donne was already speaking at a time when it behooved a leading churchman like himself to try to undo the significance of recent events which would ultimately contribute to the dissolution of Stuart absolutism. Earlier during James's reign, during what is commonly considered

to be the “high” period of Jacobean culture,⁴⁴ the worldly aspirations of the English people were less radically focused and less threatening to the state’s cultural integrity than those Donne seems to have divined in the ambitions of the Virginia company investors. I am not suggesting that there was no resistance to Jacobean absolutism, or that absolutism itself, in practice, was monolithic. The work of Barbara K. Lewalski on the courtly women writers of the period and of Deborah Shuger on seventeenth-century clerical writers both go to show that there were plenty of points of dispute and dissent *within* the dominant culture over which James presided.⁴⁵ Historians like Roy Strong and Malcolm Smuts, moreover, have drawn a well-documented picture of court culture in the time of James as a system based on at least three rival centers of power, divided among the king, the queen, and the Prince of Wales and their various partisans among the aristocracy, vying for patronage and privilege both at court and in the halls of Parliament whenever Parliament was in session.⁴⁶ And among the populace, moreover, there began to thrive subcultures of religious dissent with politically volatile overtones – recusants on the one side and disgruntled Puritans on the other. Whatever absolutism and its look of power may have entailed, the reach of absolutism was not totalitarian; it did not have the means (nor, really, the will either) to reach that far. But the question I am raising here has to do with the worldly *hope* that it was possible to entertain in the high period of Jacobean culture. Resistance may imply a kind of hope; but raising the issue of the existence of worldly hope in pre-modern society entails asking different kinds of issues than the hermeneutics of resistance usually require. So the question, again, is, how was it possible to *hope* in the England of James VI and I? What was it possible to hope for? And what would it mean to occupy the position of a subject of hope?

The question is raised in view of the fact of individuals’ *prospects* in early modern England. Life was short; death was ever present; scarcity and disease were recurring nightmares; if the extant medical literature is a fair indication, life was fraught as well with daily physical discomforts, indignities, and worries – many of them brought on by medical practice itself.⁴⁷ The majority of the subjects of England, moreover, were still ensnared by the rigid constraints of social hierarchy and patriarchal inheritance, as well as by the equally constraining cycles – natural and social – of a traditionally organized, albeit changing, agricultural economy.⁴⁸ Orthodox Calvinist pessimism and absolutist ideology were in this respect merely new versions of old doctrines. And they simply confirmed from above the truth that the vast majority of English subjects

suffered from below, that the prospects of life were closed rather than open – comfortably closed perhaps (it is not in any case for us to judge what we are incapable of knowing firsthand, the quality of subaltern life in a traditional society), but closed all the same, providing no *outlook* for a change in one’s material conditions, no sighting of new possibilities, of new horizons of social experience. The prospect of hope was reserved for the next world, and the next life, however close or far that next world and next life were understood to be.⁴⁹

And yet against the constraints of life, natural and cultural, political and social, secular and religious, material and mental, there was nevertheless earthly hope: hopes for physical health and comfort and pleasure, for large and small “delights,” as authors often put it; hopes for finding requited romantic love, familial affection, and social fellowship; hopes for conceiving and bearing children and raising them to adulthood; hopes for prospering within the context of what a Jacobean preacher might have called one’s *portion* or *lot* or *trade* in life (and what Joseph Hall called the necessary, limiting “circumference” of one’s “estate”). The list could go on, including all those things that individuals might reasonably want out of life, even in an age of severe material and social constraints: the pleasures of the table, of sports, of “revels”; recognition, so far as one’s talents made one recognizable; dignity, so far as one’s station allowed it; power, so far as one was capable of exercising it; love and sexual pleasure, with their many promises, joys, and disappointments; life itself, and the continuation of life, the abundance of life carrying on, propagating itself, an active process from which one could not only benefit but to which most individuals could make an active contribution. “Our hope,” the fertile scion of a family was often called; and indeed a nearly redemptive quality was often ascribed to the survival of an estate through patrilineal succession and the propagation of life under the conditions an “estate” might provide. The idea of posterity, to which we have just seen Hall’s Beroaldus somewhat comically allude, the idea that succeeding generations of men and women would remember or otherwise continue to experience the effects of the “acts and monuments” of the present generation, was only a high-minded corollary to the general appetite for contributing to the growth and sustenance of life. Increasingly, moreover, individuals were thinking about commercial, geopolitical, religious posterity, as prospects of world trade and world evangelism began to open, first on the Spanish and Portuguese, Catholic, models, and now on the Dutch model as well. Nor did individuals of the time, it appears, fail to pay their debts to the present, and attempt to extract a measure

of mental and physical well-being from the world. There was much to be done, much to be experienced, much to be conquered and acquired; there were many “pleasing beauties” (as Robert Burton once put it) to enjoy. “Care and sorowe bryngeth in age and deth,” a sixteenth-century physician wrote in a book of popular medicine; “wherefore let every man be mery.”⁵⁰

But there were limits too. A number of hopes that, say, an educated member of Christopher Hill’s “industrious sort”⁵¹ might entertain were inherently heterodox and transgressive, violating the boundaries, real or perceived, of orthodox values and the social frameworks supporting them. In the eyes of someone like Joseph Hall there were far too many of these hopes and far too many people going about trying to hope them, beginning with characters like Beroaldus and Mercurius Britannicus, who seem to have had parallels in the real world too. Transgressive hopes required the kind of daring presumption that Beroaldus is made to exemplify; and a “presumptuous man,” as Hall would put it in another work, “is nothing but hope out of his wits; a high house upon weak pillars.”⁵² Or as the similarly minded Richard Braithwaite would put it a couple of decades later, “those many projects which [the presumptuous man] hath devised, those impossible aymes he hath contrived, those ayrie Turrets he hath reared, fall in the end to nothing,” betraying nothing but “the folly of him that formed them.”⁵³ Inherently transgressive hopes called upon their subjects (however prudently or imprudently, however shrewdly or madly) to look beyond the limits of the given, to look outward and forward toward new horizons of expectation – toward what a sober-minded man like Braithwaite would regard as “impossible aymes” and “ayrie Turrets.”

Between orthodox and heterodox hope, between hoping for customary and hoping for unc customary things, there is a great qualitative and structural difference, even if the line between the two is not always distinct. It is easy to sustain an orthodox hope; it is expected; it is encouraged; it is propounded in the pulpit, recited at school, endlessly drilled into one by one’s superiors at home, prompted by popular wisdom in all the usual venues of popular wisdom, including the popular theater, and frequently promoted by political authorities in measures reckoned to be necessary to the public good.⁵⁴ It is the very lifeblood of a socio-cultural system that its members should not only obey the same laws but hope for pretty much the same things. But heterodox hope, transgressive hope – that is something different. For in the first place, it requires a kind of looking ahead, or afar, or askance; it requires the perception of an objective which

is fundamentally absent from the social world at hand, beyond the limits of what may be taken as the social and moral given. Hoping for a “great good” in the future, as the often-read humanist Platina put it, is a spur to “immoderate desire,” a spur to “unbridled cupidity” (*effrenata cupiditate*); from the point of view of the orthodoxy of moderation heterodox hope is always already a crime against reason.⁵⁵ It requires an idiosyncratic preoccupation with things beyond oneself and one’s fellows; it requires that one inhabit another kind of subjectivity, where one’s objects are absent from oneself and one’s own impulses are fundamentally strange, alien, outlandish. Imagining, desiring, willing, expecting – all these operations have to be brought together in the apprehension of new objects and objectives, and they have to be brought together in competition with the imaginations, desires, will, and expectations of the given social world and the customary hopes and pleasures of one’s peers. But how is that possible? How is it even possible to *conceptualize* this kind of behavior?

In his grand theory of utopian imagination, articulated in the three-volume *Principle of Hope*, Ernst Bloch appeals to what he calls “anticipatory consciousness,” conceived of, ingeniously, as a kind of unconscious of the future. We do not need to accept the fundamental premise of Bloch’s analysis. In fact, at this particular juncture of history it seems almost impossible to accept it. There is no compelling reason at this time to support the idea underlying Bloch’s theory that there is a type of thinking in the world, “anticipatory consciousness,” which is objectively true, since “the world-process itself is a utopian function, with the matter of the objectively possible as its substance.”⁵⁶ The teleology of both the liberal and the Marxian views of history, the Whiggish faith in the inevitability of liberal progress, the Marxian faith in the inevitability of an “objectively possible” classless society, at this point seem to have been thoroughly discredited. Moreover, as even Bloch would have agreed, one cannot simply assimilate any given instance of what looks like “anticipatory consciousness” into the unfolding of a single Consciousness. Hegel is dead and history is more complicated than that. But Bloch nevertheless points to a mode of thinking, writing, and being in the world for which his concept of “anticipatory consciousness” is phenomenologically explanatory. A consciousness not of the here and now but of that which is Not Yet and (by the same token, although Bloch unfortunately does not emphasize this) Not Here – this uncanny anticipatory consciousness is what we find figures like the Columbus topos trying to put into words. For Beroaldus the dimly perceived but urgently desired rewards of travel into Terra Incognita are a Not Yet and a Not Here. For Francis Bacon

the rewards of a “discovery of knowledge” are Not Yet and something of a Not Here too. For the wild hopefuls of Dekker’s satiric conditions where poets would be subsidized to Helicon and businessmen would drink of the unicorn’s horn of profits were Not Yets and Not Heres. Heterodox hope may be socially transgressive, morally suspect, and even often (this is a common charge) insane. But if heterodox hope is also a form of anticipatory consciousness, then it is a form of faith, a faith in what *might* be possible. And to conceive of this faith seventeenth-century writers characteristically turned to the Columbus topos, along with its many real and imaginary associations.

“It is fit that I publish and set forth those conjectures of mine,” Bacon would write concerning his project for an advancement of learning, “which make hope in this matter reasonable, just as Columbus did . . .”⁵⁷ Columbus is above all an agent of anticipation, a figure indeed for what it means to anticipate, but to anticipate rationally and plausibly, however grandiose or strange one’s expectations may seem to be. As Bacon also says, it is important to “make hope . . . reasonable.” Or again:

I think that men may take some hope from my own example. And this I say not by way of boasting, but because it is useful to say it. If there be any that despond, let them look at me, that being of all men of my time the most busied in affairs of state, and a man of health not very strong [a complaint that one also finds Columbus himself frequently making in his letters] . . . and in this course altogether a pioneer, following in no man’s track, nor sharing these counsels with any one, have nevertheless by resolutely entertaining on the true road, and submitting my mind to Things, advanced these matters, as I suppose, some little way.⁵⁸

The example of Columbus is “useful.” It stimulates hope, even when “there be any that despond,” incapable of imagining or sustaining their faith in the new. It justifies, moreover, the idiosyncrasy of utopian hope, the loneliness of the utopian pioneer and the ostracization or ridicule to which the subject of utopian hope may be subjected. The Columbus of one’s times looks forward and outward when other men have given up hope that there might be anything “out there” worth working to discover. He sees what no one else sees, since no one else is looking in quite the way he looks. He stays to a “true road,” even when no one else sees the road at all, and “advances matters,” even when in the eyes of others he has not advanced anywhere at all. And so it goes throughout the seventeenth century, and we continue to hear from eccentric individuals like the Baconian natural scientist and clergyman John Wilkins, writing

as a young man in 1638 about the world in the moon, and how it might be possible for men to travel there someday, complaining that like Columbus no one in his own day is going to listen to him or believe him: "How did the Incredulous World gaze at *Columbus*; when he promised to discover another part of the Earth, and he could not for a long time, by his Confidence, or Arguments, Induce any of the Christian Princes, either to assent unto his Opinion, or go to the charges of an Experiment?" The author asks if he seems worthy of mockery and an incredulous gaze, since he is merely proposing that one day men may fly to the moon. Mockery is only evidence that his project and hopes, however far-flung, however transgressive, may nevertheless prove to be fit and right and a boon to humankind, as Columbus's proved to be. For "if he [*Columbus*], who had such good grounds for his Assertion, could find no better Entertainment among the wiser sort, and upper end of the World; 'tis not likely then that this Opinion which I now deliver, shall receive any thing from the Men of these Days, especially our Vulgar Wits, but Misbelief or Dirision."⁵⁹

The Columbus topos provided a means through which a hope for uncustomary things could be made acceptable. It was a trope through which writers could explore the idea of *alternative* hope, that is of hope *as* an alternative. But deploying the Columbus topos might still not be enough, since it was easy to turn the topos on its head, as Hall and others, most notably Ben Jonson, were apt to do, and make would-be Columbuses into figures of ridiculous belatedness, stupidity, or madness. In *Eastward Ho!*, produced the same year as Hall's *Mundus* was published, a pair of would-be, latter-day explorers, bent on enriching themselves at the expense of the natives of the New World, find themselves shipwrecked . . . back where they started, on the banks of the Thames. They were looking for something *out there* that was really a missing principle of moderation and balance *in here*. "Hell and damnation!" one of the shipwrecked characters swears, recognizing the unhappily named riverside community of Cuckold's Haven. "I will run back [to the river] and drown myself!" "Woe, woe is me," says another, "what shall become of us? The last money we could make, the greedy Thames has devoured . . . there is no hope can relieve us."⁶⁰ The experience of such would-be Columbuses serves as a comic allegory for the fatuity of worldly hope, and the necessity of submission to a higher order of things, a higher order which is at once physical and metaphysical, at once worldly and godly, at once secular and religious. The would-be Columbuses of the world think that there is a "beyond," as we might put it today, something to hope for

which is not already *here and now*. But there is no beyond. There is only the here and now, the given socio-physical world, under the control of God and king – a “world divided from the world.” And there is no hope, except for the hope for inner balance and grace and the dispensations of the only “other world” that really concerns us, the other world of the world to come. *Spes in caelis, pes in terris*, as Braithwaite put it for the motto of the “English gentleman” – which, in the context of the present argument, should be translated chiasmatically: *feet on the earth, but hope in heaven*.⁶¹

3. THE LOOK OF POWER

The “look” in the look of power, as I am using the expression, adopting my terms and concepts (with some freedom) from the work of Sartre and Foucault and related theorists of “le regard” or “the gaze,” is inherently ambiguous. On the one hand, power has a “look.” It looks like something. What it looks like, of course, will depend in part on who is doing the looking, on who is observing it and why. But it is the customary responsibility of political philosophers and ideologues to devise looks of their own, to assert that power (or power of a certain kind, by way of a certain kind of institutional framework) looks like one thing rather than another. It has (or ought to have) a distinctive form, a distinctive way of being in the world, and the representation of this form or way of being is its “look.”

It is important to observe that in using the word “look” in this way I am not restricting myself literally to visual representation; as Sartre observed that the “gaze” or “le regard” of the other through which I know myself (know myself as both seeing and being seen) might be manifested in the rustle of the wind, or the sound of footsteps in the dark,⁶² so the power here may be said to have, metaphorically, a “look” in this first sense of the word, so far as it is has made its presence *apprehended* – so far as it has succeeded in making itself represented to its public, whether or not this form is primarily visual. Power exists. And one way we know that it exists is that philosophers and ideologues are ready to explain to us that it exists, and provide it with a certain “look” for our benefit, a certain representational form. They may draw extensive pictures of power in words or images, either as it is or as it might be or as they imagine it ought to be seen to be. They may put it on parade. They may commission the building of great palaces or halls of congress, or the writing of songs, the performance of operas and masques, the painting of great paintings.

But whether for explanatory, visionary, or propagandistic purposes, they will provide power with a representative “look,” and through this look make power a thing apprehended. It is through this look that we know it, however truthfully or falsely, however hopefully or despairingly. And it is through this look that our allegiances are solicited, our alertness and obedience to power made present to ourselves, our social and political values represented to ourselves.

So power *has* a look, and it is through its look, however this look is generated, that we largely know it. But there is also a look *of* power, a look which by its own lights, through its own agency, generates power, establishes power, bringing into being the hegemony of one subject or agent over another. The male gaze fixing its attention upon the woman’s body, and to that extent objectifying it, turning it into the unmotivated object of a motivated gaze (which is one reason why the model gentlewoman of the seventeenth century was urged by contrast to go about her business in society as nobody’s object, “to see rather than to be seen”);⁶³ the prison guard’s gaze, the gaze of surveillance, fixing the prisoner’s movements down to the gestures on his face, the creases at his mouth, and again then making its object into something other than itself, bringing it under the control of the gaze of surveillance, making it serve the purposes of surveillance rather than purposes of its own – these often-discussed acts of looking, acts of *apprehending*, in and of themselves exert a force of domination of one person over another.⁶⁴ Exactly what effects of domination are entailed in this look is of course subject to question. I do not *harm* you with my look the way I might harm you with a gun; in fact, although I am establishing a form of unequal and disjunctive intersubjectivity, I may not be harming you at all. But the look of power is not fashioned in order to injure its objects, although it may be a condition of the power to injure. And in any case, a look of power need not always be malignant. What shall we say about the look of the mother gazing over her sleeping child?; or the look of a grade school teacher over her charges?; or of a doctor over her patient – a version of Foucault’s “clinical gaze”? The look in every case, as both Sartre and Foucault have made clear, establishes a relation of power, and renders a condition of intersubjectivity asymmetrical and disproportionate, subordinating one subject to another. But the power to harm is only one of several powers that the look of power establishes for its subject; and it is not always the most pertinent of those powers. The look enables benign as well as malignant intentions. The power to do good commonly entails a power exerted over another, and the “look of power,” the look through which a certain

hegemonic relation is established, may well be a condition of the exercise of benevolence.

In short, the "look of power" in this second sense is the exercise of a gaze establishing a relation of domination which may have any of a number of effects but which in any case asserts and exercises a genuine power *over*, a condition where one agent or subject has a certain range of *command* over others, a certain ability to accomplish effects with regard to others. ("There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints," Foucault writes on the subject of the Panopticon, where the look of power is perfected in every direction. "Just a gaze."⁶⁵) We see the Renaissance king seated on his throne, surrounded by his retainers, the dais hung with rich tapestries, the king perhaps holding his sceptre, the sign of his power over the nation, and certainly wearing his crown – another, supplementary sign. We see him and we know that this is how power "looks" in this particular case: power is representing itself, and there is nothing arbitrary in how it goes about doing it; everything is being put forward to us and for us. Power here has this look and demands our allegiance with regard to this look. But power is also looking back at us. The king is looking. And when he turns his gaze upon one of us or all of us, when he *sees* any of us, he is in that act alone exerting a relation of power over us. In fact, we suspect, and the king might agree, that real power stems from behind the gaze of the king, and not from the obedient regard of his subjects observing the courtly spectacle over which he presides. In any case, the king will not literally need to *see* us, now or ever, in order to exert his power; but when he sees us, to whatever end, he cannot avoid exerting his power of supervision, since that power to dominate is intrinsic to his capacity to gaze, to take one of his subjects as the object of his gaze, and therefore as a subject (and object) of a certain kind. "Ay, every inch a king," Lear tells himself with ironic exaggeration and misrecognition, but nevertheless expressing the structure of the truth upon which the Renaissance system of monarchy relied: "When I do stare, see how the subject quakes" (*King Lear*, 4.6.105–6).⁶⁶

Clearly the dynamics of this two-sided look of power are part and parcel to the functioning of ideology in the maintenance of order in any political society, where the ideology of a regime can be said to reside somewhere along the axis between the look the regime is caused to have in the imagination of its subjects and the supervisory look it exerts over its subjects. By this I mean *official* ideology, to be sure, ideology in the sense of a deliberate political fantasy.⁶⁷ The fantasy may or may not be

false in an epistemological sense – the Marxian “false consciousness.” It may or may not be a distortion of reality through which subjects are fooled into accepting the power of a regime. In fact, the fantasy may well be a kind of faithful allegory, which *really* represents, albeit in symbolic form, the dynamics of power relations. Official ideologies are often symbolic allegories of power, which rest upon a deeper, less situationally specific system of social relations and a less self-consciously maintained, even unconscious system of ideological controls. The ideology of the absolute powers of a king, for example, may be imagined, circulated, and enforced through a web of political fantasy which itself depends upon a deeper system of late feudal economics, whose own ideology is communicated unconsciously rather than consciously, enforced by way of a non-deliberate rather than a deliberate promotion of obedience, authority, and economic hegemony. But official ideology is nevertheless a worthy subject of its own accord. It is not without its effect in the history of regimes. No study of the history of early modern culture, or of the transformation of the West from early modern to modern conditions, can dispense with an appreciation of the symbolic fantasies – the “ideal politics,” as I prefer to call it – through which social and political power was imagined by its subjects. These fantasies were dynamic instruments, which generated both a “look” and a system of “looking.” Because they inevitably involved both the representation of power and the exertion of power, both the imaginary of a socio-political structure and the performance of socio-political rituals and dramas, they played an active role in the development of thought, of belief, of social struggle, and of socio-political alliances and institutions. In many cases they were the very theaters of contestation through which the modern world – and modern theaters of contestation – came into being. The accession of James I ushered in a revised imaginary of the state. The work of imaginative writers like Jonson and Hall communicated representations of a revised political cosmology which at once promote the terms of the Stuart regime and ridicule any terms of opposition to it – ridicule the possibility of any individual’s seeing his way beyond it and fastening upon a new horizon of hope. If beneath the official ideology of the Stuart regime other traditions and pressures were operating, some in support of the new regime and others in conflict with it, the official ideology nevertheless contributed to historical events, enacted or performed historical events, and played a role not just in asserting the hegemony of a system of authority that was already in place, but also in modifying it.

In any case, one of the more remarkable qualities of this official ideology was the force of the idealizations it promoted, the subliminizations it encouraged. In this it was both typical of regimes of its type – the absolute monarchies of early modern Europe – and especially excessive. It was also therefore – as it is time now fully to elaborate the second main term of this analysis, along with “ideal politics” – excessively utopian. The utopian dimension of ideological discourse has long been a commonplace in fields like the sociology of knowledge, where the ideas of “the utopian” and “the ideological” are held in counterposition to one another, such that each is held to be the opposite of one another, but only as expressions as a single fundamental phenomenon, the production of “incongruent” or “situationally transcendent” political fictions.⁶⁸ The difference between the two has been thought to consist in the effects which these fictions produce: ideological fiction is conservative, it is articulated with the aim and effect of conserving or consolidating the status quo, whereas utopian fiction is progressive, written with either the intent of or the unintentional effect of shattering the existing order and fomenting change. Of course it is also extremely difficult to find reliable criteria for differentiating between the two. To tell them apart one already has to be able to say which group of political fictions is pointing in the direction of reaction and which in the direction of progress or revolution, and to do that one has to have a system in place for distinguishing the losers from the winners, the failed, ultimately backward-looking fantasies from the eventually successful, forward-looking fantasies.⁶⁹ But many of the most original and influential texts in the utopian tradition, including *Utopia*, have long been understood to embrace ideas which are backward-looking and forward-looking at the same time. Anticipatory consciousness is seldom purely anticipatory. And in any case, to distinguish texts on the basis of which incongruent ideas have turned out to be winners and which losers is to assess them not on the basis of their actual functions and purposes when they were written but on the basis of their appeal to the triumphalist prejudices of the present moment.⁷⁰

The fact is, however one wants to sift the utopian from the ideological, official ideologies like those promoted by the court of James entail a good deal of idealization, the promotion of “situationally transcendent” aspirations, and this idealization extends to both aspects of the “look” it is reproducing, both to the representation of power and the supervisory execution of power. Power as it wants to cause itself to be imagined, power as it represents itself to others, for its own purposes, will almost inevitably cast itself in a form which, if nothing else, is *worthy*

of a certain kind of obedience; its worthiness to be obeyed is what it wants its subjects to *see and feel*, in response to which it wants its subjects to “quake.” Therefore, the look of power a regime *has* will commonly include an idealized image of itself, an image of itself with regard, precisely, to its worthiness to be obeyed. Similarly, the “stare” that power exercises over its subjects will almost inevitably operate *politically*, which is to say with the intent of generating politically desirable effects; to the extent that a mere gaze *has* this power of exerting hegemony, the look of power in this second sense fashions its subjects into objects of a certain kind, making them into appropriate subjects of the regime. The look of power in the first sense, representation, entails an idealization of a governing body; the look of power in the second sense, supervision, entails the idealization of a body governed. It attempts to make the subjects of the regime into ideal subjects, that is into subjects who are ready and willing in some sense to quake before it. Both forms of idealization are inherent in the operation of a regime in power. Certainly in the case of a regime like the one which came into power in England in 1603, official ideology took up an excessive discourse of ideal politics designed to promote a harmony in the relations between the governing and the governed which approximated (excessively) to a condition of perfectionism.⁷¹

Once we consider how a phenomenon like the look of power in its ideological functions may entail a great degree of idealization of a regime and its subjects, however, it becomes very difficult to distinguish between ideological and utopian thought from the point of view of their structures; and this difficulty is both conceptual and historical. The historical problem I began to deal with in the first two sections of this chapter, and I will continue to elaborate on it in the study to follow. To reiterate the essential point, the Stuart regime’s subliminizing ideology was already staking a claim to the rhetoric of political hope, already appropriating a discourse of ideal politics and its utopian implications in advance of any other possible speech about political hope, in advance of any other form of social dreaming. The Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, the highest ranking official in England under James, wrote in an important constitutional decision,

I will not stand to examine by human reasons whether kings were before laws or laws before kings, nor how kings were first ordained, nor whether the kings or the people did first make laws, nor the several constitutions and frames of states and commonweals, nor what Plato or Aristotle have written of this argument; . . .

their opinions . . . are no canons to give laws to kings and kingdoms, no more than Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* or such pamphlets as we have at every mart.⁷²

Republican ideas and alternative ideal models are being openly discussed in James's England, Ellesmere concedes, although what "pamphlets" he is referring to it is difficult to say.⁷³ But it does not matter. They are merely "human reasons" which might decide in favor of alternative doctrines; absolutism stems from a higher authority, and operates according to higher law. As James himself would put it, in the context of another controversial constitutional matter, "*le Roi s'avisera*."⁷⁴ And so whatever else the Columbusoid dissenters of the Stuart regime may want to hope for, by absolutist doctrine they are already too late. The Stuart regime has already trumped them. It has already laid claim to the sublime look of power.

As for the conceptual problem in discriminating between ideology and utopia, the point to be made is that however ideologically compliant or situationally transcendent it may be, any discourse of ideal politics will be structured by way of an ambiguous "look." It will be both looked upon and looking. It will involve both the attribution of a certain look to power and the exercise of a certain empowering look. The would-be Columbuses of the reign of James I were in fact aspiring to a condition where, in spite of the fact that the Court had already appropriated the rhetoric of ideal politics, they too could assume the position of an enabling, utopian look of power. And this will be the case for any individual who aspires to provide an alternative idea of how society can operate. An ideal society, however completely it is imagined, will *have* a certain look; in fact, in the classic utopian tracts of the early modern period, works written in the genre that Thomas More originated with his *Utopia*, the greater part of the writer's efforts is devoted precisely to *describing* what power looks like when power is optimally organized and deployed. "But you should have been with me in Utopia," Hythloday tells his audience, "and *seen with your own eyes* their manners and customs as I did . . . If you had *seen* them, you would frankly confess that you had never seen a people so well governed as they are" (my emphasis).⁷⁵ The discourse of ideal politics is frequently devoted to the exercise of what I have elsewhere called "utopian witnessing."⁷⁶ The discourse bears witness to an ideal condition of sociality, and by the very fact of bearing witness to it intends to convince its audience of the desirability of the ideal. Seeing is believing; believing is desiring; desiring is hoping. "If I could but see a day of it," the frustrated narrator of William Morris's

News from Nowhere says to himself, trying to find a way to carry on with his hopes for radical reform; “if I could but see it!”⁷⁷ Yet if the discourse commonly describes an ideal society, it also then exercises, and invites its audience to exercise, a look of its own, a look *over* the ideal society. And thus it invites its audience not just to see but to see over, to survey the ideal set before it, and hence to exert a certain supervisory power over the ideal. This is a power over *nothing*, to be sure; it is power over the mere image of an ideal society, power over what Prospero in *The Tempest* refers to as the “baseless fabric of a dream.” It is an expression of what I call “utopian mastery,” mastery over an ideal which is Not Here and Not Yet. And it has serious limitations. “O, who can hold a fire in his hand,” Bolingbroke asks in *Richard II*,

By thinking on the frosty Caucasus?
Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite
By bare imagination of a feast? (1.3.294–98)

But the power of utopian mastery is nevertheless intended to have specific political and social effects. Seeing is not only believing and desiring and hoping, it is also knowing; anticipatory consciousness entails knowing *in advance* of knowing, for the sake of knowing how to act.⁷⁸ It entails a kind of knowing *how*, since the look invariably includes an awareness of the rules and conditions for generating (in principle) a Not Yet or a Not Here of a certain kind. The rules and conditions of social life of a certain kind, after all, are precisely what the utopian witness is most concerned to make us see; awareness of them is precisely what the witness’s interlocutors are meant to bring away from his discourse, and it is precisely with this (and often only this) that the discourse of ideal politics *provides* its interlocutors, auditors and readers. It is the power, the mastery, limited and “utopian” as it may be, that the sharers of the discourse derive from it.

The problem in view of the dynamics of an absolute monarchy and its own political rhetoric should by now be coming into focus. The would-be Columbus, or any other “discoverer” of an alternative ideal order, is attempting to occupy a discursive position which is already occupied by the monarch. The monarch has already constructed for himself the position of a utopian master. However, the problem entailed by utopian mastery even exceeds the limitations imposed on it by early modern monarchy. For it is not only with a rival in utopian mastery that the utopist has to contend; he is also setting himself in opposition to his own creation.

Let me explain, first of all, by way of a literally graphic representation of the alternative look of power that an ideal politics may require. It comes from an illustration included in *Republicae Christianopolitanae Descriptio*, a book published in Amsterdam in 1619 by the Lutheran minister, mystic, and reputed Rosicrucian, Johann Valentin Andreae. We are away from English soil with this book, and a few years ahead of our narrative – a circumstance which will require comment later in this study. Andreae is the representative of a movement of thought which openly adopts some of its ideas from the earlier writings of Francis Bacon, but which adopts them in its own way; it was a movement which would only gradually find expression in England itself and eventually play a role in the cultural revolution of the Interregnum. In any case, publishing his work in 1619 from the intellectual and religious haven of Amsterdam, Andreae does not betray any of the hesitations about utopian witnessing that English writers during the reign of James I generally betrayed; and so he writes what no Englishman of the seventeenth century could yet quite write, an unambiguously oppositional utopian fantasy on the Morean model. Working on this model, Andreae includes in his book a fictional journey to an unknown republic, and he has his fiction operate primarily (as its title word, *descriptio*, suggests) as a work of utopian witnessing.⁷⁹ The ideal city Andreae describes is a communist republic, a workers' paradise which is nevertheless devoted to piety and learning more than to the production and consumption of commodities. But take a look at what, in Andreae's mind, it actually looks like (fig. 1). Or rather, examine the city's double-sided "look." At the center of the city stands a towering temple of learning and religion which also houses the city's government. The tower occupies what might be called a position of "oversight." From here the elected leaders of the town literally oversee the behavior of the citizens, who for their part accomplish their affairs in the context of an elaborately regularized architectural structure. The fact that life in utopias like Andreae's is overly controlled and oppressively regulated is a common complaint and one to which it is worth returning. Although Andreae imagines that the inhabitants of his city would lead a generally liberal existence (by seventeenth-century standards), he has placed them in an environment where the rule of freedom (as it were) is inescapable. Everywhere one goes one sees the order of the city ordering one's life; and everywhere one goes one is also aware (Andreae adopting this idea from both More's *Utopia* and Calvin's *Geneva*) of being seen. Life in *Utopia*, in Calvin's *Geneva*, and in *Christianopolis* is a *monitored* life, an oppressively *self-monitored* system of existence. But in addition to the




Figure 1 Christianopolis, from *Republicae Christianopolitanae Descriptio* by Johann Andreae (Amsterdam, 1619). By permission of the Folger Shakespeare Library.

prospect of a life at once highly liberating and highly limiting, Andreae also offers his readers a prospect from on high, a look from above, over the city. The bird's-eye, single-point perspective (somewhat awkwardly rendered) accentuates the singular force of this "look." Whatever the experience of life inside the confines of Christianopolis may be like, outside Christianopolis, seeing Christianopolis, reader and author alike are unmonitored; they are not confined to the architectonics of the city; they are not *subjected* to the rules and limits of the republic; they are having an experience of a different kind.

What kind of experience is this? One of Andreae's sometime students, René Descartes, would later express the pleasure of this experience in a different context in his *Discourse on Method*, where he complains about

“old cities” – traditional medieval towns – which “through the passage of time” have become “badly proportioned,” one thing built upon another haphazardly, without design. Descartes prefers the sight, he says, of those newly built “orderly towns which an engineer designs at will on some plain,” towns where we see evidence “of a human will operating according to reason.”⁸⁰ That is precisely what Andreae is offering his readers, the vision of an orderly town, built at the will of a particular individual (Andreae), and operating according to reason. (“In every action,” Dante had written many years before, at the threshold of the intellectual movement being traced here, “what is primarily intended by the doer, whether he acts from natural necessity or out of free will, is the disclosure of his own image” [*propriam similitudine explicare*].)⁸¹ Andreae and Descartes alike are participating in an intellectual movement which is having an impact on all the arts and sciences of the seventeenth century, not only on architecture and the art of designing ideal cities. This movement, whatever one wishes to call it – neo-classicism (Foucault’s “the classic age”), the baroque, late Renaissance or post-Reformation humanism, or in its English redaction, as we will see, “Puritan ameliorism,” not to mention the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century to which it is intimately related – includes among its characteristic impulses not only the deliberate accentuation of the individual point of view, the limited yet foundational perspective of the individual, but the quest for what Hans Blumenberg calls “self-assertion,” or, more expansively, “the immanent self-assertion of reason through the mastery and alteration of reality.”⁸² Blumenberg’s concept of self-assertion will be worth returning to as well. Much of what Blumenberg has to say about subjective foundationalism and the mastery over reality in the seventeenth century underlies the analysis here of what I am calling “utopian mastery,” even though Blumenberg’s analysis has little to do with politics *per se*. The “I” and the “eye,” brought together in Andreae’s single-point perspective, are asserting their own dominance in this picture, their own foundational hegemony, although neither is literally represented in the picture.⁸³ The eye and I assert themselves, precisely, by observing the image of what the subject is capable of doing and of what it has done, its own alteration (however hypothetical here) of reality; the eye and I triumph in the exercise of free will that observing the creation entails. “Now, my excellent reader,” Andreae writes in a preface that is more serious than ironic, though the ironies are important too, “you see as an evident example of this Christian security [of which I have been speaking], this new REPUBLIC which it seems best to call Christianopolis. For inasmuch as other people (and I myself also) do not like to be corrected, I have

built this city for myself where I may exercise the dictatorship.”⁸⁴ The dictatorship exercised – an old Roman concept, placed in a new context – is also a self asserted. Andreae asserts himself like a latter-day Caesar, brooking no dissent, and even going further, allowing himself the power to make a republic out of the resources of his own mind. And in doing so, again, he is participating in that movement toward subjective foundationalism (the immanent self-assertion of reason) that was intrinsic to so much experimental thinking in the seventeenth century – a practice of writing and thinking of which we will continue to see a great many examples as we review the political and scientific literature of the period.

But the basic theoretical point to be made about the look that Andreae shares with his public in his drawing of Christianopolis here is that it is an empowering look from *outside*; it is a look *over* an ideal state of affairs, providing the viewer with a kind of transparent image, an image readily revealing the system according to which it has been constructed and the will-to-power underlying it. It is one thing to be a citizen of Christianopolis, residing within its walls. But it is another thing to be the creator of Christianopolis, or to assume the prospective, supervisory position of its creator; it is another thing to stand outside the walls of the ideal republic and gaze from above upon the image of its system.

In fact, it was this kind of position with respect to the future, this hopeful prospect with regard to the Not Yet, that was so difficult for intellectuals of the early seventeenth century in England to imagine themselves occupying – difficult, yet enticing too. At the beginning of the seventeenth century in England, individuals with serious intellectual commitments found the idea of utopian hope, the idea of looking beyond themselves toward a new reality and a new method of mastering it, both irresistible and absurd, both open to the mind and closed to the will. “Had I plantation of this isle, my lord, / And were king on’t,” the courtier Gonzalo asks the Alonso King of Naples in *The Tempest*, trying to divert him with a game, “what would I do?” What indeed? “I think he will carry this island home in his pocket and give it his son for an apple,” the courtier Sebastian is made to say at one point, criticizing Gonzalo for being unrealistic. But no, “Had I plantation of this isle . . . and were king on’t,” Gonzalo says,

I th’commonwealth I would by contraries
Execute all things; for no kind of traffic
Would I admit; no name of magistrate;

Letters should not be known; riches, poverty,
 And use of service, none; contract, succession,
 Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none;
 No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil;
 No occupation; all men idle, all;
 And women too, but innocent and pure:
 No sovereignty; –

...

All things in common nature should produce
 Without sweat or endeavor: treason, felony,
 Sword, pike, knife, gun, or need of any engine,
 Would I not have; but Nature should bring forth,
 Of its own kind, all foison, all abundance,
 To feed my innocent people.

...

I would with such perfection govern, sir,
 T'excel the Golden Age. (2.1.138–64)

Gonzalo's Arcadian utopia is far removed from Andreae's urbanism. In Gonzalo's commonwealth it would not seem to be possible for there to be any cities at all. There is hardly any structure in Gonzalo's commonwealth (only an upside-down method of structuration: "by contrairies [to] execute all things"), much less a rigorously worked out, architecturally organized socio-economy. But Gonzalo's commonwealth shares a concern for communitarian equality. And it shares the same paradox of power. For Gonzalo would be the king of his Arcadia, as well as its author and founder. And yet for a commonwealth to work with the system of absolute communitarianism he imagines for it the commonwealth would also not have any "sovereignty." It would not have a king. In Gonzalo's utopia there would not be any Gonzalos. "The latter end of his commonwealth forgets the beginning," Antonio, the false Duke, retorts, taking issue with Gonzalo's logic. "Prithee no more," Alonso finally tells the speechmaker, in effect ending the discussion, "Thou dost talk nothing to me" (2.1.138–64).

One notable scholar has called the whole problem of utopian invention "Gonzalo's paradox." "How could an ideal commonwealth," Harry Levin writes, "ever come into existence?"⁸⁵ "In order to redistribute power, one must first possess it" – and then of course, having the power to redistribute power, one is unlikely to give it up.⁸⁶ Gonzalo, to be sure, does not possess the power which would be needed in order

for him to redistribute power, and this seems to be one of Shakespeare's main points. But from what has been said about the ambiguities and difficulties inherent in utopian mastery, we might want to state the case of Gonzalo's paradox in reverse. In order to *want* to redistribute power, we might say – in order to want to occupy the position that Shakespeare shows Gonzalo wishing to occupy – one must first of all *not* be in possession of it. An ideal commonwealth can only come into existence – in the imagination, if nowhere else – because it is already not in existence. It is Not Here. It is Not Yet. One invents an ideal commonwealth because of the absence of the ideal commonwealth. (This would be the case no less for an absolute monarch, whose power in reality is always far from absolute, than for a disgruntled courtier or an impoverished clergyman.) And in doing so one invents oneself as well, or at least re-invents oneself; one makes oneself into the master of an ideal that one has found within oneself and projected outward. In doing so, however, as Shakespeare suggests, the utopist inevitably confronts an insuperable gap between his creative practice and the object his practice has created. Gonzalo imagines that he can easily manoeuvre himself from a position *outside* his ideal commonwealth, a position from which he is free to contrive it, to a position *inside* the ideal commonwealth, where he will be recreated as the commonwealth's sovereign king. But the two positions – the two masteries Gonzalo is imagining for himself – are logically incompatible: not only because in this particular case a king is being placed to rule over a republic without any kings, but more fundamentally because designing and founding an ideal society is incompatible with living in one.⁸⁷ (No inhabitants of Gonzalo's commonwealth, as Gonzalo creates them, would ever be capable or in need of imagining the "plantation" of a commonwealth of their own.) And so the gaze of power in which Gonzalo is trying to take pleasure is inevitably alienated from itself: it cannot be both the creating subject of utopia and one of its created objects.

Even Prospero, who has stage-managed this laboratory of the mind in which Gonzalo vents his wishes, confronts this dilemma in the end. The greatest of magus-monarchs of the Renaissance stage, the most impressive personification of kingly sciential light ever to appear on the stage, and based in part on James himself,⁸⁸ Prospero cannot at once govern his magic isle and restore himself to his ducal seat. Like everyone else on his island, he has been put on trial in the course of the action, and he has discovered that in order to recreate the circumstances that will allow him to govern as a sovereign over Milan, he has to forget his magic and

abjure his utopian sovereignty. He can create the utopia of his dreams, but only by giving up dreaming and hoping and emanating sciential light. He can become the object of his hopes, but only by forgetting – or rejecting – his subjective beginning. “Milan” will have been “thrust from Milan” and in the end Milan itself will be eliminated, absorbed by marriage into Naples (5.1.208).

4. BACONIAN HOPE

The look of power, again, entails a paradox which is both historical and conceptual – one is tempted to say, “universal.” Any attempt to exert a form of utopian mastery will have to negotiate the paradox the look of power entails both with respect to specific historical conditions and with respect to its inherent logical aporia. How *can* one set oneself up as a utopian master? How *can* one engage in the conversation of ideal politics, after all? What is there to hope for? And how can one express oneself as a subject of utopian hope? Is not to do so to take upon oneself, on the one hand, an assumption of potentialities to which no ordinary subject may legitimately stake a claim, and, on the other hand, at the same time to exert an imaginary mastery over – nothing? Utopian politics is usually only a politics of the mind; in an effective sense, it is usually not a politics at all, lacking legitimacy from the outset, and then lacking effective power in its outcome. Why bother? How can one possibly succeed at it?

It was with respect to both problems that the anti-utopists of early Stuart England presented their arguments, even while coopting the energies of utopian hope and celebrating the sublime utopian-like powers of their absolute monarch. For authors sympathetic to James’s politics and cultural policies – including Bacon, Shakespeare, Jonson, and Hall – the structure of absolutist sublimity formed a kind of normative framework through which political and social behavior was to be represented, and opposition – alternative hope – powerfully rejected. The elevation of the king to the status of a utopian master provided both the content and the form for representing and deconstructing alternative hope. Thus Hall’s *Mundus*, an anti-utopian utopian romance. (And thus the response by the young Milton, writing forty years later, in the context of another historical situation entirely, complaining that Hall was “the maker, or rather anticreator” of a “universall foolery,” a “petty prevaricator of *America*, the zanie of *Columbus* [for so he must be till his worlds end], having rambl’d over the huge topography of his own vain

thoughts, no marvell, if he brought us home nothing but a mere tankard drollery, a venereous parjetory for a stewes.”⁸⁹) Thus too the case of a play like Jonson’s *The Alchemist*: in *The Alchemist* would-be Columbuses end up subverting their subversions, to the purpose of reinstating absolute authority. Sir Epicure Mammon imagining that he is about to set his “foot on shore / In Novo Orbe” (2.1.1–2) and see the age turned to gold, or to become “master of the mastery,” that is, the philosopher’s stone, and end up “the happiest man in Europe” (1.4.28); the Puritan sectarian Tribulation Wholesome convinced that he will soon be “of power / To pay an army in the field, to buy / The king of France out of his realms . . .” (3.2.46–48)⁹⁰ – such would-be utopists are more than ridiculous; *The Alchemist* shows them destined under the pressure of their unnatural illogic, as well as their anti-authoritarian presumptions, literally to blow up. “Forward they goe with their circulations,” the 1609 translation of the *Mundus* complains about alchemists (as it happens), adding new material in the spirit of the original: “their sublimations, their conjunctions, their fermentations, till all this head-lesse action ended in putrefaction, untill reputation and revenues were both dead and rotten.”⁹¹ Try not to hope, the message goes. To do so is foolish, perhaps even mad. “*He is a Wise Man*,” by contrast, Hall would thus write in 1608, who “confineth himself in the circle of his own affairs, and lists not to thrust his finger into a needless fire. He stands like a centre, unmoved, while the circumference of his estate is drawn above, beneath, about him.”⁹²

As we will see in the chapters to follow, whatever the inherent logical difficulties of ideal politics and utopian mastery may be, a great many writers later in the seventeenth century will nevertheless find ways of asserting their idealities as if they were real, and exerting their masteries as if they held sway not over nothing but over something – something immanent, tangible, and vital. That does not mean that the writers will entirely overcome the obstacles of logic and historical circumstances; it only means that they will push the limits of logic and circumstances further, and in the face even of political defeat enlarge the political and social consciousness of their era, driving their imaginations in the direction of what we are now in a position to call “modernization.”

Meanwhile, even in early Stuart England we can see that things have developed at least this far: first, a king, coming to occupy the imaginary position of a utopia master, remaking state mythology in the image of himself as a bestower of light and love and of the state as a newly unified perfected entity, and thereby ideologically circumventing the

real contradictions upon which his power is based – this is a king who himself acts as a bearer of utopian impulses, a bearer of anticipatory consciousness, a maker of new horizons; this is a king who is already an agent of certain forces of modernization, particularly with regard to the elevation of the “reason of state” to animating principles of governance, the centralization of power in the nation-state, and the rationalization of the ends of statecraft. And second, then, subjects, Columbusoids of various stripes, attempting not so much to rebel against an oppressive look of power but to harness its energies, to fit within the framework of prospects of absolutist ideology, even if in doing so they subjected themselves not only to the taint of illegitimacy but to the pitfalls of Gonzalo’s Paradox – such were at least some subjects of James’s realm, including the Puritan separatists, whose movement was reborn shortly after James’s intervention in the Hampton Court Conference of 1605, which disenfranchised Puritan ministers,⁹³ along with the more mainstream adventurers of the Virginia Company; and such too was James’s councillor, Francis Bacon.

The case of Bacon, of course, is absolutely crucial to the history of the utopian impulse of early modern England. More than anyone else of his time, apart from the imaginary fools mocked by the satirists, Bacon exemplified that effort to see beyond, to promote something like an “anticipatory consciousness,” to work *away* from the constraints of the given and establish new forms and methods of hope. Bacon’s Columbusoid intention was very frankly to release the constraints that tradition imposed upon the rational imagination: “for why should a few received authors stand up like Hercules’ Columns, beyond which there should be no sailing or discovering . . . ?” It was to release those constraints in order to achieve and exercise new forms of power. “Human knowledge and human power and knowledge coincide [*Scientia et potentia humana coincidunt*],” as he would write in the Third Aphorism of *The New Organon*, with suggestive ambiguity.⁹⁴ Every theoretical suggestion Bacon made on the subject of science and society in his early writings broadcasts a hope for nothing less than a total revolution in the human condition, where not only new discoveries will have been made but where a new relation between humanity and the world it inhabits will have been accomplished: “a restitution and reinvesting (in great part) of man to the sovereignty of power,” as he put it in an unpublished manuscript, “which he had in his first state of creation” (3:222). And yet, for all his revolutionary language, Bacon never once ceased paying homage to the sublime power of the monarch whose supporter he had always been. For all the many paths followed in *The Advancement of Learning* (1605) or for that matter

in his product of a later decade, *New Atlantis* (1626), Bacon never gave up on the idea of a central, kingly patriarchal figure presiding over the state and the institutions it supports. And in fact, it was his discovery of the power of kingly subjectivity that allowed Bacon to move from merely speculative ideas about the means and values of science to the system of state-sanctioned cooperative science that would be his greatest legacy to the new philosophy, his most significant contribution to the discourse of modernity.

The project moves in two different directions at once, and operates, as we will see, by way of a system of fractured but motile subjectivities, both in the language through which Bacon's projects are articulated and in the actual systems that Bacon wishes to construct. Direction number one is the positive, visionary bearing of Bacon's thought. Deliberately attempting to work his way past the Calvinist pessimism that his contemporaries took for granted, realizing that living in a later age, closer to the end of the world, had its benefits, Bacon located the destiny of knowledge with the "latter times," "the autumn of the world" in which he felt himself to live; and he had already identified the object of scientific inquiry as the restoration of an Edenic-Adamic state of being: "for to my understanding it is not violent to the letter, and safe now after the event, so to interpret the place in the prophecy of Daniel where speaking of the latter times it is said, *Many shall pass to and fro, and science shall be increased.*"⁹⁵ Knowledge was a part of the constitution of the world; it was "a plant of God's own planting," and the time had finally come when it was to be "increased." But direction number two is a movement in the path toward monarchical authority. As William Blake once complained, "King James was Bacon's *Primum Mobile*."⁹⁶ And by that Blake meant that what could be taken as Bacon's sycophancy, worrisome enough as that might be, was symptomatic of a deeper failure in Bacon's thought, its dependence on the Court as the center of cultural and political life and even of human dignity. In fact, for all the many paths followed in *The Advancement of Learning* or for that matter in *New Atlantis*, neither project is really possible without the assumption of an absolute authority after the manner of James I. It is as if, for all his differences from a Calvinist like Joseph Hall, Bacon also had to find his "heaven on earth" in the context of the sublimely given power of the state.⁹⁷ What has perhaps not been sufficiently appreciated is that the first direction in Bacon's thought, towards liberation, is impossible without having the second direction superadded to it, the direction towards absolute authority.

The study of Bacon has for a long time oscillated between these two poles of Bacon's thought. Bacon has been read as a conservative absolutist;⁹⁸ as a moderate reformer;⁹⁹ and as a proto-bourgeois proto-liberal.¹⁰⁰ He has been reviled as proponent of the "death of nature" at the hands of nature's rapine scientific conquerors;¹⁰¹ and he has been celebrated as the first philosopher to teach men how to submit to nature's logic, and take a "therapeutic" attitude toward what it can do for us.¹⁰² By the Frankfurt School model of the dialectic of enlightenment he has been criticized as the progenitor of a complex revision of the subject of science and technology, through which the technocratic scientist is at once the conqueror and the conquered.¹⁰³ There are grounds in Bacon's writings indeed for interpreting them by any of these lights. For Bacon's writings are shiftily – deliberately shiftily – especially with regard to their personae, their discursive subjectivities, and especially in the case of the ambitious *Advancement of Learning*. For who is the *subject* of Bacon's project in *The Advancement of Learning*?¹⁰⁴ Of whom and for whom and through whom does Bacon presume to speak? In fact, it is first one entity, then another, then another. Yet it is precisely by shifting from one subjective entity to another that Bacon is able to articulate his project.

The "sliding subjectivities" in Bacon's writings are the subjects Bacon presumes to be speaking *of* and *for* and *through*, the subjects Bacon articulates or imagines to be articulating an "I," and, in doing so, participating in a project toward scientific and social reform.¹⁰⁵ Sometimes Bacon is speaking for mankind; sometimes he is speaking for particular men; sometimes he is speaking for sovereignty; and sometimes he is speaking for himself. When he speaks for "mankind" he is speaking in the widest possible sense for the collectivity of humanity, whose life and destiny he associates with the beginnings and ends of time as elaborated in the Bible. When he speaks for men, he is speaking for the actual laborers in the field of learning, whose work he wants to inspire and set in motion. When he speaks for sovereignty, on the other hand, he is usually applying his language to James personally, although on occasion he adverts to other individuals and to the more abstract principle of sovereignty that a king like James embodied, or even that the elected officials of a republic (like the Dutch federation) might embody. It this sovereignty, however it is composed, this principle of stability and legitimacy, that provides the project with an institutional framework and a collective coherence. But when Bacon speaks for himself he is speaking in the capacity of a philosopher-scientist overseeing in advance the whole of the project – man, men, and sovereign alike. The philosopher-scientist

is someone who may at once be a real individual, the autobiographical persona of Bacon himself, and a subject speaking from and for more universal principles, acting as a prophetic Columbusoid “minister of light.” As the philosopher-scientist, he is speaking as if from outside the system in which he wants humanity and the sovereign to operate: he is seeing all of the system, all at once, in advance of the actual formulation of the system, adopting what he takes to be a consciousness anticipatory of a consciousness still to come. It is as if, although the project depends on the internal coherence of its subjects and objects, the fit between the one and the other and the unity of the enterprise as a whole, the project also requires still another supplementary principle of unity, a unity outside the unity: not a subject of discovery, ruptured from the past, but a subject discovering the subjects of discovery, adopting a look of power over the enterprise as a whole.

These sliding subjectivities both enable Bacon’s project and subvert it. Even if the advancement of learning is a single project, a single Not Yet which Bacon is trying to anticipate, *each* of the subjective positions of Bacon’s project assumes a utopian prospect of its own, over a separate field of objects and objectives. And as a result, this single project with several prospects is ultimately fractured, and the drive for mastery over one single Not Yet, for command over “the mastery of the mastery,” will ultimately be alienated through all of its parts, although the alienations of its parts stem from the emancipatory and reconciliatory impulses motivating the project. The Frankfurt School model of the “dialectic of enlightenment” is especially relevant here; for the multiplicity of subjectivities that Bacon tries to synthesize in his single project for the advancement of learning entails a structural estrangement: a self-consciousness, fixed on the oneness of intuitive awareness and the oneness of the project as a whole, nevertheless dispersed into a diversity of instrumentalities – Weber’s “instrumental reason” – and organized by the inegalitarian, institutional sovereignty of the state.

Many shall pass to and fro, and science shall be increased, Bacon’s favorite motto asserts. “Science” or “knowledge,” *scientia*, shall be increased, and must be increased, and is being increased, for Bacon. But, again, for whom, and how, and why? And why now? “Let it be believed,” Bacon writes in *Valerius Terminus*, while advertising the destiny of the “mind” of “man,”

and appeal thereof made to *Time* . . . that the new-found world of land [i.e. America] was not a greater addition to the ancient continent than there remaineth at this day a world of inventions and sciences unknown, having

respect to those that are known, with this difference, that the ancient regions of knowledge will seem as barbarous compared with the new, as new regions of people seem barbarous compared to many of the old. (3:223)

Knowledge is like a body of land, which the mind will discover; it is a “new world.” But the world in question is actually composed of “inventions and sciences,” in the plural, just as the new world turned out to be filled with many “regions of people” and the old learning in fact involved several “regions of knowledge.” Moreover, the discovery of this new world of many things will turn out to be the responsibility of many individuals, working separately. In the midst of his decision for the destiny of the mind, Bacon thus inevitably introduces one of his subjective slippages, moving from a universal body to an assembly of particulars. Bacon summons a vision of the destiny of the mind of man; but what Bacon is continually advocating is in fact a reformation in the *products* (inventions and sciences) of men’s *minds*. He is advocating not a reparation of the mind in and of itself – except when his rhetoric expands to a discourse of “the mind of man” – but rather a systematic alteration in the mental behavior of men, collaborating under the auspices of colleges and other institutions of learning, contributing their findings and inventions in written documents and experimental demonstrations, all as they work separately upon a body which is a “new world” divided into many regions. When Bacon turns to his actual proposals for the reform, he drops his neo-Platonic appeals to mind and man and turns instead to the institutional frameworks and the collective behavior of scientists and scholars working in their divers fields. He concerns himself with what their activities as investigators into nature and humanity might produce and what “new commodities” they might provide (3:223).

Early on, when Bacon considered why the sciences had failed to progress as he believed they might have done, he turned to the idea of conventional “impediments of knowledge,” focusing on behavioral and institutional obstacles to learning such as “the want of true succession of wits,” and the “handling of the parts” of knowledge, as well as “the four sorts of idols or fictions.” If “the mind” had fallen from its perfect and original condition, giving in to idols, it was the faulty wits of men in society with their faulty traditions for discovering, compiling, exchanging, and disseminating knowledge that prevented “the mind” from recovering its “first state of creation.” When Bacon turns to the specifics of his project he thus concerns himself with men in their particular historical, social, and psychological circumstances, working on individual sectors of the body of the world and the “handling” of its “parts.” He proposes making

fundamental changes in the material circumstances of scientific inquiry, especially in providing what, adopting a phrase of Calvin's, he would call "external helps," *externa subsidia*.¹⁰⁶ The inadequacy of "the mind" is to be overcome, in short, by the supplementary instrumentalities of organizations of men.

Even without relying on the idea of a "dialectic of enlightenment," one may easily see the importance of the difference between these two focal points of Bacon's discourse. The rhetoric focused on a single "mind" is in the first place emotive: it entails an emotional appeal to Bacon's readers summoning them toward the oneness of the One. The "many" who should pass "to and fro" are invited to orient themselves toward the unitary goal of knowledge, and to aim toward it by way of a single structure of feeling. But the disparity between the multiplicity of the many and the singularity of "mind" and "knowledge" is not to be mediated only by a shared structure of feeling, important though that may be. It is to be mediated as well by the coherence of the institutional structure which organizes their efforts. The principle of this coherence is therefore to be found (at least with respect to external helps) neither in the mind nor in the men who share in that mind but in the principle of institutional coherence itself. Part of this institutional coherence will stem from a "handling" of its "parts," a point to which we will shortly return. But in the circumstances in which *The Advancement of Learning* was composed, this coherence must first of all stem from the oneness of the institution as an institution.

And thus King James comes to occupy his central position. The first book of *The Advancement* begins by praising James for his learning and intelligence, flattering James while also providing a description, albeit in a somewhat biased form, of aspirations that might plausibly be attributed to James and the productive capacity that had to be available to Bacon if he was to articulate and actualize his project: civil, religious, and philosophical authority. "[B]ecause there is met in your Majesty a rare conjunction as well of divine and sacred literature as of profane and human; so as your Majesty standeth invested of that triplicity which in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient Hermes; the power and fortune of a King, the knowledge and illumination of a Priest, and the learning and universality of a Philosopher" (3:263). The first book of the *Advancement* goes on to defend the idea of learning and what Blumenberg calls "theoretical curiosity"; it tries to find a place for the practice of genuine scientific inquiry within the value system of the society over which James exercised his sovereignty. And then the second book, taking

“the dignity of knowledge or learning” as a thing established, goes on to the measures that need to be taken in order to promote the advancement of learning; and here again, the king is central. In the first book the king is extolled as being a singular authority to which universal history has fortuitously arrived; in the second book he is extolled as a figure from whom a new posterity might be conceived and perpetuated. The “removing” of a great many of the “defects” of learning are said to be “*opera basilica* [works of the king], towards which the endeavors of a private man may be but as an image in a crossway, that may point at the way but cannot go it” (3:328). To remove the defects or impediments Bacon recommends the founding and patronage of libraries, colleges, and public lectures, and the promotion of scholarship through the awarding of pensions, the procurement of mechanical aids to experimentation, and the facilitation of international communication among scholars, all of which he likens to the prescription for the hiving of bees in Virgil’s *Georgics*. The king can be to the “endowment of the world with sound and fruitful learning” as is a beekeeper to the production of honey. Using the familiar topoi of courtly panegyric and the ideal politics of absolutist fantasy, Bacon thus makes the king into a providential constructive power, a final fullness, and then goes on to ask him to take responsibility for establishing a system of production under which scientists may work, knowledge be procured, and its commodities be gathered for distribution (3:333). In point of fact, to promote actual projects of this kind on a national or even international scale Bacon had no alternative but to appeal to the liberality of a legitimate monarch who, like the monarch represented in the masques, intends to bring the blessings of his own perfection on his people. But note again what happens to Bacon’s language and the look of power he is trying to construct. The “best state” that Bacon is trying to anticipate comes to crystallize, momentarily, into the image of a beekeeper king and his bees. The readers of Bacon’s text – the king himself, but also, of course, a general reading public – are thus being induced to apprehend an image of themselves in the future. But this image of the subjectivity of the future divides into two, the king on one side, the workers on the other. The workers pass to and fro and knowledge increases, as a “commodity” like honey may increase, while the king supervises the hive. Traveling about on their discoveries as they are, the workers are bound to a structure over which none of them individually has any measure of control; only the beekeeper-king is really stationary and free, and thereby what Donne called “omnisufficient.” The structure of feeling entailed in a desire oriented toward the One – a neo-Platonic

impetus, arousing individuals to assimilate themselves to the general, inherent, self-sufficient dignity of Man, and inviting them to partake of the utopian dignity of grasping the idea of the One and themselves as apprehenders of the One – is thus displaced into deference toward the dignity and self-sufficiency of the king.

At this point in his argument, however, Bacon introduces yet another slippage. Having designated the king to be the agent responsible for removing most of the impediments to learning, Bacon introduces one last impediment, for which the king himself cannot be held responsible, since the problem stems not from inherent coherence (or lack thereof) of the institutional structure, but the possible coherence of the various labors of individuals working within the structure. In other words, even if the many passing to and fro are united by the structure of the hive and the supervisory function of the king, the fact remains that workers are *not* all doing the same thing (gathering the very same honey). Their work, in fact, is broken down into various parts, and “there hath not been, or very rarely, any public designation of writers or inquirers concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been already sufficiently laboured or undertaken” (3:327). The king may be the beekeeper, but someone has to act as a leader among the bees and beekeeper alike, showing them the way toward what remains to be done, lest the divisions of the sciences fail to cohere and workers busy themselves with supernumerary or otherwise unsuitable labors. The one last impediment to the advancement of learning is the lack of a plan, or more particularly of an overview (in advance) of what it is that the scientists of the future should be looking for and how they should organize the “parts” of their findings. And for the eliminating of this last impediment Bacon designates – himself. “Wherefore,” as he says,

I will now attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste . . . to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation, and also serve to excite voluntary endeavors . . . (3:328)

The subject of Bacon’s discourse has inevitably shifted again. Bacon will speak in his own voice, as himself, for the benefit of a general public, and for the sake of the conceptualization of knowledge as an organized body of doctrines and fields of inquiry. Bacon excuses himself for his presumption, recalling again the Columbus topos: “I know well I can use no other liberty of judgement than I must leave to others; and I for my

part shall be indifferently glad either to perform myself or accept from another that duty of humanity, *Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam*, &c. [to put the wanderer in the right way]" (3:328). We are back in the world of the Columbusoid utopian pioneer, leading the way toward the unknown, even though in doing so one opens oneself to the charge of foolish presumption, and Bacon has to step back (as would-be Columbuses often do) and say, no, I am not doing this for myself, I am doing this for the future, I am anticipating the pathways of others.

The slippage from man to men, from men to the monarch, and from the monarch to Bacon himself is inevitable given the discursive structure of Bacon's project. The project proceeds on the condition that each of these historical subjects, right now, is ready to begin repairing the deficiencies of learning; and to each of these subjects Bacon is ready to assign a kind of prospect, a look of power: the mind "capable of the image of the universal world"; the men whose minds will labor in the "regions"; the king, both a "star" shining beyond the pillars of Hercules, beckoning scholars to go beyond the territorial boundaries in which they have so far confined themselves, and a Georgic beekeeper, empowered to create and supervise systems for the production of learning; and finally Bacon himself, a private perambulator over the precincts of knowledge, hoping to "minister light" and "excite voluntary endeavors." All four of these historical subjects may perhaps be characterized, as scholars often suggest, as aggressive "colonizers." And so too in the *Advancement* Bacon characterizes both James the man and the mind of man in general as absolute sovereigns, who may command the world of nature. But there are important differences among all these subjects. To begin with, each implies the construction of an empire over a different kind of object world: in the first case, an object world of nature in general, where "mankind" will have recovered its "sovereignty of power;" in the second case, an object world of "commodities and inventions," which "the many" will be gathering in their individual labors for the sake of all; in the third case, an object world where King James will have established colleges, libraries, lectureships, and the like, and begun the work of fashioning something "permanent and perpetual," while individuals pursue the callings of their individual disciplines; and in the fourth case, an object world of the body of knowledge itself, which Bacon here perambulates and surveys, which he elsewhere takes as his "precinct," and which he will later attempt to compile in the encyclopedic sections of his *Great Instauration* and the natural history of his *Sylva Sylvarum* (1626).

The prospect of “mankind” and its universal mind, the prospect of individual men set about their labors for the sake of the One, the prospect of the sovereign (in whomever or whatever sovereignty is invested), and the prospect of the ministering theorist – these anticipatory “looks,” and their subordinate object worlds, each involve the articulation of a will to mastery, and the complementary invention of a new phenomenal and behavioral field, with repercussions not only for how science may be conducted, but for how science may be fitted to (or imposed upon) the changing political and geopolitical realities of the century, as well as to the changing structures of religious practice. But they are not the same look: “man in general” (which in retrospect can be seen to have been extremely problematic in an age of aristocratic privilege, authoritarian government, and mass illiteracy) cannot conceivably assume the same prospective gaze as either men in particular or an individual sovereign king; nor can any of them assume the same prospective gaze as an independent, transcendently supplementary prophet, who anticipates the whole of the project from the outside. The “precincts” of each have to be different, just as the positions from which each oversees its precinct have to differ – at least until, to paraphrase and augment Plato, philosophers are kings, kings are philosophers, all philosophers are “new philosophers,” and “man in general” is a philosopher and king at once.

For Bacon in 1605, however – although this would change later in Bacon’s career, as we will see – the different prospects nevertheless seem to come together seamlessly, and unproblematically. In 1605 James’s recent accession is taken to indicate the advent of a moment, a “fullness of time,” in which the constructive power necessary for redeeming the mind, for establishing the needed institutions of knowledge, and for revising the organization of the “parts of knowledge” has fortuitously been installed in the capital of England. The constructive power of the king, placed as it has been by James himself at a fortuitous juncture in history, not only raises hopes for the actual establishment of the new institutions of learning, but enables Bacon to venture that the time has come for the “mind of man” to redeem itself, for men to be transformed into new philosophers, and for Bacon the individual to position himself as a prophetic minister of light. James’s accession has made the time of Reformation coincide with the place of his subjects, and opened up new prospects of mastery and redemption – all the more so because the mastery and the redemption Bacon is seeking, couched though it is in a language of Hermeticism and natural magic, is intended to unfold into the construction and dissemination of “external helps.”¹⁰⁷

We know, though, that apart from helping Bacon's career – at least until as Lord Chancellor he would be impeached for bribery and removed from office – James never did anything to help Bacon's advancement of learning. Bacon could defer to authority, summon authority, he could try to use James as his *Primum Mobile*. But nothing would happen – nothing except what Bacon could try to accomplish on his own, in the precincts of his mind, as he attempted to perambulate the Creation, a Columbus (in his lifetime) unfollowed, a man of too many hopes, almost all of them unfulfilled. The sublimity of the Jacobean ideology could encourage hope, but its scope was much too far beyond the actual conditions of political, social, and scientific reform to be of use to a Columbusoid philosopher like Bacon. James's ideology of sublimity encouraged dreams; it was a great spur to theatrical invention. But with a view to actual utopian hoping, whether as in the case of the rejected Puritans at the Hampton Conference or as in the case of the ultimately dejected Francis Bacon, the ideology and the man and the power behind could only in effect respond as Shakespeare's Alonso responds when Gonzalo articulates his own utopian vision: "Thou dost talk nothing to me."

Still, the lesson to be drawn from Bacon's *Advancement* is only partly that one should be wary of the dissonance between utopian visions and the reality they are meant to affect. For it is clear too that the dissonance of Bacon's reality is also an enabling condition: structurally, conceptually, historically.

The "look of power" here is on the one hand the look that Bacon attributes to the advancement of learning, the look of the apparatus of scientific inquiry he wants to see constructed along with the benefits he attributes to them, the rewards of science; but the "look of power" here is also, on the other hand, the prospective gaze that Bacon articulates in advance of the apparatus and rewards of science. It is the look that he and his readers are entitled to exert over the future. Now the look in the first sense is already fractured, if for no other reason than that the parts of science are many, and the "regions" or "precincts" over which science attempts to exert a mastery are multiple and many-sided. But the look in the second sense, the prospective gaze, the vision of a mastery projected into and over a future, is fractured too, although for different sorts of reasons. If the multiplicity of "regions" already seems to militate a fracturing of the prospective gaze, Bacon himself attempts to dispose of that problem by attempting his "general and faithful perambulation," by setting himself up as a pioneering, universal subject. But the universal pioneering subject, it turns out, paradoxically, is only one among several

subjects exerting mastery over the future. The king, for one, is another, not to mention Man in general. It would seem that the latter part of Bacon's kingdom of science has forgotten its beginning. What was to have been the province of the king has turned out to be the province of the universal perambulator. Or again, what was to have been the province of Man has turned out to be the province of the king.

Such fracturings and forgettings are all but inevitable: to articulate a "situationally transcendent" look of power is to engage in an all but impossible, unresolvable dialectic, where one begins one way and ends another, where one expresses a utopian mastery over an empire in which utopian mastery has little if any place, where standing outside an object of the imagination makes it all but impossible to find a place to occupy within it. But it is no accident that we find such fracturings and forgettings as Bacon articulates precisely when he is trying to invent something like what historians can now call the "project of modernity." Nor is it an accident that we find these things just as James comes to the throne, and serious intellectuals can attempt to draw the consequences of what seems to be a seamless system of absolutist rule. To discover the institutional requirements of modern science is to discover the fractured regions of modern science. Although it would take a long time before the implications of these fracturings would be fully appreciated by the scientific community of the modern age, the fracturing is already there at its inception, and in fact it is just this fracturing that distinguishes Baconian hope from the wild idealisms of Hermetic scientists before him. By the same token, to discover what seems to be a constructive power for reforming science – for reforming it, in effect, absolutely – is to discover the dream of absolute, technocratic mastery over the world. And to whom shall the dream be attributed? To whom shall the power of realizing the dream be assigned? The Baconian project is alienated from itself, in several ways, just as it is articulated in face of a dissonance, a resistant reality against which it wants to assert itself. But Bacon invents the project precisely out of a willingness to embrace that dissonance, to find in it the means for pretending that the moment for a real advancement of learning has finally come. Against the pessimism of the otherworldly divines Bacon can argue that a "latter age" has arrived, where the rules of pessimism no longer apply. Against the present perfect of Jacobean ideology, against the notion that the golden age has already arrived, in the fullness of time, Bacon can argue, however dissonantly, that therefore the Golden Age of Science may begin. "With what shall I repay you?," James had asked. And Bacon answers, "with this: with the advancement

of learning.” Because our ideological situation requires us to pretend that the fullness of time has arrived, so we can pretend that the fullness of time with its fullness of knowledge is about to begin.

And yet, “Concerning Government,” as Bacon goes on to say in his perambulations over the precincts of learning, “it is a part of knowledge secret and retired . . . We see all governments are obscure and invisible . . . We see the government of God over the world is hidden . . . [E]ven unto the general rules and discourses of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling” (3:473–74). Being a highly placed employee of the state Bacon himself would presumably be entitled to take an inward view of the “general rules and discourses” of high-level policy. But here Bacon lets his intellectual ambition dissolve; he closes his eyes and stops his mouth.

Wherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part, *that there was one that knew how to hold his peace.* (3:474–75)

CHAPTER 2

Utopian experimentalism, 1620–1638

I. THE WORLD IN THE MOON, THE NEWS ON THE GROUND

In 1620 Ben Jonson produced the first of a series of court masques which would be remarkable both for their fantastically imperial idealism and the directness of their appeals as royalist propaganda. The series culminates in *The Fortunate Isles*, where it is said that “That point of revolution being come / When all the Fortunate Islands should be joined,” and Macaria itself, the blessed isle of Greek tradition (and one of the islands mentioned by Hythloday in More’s *Utopia*), has been “Instructed to adhere to [James’s] Britannia.”¹ The first of these masques was evidently the most frequently performed court masque during all of James’s reign: *News from the New World Discovered in the Moon* (1620).²

“News, news, news!,” the masque opens, with the arrival on stage of a pair of heralds. “Bold and brave news!,” adds the Second Herald. “New as the night they are born in,” says the First Herald. “Or the fantasy that begot ’em” (lines 1–4). The news, it turns out, comes directly by way of the “neat and clean power of poetry”:

2nd Herald. Certain and sure news –

1st Herald. Of a new world –

2nd Herald. And new creatures in that world –

1st Herald. In the orb of the moon –

2nd Herald. Which is now found to be an earth inhabited!

1st Herald. With navigable seas and rivers!

2nd Herald. Variety of nations, politics, laws!

1st Herald. With havens in’t, castles and port towns!

2nd Herald. Inland cities, boroughs, hamlets, fairs and markets! (94–123)

What is remarkable here, both for the heralds themselves and for us, reflecting on the performance four hundred years later, is encapsulated in the words that comprise the performance’s title. First of all, the *News*; for the “news” itself, as a commodity regularly procured and imparted

for profit by an established commercial enterprise, is an invention of this time, the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 being a major impetus to its development.³ Secondly, the *New World*; for both literally and allegorically the masque is concerned with the possibility of new worlds, of alternative societies occupying alternative topologies. It is concerned with the opportunities and challenges that the existence of new worlds may pose to the spectators gathered for the performance. Are there other nations, other polities, other laws? At the time that the masque was commissioned John Hay, the Viscount Doncaster, was en route to England bearing tidings concerning the state of affairs in Bohemia and the Palatinate, determined to enlist James and England on the side of the Protestants.⁴ This was news from the Old World, to be sure; but the Bohemians were about to name James's son-in-law Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate, as their *Winterkönig*, and aggravate the conflicts of what would come to be known as the 'Thirty Years' War. Frederick had already established something of an ideal Protestant citadel at Heidelberg, a sumptuous and popular court that was attracting progressive Protestant intellectuals from all over Europe, including England; his next moves would determine the fate of Protestantism in Europe.⁵ Meanwhile, in a related development – since the sponsors of it were by and large members of the same faction as those in support of the Protestant stronghold of Heidelberg – the English colony in Virginia had at last seemed to achieve economic and political stability, and even a measure of autonomy in both respects; in 1619 its ruling company had signed its first constitutional compact, and the colony's first elective parliament convened.⁶ And at about the same time petitioners from Leyden – the English separatists under the leadership of John Robinson – had just won the king's attention and been granted permission to settle in the northern regions of Virginia, provided that they swear not to separate themselves from the English government and its bishops.⁷

The masque attempts to ridicule these events in other parts of the world, in part by assimilating them to events in a fanciful other world, a preposterous "new world" invented through the "power of poetry," and in part by associating them with a fleeting, expendable commodity, which poetry itself is in a position to trump, mere rumor-mongering "news." The masque is conveying the political message that all the "other worlds" of business with which the courtiers of England have been concerned are to James himself insignificant trifles. The news which diplomats might want to convey to the king is already known, and has already been taken care of. The king will keep his own council. At the end of the antimasque

the 2nd Herald stands before the king to say that the news from the new world of the moon is no news at all, and that eternal Truth and Fame (who will be danced in the first performance by James's favorite, Lord Buckingham, and James's son, Prince Charles) will rather remain in the ideal here and now of the court instead.

The masque thus forecloses the very "news" it discusses in favor of the more solid, lasting virtues of Truth, Fame, and the sublime ideology of courtly poetry. But the news is there; and if Jonson wants to ridicule the councils of diplomats by associating them with pedlars of commodities, he does so by representing the latter so well that he even anticipates certain developments in the production of the news which would not be realized until a few years later, all the while making the conveyance of the news not only the opening subject of the antimasque, but also its antic vehicle, its dramatic impetus.⁸ Indeed, the masque expresses an anxious preoccupation with what it represents as at least a double "newness": on the one hand, a newness concerning the conditions of discourse, the production and communication of language, of information, which the masque is concerned both to represent and dismiss, conditions under which events themselves have become a commodity to be retrieved, processed, distributed, bought and sold, and eventually used up; on the other hand, a newness concerning the contents of discourse, the things of the world, and in fact the very thingness of the world itself, for now there is a new world, with its own nations, polities, laws, a world which, by the conceit of the masque, we have not heard about yet. A new intensification and commodification of events in the world is joined to a new expansion of interest in the world, and what this world, this "other world," may reveal to us.

Significantly, Jonson associates the double newness of the culture with still a third phenomenon; for the news from the new world the masque discusses is lately *Discovered*, as the language of the title puts it – lately revealed, as if it had been there all along but had remained hidden from us until now; and it is discovered, of course, in *the Moon*. The masque calls attention to classical traditions concerning the worldliness of the moon – in Plutarch and Lucian, for example – and even identifies its production with classical authority. But the masque also makes a point of reminding its audience of more recent developments, beginning with Galileo and his "perplexive glass" (line 82). The masque, in fact, includes one of the first allusions in all of English literature to the Galilean-Kepleran understanding of the moon, and the hypothesis that, if the moon is a world or planet, it is therefore also probably inhabited.⁹ It metonymically

associates Galilean-Kepleran science, moreover, with such wistful individuals and movements as the occultist Cornelius Agrippa, the scientific inventor Cornelius Dribble, and the league of the “Rosy-Cross,” that is the Rosicrucians.

Although the journalistic urgency of Jonson’s masque is perhaps exaggerated, it is nevertheless indicative of significant changes in cultural and political life in England and Europe, changes which may not only appal the ideologue concerned to promote the permanent Truth and Fame of his king and the king’s loyal servants, but also liberate other kinds of thinkers.

The heyday of the Jacobean settlement is over. Jonson and the king are discovering themselves to inhabit a new kind of world – a busier and far more anxious world, a more dangerous world. It is too large, all of a sudden, and too rapidly paced. It is crowded with innovations. But it is in just such an atmosphere that there is a sudden growth in expressions of ideal politics and utopian mastery. “I will yet, to satisfie & please myself,” writes Robert Burton in 1621, “make an *Utopia* of mine owne, a poetically commonwealth of mine owne, where I may freely domineere, build cities, make laws, statutes, as I list myself. And why may I not?”¹⁰ We have encountered language like this from Gonzalo in *The Tempest* and Andreae in *Christianopolis*. But Gonzalo is a fictional character whom other characters silence, and Andreae inhabits another country. (Nor does Burton appear to have read *Christianopolis*, though he alludes to Plato, More, Joseph Hall and, in later editions, to Bacon.) Burton’s poetical commonwealth represents a departure: an individual, speaking in his own voice (though adopting the persona of a “Democritus Junior”), inventing a utopia of his “own”: a utopia, moreover, through which the author advocates substantial changes in the makeup of British society, even while insisting on the purely private and selfish nature of his ideas. And then, in the next few years Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis* and Francis Godwin’s *The Man in the Moone* are produced, though both are only published posthumously, in 1626 and 1638 respectively.¹¹ In 1638 they will be joined by the less coherent but good-natured stage comedy, Richard Brome’s *The Antipodes*. Each of these three texts recounts a jocoserious romance of travel, where other worlds are discovered and described and alternatives for organizing social life are explored, and where power itself – what it consists or ought to consist of, how it ought to be expressed and deployed, how it might exert new forms of mastery over the world: how it “may freely domineere,” especially from a technological point of view – is ingeniously examined. Meanwhile, from the

world of the *vita activa* we hear about still more adventures in utopian mastery. On 11 November 1620, a group of men aboard a ship at anchor off the Massachusetts coast would undersign a document where they consent to “covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation.”¹² The voice is collective rather than individual, a “we” rather than an “I”; the venue is wholly unfictional; but the authors are compacting to constitute a society out of their own willful, rational imaginations – compacting, in effect, to “freely domineere” over themselves. On paper, they even succeed; and they are followed soon after by a Great Migration, one of whose leaders imagines what will some day be the product of their labor, a “Citty on a Hill.”

It could be argued that examples such as these are more interesting for their differences than their similarities. But these and other texts and movements of the period nevertheless converge in a variety of ways – in time and place, in the schools of thought to which they variously yet similarly belong, in the imperial scope of the power they dream of exerting. I have a term for the cultural movement in question, which is meant to cover both the speculations of thinkers like Burton and the discursive trials of New England Puritans: “utopian experimentalism.” A number of individuals in the 1620s and 30s attempt to break free from the constraints on the imagination that were so firmly established during the high years of Jacobean culture. They construct instead a form of utopian self-assertiveness that may still deploy notions of sovereignty current in an earlier period, but which uses that sovereignty for new and independent, if only provisional, ends. They devise platforms through which the self may experiment with both itself and the objectives over which it hypothetically exerts control. Prototypically this experimentalism depends on the self-assertiveness of the “I” in Robert Burton’s *Anatomy of Melancholy*; but there are other kinds of “I’s” and even “we’s” who participate in this kind of anticipatory break from the past. Emphasizing means over ends, industriousness and the exercise of instrumental reason over the achievement of goals and the exercise of ends-oriented deliberation, these I’s are concerned not with the construction of a full-blown, objective utopian world, but instead with a subjective ideal, and indeed from a philosophical point of view a type of subjective idealism. But, again, their utopian experiments are imperial in scope. Unlike the “*world divided from the world*” that was the constraining stage of utopian aspiration in the early Jacobean era, in the 1620s and 30s utopian hope moves outward, in time and space alike. It moves to the New World, to the world in the

moon, to the ends of time. Even when it stays at home, as is the case with Robert Burton, it nevertheless finds an infinite imperial scope there too. George Herbert, in the text of *The Country Parson*, imagines a situationally transcendent way of life, where the priest in his limited domain acts as a kind of patriarchal all-in-all to his parishioners, performing not only as a “Father” to his “Flock,” but a “vice-regent” of God to his people, “a Lawyer also, and a phisician,” as well as a “rewarder or punisher” of all things.¹³ The same man who was capable in his lyric poetry of giving voice to the deepest existential loneliness – “I travelled on, seeing the hill, where lay / My expectation. / A long it was and weary way”¹⁴ – was capable, when translating himself and his role as a priest into the third person, of imagining an ideal provincial parish whose leader exerted an astonishingly absolutist yet intimate control over all persons and things.¹⁵ And the young Milton meanwhile, also staying at home, could imagine aspiring to the condition of a world-conquering of *spiritus*, a master of time and space, of all time and all space; even nature itself has “surrendered” to this imaginary spirit or mind, “as if indeed some god had abdicated the throne of the world and committed its justice, laws, and administration to him as governor.”¹⁶

This is history: history of the imaginary: one among several fairly abrupt shifts during the course of the seventeenth century in what people think and write when they think and write about the possibility of alternative societies: and thus in what, within the framework of the discourse of the imaginary, people *hope* for. Ben Jonson, as it happens, was already registering both a shift in the discourse of ideal politics – a shift due in part to a new enthusiasm among social dreamers – and a shift in the circumstances of cultural life that provided a new impetus and context for the discourse. He was calling attention to three phenomena in particular, I would suggest: politicization, globalization, and historicization. First, *politicization*: in 1620 fundamental changes are being observed in the terms of political life, with different main players becoming involved (Buckingham, the *Winterkönig*, Prince Charles), and with one of the hallmarks of the changes in terms being the fact that *cultural* phenomena are being more openly and controversially negotiated in a *political* arena, whether in court, in parliament, or other venues.¹⁷ Second, *globalization*: a word I adopt in a technical sense from the sociologist Anthony Giddens to indicate something obvious, though its significance can be disputed, the fact that the English nation was now operating on a wider scale in a larger world than it ever had before, its sovereignty extending into a number of colonies and trading outposts, and its domestic policies being

intimately concerned now not only with the New World across the sea but with the Thirty Years' War and the open conflicts between Catholic and Protestant principalities and states for European and even world hegemony.¹⁸ Third, *historicization*: because for many individuals involved in the new politicization and globalization of English culture, life was being experienced as if it were being drawn into an acceleration of events, the pressures of time becoming more and more the pressures of history, and history becoming experienced more and more as a drama progressing toward a resolution. In many ways the phenomenon anticipates what Habermas and Kosseleck identify as the "modern consciousness of time": a "conviction that the future has already begun," a "new experience of an advancing and accelerating of historical events." In the modern, historicized consciousness of time, "The image of history as a uniform process that generates problems is formed, and time becomes experienced as a scarce resource for the mastery of problems that arise – that is, as the pressure of time."¹⁹ Jonson is hinting at this transformation in the experience of time too.

The three factors together represent a change in the conditions of life which is difficult to discuss concretely, difficult to place in terms of what a cultural historian like Raymond Williams might call "lived experience," but which nevertheless shows up repeatedly in discourses expressing an ideal politics and a utopian mastery. "I heare new newes everyday," Robert Burton adds to the 1624 edition of his *Anatomy of Melancholy*,

and those ordinary rumours of warre, plagues, fires, inundations, thefts, murders, massacres, meteors, Comets, spectrums, prodigies, apparitions, of townes taken, cities besieged in *France, Germany, Turkey, Persia, Poland &c.*, dayly musters and preparations, & such like, which these tempestuous times afford, battels fought, so many men slain, monomachies, shipwrackes, Piracies, and Seafights, Peace, Leagues, Strategemmes, & fresh alarums. A vast confusion of vows, wishes, actions, edicts, petitions, law-sutes, pleas, lawes, proclamations, complaints . . .²⁰

There are classical precedents for remarks like these, yet there is no question but that Burton is personally responding to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War and the many complications it has added to life, even when one lives out of harm's way, in the security of tenure at Oxford University. There is no question, too, but that Burton is trying to find a way of responding to the pressure of events which, as in Jonson's masques, turn upon two dramatically different poles of experience: on the one hand, the newness of "the news" as an institution and the onslaught of information "rumored" from abroad and brought somewhat chaotically

into the spaces of the mind at home; on the other hand, the effort to find a position of ideal resistance to the pressures of globalization, politicization, and historicization, wrought and registered by “the news.” The response is defiant: the news cannot be allowed to overwhelm the self. But the response is ideal too. In *this* situation, one needs to find a way to rise above, to sublimate, to convert the pressure of time and place into an ideal subjectivity of detachment.

Gazing from an imaginary distance upon the globe of the earth, in another “anatomy,” the narrator of Comenius’s *The Labyrinth of the World*, “palpably felt it move and whirl in a circle until I feared to be overcome with dizziness. For wherever I cast my glance, everything to the least mote seemed to swarm before my eyes. Moreover, when I stopped to listen, the air was filled with the sounds of pounding, striking, shuffling, whispering, and screaming.”²¹ Some of the noise, as he later learns, is due to the prevalence of “newsmongers” in the world, who communicate by blowing whistles in people’s ears. The whole business is both futile and misleading, the narrator goes on to say, since the news is so changeable, its continual dissemination so seductive, and its consumers “so light-minded as to allow themselves to be duped by every gust of wind.”²² Comenius’s pilgrim nevertheless begins his tour of the labyrinth of the world by defining himself as an independent, disinterested investigator, using language that both recalls Burton and anticipates the language of Descartes and Bunyan.

After much inward struggle and hesitation [Comenius’s pilgrim writes], it finally occurred to me to investigate first all human affairs under the sun, and after I had intelligently compared them one with another, to choose the profession that would enable me to live pleasantly and peacefully . . .

Thereupon I sauntered out by myself and began to consider where and how I should begin.²³

Finding a guide to take him through the labyrinth, and learning to “see things in their proper aspect,” avoiding the delusions of “Assumption” and “Habit,” the pilgrim then finds himself,

upon an exceedingly high tower, so that I seemed to touch the clouds. Looking down from this tower, I saw a city beautiful in appearance, shining and prodigiously widespread, but not so great that I could not discern its limits and boundaries all around . . .

My guide, Mr. Ubiquitous, remarked: “Behold, my pilgrim, here you have that fine world that you were so anxious to see! I brought you first to this elevation that you might survey it all and thus might understand its arrangement.”²⁴

Comenius would later play a major role in the intellectual ferment of the Interregnum, inspiring the cause of universal education and world peace, even visiting England briefly during the first flush of millenarian optimism in the early 1640s due to the ascendancy of Parliament. Here, writing on the Continent in response to the Thirty Years' War, Comenius is taking an uncharacteristically grim view of the world. But the panoptic view he takes of it, like Burton's panoptic "synopsis" of the universal condition of melancholy, nevertheless approaches a utopian view of the world as well. The panoptic perspective, whether in Comenius or Burton, derives from classical stoicism and cynicism. "I did sometime laugh and scoff with *Lucian*, and Satyrically taxe with *Menippus*, lament with *Heraclitus*," Burton says.

I rub on *privus privatus*; as I have still lived, so I now continue, *statu quo prius*, left to a solitary life and mine own domesticke discontents: Saving that sometimes, *ne quid mentiar*, as *Diogenes* went into the Citie and *Democritus* to the haven to see fashions, I did for my recreation now and then walke abroad, looke into the world, and could not chuse to make some little observation . . .²⁵

Cynics like Lucian in his Menippean satires found occasions for venting their spleen, in laughter or in tears, imagining escapes into quasi-omniscient observation which made the affairs of the world seem suitably petty and the act of observing the world's pettiness suitably contemptuous.²⁶ Yet Stoics could use the same device for confirming their faith in the ultimate harmony of things, as happens most notably in Cicero's *Dream of Scipio*, which was widely read during the Renaissance: Scipio ascends to the spheres of the stars in order to find a stable, heavenly perspective on the confusions of sublunary politics, and learns from the experience to carry a kind of ideal republic within himself, whatever may happen on earth. And indeed, even when Lucian's Menippus travels to the moon and sees the world from an otherworldly perspective, the effect is at least in part to affirm the ability of the individual to stand apart and maintain a politic rationality in defiance of general political madness. The whole movement in late Renaissance thought toward the construction of "anatomies" repeats these motives.²⁷ When Burton and Comenius adopt the conceit they present their panopticisms as solutions designed to cope with the pressure of troubling historical events. It is from within the precincts of their detached yet all-observant subjectivities that they suppose that "all human affairs" may be "investigated," or that all the forms of melancholy be understood, and the cacophony of history resisted. It is from within and by virtue of that "I" that the scholar or the

pilgrim, seeing the world from a distance, and seeing his own powers to see it that way, finds himself figuratively “elevated”, empowered by having been raised above the affairs of the world, empowered to generate a perspective from which an alternative may be sighted.

2. VARIETIES OF SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM

As a philosophical term “subjective idealism” has so many associations that introducing it here may cause more problems than it solves. However, I am trying to indicate not a philosophical doctrine but a way of shaping discourse in response to perceived pressures and problems. In order to cope with the sweep of empirical data, whether (as in Comenius) the noise of the world or whether (as later in Descartes) the confusions of sense perception, subjects idealize themselves. They fashion themselves as mental and discursive constructs existing apart from the world, standing over and against or even (imaginatively) above the empirical world. Thus they recruit themselves as potential self-asserters, in Blumenberg’s sense,²⁸ selves who claim to be vested with the power of declaring from within themselves the justification and foundation of their own cognitive, discursive, and instrumental rationalities. Separated from the empirical, the mind becomes its own place, as it were. And it is from *out* of this place, this subjective foundation of the self within that writers presume to engage with reality, and indeed find the means of altering and mastering it, observing and adjusting reality according to their own inner certainties.²⁹ The subject who makes a “utopia of mine owne” deliberately constructs himself as an authorial “I” out of whose own rationality a realm of ideal politics may be fashioned, making himself the productive subject of an alternative world. But the idealism involved, again, is not inalterable. It can be manifested in many ways. And if it posits itself as an absolute beginning of things, it also posits itself as a response, an escape, an accommodation.

Historians of ideas, as I have noted, have for a long time been aware of this period as a key moment in the development of the “modern sense of time,” a transitional phase when the idea of progress, with all its ethical implications, was overtaking the idea of historical decay, and the way was being prepared for the development of the *bona fide* theories of progress of the eighteenth century.³⁰ But this modern sense of time, again, is both an invention and a response; it is a mental framework whereby a field of phenomena may be constructed both as an urging of a self-asserting subject and a prompting of external events with a logic (or illogic) of

their own. Consider the case of the Rosicrucians, the same half-real half-fantastic fraternity of scientists whom Jonson was fond of ridiculing. The Rosicrucians (whose connection with England is both doubtful and confirmed, since many English writers of the century beginning with Jonson felt compelled to respond to what they represented, and if they existed at all their seat of operation was close by the palace of Frederick I) were anticipating the coming of a “happy time,” a new age – in the term of Joachim of Fiore, whose influence on Rosicrucian thought is considerable, a “third dispensation” – and they were professing ideal principles and methods which were to be instrumental in bringing the new age to fruition. Following the methodical lead of the Rosicrucians men were said to have the opportunity to “renew and reduce all arts (in this our age spotted and imperfect) to perfection; so that finally man might thereby understand his own Nobleness and Worth.”³¹ As in other expressions of utopian idealism, the Rosicrucian writings put their reader in view both of an objective process – here a history sweeping in the direction of the new age – and an ideal method through which designated subjects will master the objective process. “Although we do now freely confess,” they write, “that the world is much amended within an hundred years [since Luther and the Reformation], yet we are assured that our *Axiomata* shall unmovable remain unto the Worlds End, and also the world in her highest and last Age shall not attain to see anything else” (169). “[W]e know,” they say, “after a time there will now be a general reformation, both of divine and human things, according to our desire, and the expectation of others” (177). As they put it in their second manifesto, the *Confessio Fraternitatis*, “God hath certainly and most assuredly concluded to send and grant to the World before her end, which presently there upon shall ensue, such a Truth, Light, Life, and Glory, as the first man *Adam* had” (185).

This is clearly a heretical and perhaps irresponsible anticipation of the idea of progress. But it illustrates the bipolar nature of the new sense of time and its amenability to utopian expectation: on the one hand, unmoveable “axiomata,” invested in the subject, on the other hand, an anticipatory consciousness, founded in the objective pressures of time, in preparation for an objective end of time. The heresy in fact finds echoes in the ostentatiously sober texts of establishment divines like George Hakewill’s *An Apologie of the Power and Providence of God*, John Henry Alsted’s *De Milleannis Apocalypticis*, and Joseph Mede’s *Clavis Apocalyptica*, all appearing in 1627. And although we will not find in these or other writings about history and time in this period a consistent outlook, we

will find in them a common concern, around which a variety of outlooks have been dispersed and subjectivities articulated. The advancing and accelerating of *events*, the *image* of history as a process, time experienced as a *resource*, a *scarce* resource, usable for solving the problems that history itself has generated, since *the future has already begun*, all seem to be the phenomena that individuals are becoming more convinced of, and that they are either trying to account for in their revised theories of providence, the apocalypse, and the freedom of the will, or trying to recoil from in their complaints about the news and its confusions. Even radical Puritans were coming to emphasize an engagement in something like worldly progress and the exploitation of the resources of time.³²

But perhaps the most dramatic testament to this strain of subjective idealism, to its responsiveness to the pressures of time and the will-to-power underlying it, is found in Milton's *Prolusion VII*. The rhetorical circumstance of the academic exercise, an imagined battle between ignorance and learning, encourages the young writer to inflate the subject of learning into a quasi-Rosicrucian master beyond mastery, overcoming time and space alike through the agency of a fully educated yet intuitive "spiritus" or mind. "And at length," Milton writes,

when the cycle of universal knowledge has been completed, the spirit of man, no longer confined within this dark prison-house, will reach out far and wide, till it fills the whole world and the space far beyond the expansion of its divine greatness. Then at last most of the chances and changes of the world will be so quickly perceived that to him who holds this stronghold of wisdom hardly anything can happen in his life which is unforeseen or fortuitous. He will indeed seem to be one whose rule and dominion the stars obey, to whose command earth and sea harken, and whom winds and tempests serve; to whom, lastly Mother Nature herself has surrendered, as if indeed some god had abdicated the throne of the world and committed its justice, laws, and administration to him as governor.³³

Milton's "spirit" is in fact something of a lonely figure, isolated from the very things over which it has assumed command. It is isolated, moreover, precisely because it is, in a philosophical sense, merely ideal, merely mental. Unlike Bacon's subject of learning, it relies neither on an institutional framework nor on technological instrumentalities, and it has, in fact, little if any instrumental hold over the objects under its command. Milton's *spiritus*, having completed its journey to knowledge, reaches out through time and space alike until the cosmos itself seems to obey it, but mainly and perhaps only *ideally*: "as if." The cosmos only *seems* to obey

the mind. "Mother Nature herself has surrendered" only "as if some god had abdicated." And so, in itself, the *spiritus* arrives at a condition where it is both omniscient and tentative, imperial and hypothetical. It is only *experimentally* sovereign, and has little hold over the realm of things. But an utter sovereignty over time and space is nevertheless what Milton proposes in his argument to be the seductive goal of learning. And this god-like sovereignty is to be achieved, as Milton's rhetoric frames it, in the culmination of a process, a journey toward which learning is already directed. There is no utopia here; but the mind is on a utopian journey, attempting to colonize time and space by occupying them with itself alone, making time and space into a nation of the mind, and the subject of itself.³⁴

3. NEW PLYMOUTH AND EARLY MASSACHUSETTS

Given these trends and conditions, it is perhaps not surprising that when individuals actually attempt to establish something like a utopia, when they invent a practical object of ideal politics, they vacillate between expressions of intense subjective idealism and shrewd admissions of the limits of their hopes, the resistance of the world to utopian mastery. The "ordinary examples and precepts of the Scriptures," the pastor Robert Cushman writes in a pamphlet promoting migration to New Plymouth in 1622, "reasonably and rightly understood and applied, must be the voice and the word, that must call us, press us, and direct us in every action." But now there is no "land or possession, like unto the possession which the Jews had in Canaan, being holy and appropriated unto a holy people . . . [T]here is no land of that sanctimony, no land so appropriated, none typical . . . But now we are all, in all places, strangers and pilgrims, travellers and sojourners . . . our dwelling is but a wandering."³⁵ In the discourse of the colony of New Plymouth – an important location for ideal politics in the 1620s, although writers on "literary" utopias and "British" utopias usually avoid them – writers develop what is virtually a religion of effort. The "voice," the "word," calling, pressing, and directing – this would be a constant theme of early New England Puritanism, providing by way of Covenant theology an idiosyncratic version of the pressures of time, the demands imposed on the self by a world that has undergone politicization, globalization, and historicization. The demand is not entirely logical; it is experienced as an uncanny impulse. But it leads to righteous things. "When God intendes a man to a worke," John Winthrop would write a few years later, "he settis a Byas on his heart so

as tho' he be tumbled this way and that yet his Bias still drawes him to that side, and there he rest at last."³⁶ John Cotton wrote to a friend,

God having shut a door against both of us from ministering to him and his people in our wonted congregations, and calling us, by a remnant of our people, and by others of this country, to minister to them here, and opening a door to us this way, who are we that we should strive against God . . . ? If we may and ought to follow God's calling three hundred miles, why not three thousand?"³⁷

It has been conventional among historians to discount the utopianism of the New Plymouth colonists. According to Perry Miller, the Plymouth settlers were all but entirely lacking in any genuinely progressive, formative impulse; "their migration was not so much an errand as a shrewd forecast, a plan to get out while the getting was good."³⁸ But for his part Miller was concerned to minimize the ethics of the Plymouth settlers in order to emphasize the exemplary, creative values of the leaders of the Great Migration a decade later – values which more recent scholars have now also called into question.³⁹ And Miller was perhaps expecting too much of the pilgrims in the first place, requiring them to be impossibly clean: to put forward a progressive or proactive campaign without also being reactive, and to express themselves through a utopian-revolutionary discourse free of ideological taint and apologetic motives. If the pilgrims failed to satisfy the conditions of a pure mission, a utopian "errand into the wilderness," as Miller understood it, it is in part because no one ever can, because a proactive revolutionary agenda which is not also a reaction to intolerable circumstances is unthinkable; and because no revolutionary agenda is ever, when communicated to a public, entirely innocent of ideology and apologetics, of the practice of self-serving self-justification.

But apology – self-legitimation – was also a mediating motif of experiments in utopian mastery at this time; the assertion of utopian objectives involved the assertion of utopian subjects who were legitimizing themselves as the foundation of an ideal politics solely by asserting themselves. The logical error involved in the adventure of self-legitimation is actually a source of the power of the utopian experiment. "[Y]ou are to become a body politic," John Robinson wrote to the pilgrims on their setting out to sea, "using amongst yourselves civil government." There were no "persons of special eminence," civil or ecclesiastical, sailing with them. And for this reason it was important for them to "provide for peace with all men," exercise charitable "watchfulness," and "join common affections truly bent upon the common good."⁴⁰ This is the advice of someone

aware that the community to which he was writing – not in retrospect, but at the very time when the community was being formed – was being fashioned out of the wills of its individual members, and would survive only so long as their wills, as he said, were “knit” together. The very isolation of the group, whether it was imposed upon them or self-imposed, provides both the cause and the ground of the free will they are exercising. Aware, however, that their position was precarious and their minds in danger of going too far ahead of themselves, these writers also proposed that it was in the *effort* of their project, the methodical “wise-walking” they were undertaking, that enabled those participating in it to participate, and that it would be in this continuation of wise-walking that they would find the deep ground of their objectives, the foundational legitimation it otherwise lacked.

It was thus that Robert Cushman would remind people that “now we are all, in all places, strangers and pilgrims, travellers and sojourners” and that “our dwelling is but a wandering.” There was not to be a simple arrival, an end to things in a New Jerusalem, where objective conditions would have fulfilled the demand for legitimation. New England was not to be an absolute Utopia. But without perfection, or because of the lack of it, there might be a place where the churches of God could thrive, and individuals would be freed to resume their spiritual wanderings again, a place where pilgrims might wander in the right way, literally justifying themselves (before God, before themselves, before the world) in the conduct of their wandering. England is impoverished, exhausted, overpopulated, and divided, Cushman and others insist (writing in the early years of a depression and straining to make a point). Moreover, the alternative of living in Leyden is no longer as welcome as it had been; among other things, the impending expiration of a truce between Spain and Holland is about to jeopardize their political standing there. But America would then serve as a resource for the labor of renewal, repatriation, and reunification. If to dwell is but to wander, nevertheless to wander in North America would be to wander under English protection, free from the distractions, pressures, and threats of a foreign nation. In fact, it would be a means for living under the authority of the English crown again, even if apart from the British Isles, gathered in a church (as Bradford had it) modeled after the primitive Christianity, and knitted together (as Robinson had it) in a “body politic.”⁴¹

The key to the attractiveness of settling in America was not that it would provide a condition for fulfillment, an endpoint of history, a second paradise, where nature would have everything already “in store” for

them, but that it would provide a condition for the furthering of a “work” which included real economic labor as well as the labor of wise-walking. The land as a whole – English but not corrupted, a “rude wilderness” but neither barren nor unwelcoming, a place in fact where men would be free precisely to toil and resume their typological sojourning on earth – provided a stage where the historical work of the churches of God and its individuals could be indefinitely extended, and the threat of annihilation at the hands of habit and corruption be kept at bay. The subtext of the New World’s purported wildness and even, as others had it, its emptiness,⁴² an important pretext for colonial hegemony and commercial expansion as well the dissemination of a utopian imaginary, is an important issue, and one to which it is worth returning.⁴³ But for the time being it is enough to understand what kind of opportunity this emptiness represented to the early colonists. “It is not with us as with other men,” Robinson and Brewster wrote as early as 1617, “whom small things can discourage, or small discontentments cause to wish themselves at home again.” “We verily believe and trust the LORD is with us.” “[Our] people are, for the body of them, industrious and frugal . . .”⁴⁴

When the Mayflower Compact was devised and signed – and I believe this social contract needs to be admired for its originality as American tradition has usually admired it, even if historians have induced some skepticism about it – the undersigners were acting both out of the necessity Perry complains about and out of free will, indeed a utopian will to power. They stood *before* the project they were about to consummate, stood before it as its *authors*, even as they recognized the ambivalent and overdetermined conditions to which they were responding. They had determined that participation in the historical reality of true religion required a voluntary participation in the community of a visible church, a community generated out of individuals being regenerated by the grace and word of God. From the beginning they all but excluded traditional “eminence” from their midst, and had to find the authority of political legitimacy from within themselves, even if that self-sustained legitimacy quietly depended on the protection and licence of higher sovereignties and a larger, typological and eschatological structure of worldly activity. We “covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation,” the undersigners of the Compact write, “and by virtue hereof to enact, constitute and frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the colony; unto which we promise all due submission and obedience.”⁴⁵

The self-asserting, self-legitimizing, subjective ideal is compacted. A new kind of colony is founded.

True, in many respects what the Pilgrims wanted to find from within themselves was a repetition of earlier models of order, especially the order of the primitive church. But since their progress was always in some sense also a return, since their emigration was a form of immigration (a way of returning to English sovereignty), and wherever they settled they would also still be pilgrims, their prospects were always intimately tied not only to a reaction against suffering but also to an unending demand for self-justification, which found immediate expression through “preaching, professing, and wise-walking” and mediated expression through their apologetics. Their task was never to be completed; it was to be an interminable labor performed in an empire of pilgrims. But that was just what America was for: America was a place where they could legitimately continue to stay busy, and where keeping busy itself – wandering methodically in an empire of one’s own – would continue to be a form of self-legitimation.

Nor were the colonists at New Plymouth much different in this respect from the later colonists who came over in the Great Migration: a period of twelve years, from 1630 to 1642, during which over seventy thousand individuals emigrated from England, more than twenty thousand of them to New England alone.⁴⁶ The migration took many forms, and was animated by a variety of motives. But the leaders of the Great Migration into New England were also identifiably “Puritan,” as historians somewhat begrudgingly continue to use the term, and they also emphasized the instrumentality and labor of wise-walking. In the most famous statement of the ideals of the new emigrants, the imperfections of the world, now and ever, provide a pretext for a project that itself is unending – always at work, always still in the process of coming into being. John Winthrop’s lay sermon aboard the *Arabella*, *A Modell of Christian Charity*, which even a recent skeptic calls “the first great communitarian statement in American literature,” is delivered, significantly, when Winthrop’s group is still only about halfway across the ocean.⁴⁷ It begins by remarking on the inequities in the world as God has created it, and then praising those inequities as a pretext for the exercise of charity, such that God will now “have many Stewards” engaged in “dispensing his gifts to man by man.”⁴⁸ If the world were perfect, there could be no active charity aiming toward perfection. If men were not unequal, there could be no labor of making them more equal. So imperfection becomes an occasion for the labor of perfection, although a final

perfection is never really aimed at. As for the “citty on a hill” the emigrants are about to found, even that is less a crystallized objective than a platform for continued charitable labor. The only product Winthrop claims to be concerned with in this passage, apart from the fulfillment of the terms of their contract with God, is the image of achievement which is going to be handed down to posterity. Winthrop argues that by doing what they have to do in order to fulfill God’s commission, by observing “the meanes whereby this must bee effected,” then “we” the Puritan emigrants “shall finde that the God of Israel is among us.” “Hee shall make us a prayse and glory, that men shall say of succeeding plantacions: the lord make it like that of New England: for wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are uppon us” (294–95). Winthrop is not imagining a city on a hill which he is going to try to recreate when he arrives at his destination; he is imagining what his technology of godly community is going to look like to others from afar.⁴⁹ His community will be “as a Citty upon a Hill” because other people will be watching and judging them, because their community will be exposed to “the eies of all people”: the global public as super-ego. It was not out of pride that Winthrop imagined a city on a hill; it was because he wanted to motivate his fellow travelers to get busy.

4. A “UTOPIA OF MINE OWNE”; OR, “ALL MUST BE AS IT IS”

Busyness, industriousness – something like Weber’s “Protestant ethic” or the code of conduct among Hill’s “industrious sort”⁵⁰ – is one of the cornerstones of Burton’s utopia too, as it is of the project of the *Anatomy of Melancholy* as a whole. “Industry is a Load-stone to draw all good things, that alone makes Countries flourish, Cities populous,” Burton writes. Idleness, by contrast, is the reason why in England “there are many swarmes of rogues and beggars, theeves, drunkards, and discontented persons . . . many poore people in all our Townes . . . base built cities, inglorious, poore, small, rare in sight, ruinous, and thin of inhabitants.”⁵¹ If melancholy is a disease of the soul whose pre-eminent cure is keeping busy, so “Kingdomes, Provinces, and Politicke bodies are likewise sensible to this disease,” so the first cure among a variety of cures is the uninterrupted observance of a program for keeping citizens occupied (67). In Burton’s utopia, “I will have no boggs, fennnes, marshes, vast woods, deserts, heaths, commons, but all inclosed; (yet not depopulated, and therefore take heed you mistake me not) . . . I will not

have a barren acre in all my Territories, not so much as the tops of mountaines, where nature failes, it shall be supplied by art: lakes and rivers shall not be left desolate" (88). The model of Burton's utopia is in large part the Low Countries, which Burton admires, the complaints of the Leyden pilgrims notwithstanding, for their many cities, their populousness and wealth: "and what is the cause" for their prosperity, Burton asks, but their "industry and excellency in all manner of trades?" (76[1989]).

With Burton's encomium to industry we are in the presence of the detached, ambivalent relation to traditional authority that the Protestant work ethic often induced. Robert Burton places a monarch at the head of his state, insists on the necessity of a hereditary monarch to the security of the state, and then ignores him, understanding that, from the perspective of the work ethic he admires, kings do not really *do* anything. On the one hand, Burton imagines a hierarchical state with an unequal distribution of wealth and honor; he finds "splendor and magnificence" desirable (89), and believes that conventional feudal estates, beginning with the estate of the monarch, are the best guarantee of the maintenance of hierarchical order. "*Utopian* parity is a kinde of governmente, to be wished for, rather then effected . . . I will have severall orders, degrees of nobilities, and those hereditary . . . My forme of government shall be Monarchicall" (89–90). But, on the other hand, in all of his specifications of legislative, juridical, and executive functions in the state, Burton ignores the monarch entirely. The monarch is a figurehead in Burton's utopia.⁵² Or perhaps not even that; perhaps he is only a sedimentation, a remnant from an earlier system. The monarch survives as a principle held over from an earlier form of government and social order; but he does not do anything. The whole hierarchy of Burton's utopia, important though it is in its traditional, feudal forms for the maintenance of the whole, has nevertheless been completely subordinated to the newer principle of state capitalism and meritocracy. The hierarchy serves capitalism, meritocracy, and private property rather than the other way around. When its representatives have nothing to do to further the interests of capitalist prosperity they are either ignored, as Burton's state ignores its monarch, or allowed to be swallowed up in economic ruin, and replaced by more meritorious individuals. "I will have such a proportion of ground belonging to every *Baronry*, he that buyes the land, shall buy the *Baronry*, he that by riot consumes his patrimony, and ancient demeanes, shall forfeit his honours" (89). The real power in Burton's state is handed over to those who work

and prosper: “all conditions shall be tied to their taske” (93). In fact, Burton makes a point of juxtaposing his statement asserting the necessity of a monarch with a statement to the effect that honor and rank have to be open to everyone of merit regardless of birth. To exclude someone from an office on the basis of his social status, he adds, is “*naturae bellum inferre*, odious to God & men, I abhorre it” (90). And with equal resolution he insists: “He that invents any thing for the publicke good in any Art or Science, writes a Treatise, or performes any noble exploit, at home or abroad, shall be accordingly enriched, honoured, and preferred” (92).

Nothing, really, could be further from the magus-king of the early Jacobean era than this; nothing could be further from that “sciential light” who makes the law and gives it, and reigns over an already perfected “world of our own,” than this king who does nothing, and this state where “all conditions” are “tied to their taske” – nothing that is, but an abolition of monarchy and hereditary titles themselves. Burton will not take that step; no one of his day and age was capable of taking it. But even while instating the monarchy and arguing for its necessity, Burton sweeps away its ideological justification except as a system of licensing the idea of order, and blithely makes his departure into a utopia of his own, founded on industriousness, private property, free trade, and merit. And thus in his own way, even while speaking as an Anglican cleric, and while paying lip service to the wisdom of the Anglican ecclesiastical system,⁵³ Burton reduplicates the pattern of political separatism that the Mayflower pilgrims signed up to. He makes a mental experiment where the princely state in itself is left as it is, used as a license of social order, and then also left behind.

The extremism of Burton’s position has been under-appreciated – in part because Burton has rigged it that way. Juxtaposing his most audacious proposals with his most conventional appreciations of the status quo, imposing his industrial meritocracy on the sedimented remains of feudal aristocracy, Burton allows the more radical features of his thought to be obscured by its apparent traditionalism.⁵⁴ It is more frequently remembered that Burton called Plato’s republic “impious, absurd and ridiculous,” than that he charged the traditional English system of patronage and preferment with waging a war against nature; and that is partly because Burton framed his remarks in such a way as to disguise or misdirect his complaints against the English system, and make it seem as if he were complaining about something else. But if the radicalism of Burton’s utopia has been under-appreciated it is probably also because

Burton's radicalism is not our radicalism; in fact, by modern standards, Burton's poetical commonwealth is one of the most outstanding examples of the early modern period of what have been called "realistic utopias."⁵⁵ Burton was "describing the potential of the processes which were already taking place in England,"⁵⁶ we are now in a position to see. Not only does Burton depict a state which in many ways resembles the state that would actually come into being at the end of the century – in its anticipation of a weakened monarchy, its professionalization of government, its affirmation of the priority of property rights, and even in its establishment of a national bank⁵⁷ – but he depicts it in terms that were already familiar to his English readers at the time, promoting reforms that many of his readers might also have wished to see adopted.

But realism in Burton's utopia is commonly associated with remarks to the effect that Burton knows that his proposals are surreal, and probably impractical, to boot. Burton never stops vacillating. The ideal "I" of utopian invention looks to itself, justifying itself, finding principles of reasoning in itself; but it also looks outside itself, so that it works by deduction and induction at once. Burton deduces his utopia from the principles of utopian invention; but he also draws his utopia from observation, from comparisons and contrasts among the examples of government which he has (indirectly, from books) observed. The effect is to assert at once both the possibility and the impossibility of the utopia he is inventing, and both the legitimacy and the illegitimacy of the self-assertive utopian subject. Sometimes the effect is such that the very impossibility of the project, its design as a mere "poetic" artifact, is what makes the utopia seem realistic.

Wandering from his official stance as "Democritus Jr.," a cynic merely standing apart from the world, and adopting the position of a poet who, in the fashion of Plato and Thomas More, may presume to imagine a society as a whole, Burton begins by locating and elaborating his utopia as a working nation-state, from its geographical situation and its means of trade and education to its religion, government, and philosophy. In the mental laboratory of the poetical commonwealth, as in Book II of *The Republic* (section 369 forward), the fiction of a state begins with a consideration of that which is *necessary* for human sustenance and mandatory for the maintenance of a civil society as a whole. And thus, perhaps paradoxically, from the beginning the fiction is fixed on the preservation of a certain form of realism. Burton situates his commonwealth geographically, dividing it into provinces and towns, establishing

the connection between those towns and their natural resources, their economic infrastructures, and their jurisdictional limits (86). Even in jest he begins with an experiment in realism, a realism which is all the more emphasized when he makes it clear that he is taking successful states of Europe as his models.⁵⁸ If Burton is following the method of Plato and Thomas More, using the language game of utopian invention as a means of comprehending the state as a whole, he enhances the realism of the method when he establishes that unlike Plato and More he is not going to distance his utopia from social practices prevalent in his own day, but instead is going to adapt his utopia to those practices whenever possible. This may be the most significant innovation of Burton's utopia: its method of fitting the real into the mold of an ideal while using the ideal as a way of fastening upon the outlines of the real.

But Burton emphasizes the impossibility of his poetic commonwealth even in spite of its realistic effects; and he does this to mark out and excuse the radical nature of his experiment. Already, while warming up to his utopia in the course of his "Democritus to the Reader," Burton has argued himself into a double bind, which will force him into a radically impossible strategy when he comes to consider the question of the good society. On the one hand, he has adopted the perspective of an independent Lucianic observer, free from the confusions of the world and its historical dynamics, from which he makes his simple but all-encompassing argument: the world is mad. But on the other hand, Burton knows that this means that he is himself mad, and therefore that a strictly sane or "wise" point of view is a logical impossibility. The very madness against which he defines himself as a kind of scientific resister is a phenomenon from which it is impossible to escape. Thus for Burton, so far as he is a student of the human condition, the scientific scholar is inevitably implicated in his field of study, inevitably a part of rather than apart from the madness of the world, and incapable of making the very escape which his project is designed to exemplify. There is no excuse, then, for his embarking on his project, no justification – none that is, but an appeal to two peculiar, contradictory claims, which lie at the very heart of his methods and aspirations. Claiming, first, that all he is doing is "satisfying" himself, he maintains that he is fulfilling a need he has a perfect right to try to fulfill ("why may I not?"), with no serious exogenous ramifications. But claiming, secondly and contrarily, that he is attempting the impossible, exceeding the limits of the known for the good of humanity as it is, he is adopting yet another form of the Columbus topos, and positioning himself as an enhancer of the status

quo. In fact, Burton repeatedly makes both claims at the same time, even in the same sentence:

The generalities of the Disease, the necessities of the Cure, and the commodity or common good . . . will arise to all men by the knowledge of it, as shall at large appeare in the ensuing Preface. And I doubt not but that in the end you wil say with me, that to anatomize this humour aright, through all the Members of this our *Microcosmus*, is as great a taske, as to reconcile those Chronologicall errors in the Assyrian monarchie, finde out the *Quadrature* of a circle, the Creekes and Sounds of the North-East, or North-West passages, & all out as good a discoverie, as that hungry *Spaniards* of *Terra Australis Incognita* . . . (23)

Burton places himself in this double bind as a warm-up to the idea of society and the problems of social experience to which he devotes the second half of his preface. In the first half, having staked out his impossible mental territory, Burton finds that there are no wise men in the world, and no wisdom, even while citing authority after authority, wise man after wise man – Democritus, Galen, Cicero, Erasmus. In the second half, he finds that there are no wise societies, and no just and healthy ones, even though he can cite example after example of well-managed societies. He runs through the tale of woe that history seems to be, the rise and fall of kingdoms, the inevitable wars, tyrannies, and injustices that have been a part of human experience from the beginning. But he claims at one point that civic felicity is common.

For where you shall see the people civill, obedient to God and Princes, judicious, peaceable and quiet, rich, fortunate, and flourish, to live in peace, in unity and concord, a Country well tilled, many faire built and populous cities . . . the people are neat, polite, and terse . . . that Country is free from Melancholy; As it was in *Italy* in the time of *Augustus*, now in *China*, now in many other flourishing kingdomes of *Europe*. (67)

Study seems to show us the way to a cure for the madness, the “melancholy” of states; it provides examples of healthy political bodies. It shows us that political health is being experienced right now, in the most economically developed countries, and leads us to the conclusion that unhappy nations need to have their political maladies removed, and their constitutions reformed. But the situation is hopeless; the world is mad; there is no hope of escaping the dilemma of the double bind that reflection imposes upon us, the paradox that there is both health and no health. For the discontented, melancholy, sick body that “had need to be reformed” is England itself; and there is no way to go about reforming it.

Burton confesses that “this Nation of ours . . . is a most noble, a most flourishing kingdome . . . a blessed, a rich country, and one of the fortunate Isles” (73). He adds that England has “good Lawes,” and valuable natural resources. But when he observes what he takes to be the deep-seated discontent, poverty, and idleness of his country and his countrymen, he sees no hope. Again, his remarks on this head are astonishingly audacious and imperious, if also somewhat coy, bringing in at once the Rosicrucians, Attila the Hun, and Hercules(!):

We had need of some general visiter in our age, that should reforme what is amis; a just army of *Rosie Crosse* men, for they will amend all matters, (they say) Religion, Policy, manners, with arts, &c. Another *Attila*, *Tamberlane*, *Hercules*, to strive with *Achelous*, *Augae stabulum purgare*, to subdue tyrants . . . to expell theeves . . . to vindicate poor captives . . . to passe the Torrid Zone, the deserts of *Lybia*, and purge the world of monsters and *Centaures*. (84)

There follows a list of abuses, like “schisme and superstition,” whose removal is as difficult as cleansing the Augean stables, and whose prevalence, it is important to note, is not for him simply an English problem, but also a European problem. No sooner does he think of reforming England than he worries about the need to reform life on the Continent, as if England and the Continent were part of the same problem, suffering from the same ills, requiring the same reforms. There are “many other flourishing kingdomes of *Europe*”; England itself is “one of the fortunate Isles”; and by his own analysis Burton can prescribe what a well-situated, well-established state needs to do in order to overcome or prevent a condition of civic melancholy. But on the other hand, much of Europe is sick; England may well be the sickest of the sick, and it would take a kind of obscure magic or superhuman power to cure what ails it. Burton, in sum, sees the materials in the present out of which a flourishing, non-melancholic nation might be made – sees them in the greater world about him, through the tools of dispassionate observation and analysis; but he does not see the means. “These are vaine, absurd, and ridiculous wishes not to be hoped,” he says of the reforms he desires, recalling the concluding words of More’s *Utopia*, and then going even further, fatalistically: “all must be as it is” (85).

This is the dilemma that his invention of a utopia is meant to resolve. Burton sees what is to be done; his physic for the melancholy of political society is at hand. But Burton is certain that there is nothing to be done, even if other nations have done what needs to be done, since the world is mad and its doctors are impotent to change it and “there is no

remedy, it may not be redressed . . . so long as [men] can wagge their beards, they will play the fools." Let men therefore "be rude, stupid, ignorant, incult," Burton concludes, ". . . let them tyrannize, Epicurize, oppresse, luxuriate, consume themselves with factions, law-suits, wars and contentions, live in riot, poverty, want, misery, rebell, wallow as so many swine in their own dung . . . I will yet to satisfie & please mysele, make an *Utopia* of mine owne . . . And why may I not?" (85).

Burton falls back upon his topos of self-satisfaction because he cannot find the resources for mediating between what he seems to have learned about the world and what he has found to be his own position within it. But his own position, which enables him to see what he sees, to laugh with Democritus and cry with Heraclitus, his position as an impossible participant observer of the state of the world, responding to the pressures of history by presuming to be independent of them, has inevitably forced him into his impasse, so that he needs to combine a "réformisme impuissant" with a "transformisme magique," as Pierre Menard once put it.⁵⁹ What enables Burton's vision, what makes Burton percipient, and his utopia realistic, seems to be precisely what makes it so radical and fantastic that it is not even to be wished for, and its production designed to serve not as a "commodity for the common good," but merely as a way of keeping busy and satisfying the political longings of the politically impotent, isolated self. Burton engages with history by disengagement, and by the same token attempts to master that which it is impossible to master through disengagement: his own mad discontent. And why not?

5. *THE MAN IN THE MOONE*

When we get to *New Atlantis*, *The Man in the Moone*, and *The Antipodes* – two prose fictions and a stage play – we are of course on different generic grounds. We encounter still other species of the utopian "I." In the prose fictions the I is the I of the narrator, recounting imaginary adventures. And if they are self-assertive, the assertion does not come by the exercise of foundational, subject-centered reason. These I's instead are noteworthy for their encounters with foundational systems outside themselves – the narrator in *New Atlantis* encountering the self-sufficient utopia of Bensalem, the narrator in *The Man in the Moone* encountering the even more self-sufficient world of the moon. The main character in *The Antipodes*, a pathologically delusional young man by the name of Peregrine, constructed after the model of Don Quixote, encounters a system outside himself too, an Anti-England, which is itself, however,

unbeknownst to Peregrine, the fictional creation of other characters in the play.

But if the central characters of these texts encounter well-established worlds outside themselves, it is not with a view to effacing their subjectivities. They are humiliated by their encounters with other worlds, but they are redeemed and reaffirmed by humiliation. At the end of Andreae's *Christianopolis*, by contrast, the narrator-hero (in what would become a common pattern in utopian narratives) undergoes a conversion where his humiliation is complete; he ends up ascetically denying himself. "To this, your republic," he tells his host in Christianopolis, "I dedicate my labors, my studies, my wishes, my prayers. I give up the guidance of myself to you, who have learned how to control others. I will eat and drink, sleep and watch, speak and be silent at your command" (280). In *New Atlantis*, *The Man in the Moone*, and *The Antipodes* a similar surrender seems to be in the offing; but instead something more complicated happens. The characters do not surrender. They end up reaffirming themselves. And it is because of an ethic of industriousness as well as disposition toward experimental and even technocratic ways of thought, toward instrumental as opposed to deliberative, ends-oriented reason, that they ultimately reaffirm themselves as utopian subjects.

The Man in the Moone is the clearest case of this. The text tells the story of a young nobleman of Spain, Domingo Gonsales, whose light-hearted autobiographical narrative is perhaps modelled after Mateo Aleman's picaresque novel *Guzman de Alfarache* (1599), and intertextually related to Gonzales de Mendoza's *Historia de las cosas más notables, ritos y costumbres de gran Reyno de la China* (1585; English translation 1587). Born in 1552, a native of Seville and a former student at the University of Salamanca, Domingo is short and slight and, as the youngest son of a large family, possessed of little money. After some mishaps in life, he is forced to go to sea and is eventually shipwrecked off the uninhabited, tropical island of St. Helena. But then upon experimentation he invents a flying machine, powered by trained geese, which takes him (thanks to an unexpected weakening of gravitational pull) all the way up to the moon. There he discovers a full-fledged world populated with plants, animals, and a species of intelligent beings. These last are "people," but they are "most strange, both of their feature, demeanure, and apparell . . . Their stature was most divers but for the most part, twice the height of ours: their colour and countenance most pleasing, and their habit such, as I know not how to express . . . Only this can I say of it, that it was the most glorious and delightfull, that can possibly be imagined."⁶⁰ After a

pleasant visit, impressed by life on the moon but homesick, he returns to the earth, landing in China, where a Jesuit community entertains him. He writes his story as he is preparing to go home, enthusiastic about sharing his Columbusoid story, which “hath proved a meanes of eternizing my name,” and proud to be able to impart the scientific wonders he has discovered:

You shal then see men to flie from place to place in the ayre; you shall be able, (without moving or travailing of any creature,) to send messages in an instant many Miles off, and receive answer againe immediately; you shall bee able to declare your minde presently unto your friend, being in some private and remote place of a populos Citie, with a number of such like things: but that which far surpasseth all the rest, you shall have notice of a new World, of many most rare and incredible secrets of Nature, that all the Philosophers of former ages could never so much as dreame off. (10–11)

The Man in the Moone is an astonishing text in many ways. It is the first work of science fiction in English, and the first attempt by any modern European text to imagine a scientifically plausible incident of interstellar travel. It includes the first encounter between an earthling and an intelligent alien species. Moreover, the world on the moon it discovers, though perhaps less dramatically interesting than other utopian inventions of the Renaissance, provides a new model of social felicity; for *The Man in the Moone* imagines a *technologically felicitous* society. Indeed, it imagines a society where technology is already wholly adequate to worldly aspiration. Labor has been transformed into play. Thanks to technology, scarcity and want are unknown. And so, for the most part, is discontent. Even the technology of language – and Domingo Gonsales, like his inventor, Francis Godwin, a devotee of the science of artificial languages and message-sending systems, is very much aware of the fact that language is a technology – has been mastered on the moon. In the world on the moon, language and reality are perfectly, reciprocally referential, so that the problem of misunderstanding among individuals and of the discrepancies between words and things and thus ideas and things has been overcome as well.

Godwin provides few concrete details about life on the moon, however, and its abundance and felicity are so vaguely rendered, with so much of the difference between the earth and the moon being attributed to natural causes (paradoxically but importantly, the world on the moon is technologically advanced *by nature*) that modern critics find it disappointing.⁶¹ Many recent historians of early modern utopias ignore it altogether.⁶²

Certainly, Godwin makes it clear that since so much depends on nature, the society of the moon he imagines is not directly imitable. But the Paradisal state of the world in the moon serves no less than the condition of More's Utopia or Bacon's Bensalem as a model of an ideal society, as the projection of a logic of social dreaming. And even more important, though it projects an image of a heterocosm that satisfies a certain kind of social desire, the main point of the fiction is cautionary. The text holds up the world in the moon as a desideratum that we *cannot* really aspire to. In the world on the moon, fact answers fancy, things perfectly exemplify their values, and technological instruments are naturally and perfectly suited to the purposes they serve. Language itself is unfallen, a perfect instrument of denotation. *The Man in the Moone* illustrates what it would be like if our physical instrumentalities and languages were wholly adequate to our longings and needs, and it emphasizes the irony of the fact that in the sublunary world they are not.

The point is driven home often. Gonsales learns that the earth, even in its most benign and fertile climates, like the St. Helena he visits, is inherently a world of scarcity; he learns that "great" men, clinging to an ideology of natural "greatness," are often small-minded, spiteful, and dangerous; and he learns by contrast that he can compensate for the scarcity and pettiness and even for the social and natural physical limitations by the tools of technology. Whether in the form of flying machines, communication devices, or other inventions, technology will enable men like himself and those who follow him to compensate for the imperfections of their world and therein find a new kind of power and greatness. But the message is double-edged: if technology compensates and provides us with a measure of greatness, it is only because the sublunary world is inherently imperfect, and always will be. Our technology, that is, both compensates for limits and confirms us in them. It cannot perform its function of compensation except for the fact that it is undertaken under conditions of limitation.

The figure of Domingo Gonsales, the technocratic *pícaro*, symbolically embodies the duality. He represents the smallness of humanity in the face of the natural world – the inadequacy of human nature in a condition of fallenness and exile. But he also represents the potential greatness of humanity, the idea that "great and wonderful things may be performed by most unlikely bodies," if only those bodies learn to harness technology and perfect the tools of communication – if only, that is, the greatness of the subject-in-itself be eschewed, and the greatness of instrumental performance, the greatness of great means, be embraced instead. The

world of the moon dwellers is *not* to be aspired to; we are not to seek a paradisaical condition; the condition of paradise is not *available* to us, even on an island like St. Helena. The world of the moon dwellers, so positive in the unity of its words and its things, its values and its means, stands for us not as a positive goal, an expectation on the horizon, but as a kind of negativity, an object-choice that we cannot choose, and ought not to seek, suited though it may be to our constitutive longings. It stands for the idea that what we need to be choosing instead is not an object at all, but rather an instrumentality.

Adhering to the form of romance, but also mitigating the effect of narrative wonder by adding elements of the picaresque to its text, Godwin establishes a new literary line, where the purpose of the ideal is neither to satirize the real, to compensate for deficiencies in the real, nor to promote the emulation of a new social model, but rather to reconfigure the prevailing image of the human condition and humanity's capacity for self-improvement. It is to put before us the impossible object of our desires, to the end that we may learn to demand our possible objects. The text is not revolutionary in a political sense, since it adheres to conventional models of social order, including the idea of natural nobility (though it also calls attention to the inherent flaws in the idea of natural nobility on earth). Indeed, it is much less inflammatory from a political point of view than Burton's utopia. But the line of fiction it establishes leads directly to the dissenting Defoe (*Robinson Crusoe*, in fact, adopts several ideas and scenes from it); and the ideology of technocratic reform it articulates is a forerunner of what was about to become something of a mainstream movement. Although he seems to have been fairly orthodox in his religious views (author of two conventional works of British history, he was bishop of Hereford at the time of his death), much of the position Godwin allegorically argues in *The Man in the Moone* correlates with common Puritan beliefs. Godwin, too, is concerned with establishing an empire of industry, and similarly constrained by the paradoxes such a notion involves; and he similarly focuses, as a way of mediating the double bind of impulses toward utopian mastery in a world where none may be had, on the dignity of the "means" of amelioration, the "method" of improvement, the promotion of instrumental over deliberative rationality.

Unlike some Puritan thought, though, even if the text teases us with the expectations of transformative technologies, the text also discourages social innovation. If we cannot depend upon a natural match between our

ideals and our material realities, nevertheless those ideals are immanent and natural, and they are not to be changed; they are the ideals of absolutist European society, and they are God-given and good. So in extolling the transformative power and grandeur of telecommunication and aviation Godwin seems to be missing something, failing to draw an obvious conclusion from his project. The complaints of twentieth-century critics about the inadequacy of Godwin's utopian vision are indicative of this. Godwin seems to be missing the point that transformative technologies inevitably transform social reality as well.

6. *NEW ATLANTIS*

It is not clear, interestingly enough, whether Bacon ever appreciated that point either. The sweeping reforms suggested for the *Advancement of Learning* are seldom developed in the social or political realm. When Bacon comes upon the “art of jurisprudence” in his survey of the precincts of knowledge, he recommends a middle course between legal practice and utopian speculation. When he comes upon the science of government he shies away from saying anything about what he calls “a part of knowledge secret and retired,” better left to the wisdom of kings.⁶³ Rather, as we saw in chapter one, Bacon depends upon the given conditions of the state, including its unrealistic politics of sublimity, as a stable framework for progress in other areas, which more or less leave the sublime state of the monarch untouched.

And now in *New Atlantis* – though this seems to have been overlooked by most critics – we find Bacon imagining an adventure to a society more advanced than his own, more prosperous and content as well as more technologically developed than his own, whose social values still coincide with those of Bacon's Britain, and whose political system still duplicates the sublime monarchy in Bacon's Britain. Unlike *Utopia*, which is one of the text's inspirations, there is no satire in *New Atlantis*. There is critique, it must be admitted: the advanced system of Bensalem, once exhibited to the public eye, demonstrates some of the weaknesses of contemporary English society; but not, again in the spirit of satire. It is in the spirit rather, on the one hand, of compensation and regret, and, on the other hand, of what Bacon himself would call the work of hope.⁶⁴

Consider first the innovations of the work, some of them shared with *The Man in the Moone*: a fictional “I” transported into the realm of romance, taken on a fictional journey to an ideal state where the “I” has

still to learn what it is that he ought to be attempting to acquire and assert, an early instance of what Marshall Grossman calls the “cumulative self” of modern narrative;⁶⁵ a voyage to a utopia, by the same token, which asks its reader to share in the eternal present of the narrator, to experience the narrative as if it were unfolding in what Bakhtin calls the “chronotope of the present”; a voyage to a utopia which results not from a journey of exploration, but as an accident of trade, of a mercantile adventure; and finally, the discovery of a utopia where all of the achievements of the society result from plausible scientific premises. There is plenty of wishful thinking in the construction of *New Atlantis*, but by Bacon’s own standards there is no magic in it.

What there is, rather, is something like dreamwork, in a Freudian sense. Not only is there a haunting, dreamlike quality to the narrative; there is also a dreamlike objective to it, an underlying interest that the text cannot objectively realize in full, an interest in the past, an interest in returning to the past, or rather in returning to the past and remaking it into something *new*. This is what Bloch calls the “compensatory” function often to be found in pre-Marxist utopias. Whether in the full-fledged invention of an alternative society (as in Burton) or in the anticipation of an alternative mastery over the natural world (as in Milton), writers of the period compensate in the imagination for what they have failed to achieve in reality.

But in *New Atlantis* the compensatory function is triumphant. The “look of power” underlying it looks a lot less far afield than its mercantile adventures or its suggestion of a possible future seduce us to find in the text. For what is it, precisely, that *New Atlantis* makes us see? And what is it that it wants us to do? There is no ambiguity concerning the text’s generic position; as a self-enclosed utopian romance, as a fable, it never once openly suggests the existence of an author or a reader outside itself, capable of acting in the real world. There is no *program* in a literal sense recommended in the *New Atlantis*. There is neither a before nor an after that the text asks itself or its readers to occupy; and there is nothing that the reader is left to *do*. The look of power in Bacon’s text is in this respect purely specular, a putting of power on display, leaving the reader perhaps to quake before it, but giving the reader nothing constructive to appropriate – nothing, that is, but the image itself.

Of course, the structure of Bacon’s commonwealth reflects the project Bacon outlined in earlier writings. Salomon’s House, in particular, the central institution of learning in the state of Bensalem, recalls the college

that Bacon was petitioning James to create. The hierarchical arrangement and division of labor that enable the work of science at Salomon's House recall Bacon's vision of the scientific community as a beehive, presided over by a beekeeping philosopher-king, who happened to like being compared to the Biblical Solomon. But if *New Atlantis* reduplicates the earlier project for an advancement of learning, it does not, by the same token, represent much of a departure from the world at hand. Compared to Burton's utopia, or the project of the Plymouth settlers, Bacon's utopia, to whatever faraway island it is displaced, pretty much stays at home, and is careful to keep the traditional kingly order of home intact. It is audaciously experimental perhaps, and a child of the end of James's reign rather than its beginning, simply in its fabulation. In *New Atlantis* Bacon represents an island nation where the work of generating an ideal society through the utopian energies of a lawgiving king – like the James to whom he had once appealed in *Advancement of Learning* – has already been accomplished. The project of 1605 is complete. A failure in reality – since the project of 1605 was never even begun – has been undone through compensatory fabulation. A journey that has never been undertaken – since Bacon was never even invited to prepare plans for forming the colleges and laboratories of his dreams – has been remade into a romance of discovery where the subject finds his work has already been accomplished. If Bacon's utopia is less progressive, realistic, original, or convincing than Robert Burton's "Utopia of mine owne," it is nevertheless, in an important sense, more melancholic. If it reiterates a hope, if it finds hope in the reiteration of complex anticipations, it also documents failure, a failure *so far*. And many of its idealizations depend upon a withdrawal into social and historical anachronisms, into an impossible recuperation of the sublimity of the Jacobean present perfect.

There are at least two unmistakable signs of failure and melancholy in *New Atlantis*. One is the relation of the officials of Bensalem to money; the other is the relation of the story to patriarchy, marriage, and procreation. As for the problem of money, it is to be noted that the pilgrims in Bacon's fable, its possibly Spanish sailors,⁶⁶ operate both politically and economically according to simple principles of economic exchange: in Marx's famous formulation of basic exchange in a primitively moneyed society, commodity–money–commodity: C–M–C.⁶⁷ Intercepted off the coast in this uncharted territory, the sailors immediately offer "merchandise" for sale to compensate for the charge of their landing their ship, taking provisions, and housing their sick; in addition, they offer the Bensalemite

messenger “some reward in pistolets,” and “a piece of crimson velvet to be presented to the officer” (3:131). They encounter a response to their negotiations that will be frequently repeated: “the servant took [their offerings] not, nor would scarce look upon them” (3:131). Again and again, in fact, the sailors offer to pay for their care, and attempt to win the favors of officials and servants by offering gratuities. Their hosts always refuse both kinds of offers. The state of Bensalem will pay for the needs of its guests out of its own stores. And neither officials nor servants will agree to take bribes. One official tells them, “‘He must not be twice paid for one labour’: meaning (as I take it),” the narrator adds, “that he had salary sufficient of the state for his service. For (as I after learned) they call an officer that taketh reward, *twice paid*” (3:132). Later, the governor of the hospital where they are lodged, being offered twenty pistolets, needs only smile at them and say, “What? twice paid!” The sailors expect to give in order to receive, and since they find themselves in a situation where they seem to have no way of increasing their wealth, they are prepared to spend some of it in order to provide for their needs. (C–M–C would then inevitably lead to a second sequence $C_1-M_1-C_1$, where C_1 would be less than C .) But the sailors find instead that in Bensalem they will only receive and that no one there will even consider accepting gratuities from them. This is a remarkable picture for someone in Bacon’s position to have produced, Bacon a man who had risen to great wealth and power in civil service, and who had eventually been removed from office and heavily penalized for taking bribes. Twice paid? Bacon had publicly confessed to the practice. He had been imprisoned, fined, and had had some of his property expropriated, including one of his houses; he had been prohibited from ever holding public office again, banished from Parliament, where he had always been a popular member, and exiled from the immediate vicinity of his native London.⁶⁸ But the sailors find that in Bensalem the formula C–M–C – the formula of primitive commercial exchange, including the formula of bribes – has been subordinated to a rule of public munificence, of generosity and service; and there is nothing they can do to reintroduce commercial exchange and corrupt the Bensalemite system. In a sense the formula of commercial exchange has been obliterated altogether: “we maintain a trade” with foreign countries, a Bensalemite says, “not for gold, silver, or jewels; nor for silks; nor for spices; nor for any other commodity of matter; but only for God’s first creature, which was *Light*: to have *light* (I say) of the growth of all the parts of the world” (3:147). Bensalem is not interested in taking any commodity in exchange for any other; commodities in

Bensalem are for giving away, not for taking in – or at least, not for material consumption.

So the narrative of *New Atlantis* begins by ideally reversing the great failure in Bacon's life, making the "I" of the narrative come face to face with a system where the disabling reciprocities of commercial exchange have been annulled, where bribery as a result is out of the question, and where, though merit is rewarded, one may also be rewarded in advance, even if one has not done anything at all. Princely authority expresses itself in just this way in the kingdom of Bensalem. Generosity precedes service. It does not want any material commodities in exchange or in satisfaction for the munificence it has disseminated, only "light." An authority like the king is a "debtor to no man, but for the propagation of his subjects." *New Atlantis* thus takes up the failure of princely government that Bacon had experienced, as both a participant and an observer – its failures to be perfectly princely, its failure to hold itself aloof from the corrupting effects of commodity exchange, of payments, gratuities, and bribes, of the open system of *indebtedness* required by the logic of C_1 – and undoes it, reverses it, putting in its place a system where wealth is generated and bestowed but never exchanged and diminished. The approving, economically perspicuous author of "Of Usury" and "Of Plantations," the self-made commonwealthman, member of the Virginia Company, and disgraced ex-Chancellor, imagines an "I" who discovers that the ethics of trade, of exchange, of worldly conquest, have in one part of the world been both mastered and dematerialized, so that the purpose of worldly activity has become the creation of symbolic wealth ("light") rather than the acquisition of material goods, and it is impossible for someone like himself to take bribes, negotiate loans for the crown, and experience failure.

The sign of failure marked out and mythopoetically compensated here by Bensalemite economics is related to a second incident: the celebration of patriarchy and paternalistic marriage that the fable documents at length. Though Bacon is on record as thinking of civic pageantry as a "toy," and of doubting the value of marriage and children to a man with public ambitions, a good deal of the narrative is devoted to a description of the pageant of the Feast of the Family, which celebrates the sexual productivity and moral authority of fathers and the sanctity of chastity in marriage. Details like these may be cause for doubting some of Bacon's sincerity in suggesting that Bensalem is an ideal republic (and, of course, Bacon himself never says that that is what it is); but when a man whose own marriage was unhappy and barren, and who clearly

preferred the company of men to the company of women, invents a model republic founded on the sexual productivity and moral authority of fathers, the sanctity of the institution of marriage, and an ethic of heterosexual chastity, he would seem at the very least to be articulating an ambivalence.⁶⁹ The Bacon of the *Essays* certainly scoffed at familial fidelities and intimacies. But again, one of the failures of Bacon's life was his failure to have children. In the *New Atlantis* one of the highest marks of success for a man is the number of his progeny.

The action of the *New Atlantis*, it is worth recalling, takes place in an imagined recent past, placed in the context of a deep past with significant implications. Something has just happened. And in the end – what? The closest analogue of its fictional premise, and perhaps a source for it, is Andreae's *Christianopolis*. One imagines that Bacon's sailors are in line to be converted to the ways of Bensalem: in fact, we are told that most visitors to Bensalem decide to forsake their earlier lives, and remain in Bensalem permanently (3:145). But what the sailors are being converted to is a society with a deep past, a society whose past in fact has been precisely correlated with the European version of world history, and whose future is apparently coterminous with it.

A good part of the first half of *New Atlantis* is occupied with the spinning of an elaborate history, going back to Plato's legend of Atlantis, where a world of high civilization is said to have preceded the historical world as we know it today, thriving "in traffic" with both Eurasia and Bensalem. Then there was a deluge. Atlantis, now known as America, with its great civilizations of Mexico and Peru, was reduced to a state of depopulated savagery, its remaining people being cut off from contact with the rest of the world and in effect set back a thousand years. Meanwhile, European culture and global navigation decayed, and the Bensalemites found themselves isolated. Two events then fixed Bensalem in the condition in which the sailors have found it. About 300 BC the lawgiver Solamona established its constitution, such that the island was to continue in its "happy and flourishing estate" in secret from the rest of the world. And about the year AD 50 Christianity was revealed to the people of Bensalem, and its Scripture delivered to them, by way of miracle at sea. From that time on Bensalem has prospered as a hidden kingdom, in secret traffic with the world, developing its arts and sciences, acquiring its commodities of "light," and practicing a devout Scripture-based Christianity.

Three things are noteworthy about all this. In the first place, as in More's similar foundation myth in *Utopia*, the culture of Bacon's island republic is made to be both joined with and separate from the humanistic

and apostolic culture of Western Europe. In the second place, Bensalem henceforth develops on its own, independently of the old world and the new, yet with the benefit, on the one hand, of knowing what the other worlds know, and on the other, of knowing what they know without being known, or otherwise disturbed. Bensalem develops in a condition of prosperity, peace, and isolation. It does not suffer from outside intervention, or from any of the vicissitudes of history. And yet in the third place – and this is perhaps the most significant irony of all of the text – the scientists of Bensalem, so far as we have been told, have not really accomplished anything that the Europeans have not accomplished. At the interrupted conclusion of *New Atlantis* the sailors have learned about all of the institutions and facilities of experimentation that the House of Salomon has set up; and they are provided with their own generous subsidy. But the sailors have not seen any results. In fact, there are none, apart from a handful of relatively minor improvements and additions to the stock of European commodities and arts: “sweeter” and more ingenious musical instruments, better optical lenses, more various food-stuffs and perfumes. Technologically, scientifically, and theologically the Bensalemites have developed only to about the same level as their visitors. All the Bensalemites have done so far, apart from making some preliminary improvements upon European instrumentation, is put in place the institutional apparatus of the 1605 project for the advancement of learning.

“[W]e are but between death and life; for we are beyond both the old world and the new,” one of the sailors exclaims in fright (3:134). Yet the sailors soon come to learn that if they are literally outside the two known worlds, in this third world they are also literally involved in the course of global history, and stand as it were on the very cusp of it. But consider what the author has had to do in order to put this historical dream-work into operation. In order to imagine a society where the Great Instauration may have taken hold, Bacon has posited a reversal of his own realistic understanding of the world and of cultural production. He has re-imagined, in his own way, the whole of human history. He has imagined a process by which all of human learning, ancient and modern, adds up to the discovery of the conditions of a new beginning, a Great Instauration. At the same time, he has imagined a nation-state where the present perfect of the legitimizing ideology of 1603–5 has been permanently, materially installed, and nourishment has replaced depravity. The moneyed exchange economy with which he has begun has been subordinated to a system of self-generating munificence. The princely

state as a system of autonomous, incorruptible lawgiving has been restored. Moreover, the munificence of the state and the advancement of learning have been caused to be conducted under conditions of absolute self-containment – a complete reversal of the open system of exploration and exploitation that the sailors initially represent.

The containment of Bacon's imaginary system is perhaps its most historically significant legacy and its most indispensable element.⁷⁰ In Bacon's imaginary state the resources of time themselves are institutionalized and rationally managed; the activities and products of its laborers are entirely enclosed within the confines of a hermetic college; the light of knowledge itself becomes a commodity to be procured and saved. "The End of our Foundation," the Father of Salomon's House tells his visitors, in words that will be echoed by Milton in *Prolusion VII*, "is the Knowledge of Causes, and the secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible" (3:156). Thus, as in *The Advancement of Learning*, the final goals of the project are defined with respect to a universal subject ("Human Empire"), and framed with respect to the universal subject's open prospects. But the work of Salomon's House, along with its products, is kept within the boundaries and structures of the college. The system of "Merchants of Light," "Depredators," "Mystery-men," and other categories of scientists is designed to compensate for the fact that the universal subject is incapable of actually producing knowledge; only specialized subjects, working in concert but individually in their specialized fields, can produce results. Thus the cultural productions of Bensalem and its scientific community are contained within a closed and rigid system, where there is in fact no room for "Human Empire" as such, or the prospect of humanity as a whole, but only for the accumulation of scientific commodities and techniques under the wary supervision of "Fathers."

In order to imagine a successfully functioning enlightened society where his fictional "I" and his fellow sailors can make a new beginning Bacon has rigged up a world where citizens and especially scientific citizens work together collectively and accumulatively without expenditure, and, by the same token, where they may conduct their business of gathering light, of seeing, *without being seen*. Now this requirement of seeing without being seen would continue to be an issue for scientists for the remainder of the century; it would play a role in the guidelines set up for the operations of the Royal Society; it is still an issue today. But the problem of inventing a new system of learning, as Bacon negotiates it in the fable of a historically "present" Bensalem, is thus illustrative of the

problem of utopianizing as a whole: how to imagine that which, were it real, would be for that very reason beyond imagining: how to imagine a condition where the subject of imagination would be the subject of another, where the utopian imagination would not be *needed*. For once one lived in Bensalem, one would not have to imagine it anymore. The romance would be dead. One would not even be on a pilgrimage toward it anymore.

It is here, in any case, “between life and death,” that the unfinished text of *New Atlantis* leaves us: a place like so many others of the 1620s and 1630s, where utopian mastery is experimentally asserted, where a subjective ideal is provisionally asserted, but then where so many limits are encountered, so many resistances observed, that only the methods of utopian experimentation are finally embraced – and the ends of utopian labor vanish into air. That is perhaps as it should be. Attempts to exceed the limits of utopian experiment may well end as in the case of Richard Brome’s *Antipodes*, where another utopian adventurer, arrived in an “Anti-England” of the imagination, attempts to convert his adventure into real imperialistic power. There are no “as ifs” in the mind of Brome’s Peregrine, so he ends up violently and madly attacking a closet-full of stage-props; and with that his utopia dreams come to an end.⁷¹ But like Burton’s utopia, Milton’s spiritus, and many of the other texts considered in this chapter, *New Atlantis* leaves its readers (as it leaves its story) at the point of getting down to business, of finally getting to work with establishing that empire upon which the new imperial mind is so emphatically bent. It responds to the cacophony of the present by retreating to a subjective ideal where something better, larger, clearer, and more complete, a new kind of world, is *ideally* a possibility. A world that is always still *only* a possibility – although, most importantly, it seems to be very much a possibility *right now*. The world Bacon creates is not an empire of ends but an empire of means: it is what Bacon called, again, a “work of hope.”

CHAPTER 3

“Reformation” and “Desolation”: the new horizons of the 1640s

I. “THAT NEW UTOPIA . . .”

There were signs of a change in the offing even before the political crises brought on by the Scots’ or Bishops’ War, when Charles led an army against Scottish Presbyterians to enforce Anglican rituals and ended up suffering a humiliating defeat. The defeat led to Charles’s having to call a Parliament after over ten years of personal rule. In summoning Parliament he put into motion a chain of events that would lead to his own execution and the declaration of a republic – in a sense, the single most utopian thing ever attempted in British political history.

But signs of change, again, appear even before then. In 1630 the restless quasi-Baconian reformer Samuel Hartlib set up a household in London, which was to be a center for progressive intellectual projects for the next thirty years, and Hartlib was already writing to his friend John Dury overseas of a society of like-minded “reformers” that was gathering around him. These included the educator John Pell, the Puritan ministers William Speed, William Sedgwick, John Cotton, and John White, and the doctor of divinity William Twisse, the associate and executor of the late Joseph Mede.¹ Hartlib had earlier been associated with a somewhat mysterious society of scholars on the Continent whose leading spirit was in fact Johann Valentin Andreae; the society had adopted the name *Antilia*, from Andreae’s *Christianopolis*. The movement had been “interrupted and destroyed,” Hartlib would say, by the Thirty Years’ War; but Hartlib seems to have cherished a lifelong ambition of reviving it.² During the 1630s Hartlib’s ambitions were impeded by the controversies that had forced colleagues like Cotton, White and many others to repair overseas as leaders of the Great Migration to New England. Much of Hartlib’s time during the 1630s was occupied with providing relief for ministers in exile, maintaining lines of communication among them and their patrons, and looking into the possibility of getting a new society

founded, a new *collegium charitatis*, *Illustre Collegium*, or *Societas Reformatorum* in Europe, or even perhaps a new colonial *Antilia* in Virginia.³ Hartlib's energies were occupied, in other words, with instrumentalities of various kinds – educational, philosophical, colonial, and philanthropic. He developed a network of clients and patrons that came to include scientists like William Harvey and Robert Boyle as well as a number of Puritan divines and such important political figures as Bishop Williams, The Earl of Pembroke, The Earl of Warwick, Robert Greville Lord Brooke, and such soon-to-be powerful members of the lesser gentry as John Selden, Sir Oliver St. John, and the leader of the Parliamentary rebellion, John Pym.⁴ In 1637 and 1639 respectively Hartlib supervised the publication in England of Comenius's first two attempts to outline a project of "pansophia," *Conatum Comenianorum Praeludia* and *Pansophiae Prodromus* – a program for universal learning with implications for both the reform of science and the promotion of world peace.⁵ He may have had a hand, in 1639, in helping to publish the first edition of More's *Utopia* to appear in fifteen years (only the second edition of the text to appear since the end of the sixteenth century). He was certainly instrumental in publishing that year a fascinating proposal for renewing and reorganizing England's economic system, *A Discovery of Infinite Treasure, Hidden Since the Worlds Beginning* – a text which ushered in the new discourse of utopian public-mindedness that would play a major role in English life all the way through the days of the execution of the king.

Hartlib, Dury, and Comenius were, in the view of Trevor-Roper, the "philosophers of the English country party in the 1630s. Peers and bishops, Parliament-men and country gentry, all who were bound together by opposition to the rule of Stafford and Laud, were also bound together in support of these three men."⁶ A number of recent historians have argued against the idea that there was anything like a coherent "country party" at the time of the Great Civil War, and have called into question the existence of a coherent platform or ideology among the Parliamentarians.⁷ The idea of a particularly "Puritan" contribution to the development of modern science, led by such men as Samuel Hartlib and his friends, has also been called into question.⁸ As Trevor-Roper himself observed, even if the members of the Hartlib circle were Baconians, their Baconianism was seriously diluted, lacking both the empiricist rigor Bacon had originally called for and Bacon's aristocratic audacity; their Baconianism was attenuated by a spirit of "puritan dullness . . . lit up here and there by lunatic flashes: millenary calculations, messianic hopes, mystical philo-Semitism."⁹ But the association of the

leaders of the revolt against Stafford, Laud, and Charles I with the amelioristic projects of the Hartlib circle is indicative of a surge of intellectual, political, and religious enthusiasm which was connected with all that was revolutionary about the English Revolution as well as with much that was “lunatic” about it; and it cannot simply be analyzed away. As the period of the Great Migration came to a close and yearnings for social change came to be focused on England itself, the voice of enthusiasm was unleashed, and the enthusiasts immediately came to adopt a form of revolutionary idealism – an idealism with limits, as we will see: an idealism which in all but a few cases caved in under the stress of class divisions and the inconsistency of popular support, as well the structural defects of its utopian gaze into the Not Yet, but an idealism which nevertheless came to be fitted to more and more political and social situations. After undergoing a revision in the hands of Independents and Levellers, this idealism almost succeeded in providing English government (for however brief a time such a utopian thing could have lasted) with a written republican constitution.

When the Long Parliament convened in November 1640, taking upon itself the role of the chief representative body of the English people, a large number of men and women of a Puritan leaning began to believe that they were participating in a uniquely liminal historical moment. Their participation in this moment, as they mainly understood it, was at once mandatory and voluntary. Providence had apparently called upon a whole nation to reform itself; God was working his will, and his will was that the English people reform themselves as a people. So they had no choice: God was calling, and Providential history was moving into a new stage. But the godly also were free agents: they had been chosen to “gather” themselves, as ministers often put it, and voluntarily “build up” the “New Jerusalem.” Earlier in the century the experience of exile, war, and national humiliation – the apparent ascendancy of the forces of the Counter-Reformation on the Continent, in the Americas, and even in England itself, where the “hireling” bishops and the Queen’s “Jesuit” advisers held sway – had (with some exceptions) hindered whatever worldly hopes may have been germinating among the godly. But with the convening of the Long Parliament political and religious aims and means seemed to have converged; in the Parliament many found an instrument of mediation, through which godly objectives might be accomplished by national political means, and political objectives might be accomplished by national godly means. Individuals seemed to have found themselves, at last, free to participate in the

accomplishment of what they took to be ultimately inevitable, the reformation of the world.

The idea of a general reformation was itself connected in the minds of the godly with the accounts of the beginnings and ends of history which had been circulating among them – accounts where the typological frequently merged with the literal, and paradigms of original purity intersected with paradigms of eschatological amelioration, redemption, and apocalyptic judgment.¹⁰ Although there were disagreements as to how these accounts were to be tied together and interpreted, and what practical consequences were to be drawn from them, there seems to have been little doubt among enthusiastic partisans on the parliamentary side that a liminal historical moment had arrived.¹¹ Sometimes the chialistic hopes of Puritan partisans would find an exhaustively concrete, literalized expression, as in a sermon delivered by another of Hartlib's associates, the sectarian minister John Archer, *The Personall Reign of Christ on Earth*. Unlike many similar messages to the godly, Archer's sermon went ahead and specified the coming of a final, blessed community on earth, governed in fact by the saints on earth, who will have overthrown ungodly authority and will live autonomously in a condition of holy prosperity; he even named a date: 1666.¹² But what was really revolutionary about the attitudes of the partisans of reform was not only their faith in providential opportunity, whether or not it was accompanied by a belief in a millenarian future; what was revolutionary was their conviction that they now had a hand in shaping the ends toward which the effects of a providential opportunity might be directed. Now, for the first time in English history, however literal the idea of the millennium was to be understood, and whatever objective radical agitation was believed to be directed toward, a substantial number of politically affiliated people were coming to believe that they could respond to providential opportunity not only instrumentally but normatively and constitutively as well. In other words, subjective idealism was being matched by an objective idealism.

Speaking as a radical, millenarian congregationalist, the author of *A Glimpse of Sion's Glory* (possibly Thomas Goodwin, lately returned from exile) promises the audience of his sermon an abundance of blessings to arrive on a day not too far in the future, when Christ shall reign on earth, and asks them to consider,

Seeing that these things shall be, what manner of persons ought we to be? . . . If God hath such an intention to glorifie his Church, and that in the World: Oh, let every

one say to his owne heart; *what manner of persons ought we to be?* and especially, *what manner of persons ought yee to be?* because you are beginning this despised Worke, gathering a *Church* together.¹³

This kind of social voluntarism, though adopted from the traditions of Calvinist resistance and Brownist separatism, is really something new, for three reasons. First, it is imagined on a national scale, with no implications of a gathered church in exile, or for that matter even of the church's being typologically in a condition of wandering. Secondly, the sermon's voluntaristic rhetoric puts before its audience a specific, if somewhat nebulously imagined, material objective ("You see," he says, "that the Saints have but little now in the World; now they are the poorest and meanest of all: but then . . . the World shall be theirs . . . *Not only heaven shall be your kingdome, but this World bodily*").¹⁴ Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it draws ethical conduct of a certain kind to follow as a consequence of an interpretation of and a participation in the historical moment.¹⁵ There is no concept here, as we saw in the case of the New England settlers, of saints being driven by a subjective "byas" to do the right thing. There is no sense of being watched from afar, of having God, history, and European civilization ("all eies") at the backs of the saints. The glance of godly, voluntaristic behavior has shifted from the onlookers, from those who are not directly participating in godly radicalism, to the radicals themselves. *You* are "beginning this despised Worke," the preacher insists; and this is a work of which you yourselves will be the beneficiaries. The "glimpse of Sion's glory" is a glimpse of what is to come taken by those who are ethically responsible for making it become what it is to become, and who are at the same time promised to be the ones who will be made to benefit by it. The gap has closed. The subjects will also be the objects, the means will also be the ends, and those who empower themselves to look upon the promises of God acquire a look of power: they look upon the power that they themselves are engendering, and that they are causing themselves to inherit.

This species of "enthusiasm" (a word which already had negative connotations, and was ordinarily associated with Puritan sensibilities), this sense of having been gifted with enormous powers of self-transformation through participation in a divinely appointed, still to be gathered *societas*, this combination, in Milton's words, of "*manhood and grace at once*," was not taken lightly.¹⁶ If from afar it could resemble what an ambivalent observer like Robert Burton could think of as the obverse side of a dangerous "religious melancholy," to those in possession of it it amounted to

a kind of radical obedience. One obeyed a radical command, and one obeyed it radically; and this was empowering, rewarding, and saving. But one was aware that obedience to the command made one subject to a worldly ridicule powerful enough to shake one's faith and jeopardize one's projects. Lord Brooke complained in a famous tract,

If one that hath tasted and experimentally found the sweetnesse of Peace of Conscience, and knows how impossible it is to keep it, but by close walking with God, how easily it is interrupted by loose walking; how sweet it is when enjoyed; so that it ravisheth the soul, and filleth the whole heart, that it cannot but flow out at the Lips, in sweet brethings of, for, and after God in Christ Jesus . . . O that man is beyond all rule of Reason; He hath a Tang of Phrensie; one puft up with a spirit of self conceit; a Rank *Separatist*.¹⁷

Then as ever, radical behavior could subject an individual to ostracism and demonization. The Leveller John Lilburne was constantly defending himself against a charge of "turbulence," and finding himself compelled to explain the reasons, whether divine or natural, for his apparently outrageous conduct.¹⁸ But as religious and political purposes intersected and the call to personal salvation seemed to involve both the reformation of the church and the redemption of the nation, enthusiasm, frenzy, and turbulence came to be the vehicles of the national will.

In the radical obedience endorsed by Lord Brooke, an active member of the House of Lords from the opening of the Long Parliament until his death in 1643, we indeed find most, if not all, of the hallmarks not only of enthusiasm, but of modern revolutionary behavior.¹⁹ The first radicals of the English Revolution lacked a *theory* of revolution, although the word itself was beginning to acquire its modern meanings at this time.²⁰ In the early 1640s the idea was as yet unformulated that a people could overthrow an existing regime and install in its place a "wholly new" social and political order, distinctly more perfect or at least more satisfactory than the one it replaced. Until the convening of the Long Parliament "enthusiasm" often found itself being expressed in the kind of dissonant disorderliness that Lord Brooke, for one, lamented; apart from separatist flight, it lacked direction. Historian Anthony Fletcher is surely right to emphasize (as Gardiner had done before him) that if even so centrally revolutionary a figure as John Pym came to the Long Parliament with an agenda, it was a backward-looking agenda rooted in notions of the "ancient liberties" of the subject, and the erstwhile lawful peace of the pre-Laudian Church and the pre-Caroline parliamentary state.²¹ But if a theory of revolution was

lacking, and a model of a new political order as yet unimagined, an ethic of potentially revolutionary behavior had already been developed. Pym himself had considered emigrating to America in 1630, and had been a patron of Puritan emigrants throughout the 1630s, as had been Lord Saye and Sele, Lord Brooke, and other members of the Hartlib circle.²² Meanwhile William Prynne, Henry Burton, John Bastwick, and John Lilburne, putting themselves forward as martyrs to the Puritan cause, were leading crowds in and around London to demonstrate their moral indignation with the Laudian regime – not as rioters or petitioners, using traditional means to communicate their needs to those of higher rank, but as members of something like a political movement, showing their solidarity with victims of injustice.²³ Alternatives to conventionalism (“nonconformity,” a relatively new word) were becoming a common feature of the English cultural vocabulary. An ethic of radical obedience – a willingness to adopt extreme measures for the sake of pursuing one’s godly objectives, even if the content of those objectives was only nebulously imagined – was already being adopted well before the consequences of such an ethic could be reckoned; and the ethic was becoming increasingly widespread. In the course of a fairly typical sermon delivered to the House of Commons, the Presbyterian minister Henry Wilkinson noted that the men of his time were “raised to the highest pitch, aiming at nothing under a thorow Reformation; *Zion* and *Jerusalem* is in their eye and in their heart continually: Men seem to be aspiring and even ambitious to contribute something to that work which shall be the glory of the world.” Nor was this radical perspective, *pace* Walzer, limited to the Calvinist-trained saints assembled in the House, and their colleagues in the country magistracy. Wilkinson went on to note that “The generall talk throughout the houshold among the domesticks, is, that Christ their King is comming to take possession of his Throne, they doe not only whisper this, and tell it in the eare, but they speak it publickly.”²⁴ By 1645, John Dury himself would already claim that England was fulfilling a special, unprecedentedly revolutionary destiny, having made of itself a “new thing in the world”:

We are all entrusted to bear the vessels of the Lord in our distinct charges and places, in a more eminent way, then any other people of the world; for the Nations of great *Britain* have made a new thing in the world; a thing which hath not been done by any nation in the world, since the preaching of the Gospel in it . . . that not only the Rulers, but the whole multitude of the people should enter into a Covenant with their God, and one with another . . .²⁵

The language is religious rather than secular; the “new thing” being accomplished is, again, imprecisely or incompletely understood. But the sense of participation in an inevitable, radical transformation in society – a transformation to which everyone has been “entrusted,” for the sake of which everyone is obliged to be radically obedient – is unmistakable. If an ethic of taking a radical *departure* from traditional social constraints had been a long time developing, though there were as yet few platforms or programs for political and ecclesiastical reformation, and there was no theory at all of revolution, the godly opposition to the Laudian-Caroline regime was now coming to see itself as an instrument of revolutionary transformation, and felt itself as a growing force in matters both political and religious. “Are there not thousands that are resolved,” William Sedgwick asked rhetorically in a sermon to the House of Commons, “neither to rest themselves nor give God any rest, till Christ is upon the throne and his enemies under his feet?”²⁶ “Looke above your selves to Gods glory, and his Churches good,” Sedgwick concluded in a startling ascription of agency to radically obedient saints, “and then God and you drive one designe: you shall be *co-workers* with God.”²⁷

In his classic answer to the “Nineteen Propositions” of Parliament, where he conceded that England was constituted as a “mixed monarchy” and its monarch subject to the laws of the realm, King Charles complained about “that new *Utopia* of Religion and Government into which [the Parliamentarians] endeavor to transforme this Kingdome.”²⁸ And he was not far wrong. “I can tell you, sir,” Oliver Cromwell is reported to have said in the early 1640s, “what I would not have, though I cannot what I would.”²⁹ The Parliamentarians were endeavoring to become the masters of a *societas* which did not yet exist, and was nowhere to be found, except in the glimpses they had of themselves as gathering citizens of a typological community. A New Utopia of sorts.

2. BABYLON’S FALL

Before 1645, the chief motivation behind proto-revolutionary impulses, especially with regard to their expression in non-conformity and oppositionism, was negative rather than positive: the sense many people had of being under siege. Nearly every reference to Zion and Jerusalem was coupled with a reference to Babylon. Nearly every attempt of English subjects to express “what they would” was conditioned on a complaint about what they would not. “Let us intreat God to comfort *England*,” the Presbyterian Francis Cheynell prayed in the course of another Parliamentary sermon.

"O let us pray that either *Babylon* may be separated, expelled out of the bowels of *Sion*, or *Sion* delivered out of *Babylon*." "Away with *Babylonish* Gestures, Names, and Titles, Rites, and Ceremonies, away with *Babylonish* Garments too," he went on. "Make Gods Authority your Foundation . . . Make *Gods word* alone the Rule of Reformation . . ." ³⁰ Henry Wilkinson, taking up the thread of a familiar reading of Revelations, where the Pope was Antichrist, and the present day of Reformation was the "latter day" when the Pope's reign would come to an end, noted a "concurrence of Providences," "intimations and prognosticks" of the overthrow of *Babylon* and of the reedifying of *Jerusalem*. ³¹

Brian Manning has argued that anti-papist hysteria was the chief impetus behind the radicalization of the English public, from leaders of the parliamentary revolt like Pym to the London tradesmen, apprentices, and servants, whose mass demonstrations played a large part in forcing Parliament to adopt increasingly intransigent and radical policies. ³² In any case, the three chief complaints against the bishops and their allies were all of a radicalizing nature, demanding radical remedies: that the bishops were idolaters, undermining the work of the Reformation; that they were usurpers, subverting the legitimate authority of the English government; that they had their hands on the goods of the subjects, claiming that the "subjects have nought of their own." In all respects, the "papist" bishops seemed to have been waging a war against the livelihood of native subjects, and for many the most plausible response seemed to be a form of radical resistance, the mobilization of a public will which would be satisfied with nothing less than the extirpation of episcopacy and other papist shibboleths "root and branch."

Once the Civil War broke out, the adversaries of the parliamentary party and its godly supporters were no longer members of a fearsome conspiracy, subverting the true faith and government of England from within; they came to be identified as members of a party in its own right, a party of "cavaliers," whom the pamphleteer John Goodwin characterized as "an accursed confederacy of Jesuits, Papists, Atheists, of stigmaticall & infamous persons of all kinds," who have "gotten the chiefe treasure of the Land, the King, into their possession . . ." Goodwin coined a new name for the parliamentary position, "anti-cavalierism," and he was able to articulate that position by appealing to the "desperate designs" that the Cavaliers were apparently aiming against the English people. These included the aims "to dissolve and ruine that Assembly [i.e. the Parliament], which is by interpretation, or representation (which you will) the whole Nation"; "to turn the Lawes and present frame of

Government upside down”; “To make havoc and desolation, to root out the Generation of the Saints rush and branch, men and women, young and old fearing God, out of the Land”; “to excommunicate and cast out all the pure and precious Ordinances of God out of his House”; and finally, “To spread that Veile, or covering of Antichristian darkness again over the face of the Land, which God by a most gracious hand of providence had rent and taken off many yeares since.”³³ John Pym’s favorite preacher, Stephen Marshall, could take the apocalyptic imagery so far as to use it to warn a parliamentary audience of subversion from within its own body, a subversion caused by the flagging spirits of those who could not bring themselves to thwart the dangers of Babylon. In a sermon published under the name *Reformation or Desolation* Marshall held up what he took to be an infallible “rule” that “whensoever the sins of any *Church, Nation, City, Family, or Person* (you may take it as large or as narrow as you will) are come to full measure, then God infallibly brings ruine upon them.” “No mortall man can possibly determine when the *precise time* of this or that nations utter ruine is certainly come,” Marshall went on to say, “. . . but yet there bee signes whereby wee may say of this, though wee cannot know the very time of a Nations desolation; yet wee may know when the ruine of it comes neere at hand . . .”³⁴ Marshall all but accused certain members of his audience of being traitors. “So I say to you,” he admonished them, “come down, forget that any of you are *Earles or Lords, Knights, or Gentlemen* . . . and give me leave to ask you . . . Are yee not children of *Belial*? (that is the very thing which you must answer in your own bosome), *that is*, are there not amongst you such as *refuse* to carry the *yoak* of *Christ*?”³⁵ In the *Grand Remonstrance* of 1641, the petitioners of the House of Commons complained that the “root” of all the “mischief” rampant in the nation was “a malignant and pernicious design of subverting the fundamental laws and principles of government, upon which the religion and justice of this kingdom are firmly established” – papists, bishops, corrupt clergymen, and greedy courtiers.³⁶

But all of this, again, is more negative than positive; what was proto-revolutionary about the godly in England was a reaction against a partly real and partly imaginary foe, whose obstructionism the glimpse of Sion’s glory was intended to overcome. If the English people, as Richard Helgersson has shown, were becoming more aware of themselves as members of a nation-state – a horizontally (spatially, administratively) as well as a vertically integrated body politic – they were also becoming

aware of themselves as such in opposition to that which they were not, an “accursed confederacy” which was subverting “fundamental law” and threatening the integrity of that “Assembly” which stood either “by interpretation, or representation (which you will)” for “the whole Nation.”³⁷

But as we saw earlier in the case of the first settlers in New England, reactive impulses – resentment against what seemed to be an oppressive agent, determined to take away that which was already one’s rightful legacy, and one’s means of existence – were inevitably accompanied by proactive motives. If an accursed confederacy was subverting fundamental law, an increasing party of the “well-affected,” as the expression went, were seeing themselves as the agents of reformation and amelioration. If they were determined to recover “the right in these goods we have got,” basing their claims on fundamental law, they also were ready to improve upon fundamental law, if that is what it took. They understood that in rectifying the present they were establishing conditions for a better future, for a “new thing” in the world.³⁸ The often noted glee of the early 1640s (“Come at once!” Hartlib had written to Comenius, urging him to move to England)³⁹ was a glee that came to men not only from having found an enemy worth hounding, but also from having taken possession of what they took to be the instruments of transformative possibilities, from having entered upon a historical moment when language itself was coming to have a liberating impact, and when ideas long smoldering among them were suddenly afire, capable of taking command of the world.

3. THE RHETORICAL SITUATION OF A SITTING PARLIAMENT

When the Long Parliament convened in November 1640 the power of words themselves underwent a change. Words had a new effect on the structure of life. The ascendancy of Parliament meant that it was possible for political speech – especially speech directed toward Parliament itself – to influence changes in policy, doctrine, and law. It had been possible before for English subjects to make their desires known to themselves and their authorities, but not like this, not with so little censorship, not with so direct a channel to authority, and not in relation to an authority so disposed to institute fundamental change, and so positioned to act directly on behalf of what were taken to be “the people.”

From the outset political writers identified Parliament as the vehicle of rights, privileges, and responsibilities well in excess of any claims made for it in such earlier progressive documents as the Petition of Right of 1628;

and English subjects expected of it the kind of rectifications and restitutions that had previously been expected of its kings, making Parliament a magnet of social dreams.⁴⁰ Later in the decade, when anti-monarchical talk was being bandied about, John Wildman could complain contemptuously to those who would keep the king in power, "You have seen the stream of power declared to proceed from a false fountain, the King's will."⁴¹ But already in 1640 it was seen that language addressed to the Parliament or on Parliament's behalf was coming to acquire a political leverage, a practical, social effect in the world that political discourse in England simply had not had and could not have had before. Writing on behalf of the Parliament in 1640 Henry Parker insisted that "it is manifest, that in nature there is more favour due to the liberty of the subject, then to the Prerogatives of the King, since the one is ordained only for the preservation of the other." Moreover, "the supream of all humane lawes is *salus populi*. To this law all lawes almost stoope, God dispences with many of his lawes, rather than *salus populi* shall be endangered, and that iron law which we call necessity itselfe, is but subservient to this law."⁴² Thus from the opening of the Long Parliament a theory was in the air transferring legitimate agency and authority to a "people" whose welfare or "safety" came first, and whom Parliament (rather than the king) could be held to represent. ("You are the Nation representatively, virtually, and eminently," a preacher preached to Parliament in 1641; "you stand in the place of the whole Nation."⁴³) It was a small logical step from this promotion of the law above the king, the *salus populi* above the law, and Parliament above any other body or office as the representative and guardian of the *salus populi*, to the passage of the Triennial Act (15 February 1641), which freed Parliament from its dependency on the king's pleasure, for the sake of preventing "in time to come" such "sundry and great inconveniences" to the English people as had lately arisen during the years of Personal Rule. In the Triennial Act the Parliament based its *right* to formalize its sittings on fundamental law (statutes passed under Edward III); but in doing so it claimed to be establishing a new and indissoluble precedent on its own authority by virtue of the principle of *salus populi*; and it stipulated provisions for the calling of elections in all the "Counties, Universities, Cities, and Boroughs" of "England and Wales" with a systematic comprehensiveness that had no precedent in English legal history.⁴⁴ Parliament was taking measures to secure what it took to be its ancient privileges; but it was securing those privileges by appeal to a newly fashioned or rather self-fashioned authority, and it was consciously propagating itself into a vast indeterminate

future, putting what it took to be the “safety” of the nation for now and forever before the precedent of the experience of government under the Tudors and Stuarts. The breadth of the Act, in its reach into the minute mechanisms by which a Parliament was to emerge as the instrument of public safety out of the material structures of the public itself, entailed a look of power that extended even to anticipating a ritualistic summoning of elections in the boroughs and shires to take place once every three years. And yet the spirit of the Act was clearly expressive of a general if not universal respect for the *de facto* power of the sitting Parliament. Even Bishop Joseph Hall, trying to defend episcopacy against the threats to it that many of the godly MPs had already expressed, could bring himself to admit, in an address to Parliament, “that the eyes of all of us the good Subjects of the Whole Realme are fixed upon your success.”⁴⁵

The rhetoric addressed to the Parliament, in actual fast-day sermons (most of which were subsequently printed on order of the Parliament) and other kinds of discourse, itself deserves a full-length study.⁴⁶ The most famous example is *Areopagitica*, a text which in its own way exemplifies the enormous pull of the sitting Parliament on the political imagination.⁴⁷ When Milton tells his addressees of the “noble and puissant nation” evident to his “mind” he is at once challenging his addressees to imagine what he imagines, to understand the imperatives of the moment as he understands them, and acknowledging the power of his addressees to produce the conditions he is longing for. Most texts addressed to the Parliament play this rhetorical game as well, discovering the body of Parliament as an agent for hope, which inspires and provides the means for satisfying a newly imagined expectation, while exhorting Parliament to follow a correspondingly specific policy. In his study of the fast-day sermons Trevor-Roper points out that underneath the rhetoric of their characteristically typological calls for building a New Jerusalem there is usually to be found a narrow political subtext, a specific policy being encouraged at the urging of the sponsors of the sermon. When William Dell (to cite an interesting example that Trevor-Roper omits) tells members of the House of Commons that it is a gross mistake to imagine “the *Reformation* of the *Church*, which is altogether a *spiritual* and *heavenly* kingdome, after the manner of the Reformation of *Worldly* states and commonwealths,” reminding them of how the “*poor, illiterate, mechanick* men, and only *armed* with the *power of the word* turned the world upside down,” he is not only promoting a doctrine of almost carnivalesque antinomianism; he is also exhorting parliamentarians to keep their hands off the sectarians, and forego their inclinations toward Presbyterian and Erastian

policies – doubtless with the blessings of a sponsor from among the corps of New Model Army Officers, for whom he served as a chaplain.⁴⁸ Dell insists, “For as the Kingdom of *god* is an *inward* Kingdom (*the kingdom of God is within you*) so the *Reformation* that belongs to it, is an *inward* Reformation. This *true* gospel reformation, lays hold upon the *heart*, and *soul*, and *inner man*: and changes, and alters, and renews, and reforms *that*; and when the heart is reformed, *all* is reformed.”⁴⁹ The language is inspiring, and it is vague or typological enough, taken as it is, to conform to almost any Protestant doctrine of salvation. But it is specifically being used to work up an enthusiasm for radically tolerationist independency; and it is being spoken by a guest speaker whose sponsors happen to control the military.

Such complexities in the use of language and in the formation of social policy serve as a warning against an overly schematic approach to the revolutionary ethos of the Puritans, such as Walzer is accused of by Derek Hirst, for one.⁵⁰ There was never a single program on the table for the Saints, or a single form of political engagement. Unity itself was a constant issue. And some men, whose attitude toward worship, conscience, and individual responsibility was little different from that of an oppositional leader like Lord Brooke, could unhesitatingly choose the other side, the side of the king, the “party of order,” as Manning calls it. But Walzer himself was specifically identifying an “ethos,” again – a moral and political responsiveness, not a program. And the complexities involved in articulating and deploying that ethos should obscure neither its remarkable potential for giving rise to radical behavior nor, on the other side, the enormous role played by the newly “eminent” Parliament in focusing social discontent in politically radical directions.

Words, in any case, had a new power because they had a new locus – a new body to receive them, a new authority to respond to them – and because individuals and groups of individuals (the “many thousands” who frequently petitioned the Houses) could plausibly expect that what they had to say would have an impact on Parliament’s deliberations and hence on the welfare of the nation as a whole. Whatever Parliament had been in the past in English society – and there were almost as many interpretations of what Parliament had been then as there are among historians today – it was, in the 1640s, something different. Until the Leveller movement and Independent republicanism came along (although Henry Parker for one was already anticipating their ideas to some extent), Parliament was generally understood to “stand in the place of the whole

nation,” as the minister put it. It was understood to fulfill the function of what Hannah Pitkin has called “formal representation,” where the representative is held to act not only *for* the represented but also *as* the represented, *in the place of* the represented. This gave the Parliament a kind of ontological authority, which it could not have had were it thought merely to act *on behalf of* the represented, as the contractual *agents* of the represented. It gave it the authority, in effect, of *being* the nation (“by interpretation, or representation [which you will]”).⁵¹ In practice, of course, it was nothing of the kind. But in the early 1640s, given the role it was to play as a rectifier of wrongs that the personal rule of an absolute monarch had been unable to address, given its actual political strength because of the disastrous outcome of the Bishops’ War, and given its position as the one place in England’s central government where the spirit of Puritan ameliorism was seriously represented, many individuals acted as if that was what it really was: the whole nation. Language addressed to the Parliament was thus in the curious condition of being a language whereby, in principle, a people was addressing itself, rectifying and ameliorating itself.

4. AMELIORATION: *MACARIA* AND *A DISCOVERIE OF INFINITE TREASURE*

One way of looking at the career of ideal political discourse during the 1640s would be to observe the progress made in pressing the English people against their self-image as agents of an ideal polity. As time went on the project would all but collapse. Toward the end of the decade this project would have to be pushed so hard that something remarkable would happen: a mainstream Puritan ameliorist would push the image into the future, and singlehandedly (if obscurely) invent the genre of futuristic fiction. Something even more significant would result as well, beginning in 1645: among the Levellers the project would be pushed to the breaking point, and the result would be a vision of representative democracy, of representative democracy *making itself* out of the ruins of parliamentary ameliorism.

But the earlier expressions of utopian reflection deserve consideration too, and chief among them the contributions of that relatively obscure member of the Hartlib circle, Gabriel Plattes. In *Macaria* (1641) Plattes wrote what is often considered to be something of a political platform for the ameliorist movement, a work that cleverly (if also somewhat naively) draws together the literary, philosophical, religious, and social traditions

of Puritan ameliorism, and puts them at the political disposal of the sitting Parliament. But *Macaria* already assumes certain values which the earlier, pre-parliamentary *Discoverie of Infinite Treasure* can be seen to be busy trying to invent.⁵² These are values which less serene addresses to Parliament would continue to try to reinvent throughout the 1640s, values of what may be thought of as “ideal sociality.” In the *Discoverie* we find a member of the Hartlib circle trying to fasten upon the vehicle of an audience, and an audience *as* vehicle, while elaborating a vision of the future; in other words, constructing solidarity as both the instrument and the goal of a program of amelioration. The text has received scant critical attention, possibly because, though it claims to be prescribing an “approved medicine” of “new inventions,” which should help to make “this Country the Paradice of the World,” it in fact offers few concrete proposals.⁵³ But that is part of its interest. *A Discoverie of Infinite Treasure* recommends more intensive husbandry, a more geometrically regular planting of orchards, a better provision for manuring, and the like; but it says little which could be construed to represent a “new invention,” or mark a revolution in husbandry.⁵⁴ (A book on mining and metallurgy which Plattes also published that year contains considerably more practical advice.⁵⁵) What *A Discoverie* occupies itself with instead – and Plattes is evidently aware of this even as he seems to be doing something else – are the forms of subjectivity and agency, the forms of authorship, readership, citizenship, and leadership that are going to be needed if real social progress is to be made, and something like a “Paradise” is to be produced: subjectivities as conditions and endpoints of utopian solidarity.

Plattes does not have a parliamentary audience to try to influence, but he does have an idea of a general public and a general good, which can best be served, it turns out, by the guidance of a vanguard status group, which Plattes also wants to reform. Plattes’s “intent” in publishing his book, he writes,

is, that all in general might receive benefit thereby, and they might be satisfied so fully before hand, that they might joyn together with consent to accomplish the work more speedily for the general good of all that are present and alive; and also for the generall good of their posteritie, whose happinesse all men are bound to indeavour themselves by their providence to follow. (B1v)

The idea may seem unremarkable. But it is the iteration of a doctrine of progress which had no systematic defenders in England (after Bacon) until the publication of Hakewill’s *An Apologie of Declaration of the Power and Providence of God* only twelve years before. It is a deliberate combination of

that doctrine of progress with the commonplaces of covenant theology and separatist communitarianism. And for all the text's pedestrian interest with apple trees and manure, the idea of the general good leads Plattes to elaborate social dreams of the widest possible scope. Plattes sees his project specifically as an alternative to colonialism and imperialistic warfare, an attempt to solve an *economic* problem, the apparent immiseration and overpopulation of England, without recourse to imperialistic means. "If this be not a better cure for an over-peopled Common-wealth," Plattes writes of his project, "then to make violent incursions upon others territories, as is too frequent, I referre the matter to all mens judgements: the whole world is all of one Gods making, and no question should be one body Politique . . ." (n.p.). Proposing on one level to give advice on how to plant apple trees and manure fields, Plattes proposes on another to show the way to world peace, addressing on the level of economics what his associate, John Dury, had been trying to sponsor through ecumenical diplomacy, namely the reunification of the peoples of the world. In light of these ambitions the metaphor of paradise is not so much of an overstatement: Plattes's hope is to see first England and then the whole world become the kind of place where scarcity has been overcome, where the competition for resources has been rendered moot, and the behavior of men accordingly transformed. But his plan to realize this hope depends only in part on specific material recommendations; it also depends on causing his audience to become leagued together for the public good and thus able to put recommendations like his own into practice.

Where one side of his plan ends and another begins, Plattes himself was probably uncertain; there seems to be a great deal of unwitting sliding from one to the other throughout the book, and Plattes's writing in other ways betrays an uneasiness with his attempts to accommodate the one to the other. In a telltale metaphor, for example, he adverts to the familiar figure of the commonwealth of bees.

I could never finde so exquisite a Modell or resemblance [he writes] of a well ordered and flourishing Common-wealth, as an hive of bees; which in these two principall points do so farre excell men . . . for first they are all industrious, and suffer no drones to remaine amongst them, and by this means their well living is no whit diminished by growing numerous: Secondly, they are all bent to worke for the generall good . . . for when any one hath fortune to finde out a pot or vessel of honey, he doth not like men eate it all up himself; but forthwith he goeth home and telleth his fellowes whom he guideth to the treasure which he hath found: and there they work with one consent . . . (C2v2)

This is standard material. But Plattes is using the image for somewhat original ends, since in his use of the image neither the beekeeper nor the monarch of the hive is given a role to play, the drone has been banished, and the image itself is allowed to slide from the description of an ideal condition to an exhortation to altruism. In the best-known ancient model of the commonwealth of bees, Virgil's *Georgics*, drones are also stigmatized, but both the beekeeper and the monarch (for Virgil male and hence a king) are given prominent parts to play, the king being "the guardian / Of all their works," whose existence guarantees that the bees do not turn on each other and "plunder" their own "edifice of treasured honey."⁵⁶ Bacon had followed suit in *The Advancement of Learning*. Here, however, the bees themselves take responsibility for maintaining the "general good." The hive is self-sustaining by way of a principle of *salus populi*, observed universally by the industrious ones. (Those who lack industry and altruistic impulses, as to be expected in a Puritan commonwealth, are excommunicated.) The conventional image of a well-ordered and prosperous state has thus been adapted to the less conventional image of something like a republic, where all the citizens endeavor to make an equal contribution to the general good without needing a kingly guardian to supervise and discipline them. Thus far, Plattes argues, most men have worked only for the sake of private goods (87); they have not acted enough like bees, who always lead their fellow bees back to the sources of wealth they have discovered, and who always direct their independent findings to bear on a communitarian project, in keeping with which men come to "work with one consent." But Plattes has discovered an "infinite treasure." And instead of monopolizing it for his own advantage he is leading all men to the knowledge of it – a knowledge which turns out to consist not so much in the resources to be exploited as in the value of pooling the resources available and having everyone act for the common good. The "infinite treasure hidden since the beginning of the world" that Plattes discovers (since again, Plattes actually has little real advice to give, few real treasures to divulge) is humanity itself. Until now humanity has been blind to its own capacity for enriching itself through rationalized cooperative behavior.

It is surprising, reading the text from a distance of 350 years, to see Plattes working so hard to establish an ethic of organized scientific and economic labor that we now take for granted. Plattes is almost painfully aware of what he takes to be the novelty and loneliness of his position. If there is a generic model for his treatise, in fact, it is not the many treatises on husbandry, ancient and modern, that were already in print

in England, but rather Burton's lonely *Anatomy of Melancholy*. There are a number of allusions to Burton's text in the course of Plattes's *Discoverie*, and Plattes often seems to be imitating Burton's jocoserious tone. Plattes, too, talks about melancholy and madness. What may seem commonplace to us, the idea of pooled resources, is for Plattes as audacious as the idea of knowing all there is to know about melancholy and its cures; and to confess this idea leaves a man open to the charge of madness. There is good reason for this: Plattes joins the validity of his project to the notion of something new, which would not at all have been acceptable to many figures of authority. He joins the project to a Columbusoid, Cartesian-like universal subject: "What knowledge have I but what every one may have if he follow my steps . . ." (87). To show others where the honey is, and to exemplify the ethic entailed in showing others where the honey is, inspiring others to do the same, others who by following the right method may *become* the same – this is the utopian ethos and purpose of the *Discoverie* as a whole, and it is the very model of the utopian attitudes which come to the forefront of national life in the early 1640s.

In a similar vein, much of the discourse addressed to Parliament or addressed with regard to the powers of Parliament in the next few years would be deliberately positioned between the ostensible objectives of Parliament's deliberations and the willfulness of its individual members, deliberately positioned not only to sponsor specific policies, but also, more generically, to work up radical resolve for the sake of a common good.⁵⁷ "If you would give God no rest," Sedgwick exhorted the MPs, "you must in praying and doing quit yourselves and seek the glory of God and the good of the Church . . . You must not seeke yourselves."⁵⁸ "Shall private and particular Christians," Henry Burton wrote, "... never reforme themselves, untill they see a general *Reformation* over the whole land? What if they shall never live to see this?"⁵⁹ In his great funeral sermon over the death of John Pym, Stephen Marshall held up Pym as an example:

Hee was a man of *publicke spirit*, a most usefull man . . . wholly laid out for the publicke good: the publicke safety was written in *His* heart . . . it was *His* meate and drinke, *His* worke, *His* exercise, *His* recreation, *His* pleasure, *His* ambition, *His* all: What *He* was, was onely to promote the publicke good.⁶⁰

Even works like *Areopagitica*, ostensibly addressed to a specific policy and a specific statutory writ, were concerned to work up a spirit of public-mindedness among members and supporters of Parliament. There was a twofold performance of audience formation involved in these works:

on the one hand, the modelling of Parliament as a certain kind of body with certain responsibilities to the general good (thus Milton's invocation of the ancient Areopagus, or Marshall's invocation of the heroism of "publicke spirit"); on the other hand, the modelling of a vision of the public good itself, in the context of which and for the sake of which the Parliamentarians were encouraged to act.⁶¹

The relation between the two was never self-evident. The actual status of Parliament as a representative body was indefinite, even as Parliamentarians worked hard, sometimes at cross purposes, to clarify its conditions, methods, and aims, propagating it and converting it into an executive as well as a legislative authority.⁶² The public good itself required definition, and was undergoing dramatic changes. Models of an orderly, princely commonwealth were giving way to models of a voluntaristic republic; the nature and justification of elective representation was being questioned and revised; the idea that Parliament was in some way the embodiment of the nation and the agent of its future was being tested against the perplexity of experience. In works as various as *Areopagitica* and *Reformation and Desolation*, the reader can detect what might be thought of, with due allowance for the wordplay involved, as the *strain* of gathering and being gathered: the tension and the music of the language of individuals trying to uncover, situate, challenge, and expand the precincts of a public will. The visions that writers like Milton and Marshall try to set before their audience – visions of a Not Yet to which their audience is to aspire – promise a new fit between the individual and the whole which will eventually, perhaps inevitably, be accomplished, even though they also begin on the premise that their ameliorist conditions and objectives were not yet being satisfactorily achieved.

Such a strain is already being felt in Plattes's *Discoverie*, where the audience is not Parliament but a more general public, which itself is being asked to perform in a quasi-parliamentary, that is, representative fashion. It shows up in the shifting rhetorical function of the exemplary bee, now abiding in a republican commonwealth, now in the process of fashioning one. It shows up in some of the difficulty Plattes has with the problem of social class. Among other things Plattes defends the right of workers to be paid a fair wage for their labor, and argues that only well-paid workers can be expected to produce a surplus of wealth for the nation. But Plattes addresses his book above all to gentleman farmers, whom he calls "husbandmen," and he expects that gentleman farmers will be the ones leading the reformation of the economy. Though he expects that with a reformed economy all members of society will stand to benefit

(from poor farm workers to the clergy, tradesmen, the “impotent poore,” and even the king), the class system will remain in place, albeit with the class of landowning and land-working gentry having taken the lead. In any case, what is evident in a text like *A Discoverie* – not only in spite of the strains and fissures in the text but also in virtue of them – is the development of a public-minded if caste-oriented utopian ameliorism. This ameliorism initially appeared independently of the convening of the Long Parliament, and the change in the language of politics that that entailed; but it nevertheless arose from within the same social circles as would the leaders of the first stage of the English Revolution, and it would continue to exist alongside of and in dialogue with Parliament. It would feed into the radical resolves of the MPs and their popular supporters, contributing to their self-consciousness as radicals. It would encourage the elaboration of a number of doctrines more or less essential to the progress of the Parliamentary movement – doctrines of irenism, of social activism, of the “work” of republican-minded or universalist reformation. It would inspire the development of the newly popular chiliasm, providing theoretical frameworks for interpreting the historical moment, for identifying and responding to its liminality. It would stimulate the introduction of a number of ancillary issues, such as concerns for universal education, the improvement of trade, the distribution of wealth, and the organization of labor, which would add cultural weight to the parliamentary cause and kindle additional popular support for it. “When at last the preludes of God’s works show themselves,” Comenius was writing at the time, partly during an otherwise disappointing visit to England, promoting in *Via Lucis* (“The Way of Light”) his program for universal education, “. . . Why, then, should we not take to heart to believe that, through the ways of Light which are at last being opened, the destruction of the kingdoms of darkness and victory and triumph for Light and Truth are being wrought?”⁶³

The ethos and the strain entailed are noteworthy in Plattes’s major utopian work, *Macaria*. As in *A Discoverie* Plattes had drawn upon Burton’s Menippean, jocoserious voice to articulate the position of an altruistic discoverer of “treasure,” so in *Macaria* Plattes draws upon the Menippean fiction of *Utopia* and *New Atlantis* as a pretext for his appeal to Parliament, while using the literary form of the philosophical dialogue that the Italian writer Campanella had employed for his *Civitas Solis* (1605), and taking his ideas predominantly from the framework that Burton had drawn upon in his own “poetic commonwealth.” “I am confident,” Plattes says in his preface to the Parliament, “that this Honourable Court [i.e. Parliament]

will lat the Corner Stone of the worlds happinesse before the final recesse thereof," and therefore, "I have adventured to cast in my widowes mite into the Treasurie; not as an Instructor, or Counsellour, to this Honourable Assembly, but have delivered my conception in a Fiction, having for my pattern Sir *Thomas Moore*, and Sir *Francis Bacon* . . ." ⁶⁴ On the one hand, Plattes begins by acknowledging the same sense of Parliament's power and promise as other writers were acknowledging: Parliament is unmistakably a direct agent in the reformation of the world. On the other hand, Plattes suggests that in order to appeal to that agent one requires indirectness. One cannot simply tell Parliament what to do. One has to provide a model, a kind of moving picture, of what it is that Parliament can put into effect – a picture which seems to have all the more authority in that its genre was created by two of England's greatest literary heroes.

Both Plattes and his public know perfectly well that *Utopia* and *New Atlantis* were literary jests and that the word "utopia" could be used pejoratively. But what is striking about Plattes's dialogue, as previous commentators have noted, is that in this case a genre of jokoseriousness is used for deadly serious purposes. The model of an ideal republic, as *Macaria* presents it, is said in the course of the dialogue to have nothing in it "that is generally deemed impossible," nor any "contradiction in it" (81). In fact, the model puts nothing forward which would have required a major social upheaval. The model is a program of moderate reforms, primarily in the administration of government and the dissemination and uses of learning: the formation, for example, of councils of industry and trade, and yearly synods for deciding questions of religious doctrine. But even this – this idea of restructuring English government and its institutions of knowledge on the basis of a rationalized model – is radical enough to inspire Plattes to adopt the conventions of utopian romance, and to have his interlocutors make extravagant claims for what his program might accomplish. "I doubt not," one of them says at the conclusion,

but wee shall obtaine our desires, to make England to bee like to *Macaria*; for which our posterity which are yet unborne, will fare the better: and though our neighbour Countreys are pleased to call the English a dull Nation, yet the major part are sensible of their owne good, and the good of their posterity, and those will sway the rest; so wee and our posterity shall bee all happie. (90)

Indeed, that same character, having been satisfied that the reforms being called for could be disseminated by nothing more than "the Art of Printing," and wills of the peoples who have become acquainted with their principles, is earlier given to say, "Well, I am imparadised in my

minde, in thinking that England may bee made happy, with such expedition and facility" (89).

Like other writings of the Hartlib circle at this time, *Macaria* puts the reader face to face with a firm belief that a solution to the world's ills is at hand and will not require all that much effort, since the solution is also *in our hands*. *Macaria* has been called a "full-employment utopia," primarily because of its emphasis on trade.⁶⁵ It might be more accurate, however, to think of it as an opportunistic utopia of industriousness, in the tradition of Robert Burton and the New England Puritans.⁶⁶ Other utopian documents appearing later in the decade will begin to take up the issue of poverty and employment as their primary issues. But *Macaria* is more concerned with a systemic "happiness"; and though it includes provisions for economic well-being, prosperity and full employment are not its main aims. The document is written from and for the point of view of an already employed and prosperous gentry. As in Burton's utopia and Plattes's earlier *Discoverie*, the main hope is that those responsible will take control over the administration of the nation, that nothing in this nation will be out of control, nothing left idle or out of order; nothing will be left a wilderness or a waste anymore. All will be of use, and everything of use will be of value.

As in Burton's utopia, too, although *Macaria* is said to have a king, the king is given few responsibilities. Except in matters of warfare, where the king evidently still plays the leading role, *Macaria* gives over all of its government to a governing elite. A regularly meeting "Great Councell," "like to the Parliament in England," has control over *Macaria*; it is this council which has control over the subcouncils seeing to the prosperity of the kingdom, the "Councells" of "Husbandry," "Fishing," "Trade by Land," "Trade by Sea," and "New Plantations." In addition, a "Colledge of Experience" oversees the discovery and dissemination of knowledge in the kingdom. It sees to the training of parsons, who are also skilled as medical doctors, and sponsors a yearly synod which, under the supervision of the Great Councell, supervises the development and dissemination of religious doctrine.

The idea of *Macaria* is thus the idea of a state governed by an educated elite occupying both elective and appointive offices; a state whose rulers, operating on the basis of cooperative, collective, and "experimental" behavior, see to the care of the body and soul alike of the members of the polity, and work to assure general prosperity and consensus. One of the conditions of the felicity of this state is the room for amelioration that Providential history has evidently provided. Another is the Baconian

idea of organized knowledge, assembled and disseminated by way of an organized college. A third is the Comenian doctrine of one world, one religion, and one way, a doctrine which provides for the body and the soul, for material prosperity, salvation, and religio-political solidarity all at the same time. But perhaps the most important condition is simply the conviction, put in the mouth of the Traveller, that both the occasion and the means are at hand for taking the matter of "one way" in hand. To repeat the essential point, in the words of the naive narrator: "I am imparadised in my minde, in thinking that England may bee made happy, with such expedition and facility" (89). It is almost as if the expectation – the sheer joy of plausible expectation – were more rewarding than the thing expected.

5. THE WAR BREAKS OUT

Against the idealism of the Hartlib circle, nevertheless, one has to keep in mind the crosscurrents of self-interest and class solidarity that were also a part of the life and mentality of the Parliamentary party. At the death of Pym, in spite of the costs and privations of the war and Marshall's funeral oration in praise of selflessness, Pym's heirs were voted lands worth £10,000 a year in rent, a great deal of money at the time. While performing his duties to the state Sir William Lenthall, Speaker of the House of Commons, amassed an immense fortune. The list could go on.⁶⁷ Expressions of idealism and impulses toward serving the public good were balanced by a system of political economy that put many of the goods of the public at the disposal of a party and class that already controlled much of England's wealth and had no intention of forfeiting it. The spoils system of traditional patronage lived on, as did the hegemony of landed wealth and the custom of "engrossing" family estates. The doctrine of "one God, one church, one way," may have reflected an aspiration; it may have expressed a genuine impulse toward broad communitarianism; but it also reflected the self-serving interest of a traditional oligarchy, with social and economic stakes in sustaining an ideology of unanimity.

With the outbreak of the first Civil War, given the difficulty of sustaining utopian ideals in the face of the reality of war, Parliamentary communitarianism, with all its impulses toward a widely shared ameliorism, was strained to breaking point. Writers like Milton and Dury could continue to produce images of a new social order, in one respect already covenanted and in another respect still to be achieved. But in the course of what proved to be a devastating war – over one hundred

thousand dead, uncounted thousands wounded and displaced – its casualties aggravated throughout the country by poor grain harvests and a prolonged economic recession, ameliorism became all but impossible to sustain. Political theory in many quarters, while becoming more and more republican in its understanding of the fundamental nature of the body politic and its agents, more and more conscious of the public consent underlying successful government, was forced by circumstances to turn toward the rather non-utopian idea of the fundamental legitimacy of *de facto* authority.⁶⁸ *Right and Might Well Met* John Goodwin named a tract of 1649. To the mighty went the right of being mighty, as proved by the trial of combat: so much the better, and a sign of God's will, that a Parliamentary force representing the *salus populi* was the mightily triumphant party. But contradictions remained, and apocalyptic fantasies lingered. In 1647 the leading theorist of the Army Independents, Henry Ireton, could in the same day (during the famous Putney Debates) defend property as the foundation of civil society, argue against manhood suffrage, insist that the Agreement of the People was too drastic an innovation, and seriously entertain the idea that God might soon will the destruction of “not only King and Lords, but all distinctions of degrees” and even of “all property . . . that there be nothing at all of civil constitution left in the kingdom.”⁶⁹ “Reformation” and “Desolation” named a pair of conflicting vistas – horizons of the Not Yet – that often went hand in hand.

Yet in the midst of these complicated times, one member of Parliament, at least, was capable of imagining a startlingly felicitous future: *Nova Solyma* (“New Jerusalem”), a work in Latin. Written by a Cambridge-educated Presbyterian MP from London, who was excluded during the purge of 1648, *Nova Solyma* is set at least half a century in the future.⁷⁰ It tells the story of three young men, two of them from England, one from the New Jerusalem itself, who have been traveling through Europe, meeting with various sorts of baroque adventures, and have now arrived together in Judea. The Judea (or Zion) they arrive in has been settled during the past fifty years by converted Jews, who have returned to their country from the Diaspora. By this time Judea has become a prosperous and peaceful republic, devoted to trade, piety, and the devout but plentiful pleasures of the Christian life – music, poetry, civic ceremony. It has established a model system of education for all of its male citizens (although the system has two tiers, and those destined for the second tier are trained more for trade than for the pursuit of knowledge and the art of government), and all of its efforts as a society seem bent toward a

practice of amelioration. "We try to improve by art and culture in every way," one of the leading citizens of Nova Solyma explains (1:90). "The founders of our republic," a schoolmaster later remarks,

in their zealous enquiry how best to establish it on a sound basis, put the education of the rising generation in the very forefront of all means to that end. They held the opinion that good laws, an effective army, and all the other defenses of a State, were of comparatively no avail if obedience and benevolence and the other virtues which tend to the well-being of mankind were not early implanted in the minds of the young . . . (1:235)

In the end, Judea is shown to have succeeded in providing for all of its subjects both economically and spiritually. Although work remains to be done, the nation is a prosperous, civic-minded, pious, and peaceful republic; and it has just joined in filial bonds (by marriage and trade treaties) with a hitherto less enlightened England.

Nova Solyma thus provides a narrative image of the Hartlibian program of Puritan ameliorism – an image of the program put into practice, its various values (ascetic piety and worldly prosperity, congregational independency and federalized world peace, dependence on free grace and respect for free will) put into balance, combined into the framework of a historical settlement, a world-transforming, peaceful revolution in the near future. Little that is extolled in descriptions of the institutions of its fictional republic is different from the implied society of Plattes's *Macaria*, or from what Hartlib and Dury recommend in texts like *A Motion Tending to the Publick Good of this Age* (1642) or *Considerations Tending to the Happy Accomplishment of Englands Reformation* (1647): the rationalized supervision of religion, trade, and science, for the benefit of a population assumed to be inherently educable and improvable, inherently self-directed, rational, and worshipful.

But Gott's use of novelistic fiction itself is unusual. The romance of the text is neither allegorical nor fantastic. The style is mixed in the conventional fashion of a baroque or mannerist romance, combining lyric and narrative, joining the thread of its narrative by interpolation, and focusing on various kinds of quests, including romantic quests for marriage partners. Being a Christian romance it is much concerned with the miraculous ways of God, and along with its marriage plot and its delineation of the history and customs of the new Zion, it includes episodes of spiritual revelation and conversion. But there are no mystical meanings in the text which are not fitted into the frame of the story's verisimilitude – the text has no allegorical secrets – and there are no events in it which

cannot be explained, apart from the supernatural reality of God's will, as the outcome of natural causes and deliberate human choices. Gott, moreover, has produced what amounts to the first futuristic, novelistic fiction in European literature, and even the first futuristic utopia, the first example in European literature of a "uchronia."⁷¹ "We are now very close on the fiftieth year since our long and widely scattered nation was restored to its wonderful prosperity," one of the new Zion's leading citizens remarks.

You do not forget, I feel sure, the terrible calamity of our nation in bygone days; it was indeed a remarkable punishment . . . But when indeed, by the sudden flash of divine light, that stubborn mental darkness was removed, and, prompted by a heavenly impulse, we acknowledged the true Messiah, and became His disciples with unwonted zeal, then it was that to us of that same race that had been sunk so long in the lowest depth of misery there came, as it were, life from the dead, and our exaltation to the highest by divine mercy. (1:88–89)

If *Nova Solyma* is a "uchronia," the advent of the society it forecasts all the same depends on a miracle – the miracle of what Archer called "The Personall Reign of Christ on Earth." It embodies a program of improvement, but the program first of all depends on the supplement of the millenarian miracle. The society does not come into being as a result of human progress; rather, human progress comes into being as a result of the advent of the millenarian society. We are not yet in the Age of Enlightenment, and the fiction of *Nova Solyma* is riddled with what from a post-Enlightenment point of view look like fissures and contradictions: progress which is not a result of progress, the assertion of human dignity and the rewards of learning which are not a result of human effort and learning. And in the context of its own day and age *Nova Solyma* is riddled with fissures as well; for this is a text about the millennium to come where the millennium so far has arrived only in Judea, and where the spread of millenarian reform to England itself is shown to depend on – well, marriage: the wedding between one of the young English travelers and a daughter of Judea.

The author introduces his own explanation of this disappointing result. In an astonishingly modernistic metafictional moment, the schoolmaster is giving a lecture on the types of poetry and ends up discussing the genre of fiction to which *Nova Solyma* belongs – one in which "All styles of writing are permissible, and any subject may be included," and the narrative is "written in prose with fragments of verse interwoven here and there" (1:298). The schoolmaster does not approve of works of this

kind in general, but he claims to have heard of at least one exception to this rule, of “one we have heard of who is trying, as doctors do, to extract an antidote from this poison, and to use this style of writing to make the world better rather than worse” (1:299). “The author,” the schoolmaster goes on to say,

does not claim that he is absolutely correct . . . He has not the impudent audacity of those rash reformers who are for tearing up the old foundations, for putting civil and political life on a new basis, and for carrying out specious schemes which are as costly as they are dangerous, in order to overturn what has stood the test of many generations.

Rather:

The argument of this book is the history of a life that is free, that has received a liberal education, and has been well and religiously brought up; it keeps within the limits of the humanly possible, and deals, as a rule, with the middle ranks of life, who are perhaps the best, and certainly not the least numerous. I would gladly extol it more, except that I should seem to be praising my own nation, for by a novel and daring fiction the scene of the tale is laid here in Nova Solyma, and the author long ago described in his book, more as a prophet than as an historian, the life we lead in this present age. (1:300)

In the society of the future, scholars are familiar with a novel about the society of the future: the book the contemporary reader of Gott’s fiction is currently holding in his or her hands. So fiction self-consciously triumphs. But it triumphs at the cost of coming to terms with the “rash” reforms that would actually be needed if England were really to become the kind of society Gott wants it to become; it comes at the cost of avoiding that “tearing up the old foundations, for putting civil and political life on a new basis” which would really be required if English society were to become a felicitous society on the amelioristic model – without a miracle of divine intervention.

6. THE LEVELLER MOVEMENT: “WE ARE THE MEN OF THE PRESENT AGE”

We come finally to the Levellers, some of whose leaders were already aware of the break in English history – a break that they themselves were both experiencing and making – as early as 1645. An understanding of this break first appears in full form perhaps in William Walwyn’s tract, *Englands Lamentable Slaverie* (11 October), written in response to something

John Lilburne had written in prison, entitled *Englands Birth-Right Justified* (8 October). Lilburne had written in his customary style of combative legalism – a style of argument through which Lilburne discovered fundamental principles of individual liberty in the givens of common law. Although he was drawing fairly radical conclusions from his discoveries, both his principles and his conclusions were framed by an appeal to tradition, including the Magna Charta and the pre-Norman “birth-right” it supposedly codified.⁷² Lilburne was exceptionally uncompromising in his views of the juridical freedom he claimed, and often insolent in the way he expressed them, but he still conformed to the paradigm of Puritan ameliorism and Parliamentary revolt.⁷³ But while expressing his solidarity with Lilburne’s fight for legal liberties Walwyn argued that the Magna Charta upon which Lilburne relied was but a “messe of pottage.”⁷⁴ Walwyn claimed that appeals to tradition – any tradition, by any charter – were too limited. He insisted instead on measuring things according to “the universall Rules of common equitie and justice,” rules to which “all men and all Authority in the world are bound” (149). The “liberties and priviledge which you claime,” he wrote to Lilburne, are “as due to unto you, as the ayre you breath in” (149). Parliamentary authority was “a power intrusted by the people (that chose them) for their good, safetie, and freedome,” so that “a Parliament cannot justlie doe any thing to make the people lesse safe or lesse free then they found them” (147).

Walwyn’s tract thus breaks from tradition in two ways: it breaks from the accumulated conventions of common law to a body of unchangeable and universal natural law, and it breaks from the idea of Parliament as the embodiment of a national will to the idea of Parliament as a group of agents acting on behalf of the individuals who voted for them. These two breaks would be spelled out again in the first Leveller Tract published on behalf of a collective voice, *A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens* (7 July 1646), of which the probable dominant author was Richard Overton. “Wee are well assured,” the “many thousand” remark to its audience, the members of Parliament, “. . . that the cause of our choosing you to be *parliament-men*, was to deliver us from all kind of Bondage, and to preserve the Common-wealth in Peace and happinesse: For effecting whereof, we possessed you with the same Power that was in our selves, to have done the same; For wee might justly have done it ourselves without you, if we had thought it convenient . . .” “Wee are your Principalls,” the document goes on to say, “and you our Agents.”⁷⁵ (In later writings Overton would call Parliamentarians “the betrusted” and the electorate “the betrusters” – expressions which survived in the various Agreements

of the People.) As Walwyn had suggested, government was to be measured by standards of natural law; tradition itself was to be subordinated to the demands of natural law and the inalienable liberties of individuals. "[Y]ee were chosen," the Remonstrance says to its "parliament-men,"

to worke out our deliverance, and to Estate us in naturall and just liberties agreeable to *Reason* and common *equitie*; for whatever our Fore-fathers were; or whatever they did or suffered, or were enforced to yeeld unto; we are the men of the present age, and ought to be absolutely free from all kindes of exorbitancies, molestations or *Arbitrary Power*, and you wee choose to free us from all without exception or limitation, either in respect of Persons, Officers, Degrees, or Things . . ." (114)

What is new here is not only an idea, which in itself, though uniquely framed, was drawn from Continental conciliarism, Thomism, and Calvinist resistance theory; what is new here above all is a manner of speaking, a manner of address, which declares itself in expressions such as "we are the men of the present age." If Parliament had generally been conceived of as a body that acted in the place of the nation or the people and thus *as* the nation, Parliament is now being conceived of as an employee of the nation, as a depute with no intrinsically legitimate will of its own. The nation itself speaks through the voice of a "we," a self-professedly modern "thousands," whose rights and interests are defined in relation to the present, and whose integrity stems not from the social institutions that traditionally serve or frame them, but from their own independent wills, irrespective of institutions and traditions. Overton for one is speaking at this time about the idea of "self propriety," what C. B. Macpherson, three centuries later, would call "possessive individualism," taking this propriety of the self as the basic term out of which and on behalf of which civil society is to be formed.⁷⁶ The authoritative national will has thus been shifted from Parliament to the nation's citizens, who themselves are said to be politically defined by their natural rights and their freedom in the present. The people alone bear within themselves the power of "betrusting" their will to their representatives; and along with the power of voting they are vested by right with the power of political speech, a speech that assembles the will of the people out of the thousands of individual voices.

Under these conditions, what was at once a new danger and a new opportunity was opening up. The danger from a material point of view seemed to many to be the overthrow of the whole conventional social order. If authority had been transferred to individuals, to the "free-born"

men of contemporary England, and if the fundamental institutions of society were therefore subject to the whims of self-proclaimed citizens, the Levellers might well be posing a danger to the magistracy itself, as well as to the gentry who traditionally and actually controlled it. It might even threaten to "level all men's estates."⁷⁷ At the Putney Debates, Colonel Nathaniel Rich claimed that those without property in the nation outnumbered the propertied by a margin of five to one. If all free-born individuals were equally empowered as electors, he went on to say, "It may happen, that the majority may by law, not in a confusion, destroy all property; there shall be an equality of goods and estates."⁷⁸ But the Levellers were never the economic threat that their opponents feared them to be. In response to these fears the Levellers specifically disavowed the levelling estates, even adding a stipulation in the third Agreement of the People to that effect. Nor, precisely, did the Levellers intend to undo the conventional system of social status.⁷⁹ But the Levellers nevertheless wanted to submit the economic and the status system alike to new standards of fairness and charity, of "common equitie." And this meant that in imagining an atomized citizenry, composed of a multitude of self-possessive individuals, they were also imagining a new horizon of social solidarity. They were imagining an ideal solidarity akin to those that Puritan utopists like Plattes and Dury commonly invoked, but broken off from the self-enclosing system of class and classis that their predecessors depended upon, an ideal body composed out of self-possessive individuals freely giving themselves in response to universal "laws of nature." As a late document, Walwyn's *Manifestation*, puts it: "no man is born for himself only, but obliged by the Laws of Nature (which reaches all) of Christianity (which engages us as Christians) and of Publick Societie and Government, to employ our endeavours for the advancement of a communitive Happinesse, of equall concernment to others as to our selves."⁸⁰ The atomization of the body politic that the Levellers by and large took as their starting point thus represented both a radical rupture from convention and a radical return to the conditions out of which convention might be reestablished. The Levellers considered the government of England a failure, the leaders of the government so many betrayers of the common weal, and the recourse to war that the leaders had engineered a disastrous error. Under these conditions Parliament itself had lost its legitimacy as a representative, whether by "interpretation" or any other means; and neither the body of Parliament nor the traditional social, economic, and political rules under which Parliament operated could be employed anymore. But that then was cause for Leveller opportunity:

an opportunity for renewing and rectifying the government of England by drawing upon the free wills of its otherwise disassociated individuals.

Restoration, of course, was as prominent a goal as reinvention among many of the leaders of Leveller movement, especially those like Lilburne, to whom the idea of the Norman Yoke and the nationalistic implications of being “freeborn” were so attractive. Laws were to be written and legal procedures were to be conducted in English. Rights such as freedom from illegal search and seizure were to be guaranteed to every “freeborn” man who had not forfeited his “birthright.” But the idea of restoration was already becoming vestigial. Even when couched in the language of the restoration of birthrights, Leveller ideology was moving toward the wholesale revision of the relations of power upon which English government would be based. Though it frequently enough adopted a rhetoric of making a return to fundamental, pre-Norman liberties, Leveller thought was aimed mainly toward constructing a platform for the future, an Agreement of the People, which would produce and consolidate a new social order out of the alienated individuals of the old.

It was just this element of radical novelty that so thrilled and so appalled Independents like Ireton and Cromwell. Early in the Putney Debates, well before they went on to their famous discussion of the franchise, property, and civil society, Cromwell could be heard to respond to what might be thought of as the *poetic* audacity of the Leveller program. “Truly this paper,” he says, referring to the first version Agreement of the People, “does contain in it very great alterations of the very government of the kingdom, alterations from that government that it hath been under, I believe I may almost say, since it was a nation.” The idea of the Agreement, Cromwell went on to say, though based on “plausible . . . pretensions” and “expressions,” assumed that “we could leap out of one condition into another.” And this was troubling. “How do we know if, whilst we are disputing these things, another company of men shall [not] gather together, and put out a paper as plausible as this?” By what right, and to what end, do the small group of men in that Hall at Putney propose to reinvent the government of all of England? Their *ideas* may be sound, or “plausible,” as Cromwell puts it. But if one small group can propose ideas for revolutionizing government, and vow to adopt them, by the same right so can another:

And not only another, and another, but many of this kind. And if so, what do you think the consequence of that would be? Would it not be confusion? Would it not be utter confusion? Would it not make England like the Switzerland country,

one canton of the Swiss against another, and one county against another? I ask you whether it be not fit for every honest man seriously to lay that upon his heart? And if so, what would that produce but an absolute desolation – an absolute desolation to the nation . . . (7–8)

Historians have concentrated on the nuts and bolts of sovereignty that the participants in the Putney Debates discussed – as well they might. But Cromwell's early hypothetical objections to the legitimacy of the exercise take us to what is perhaps the very heart of the political problem of revolutionary England. It certainly takes us to the heart of the problem of ideal politics and utopian mastery. For Cromwell is bringing up again the problem we first encountered in the dialogue in *The Tempest* between Gonzalo and the courtiers – Gonzalo's Paradox – the chief difference being that Cromwell is bringing it up in a context where real political effects can follow from what is being said. By what right, and to what end, can an individual or group of individuals imagine a new beginning, by which society can be reinvented along ideal lines? Like the courtiers in *The Tempest* Cromwell doubts the right of individuals, here the members of the Army Council, to concoct a new system of government, and to propose that a society "leap out of one condition into another." And he calls their right into doubt precisely because the act of imagination and reason that produces the proposal, however "plausible," flies in the face of the real logic of sociality. It proposes an end which forgets its beginning, since if one act of imagination and reason can produce the terms under which a whole society is to be governed, so can other acts of imagination and reason. Whatever *one* mind can do, *other* minds can do. When one new beginning can be embarked upon, other new beginnings can be embarked upon. The end result of the forming of society based strictly on what a man might call his reason, so far as it ratifies the ability of men to reinvent their worlds, to make a new beginning for a whole social order, is thus the forming of a fragmented society, a society which breaks apart. "It is not enough," Cromwell concludes, "to propose things that are good in the end, but . . . it is our duty to consider consequences . . ." (8). Or again: "It is not enough for us to propose good things, but it behoves honest men and Christians . . . to see whether they be in a condition . . . [to] attempt that that is fairly and plausibly proposed" (8–9). One can make plausible proposals; one can use one's reason to think of better systems of social organization. But how can one make a good idea politically legitimate for a whole nation? How would one guarantee that its adoption would not have the undesired consequence ultimately

of annulling or fragmenting political legitimacy itself? In other words – and this becomes an especially vexing concern during the 1650s, when neither the Leveller nor the Independent solution would find a satisfactory settlement – how can a political *beginning* be made which is *also* a political *conclusion*, and not just a propaedeutic to an endless chain of new beginnings?

In the positions assumed by Cromwell and Ireton, responding to the problem of utopian reasoning, we find time and again a vacillation between a desire to reinvent society from the ground up and a fear that attempting to do so would ultimately result in “desolation.” Their positions, which would soon enough come to embrace Pride’s Purge, the trial and execution of the king, and the declaration of a republic, would nevertheless again and again assume an anti-utopian stance.⁸¹ Cromwell would insist that whatever he did had to have at the very least “the face of authority, if it be but a hare swimming over the Thames, I will take hold of it rather than let it go.”⁸² Swimming alone, acting on one’s principles alone, engaging in the practice of utopian society-invention – this was not enough; lacking the face of authority, it could result in desolation. And thus although Cromwell could lead a revolution, he could not lead a project of society-invention. Ireton’s thoughts seem to have been even more vexed on the subject, since Ireton could imagine a utopian politics, and could even fit his doctrine of the primacy of property, as he knew, into a framework of ideal constitutionalism.⁸³ But in the language of the constitutional proposals and army declarations of which he was the prime author, as in the positions on property and sovereignty which he insisted upon, Ireton repeatedly endeavored to contain his radicalism within a context of traditionalism. He tried to make the restoration of previous privileges and liberties preside over a platform of invention. Consider his *Heads of the Proposals Offered by the Army* (1 August 1647). Ireton here puts forward a number of propositions similar in spirit to Leveller ideas, calling for the breakup of the sitting Parliament, regular elections, religious freedom, the disenfranchisement of those who had fought against the parliamentary army, the indemnity of those who fought for it, and the maintenance of the army for the next ten years under the supervision of an elected Council of State. But having effaced both parliamentary and Cavalier opposition, having placed Parliament on a rational basis, having established certain political and religious freedoms for all English citizens, and having asserted the autonomy of the army, Ireton’s document then proposes to “restore” the king and the royal family to their original condition, and after a

period of ten years to bring the whole of the pre-revolutionary ruling elite back into government, even putting any militia that might be raised back under the king's direct command.⁸⁴ King Charles himself rejected the *Proposals*, shrinking from the idea of religious freedom. But as far as many Levellers were concerned Ireton's compromise between real republicanism and the restoration of pre-revolutionary government was entirely reactionary.

Ireton's language is one of documents like *The Petition of Right* and, more immediately, the *Triennial Act*; it is the language of rectification, founded on doctrine of "fundamental liberties," but presented by and large as a correction rather than a reinvention of the traditional constitution. Far more radical in its rationalization of government than any language that might have come out of the Presbyterian camp, Ireton's political discourse is nevertheless controlled by a will to self-containment, a will to keep things the same, in the hands of those who are already in possession of power.

Among the Levellers, however, we find instead a decisive will to self-invention, although it was only gradually that they lighted upon a doctrine fully equal to their ambitions. Both *The Case of the Armie Truly Stated* (15 October 1647) and the first Agreement of the People (3 November 1647) contain their principles of representative democracy within the context of a complaint, using the familiar language of grievances and "inconveniences." The discourse is situational, *de facto*. "Having by our late labours and hazards," the first Agreement begins,

made it appeare to the world at how high a rate wee value our just freedome, and God having so far owned our cause, as to deliver the Enemies thereof into our hands: We do now hold our selves bound in mutual duty to each other, to take the best care we can for the future, to avoid both the danger of returning into a slavish condition, and the chargeable remedy of another war . . .⁸⁵

As in the language of Ireton's platforms and earlier documents like the *Triennial Act*, the assertion of a right to speak, propose, and alter the government is based upon the advent of a privileged historical moment, a divinely sanctioned opportunity. Under these circumstances the speakers propose to take "care" for "the future," although mainly in order to prevent the recurrence of injuries, the "danger of returning into a slavish condition" and the burden of having to wage "another war." The authors of the first Agreement thus reduplicate the rhetoric of the earlier constitutional documents. "That to prevent the many inconveniences," the second clause of the Agreement states, "apparently arising from the

long continuance of the same persons in authority, this present [is to] be dissolved upon the last day of September . . ." (226–27).

In *The Case of the Army Truly Stated*, it is again the event and the grievance which controls the discourse: "the grievances, dissatisfactions, and desires of the Army, both as Commoners and Soldiers," which the army has "with much patience" waited to see redressed. Kishlansky remarks that "the [Army] documents have a reflective quality as well as an assertive one, setting out the process of reasoning or series of events which led to their articulation."⁸⁶ And to Kishlansky's observation it might be added that the reflective aspect of the documents was in large part a product of a problem: the Levellers of the army had not yet settled on a system of legitimation which did not depend in some way on the mode of restoration, and the ameliorist discourse of "fundamental liberties." Walwyn and Overton may have already devised a doctrine of natural law; but no one had yet managed to combine the idea of natural law with the claims and grievances of the "men of the present age." No one had succeeded in discovering a legitimate "condition" for social invention apart from traditional appeals to grievances and the outcomes of events. Even when the authors of the *Case of the Army* state that "all power is originally and essentially in the whole body of the people of this Nation," they are appealing, as the parliamentary spokesman Henry Parker had done before them, to a "people" already made, already vested with traditional rights, and already rendered as an object whose "safety" is the highest law, the very principle of political authority.⁸⁷

A language suited precisely to the theoretical innovations and will to self-invention that were central to Leveller concerns would not emerge until the penning of the third Agreement, the Agreement of the Free People of England (1 May 1649), which Brailsford calls "the last collective testament of the Leveller leaders, to the English nation and to history," a document in which the Leveller "political program stands mature and complete."⁸⁸ It was preceded by the *Manifestation*, already alluded to, where Walwyn had already staked out the new area of discourse that would be needed if Leveller doctrine was to find a suitable organ. "[W]e aim not at power in our selves, our Principles and Desires being in no measure of self-concernment," the collective voice penned by Walwyn insists: "nor do we relie for obtaining the same upon strength, or a forcible obstruction; but solely upon that inbred and perswasive power that is in all good and just things, to make their way in the hearts of men, and so to procure their own Establishments" (394). The objectives of the Levellers have to be formulated and pursued with disinterest; they cannot

be grounded in *de facto* authority; they cannot be aimed at the preservation of a pre-given authority, or the satisfaction of a pre-given interest; they cannot be gained by force. They have to be established inwardly, in the "hearts of men"; they have to follow from such a principle of universality, or natural law, that they in fact "procure their own Establishments," when once they have found appropriate expression. And so: "We have with the best care and abilities God hath afforded us, cast the same into a Modell and Platform, which we shall speedily present unto the view and consideration of all, as the *Standard* and ultimate scope of our *Designes*" (394).

The "Modell and Platform" does not altogether neglect the force of events. Its Preamble begins by citing "the long and tedious prosecution of a most unnaturall cruell, homebred war," and the "eight yeares experience" or "failed remedies." The Third Agreement is put forward as both a lament against previous wrongs and a recognition of a Providential opportunity, "that opportunity God hath given us to make this Nation Free and Happy." The Agreement will even claim among its motives the "prevention" of "distractions" and the "removall of all grievances."⁸⁹ But it will also insist on a disinterestedness that no earlier manifestoes had exemplified. And it will find a new kind of voice, articulating a new look of power. The third Agreement is devised as a purely *performative* document. It is signed by Walwyn, Lilburne, Overton, and Price; but it is written in the voice of a people willing itself into being, making itself into its own object. It is in fact the first document in national history whose main clause follows from the words, "We the people." It is the first document articulating a pure collective constitutional origin, its every expression contributing at once to the fashioning of a political people and the fashioning of the right and power of the people to fashion themselves:

And being earnestly desirous to make a right use of that opportunity God hath given us to make this Nation Free and Happy, to reconcile our differences, and beget a perfect amities and friendship once more amongst us, that we may stand clear in our consciences before Almighty God, as unbyassed by any corrupt Interest or particular advantages, and manifest to all the world that our indeavours have not proceeded from malice to the persons of any, or enmity against opinions; but in reference to the peace and prosperity of the Commonwealth, and for prevention of like distractions, and removall of all grievances: We the free People of *England*, to whom God hath given hearts, means, and opportunity to effect the same, do with submission to his wisdom, in his name, and desiring the equity may be to his praise and glory; Agree to ascertain our Government, to abolish all arbitrary Power, and to set bounds and limits both to our Supreme, and all Subordinate Authority, and remove all known Grievances.

(402)

In the Agreement the people themselves are said to speak. They agree “to ascertain our Government.” They agree to reorganize the electoral geography of the country. They agree to establish conditions for representation, taxation, mutual defense, and jurisprudence, while at the same time limiting the power of local and national government. There is only one limitation to this Agreement, which answers the Cromwellian objection. The Agreement is final. It is agreed that no other agreements shall be given precedence over it:

And all Laws made, or that shall be made contrary to any part of this Agreement, are hereby null and void. (409–10)

The Agreement declares, in fine, that the self-legitimizing social voluntarism from which it derives will, once it is agreed upon, put an end to all self-legitimizing social voluntarism. There will be no Swiss cantons “one against another,” because there will be no more constitutional agreements. Nor will any extra-constitutional dissent ever be countenanced again. Having found themselves at the end of a desolating eight-year war, given by a God a “blessed opportunity” to reform the commonwealth once and for all, the free people of England agree not to disagree on fundamentals anymore.

CHAPTER 4

Out of the “true nothing,” 1649–1653

I. RUINING THE WORK OF TIME

At the beginning of the second book in *Don Quixote*, Quixote is recovering from his mad adventures in Book One. He spends the time in conversation and other innocent amusements with his two friends, the barber and the priest. In the course of their dialogue, as Cervantes tells his readers, the three men

happened to discuss the principles of statecraft – as they are called – and methods of government, correcting this abuse and condemning that, reforming one custom and abolishing another, each one of the three setting himself up as a fresh lawgiver, a modern Lycurgus or a brand-new Solon. To such a degree did they refashion the commonwealth that it was if they had taken it to the forge and brought away a different one.¹

All three men, in a sense, are acting Quixotic here; they are dwelling on an illusion. But this is a humanist rather than a chivalrous illusion. The premise is philosophic and amelioristic rather than egoistic and nostalgic. As the novel, in its second part, is becoming more self-reflexive in its own right – commenting on its own creative machinery, putting Quixote in situations where he finds himself confronted by the effects of the fictional legacy of Book One – so it dwells momentarily on a gentle parody of humanist self-reflexivity, a discussion of the “principles of statecraft.”² And what that means in this case is that momentarily, for the sake of discussion (and we need not assume that a topic is trivial simply because it is introduced, as the expression has it, “for the sake of discussion”) the knight, the barber, and the priest have taken upon themselves the ability to consider political society in the abstract, apart from the real conditions of life. They are considering political society as if it did not yet exist, or did not yet exist in the implacable, irreplaceable form in which it really exists, so that at will, in their minds, they may

"refashion the commonwealth" entirely, as if they were taking it to the forge and could bring away something different.

Something similar happens in the real world of revolutionary England in 1649. "After the death of the king," Lucy Hutchinson writes in her memoirs,

it was debated and resolved to change the form of government from a monarchy into a commonwealth, and the house of lords was voted dangerous and useless thereunto, and dissolved. A council of state was to be annually chosen for the management of affairs, accountable to the parliament, out of which, consisting of forty councillors and a president, twenty were every year to go off by lot, and twenty new ones to be supplied. It is true, that at that time almost every man was fancying a form of government, and angry, when this came forth, that his invention took not place . . .³

What in *Don Quixote* is represented as something of a game, not unlike the game of "if *I* were king" that Shakespeare's Gonzalo plays, becomes in Lucy Hutchinson's *Memoirs* the representation of a "fancy" upon which the future condition of the commonwealth of England is nevertheless held to rely. What Hutchinson is recalling is a condition of political discourse that Laclau and Mouffe call "hegemony," the opening of a "space of indeterminacy" and a certain "discursive presence," where the material conditions of existence become subject to reconstructive political deliberation:⁴ in other words, a condition where the expressive threshold of utopian mastery has been reached not by a lonely Columbusoid intellectual here and there but by a whole public. In 1649 English citizens began a series of debates on the English constitution. The exercise was intellectual but not merely academic or Quixotic. The nation itself seemed ready to be brought to the smithy of the public imagination; in fact the autonomy, as well as the real power of the political imagination, was being asserted. It seemed as if something new could be brought forth, as if those privileged to lead the revolution could act as fresh lawgivers, as modern Lycurguses or brand-new Solons: as utopian masters.

The meaning of what happened in 1649 and the next ten years, up to the Declaration of a Restoration of the Stuart Monarchy early in 1660, has always been a subject of controversy, and no doubt will continue to be a subject of controversy so long as it is a subject of interest. At least this much, however, is *not* controversial, although as early as Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion* (begun during the Interregnum, while Clarendon was in exile) there have been efforts to minimize its significance: namely, that the events immediately preceding and following the execution of the

king entailed a conflict of “ideologies,” of systems of belief, of imaginary (but pragmatically determinate) relationships to social reality. One upshot of the “rebellion” of the 1640s was the development of an ideology of popular sovereignty (*salus populi suprema lex*), whose main significance, apart from the idea of popular sovereignty itself, was a restructuring of political deliberation, a reforming of political subjectivity and the languages that could be used to address political issues. English subjects were now able to imagine themselves as the objects of their own political and religious hopes. But another upshot of this rebellion, as its original ideology of popular government broke down and a second “revolutionary” ideology began to develop, was the promotion of a psychological and philosophical break from the precedent of inherited order. Among many of the more radical activists in Parliament, in the army, and in the populace at large it became clear that nothing less than a new constitutional beginning for the English commonwealth was imperative.

The last version of the Agreement of the People was put into its final form only after the execution of the king. The lucidity with which it states both its objectives and the derivation of its constitutive legitimacy probably owes something to the king’s death and to the newly felt freedom to subject politics to the forge of “fancy.” For whatever reasons and on whatever authority the king was beheaded, the execution produced yet another transformation in conditions of political discourse in England, where a “space of indeterminacy” opened up. The most famous and possibly the most eloquent expression of this transformation comes in a poem by Marvell, where Cromwell is praised for having dared

To ruin the great work of time,
And cast the kingdoms old
Into another mold.⁵

But there were many other expressions of ideas of this sort, both in poetry and prose, many even from a resentful royalist point of view. The author of the frequently reprinted *Chronistichon*, first published in the spring of 1649, characterized Charles’s execution as a kind of second Fall:

Such a Fall
Great *Christendom* ne’re Pattern’d; and ’twas strange
Earth’s Center reel’d not at this dismal *Change*.⁶

The official apologist of the new republic, Marchamont Nedham, on the other hand, characterized the fall of the old regime as the collapse of a

historically determined system of government that had been suffering from the violent distempers of "old Age," and whose death "hath proved the *generation* of another."⁷ But whether a "great work of time" had been ruined or felled or had undergone the convulsive agonies of a natural death, the point seemed to be that the events of 1649 had abolished the conditions of the traditional political order; a space had opened up which had previously been filled by the institution of monarchy and the king's two bodies. It was here that "almost every man" could take up the position of "fancying a form of government," or even, in Cromwell's case, actually making one – "casting" the state into a "another mold."

A prime specimen of this new form of political fancy is the series of "Acts" issued by the House of Commons in the days following Pride's Purge and the execution of Charles I. The Acts are written in clear and plain language, eschewing legal jargon and courtly elegance. The first Act (9 February 1649) abolishes the "Oathes of Allegiance, Obedience, and Supremacy" that had been required under the Tudors and Stuarts – in effect, changing the rules of speech acts in the country.⁸ An Act registered the next day (10 February) requires an oath to be pledged by every "Freeman" in England "at the time of his Admission to the said Freedom: You shall swear, That you shall be true and faithful to the Commonwealth of England . . ." A few days later the Parliament then registers "An Act of this Parliament for Constituting a Councel of State for the Commonwealth of England" (13 February), giving forty-one designated individuals, meeting in a quorum of no fewer than nine, the "power" and "authority" to suppress the claims of Charles's eldest son to the crown of England, to command the national and regional militias, to foster the advancement of national trade, and to establish diplomatic relations with foreign nations. It puts Parliament in charge of the Judiciary (2:2). On 17 March it abolishes the office of the king. On 19 March it abolishes the House of Lords. Two months later, on 19 May, taking measures for providing for the national treasury, including assessing taxes on the county level and appropriating the remaining lands of the Church, it finally declares England a republic:

Be it Declared and Enacted by this present Parliament and by Authority of the same, That the People of England and of all the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging, are and shall be, and are hereby Constituted, Made, and Established, and Confirmed to be a Commonwealth and Free-State . . . and that without any King or House of Lords. (2:122)

From the proclamation of the king by the Council of State in 1603, with all its semiotic excess and all the semi-ritualistic trappings associated with it, the political imagination has come a long way.

History, to be sure, has not been kind to the achievements of the Rump Parliament. From the beginning it was plagued by the kind of dissension that Hutchinson registers. Its authority was always suspect; its popularity was always in doubt. Although on the evidence of the Acts alone the work it performed of reorganizing and reauthorizing the machineries of power in England and its satellite states was really quite remarkable – an object lesson in how constitutional government discursively constitutes itself – it never succeeded in implementing a final, promised “settlement,” by which the members of the Rump would surrender their offices, and a new, statutory, popularly elected Parliament would be assembled. The Rump was composed of a body of men divided in their allegiances, interests, and backgrounds, who were uncertain of what they wanted, wary of the support of local communities and the populace at large, too cautious to put into effect all the reforms the more radical members were agitating for, and afraid to call elections lest the nation vote them out of office and their republic out of existence.⁹ But the experience of the Rump and its project to recreate England and ultimately Great Britain as a constitutional republic focused in a new way the idea of power, and particularly of constitutive or constructive power, such that political discourse itself in England was permanently changed. For here in the hands of a small body of men – Blair Worden estimates that no more than 211 (out of an original Parliament of 470) ever participated in the Rump, and that few of these 211 bothered to attend with any regularity¹⁰ – was what seemed to be the “fancy” out of which government itself was derived. When the structures and details of that fancy were brought into consciousness, power itself acquired yet another new *look*, another ideal prospect and representation. “[T]he *Power of the Sword* ever hath been the Foundation of all Titles to government in *England*,” Nedham wrote in 1650, “both before, and since the *Norman Conquest*.” Seemingly Nedham was reiterating a doctrine to which even James I had appealed, but Nedham spoke from the newly constructed position of a republican who (having the full support of the radical Rumpers behind him) in effect held the power of the sword in his hands, having only just recently ruined the great work of time, and having only just declared that the will and fancy of the members of his party would determine the future of the nation.¹¹ The members of the pro-Republican party wielded an exclusive constructive power over the nation, and were free

to exercise it as such a thing had never been exercised before. "[T]he only way to make this a happy Government," the commonwealthman William Hickman wrote in a letter to Cromwell, "is not onely to abolish all things that were constituted under monarchy . . . [b]ut to sett up a Government in all the parts of it sutable to our republike" – a government which was not to be "pattern'd by any Commonwealth auncient or moderne."¹²

The unveiling of the look of power this letter and other documents of the period exemplify was the starting point of a good deal of the debate and speculation of the 1650s: the unveiling of the idea, however mistaken it may have proved to be, that individuals of the moment held the power in their hands to transform political society, and to transform it totally. Nor did the continuing crises of government attenuate the "hegemony" condition of political discourse. The failure of the Rump and all succeeding governments of the Interregnum to contrive a lasting settlement only perpetuated the openness of discourse to a transformative ideal politics, leading the way not only to the final collapse of the revolution in 1660, but also to the articulation of some of the most original political thought in Western history.

2. FIFTH MONARCHY ECONOMICS

Among the more significant things to appear in this space was a concern with economic well-being and, in the fullest sense of the term, what Marx would call "political economy." Economic dislocation and depression, as earlier noted, was a major impetus to radical insurgency during the late 1640s. Poor relief and the regularization of trade were in fact a preoccupation of the Rump and local authorities during 1649; and Brian Manning has argued that the success of these efforts contributed to the dampening of the social radicalism that had initially helped to foment the revolution.¹³ But when the Rump took over the whole apparatus of state government, it found not only that a number of policies (like poor relief) were now entirely in its hands, but that responsibility for the preservation and growth of a whole society and culture was now entrusted to its deliberations. Property especially became a new domain subject to parliamentarian responsibility. When Parliament took over church and state from the jurisdiction of the monarch, it found itself the trustee of a great deal of property, and the arbitrator of the system of rules according to which property – public and private – was to be preserved, exchanged, developed, taxed, and redistributed.

The problem of private property had figured prominently in the thought of Henry Ireton during the Putney Debates and would continue to motivate the politics of Oliver Cromwell, although for Cromwell, at least, “propriety” was inextricably bound up with old-fashioned hereditary privileges.¹⁴ But the fact of the new political order brought into focus the role of government in protecting a system of economic behavior that was in many ways independent of it; and it exposed the hitherto feudal or customary nature of a great deal of property in the nation. Now that feudalism could be conceptually grasped and its codes revised, the way was open toward rational economic reform, according to which property might be codified and exploited in relation to the needs of either the nation as a whole, or, as clerics speaking a religious language often put it, the needs of the poor and the meek. (Harrington would soon refer to pre-revolutionary arrangements as “gothic” conventions.¹⁵) The Rump Parliament found itself the *de facto* custodian of all lands and goods previously owned by the crown, the Church, and Royalists which Parliament could expropriate by right of sequestration; it also found itself responsible for policing traditional common lands – fields, forests, and fens – and for overseeing their development. Popular sovereignty thus entailed the discovery of a body of property that by definition was public rather than private. Freed from conventional claims of tenure, this was property as a resource still to be codified, allocated, and developed: a resource still to be subjected to a look of power.

Leading Independents like Cromwell came to see that they were playing a major role in conserving the system of “propriety,” and of keeping it in customary hands (Royalists and bishops excepted), although they were also aware of a need for reformulating the language of customary privilege. Most of the leading Levellers, too, saw themselves as defenders rather than opponents of private property, although they tended to value property as an expression of contractual, possessive individualism. Walwyn, as already noted, once wrote about the duty of every citizen to work for the sake of the “communitive Happiness,” and even suggested that small groups of individuals might voluntarily live together in Christian communes, pooling their resources and sharing their labor. But Walwyn, for one, made it clear that the Leveller program would entail neither a levelling of men’s estates nor the abolition of private property. The emphasis in Walwyn’s thought is on the dignity of personal choice and the integrity of the individual exercising the choice. His main concern is with providing a system of government under which

individuals would be free to choose how to live; whether the choice was for communes or independent workshops and farms was a secondary matter.¹⁶

However, a number of individuals, including some from within the early ranks of the Levellers, had an eye on the new public property of the state in view of the imperative of national communitarianism that the doctrine of Christian charity might imply. And soon enough ideas were circulating which went well beyond the more purely constitutional reforms of the Levellers or the Parliamentarians, including notions of distributive justice and economic democracy. In 1646 Thomas Edwards had already noted that the idea that "there ought to be a community of goods" was yet another error of the sectaries; half a year after the apparent victory of the sectarians, in August 1649 an anonymous pamphlet chided the Commonwealth's government for not having yet established "an equality of goods and lands."¹⁷ In 1653 a "Behemenist" (that is, an acolyte of the late German mystic Jacob Boehme) named Samuel Hering would write about "Sinking down into humility in self annihilation," and being "led by the noble minde into the true nothing, in which the vanity of all things did appeare to me."¹⁸ Then he would go from his "true nothing" to a vision "of things good to this nation," including the setting up of hospitals and colleges, the democratic reorganization of local jurisdictions, the nationalization of health care, and the abolition of all hereditary titles.¹⁹ The less disciplined "Ranter" Abezier Coppe, speaking in the assumed voice of a Biblical prophet, would go into a trance, assume the voice of a prophet, and call for turning the world upside down. "Thus saith the Lord," begins his most powerful text, with deliberate echoes of Ezekiel, but with a rather different prophetic conclusion, "*I inform you, that I overturn, overturn, overturn. And as the Bishops, Charles, and the Lords have had their turn, overturn, so your turn shall be next (ye surviving great ones) by what Name or Title soever dignified or distinguished) who ever you are, that oppose me . . .*"²⁰ Coppe would then go on to demand a form of communism, although Coppe was notably reticent about the form itself, apparently aspiring more toward the ecstasy of recrimination than real social reform: "Give, give, give, give up, give up your houses, horses, goods, gold, Lands, give up, account nothing for your own, have ALL THINGS common, or els the plague of God will rot and consume all that you have . . ."²¹

Among the most remarkable documents in this vein is *The Poor Mans Advocate, or Englands Samaritan* (1649), written by the physician, baptist

minister, and soon-to-become Fifth Monarchist Peter Chamberlen.²² Chamberlen echoes the discourse of public addresses to the Parliament and continues the tradition of concern for the “public good” characteristic of Puritan ameliorism.²³ He also echoes the recriminatory tone of more ecstatic writers. “Shall the Rich still be paid,” he asks, “and the Poore taxed? When shall the mountaines be made low, and the Valleys exalted?”²⁴ But Chamberlen takes the original step of suggesting that out of the king’s and bishops’ lands, as well as tithes and taxes, a “joynt stock” ought to be made to provide for what would have amounted to a welfare state, with a particular concern for caring for the defenseless and the poor. According to Chamberlen, the practical health of the state as a whole and the moral purposes for the sake of which the state as such is to be designed are combined in the logic of a single axiom: “*The most necessary work of mankind, is to provide for the poore*” (1). It makes good practical sense to provide for the poor since the poor provide a resource for the creation of wealth: “The rich are provided for, in providing for the poore . . . The wealth and strength of all countries are in the poore . . .” But a moral imperative is involved as well: “The poore have a right unto the creature as well as the rich . . .” (1). Chamberlen argues that the capital that has come under the control of the Parliament is “by judgment false to the publique,” and indeed “purchased to the publique by Conquest.” The lands, goods, and moneys appropriated by the Parliament “ever were supposed to be publicke in being entrusted into those Hands who were supposed publique persons, for publique Uses,” and are “now no mans propriety” (5). Among Chamberlen’s practical suggestions are the creation of a public bank, a new “Academy” to oversee the education and welfare of the populace, and the annual election of a “Trustee” to manage the economy for the benefit of all.²⁵

The Fifth Monarchists, who formed what was probably the most significant radical movement during the 1650s, were an outgrowth of sectarian movements of the 1640s, such as the gathered Baptists whom Chamberlen had represented, and they became self-defined as a group only gradually. As its most prominent historian insists, moreover, they never formed “an egalitarian movement” in the post-Enlightenment sense of the word, since most of its members made a sharp distinction between the destiny of the godly elect and the fate of everyone else.²⁶ The alliance was not formed by a body of individuals entirely united by a single doctrine either, whether in the sphere of religious doctrine or political theory. But its adherents were strongly based in the urban artisanal class, with especially strong representation among clothworkers; their politics

were commonly republican, and their economic policies democratic, concerned with the diffusion of Christian charity through a broad and equitable distribution of wealth.²⁷ The one universal tenet of the movement was the idea that the time had come for the history of earthly monarchies to be replaced by a Fifth Monarchy to be ruled over by Christ. Whether this meant that a secular or a theocratic government was to come into being, however, was a matter of some disagreement. So was the question of whether this Fifth Monarchy was to entail the kind of heaven-on-earth millennium that Joachimite ministers like John Archer had predicted (in *The Personall Reign of Christ on Earth*) or some considerably less magical period of rule by the godly of the earth. When one examines the writings and activism of individuals associated with Fifth Monarchism one finds a good deal of dispute over what Fifth Monarchism was or ought to be. But the drive toward getting the idea right – this idea, after all, of something only being anticipated, of a Not Yet for which Biblical authority was only sketchy and the signs of the times only at most an ambiguous hint – and asserting intellectual hegemony, however uncertain it might be, was characteristic of the movement. If Fifth Monarchy was not the most important utopian movement from a theoretical point of view, it was certainly the most militant of radical movements of the Interregnum, and perhaps for that reason the most popular as well.

The former New England colonist and cleric, William Aspinwall tried to provide a definitive account of the movement in his brief treatise, *Of the Fifth Monarchy, or Kingdome, That shortly is to come into the World* (1653). Aspinwall insisted that the Fifth Monarchy predicted by Scripture was to be understood not only typologically, "spiritually" or "metaphorically," but also literally. Moreover, this monarchy, to be ruled over by Christ, was to reach into matters of "Civil Government" as well as "Church-power."²⁸ There was to be a form of world government, in civil and religious matters at once, which was to be ruled over by Christ himself. And yet this world government was not to be managed by Christ directly, but by men, who would express Christ's will by "refining" themselves and the political-ecclesiastical bodies of which they were representatives – making themselves individually into more worthy Christians, and collectively into a purer and purer gathering, with better and better elected leaders. "I am [not]," Aspinwall says, "of their judgement, who say, That christ shall reign personally upon earth 1000 years, but his Saints shall be his *Viceregens* . . ." (A5).

And so this religious movement, this alliance of heretical sects, was also from the outset a movement demanding a transference of power from

the general representative of the nation to a particular representative, a body of self-identified "Saints." The idea for a while even appealed to Cromwell, who allowed himself to be influenced by Major-General Thomas Harrison, the most politically prominent of Fifth Monarchy men; Harrison was among those who pressured Cromwell into dissolving the Rump and calling for a "nominated assembly," later to be known as Barebones Parliament.²⁹ But like the New England Congregationalists who were something of a model for many of them, the Fifth Monarchists commonly folded a religious program into a socio-political program, and vice versa. Indeed, this folding of the religious into the social and the political was vital to what they stood for; it determined how the members of the movement were able to see themselves as both the subjects and objects of hope.

There are no Fifth Monarchy utopias, as J. C. Davis remarks with regard to Peter Chamberlen's *Poor Mans Advocate*.³⁰ Chamberlen's program, for one, never quite gets past the optative and the subjunctive, never quite crystallizes into the fixed image of an ideal state in action; nor do any of the other Fifth Monarchist platforms. But one of the main reasons for this is that Fifth Monarchists by and large assumed that they were already in a kind of ideal state, albeit one not yet complete. Like other chiliasts before them – for example, the Rosicrucians discussed in chapter two, or the audience imagined for *A Glimpse of Sion's Glory* discussed in chapter three – they located themselves in a historical continuum where they were already both subjects and objects of a "work" being accomplished, and already then the very body of the new age to come. Thus Aspinwall could appeal to a process of "refinement": the saints need only strive to become more of what they already essentially are, while excluding from their ranks any of the less pure, the reprobate remnant (A7). More practically and rationally, Chamberlen could appeal to recent events – the execution of the king, the facts of economic life that emerged immediately upon his death and the proclamation of a republic – as the objective conditions of a new social order now coming into being as the working out, by God and man, of a millenarian future.³¹

And then there is the case of Mary Cary.³² Cary was at least to some extent a feminist as well as a millenarian prophetess. She openly opposed certain forms of gender inequality, beginning with the taboo against women preachers; and she openly embraced the role of prophetess because that, given the limitations, was the most empowering role available for a woman of her status with political ambitions.³³ But what was

truly exceptional about Cary from the present point of view was the fecundity of her imagination, projected upon a screen of millenarian expectation and all but expanding into the model of a formal utopia. Such was her lengthy text *A New and More Exact Mappe, or Description of New Jerusalems Glory* (1651; but she claims to have written the text in the 1640s), where she takes it upon herself to imagine the world as it will be when the millennium now being prepared for will actually arrive:

All wars shall cease.³⁴

Not only the external and visible enemies of the saints shall be subdued . . . but . . . also their internal and invisible enemies shall be chained up. (231)

Not only men, but women shall prophesie; not only aged men, but young men; not only superiours, but inferiours; not only those that have University-learning, but those that have it not; even servants and handmaids. (238)

The weak shall be made strong; they shall be enabled to speak a pure language; their minds and affections shall be raised and made more heavenly. (277)

[The Saints] shall be enabled [by the abundance of Spirit] to make a holy use of all the creatures which they shall then enjoy . . . They shall indeed build houses, and inhabit them; and plant vineyards and eat the fruit of them; but they shall not defile their houses by sinning in them, nor shall they sin in using the creatures they shall enjoy; their corn, and wine, and oyl, and flocks, and herds, and fruits of the trees, and of the field, which they shall enjoy, shall in no sort be abused by them; for the Spirit shall guide them to use all the creatures in a holy manner, enabling them to receive them with prayer and thanksgiving. (278)

This "abundance of Spirit" among the Saints during the millennium, as Cary calls it, is to be accompanied by a variety of "outward privileges" as well:

There shall be no outward thing wanting to the Saints, that may make their life outwardly comfortable. (288)

The creatures shall appear in their primitive beauty and goodness wherein they were created, being all in subjection, and useful to man, and they shall be in no case hurtful, neither one to another, or to mankind. (293)

Interestingly, many of these same ideas were the object of Joseph Hall's ridicule in a pamphlet published in 1650;³⁵ and their main significance may be that in contrast to the authoritarian pessimism of men like Hall they express an impatience with merely spiritual consolations, a demand, however unrealistic, for the realization of material and spiritual happiness together.

But sometimes Cary goes beyond mere impatience and begins to develop an actual picture of millennial society. The Saints shall always enjoy “seasonable weather, for the bringing forth of fruit . . . [T]hey shall have always seasonable showers of rain, and profitable springs of water” (294–95). Moreover, moving from natural to social conditions, the Saints will live in peace, plenty, and freedom among themselves. But Cary’s vista of a society to come is largely an image, alas, of a society of petty bourgeois in a condition of hegemony:

They shall have commodious Houses and Gardens which they shall build and make for themselves; which they shall peaceably and comfortably enjoy; building up those Cities and places that have been laid waste and desolate . . . (301)

[They shall have] apparel, and silver, and gold, and other sorts of metals, which are for covering and outward ornament for the body, and for necessary furniture and utensils for household-affairs. (301)

They shall follow their several employments and vocations as now they do . . . but doubtless in a more regular, and more excellent and comfortable way than many now do; i.e. some shall not labor and toyl day and night . . . to maintain others that live vitiously, in idleness, drunkenness, and other evil practices . . . (308)

But whatever the lawful employments be in which they labour, whether in Husbandry, of Handy-craft-employments; strangers shall not drink the wine nor eat the food, nor inhabit the houses, nor wear the apparel, for which they have laboured; but they and their children shall comfortably enjoy the work of their hands. (310)

This is a lively example of a phenomenon we have encountered on previous occasions: a program of radical amelioration, projected onto an ideal canvas of millenarian destiny, which in fact replicates the existing practices and ethics of an emergent social group. The utopia of Mary Cary, projected onto an imminent millennium, is a society of petty yeomen, artisans, shopkeepers, and merchants, whose most important characteristic is that its inhabitants are not *hindered* from being what they already take themselves to be trying to be. Infant mortality, infirmity, fickle weather – these impediments are removed. Taxation, tithes, rents, and direct economic exploitation, along with the interference run both by a system of parasitic cavalier lifestyles and by an insufficiency of “spirit” even in the hearts of the faithful themselves – these impediments are removed as well. All of this is wishful thinking, to be sure. But the combination in Cary’s thought of spiritual reformation with material

prosperity unites her both with her fellow Fifth Monarchists and with Puritan ameliorism generally. And Cary's projection of the program of reform onto the screen of a prophecy is also a type of argument, an argument in support of hope. It amounts to a prophetic version of utopian witnessing. That the hope the prophecy bears witness to is ultimately a hope for *survival* – a petty bourgeois surviving as what they are, only doing so "in a more excellent and comfortable way" – tells us a good deal about both the worldliness of the Fifth Monarchists as well as their otherworldliness. It also tells us something about the mood of sectarians, who were faced with a vanquished "fourth monarchy" on the one hand and a troubled, possibly failing revolution on the other. It may even help to explain why the Fifth Monarchists as a group were the radicals of the revolution most inclined toward desperate measures, including outbreaks of violent insurrection that lasted into the Restoration. Their utopianism was also a form of identity politics; it was their very identity as saints that was threatened by the failure of the English revolution. And it was their livelihood as a group, from a perspective at once religious, political, and economic, that they both hinted at their visions of the future and took up arms against recalcitrant parliamentarians, royalists, and in 1662 even against the restored Charles II.

3. WINSTANLEY THE DIGGER

Similar to both Fifth Monarchists and Ranters in his social, political, and religious outlook, though more intellectually adventurous than the former and an open opponent of the latter,³⁶ Gerrard Winstanley nevertheless takes another step. The spokesman and leader of the self-proclaimed "Diggers," Winstanley articulates still another break, still another rupture from prevailing discursive and doctrinal habits – something like what used to be called the "third stage of analysis" through which European radicals eventually made class conflict and its economic conditions the primary focus of political theory and revolutionary practice.³⁷ Although the teleology implicit in expressions like the "third stage" has long been discarded by most historians, and the emphasis in Winstanley studies has shifted from the political and economic to the religious dimensions of his thought,³⁸ the break Winstanley made from the thought of his contemporaries was real, if also a highly complex matter. The movement would end fatally, leaving Winstanley to complain at the end of his very last piece of writing, "*O power where art thou, that must mend things amiss.*"³⁹ But in the meantime Winstanley would push past the limits that constrained

the communitarian instincts of the Levellers, the identity-rooted politics of the Fifth Monarchists, and even past the pure subjectivity of the Ranters, who, because of their adherence to carnivalesque ecstasies of what Coppe called "Libertinisme," were never able to develop a social or political program. The idea of Winstanley's thought representing a "third stage" of revolutionary consciousness may not be so far-fetched after all.

Like other utopianisms of the 1650s, it should be observed, Winstanley's work begins on the premise of an absence, a perceived void in social and cultural authority. His first writings, texts from what are generally understood to be his "religious" period, date from the end of the second Civil War; his important transitional writing, *The New Law of Righteousnes (sic)*, where Winstanley blends his religious reflections with a millenarian social vision that includes communist ideas, is dated 26 January 1649, four days before the execution of the king.⁴⁰ The Digger colony at St. George's Hill was started on 1 April 1649; the first manifesto of communism, written by Winstanley though collectively subscribed, *The True Leveller's Standard Advanced*, was published toward the end of April 1649. From then until the winter of 1652 (although Winstanley's communal experiments had fallen apart by the spring of 1650) Winstanley continued to publish a series of religious and political writings culminating in *The Law of Freedom in a Platform*. All of Winstanley's published writings thus date from the period of the greatest political ferment in England; all of them are keenly aware of the crisis in authority being felt throughout the nation; and most of them, taking as a starting point the failures of older systems of power, and often commenting on the significance of the execution of the king, are addressed to the prospect of a new age, when new conditions of spirituality and sociality will obtain.

Though its affinities with other radical programs are obvious, the fundamental difference in Winstanley's work is nonetheless unmistakable. When, for example, Winstanley announces in *The New Law of Righteousnes* that "The work of freedom is in the hand of Christ, and he is the righteous freedom; he hath begun to spread himself, and he goes on mightily, and will go on," he is repeating what is already a commonplace. But when Winstanley goes on to say that Christ is making a "universall Power," and that "this universall Power of a righteous law, shall be so plainly writ in every ones heart, that none shall desire to have more then another, or to be Lord over other, or to lay claim to any thing as his; this phrase of *Mine and Thine* shall be swallowed up,"⁴¹ he has gone on to make an overt and irreparable break from most of his contemporary sectarians.

Mary Cary, John Dury, Samuel Gott, Abezier Coppe, and others besides, speaking for their various constituencies, had used the figure of a new age as a way of reflecting the image of the emergent social orders to which they subscribed onto a screen of teleological expectation. But Winstanley has already deconstructed the relation between the self and the group, and the present and the future, upon which this millenarian mirroring generally relied. For sectarian millenarians "mine and thine" was a measure of inequality, where a certain claim to "mine" excluded and indeed deprived a certain "thine." It indicated a social imbalance that needed to be redressed. But for Winstanley the rule of mine and thine is both a law of sociality *and* a principle of psychic economy. To bypass it on the level of the social – as in their own ways, within limits, so many Puritan radicals were prepared to do – was also, for Winstanley, to shatter it at the level of the individual. It was to overcome an inward as well as an outward barrier to righteousness and freedom, and yet to make the breaking of one barrier dependent upon breaking the other. For Winstanley there could be no new age solving the problem of the human condition which did not rectify the relation of self to self, self to its objects, and selves to selves, and which did not in effect restore all those relations *all at once*, within the context of a universal, material community.

Alone among prominent writers of the Interregnum, Winstanley was thus aiming toward what political scientist Bernard Yack calls "total revolution." That is, he was aiming to transform "the whole of human character by attacking the fundamental sub-political roots of social interaction."⁴² If a number of his contemporaries wanted distributive justice, Winstanley wanted to put an end to distribution. If a number of his contemporaries wanted to make significant adjustments in the organization of resources and political rights, Winstanley wanted to transform the meaning of economic resources, and to restructure the relationship between the political individual and the socio-economic community. If a number of his contemporaries were anticipating a new age for the benefit of the Saints, Winstanley was anticipating a new age for the benefit of all. And in this new age the "all" would itself be transformed. The new age could only come if there was also a new man, a "Second Adam" who did not yet exist, and of whom one could scarcely as yet summon an image, except by reference to the pre-fallen condition of man in the Garden of Eden.

So Winstanley shifted from the reforms of his contemporaries to "total revolution," attacking the "sub-political roots of social interaction," attempting to redefine the conditions and the values for the sake of

which humanity would experience what made it human. But the shift followed a complicated route, and to look for the mere working out of a “coherent theory,” as Hill has tried to do, or even an almost coherent doctrine unfortunately unsuited to its times, as Aylmer has attempted, is to miss the dynamics of Winstanley’s experiment, with all its deconstructive energies and all its summonings of spirit, power, and revolution from divers agents working at divers purposes.⁴³ It is to miss not only the dynamics through which Winstanley constructed his project but the dynamics which led to its failure.

Winstanley himself tells the story of how he arrived at the idea of communism and began to struggle with the problem of working it out in a pamphlet published in the summer of 1649, six months after the founding of the Digger colony on St. George’s Hill. A year earlier, while first formulating his ideas, he writes,

my heart was filled with sweet thoughts, and many things were revealed to me which I never read in books, nor heard from the mouth of any flesh, and when I began to speak of them, some people could not bear my words, and amongst those revelations this was one, *That the earth shall be made a common Treasury of livelihood to whole mankind, without respect of persons*; and I had a voice within me bad me declare it all abroad, which I did obey, for I declared it by word of mouth wheresoever I came, then I was made to write a little book called, *The new Law of Righteousnesse*, and therein I declared it; yet my mind was not at rest, because nothing was acted, and thoughts run in me, that words and writings were all nothing, and must die, for action is the life of all, and if thou dost not act, thou dost nothing. Within a little time I was made obedient to the word in that particular likewise; for I tooke my spade and went and broke the ground upon *George-hill* in Surrey, thereby declaring freedom to the Creation, and that the earth must be set free from intanglements of Lords and Landlords, and that it shall become a common Treasury to all, as it was first made and given to the sonnes of men.⁴⁴

Of the many things that might be observed about this remarkable passage, the first may be that it shows Winstanley experiencing what we now call communism as the object of a drive, a drive which was both separate from himself and uniquely internal. “Many things *were revealed*” to him, he writes in a significant turn to the passive; a “voice within” made itself known to him, which he was compelled to “obey.” It was a unique voice, telling him things that he had “never read in books, nor heard from the mouth of any flesh,” among them the idea that would govern his work and thought for the next few years, “*That the earth shall be made a common Treasury . . . without respect of persons.*” But obedience to the imperative

of one revelation led to a sense of dissatisfaction and the coming of another revelation invoking yet another, fresh imperative. If he had traveled about telling people about his premonition, many "could not bear" his "words." And now, finding himself still subject to the same drive, under the spell of the same premonition, he "was made" to put what had been revealed to him into writing, "to write a little book." *The New Law of Righteousnes*, published a few days before the execution of Charles I in 1649, not the first "little book" that Winstanley had published but the first one openly embracing a communistic program, was addressed "To the twelve tribes of Israel that are circumcised in heart, and scattered through all the nations of the earth" (149). It announced its ambition as being no less than to bear witness to a "new law . . . budding forth, to restore the whole creation from bondage of the curse." But once again, Winstanley no sooner completed the task he "was made" to perform than another fresh circumstance and another revelation presented themselves to him, leading him on into new courses of action, and ultimately, yet again, into new revelations.

The pattern would continue throughout Winstanley's brief public career. Having experienced his first revelations, with their splendid but still somewhat vague intimations of a state of affairs which "shall be," Winstanley would struggle to work out the details not only of the object that was to come into being, but of the means of getting it articulated, communicated, and effected. Again and again he would thus move from one aspect of his project to another, working out details in response to the practical demands he was making upon himself, finding a new problem, a new imperative, a new elaboration, or a new plan of action summoning his attention. "My mind was not at rest," as he wrote. Indeed, it never would be.

But there is still more to be said about Winstanley's project as this passage explains it. Winstanley's appeal to "action," "the life of all," is doubtless worth stressing: "if thou dost not act, thou dost nothing." The kind of imperative with which his new career had begun, "that the earth shall be made a common treasury," demanded direct political action from the outset. And yet it is also noteworthy that Winstanley's imperative to action, "the life of all," is framed as doing obedience "to the word"; and it is perhaps even more noteworthy that in taking action, in breaking ground, Winstanley finds himself "declaring" something. There are few moments in Winstanley's political career when he does not frame his activity as a signifying practice, a "declaration." Obeying his drive toward communism, Winstanley improvises a series of practical

communications, some to himself, some to his fellow citizens and their corporate entities (like the “City of London” to which this particular pamphlet is addressed), and some even “to the Creation.” His practical communications involve actions as well as words, but the actions themselves are always, again, placed under the jurisdiction of words; and in an important sense the actions themselves are words: “declarations,” evoking new acts and new communications. Shrewdly materialistic though he is, and capable as he will show himself to be of entering into debates about political arrangements which are thoroughly realistic in their assumptions and assessments, Winstanley always holds onto his doings as symbolic actions. His actions speak. And most of his actions are forms of speech, framed as speech – or, more accurately, framed as writing. Even the spade with which Winstanley moves beyond words to action is a kind of implement of writing in Winstanley’s hands, a tool with which Winstanley writes upon and to the earth, “declaring freedom to the Creation” – making a declaration which in turn, of course, will only prove to be the occasion for more declarations.

What Winstanley alerts his reader to in this passage are the compulsions of a divine yet immanent productive capacity, a power both interior and exterior, both material and verbal, which he holds to have an effect both in the world and with respect to the world, a productive capacity, indeed, always addressing itself to the world, even as it works within the world in order to change it, to “free” it from “bondage of the curse.” Held to stem from God, it nevertheless works its way through men and for men and, for that matter – indeed by the same token – for the sake of the whole of creation, with man himself as its God, and the spirit of God as the spirit of man, of man (and creation) in a new, unfallen condition. “The time is come,” Winstanley wrote in *The New Law of Righteousnes* when first announcing his idea of communism, “that the Spirit will draw all things into man againe, to live and be at rest in him, as their Governour . . . and all bondage, curse and tears shall be done away: And this is what I wait for, being assured it shall be accomplished, having received a taste” (156). The productive capacity shifts from subject to subject, from spirit to man, from man to God, from God to Creation, from Creation back to governing man and mankind’s spokesman, Winstanley himself, privileged with a “taste.” And it is always both making itself effectual and making itself known; it always takes the form of a power that fashions its objective by signifying it; it always takes the form of a poetic power. And although the expression was not quite available to him, it is important to add, the objective of the poetics being evoked was always the formation of a

communist society. However one wishes to couch the project – and however much one wishes to distance Winstanley from Babeuf or Marx – the net effect of the productive capacity driving Winstanley to embark on his project is the formation of a communist society, where material and ideological systems of alienation and exploitation, Winstanley's "curse," are entirely overcome. It is communism that the Voice prophesies, and it is communism that the poetics Winstanley evokes is intended to produce. But this productive power, which Winstanley articulates and champions, submitting it to the discipline of the written word, would turn out to have its fatal limits too – limits like other communist poetics before and after it, which Winstanley would be unable to overcome, and to which his project would inevitably succumb.

As his thinking on the subject evolves, by early 1649 with his *New Law of Righteousnes*, and then especially in the spring of that year as he and his colleagues begin their digging on St. George's Hill, Winstanley arrives at the critical point where a communist ethic emerges for him as something to be explained, experienced, and disseminated, and a communist world state becomes something to be made, fashioned out of collective, material and symbolic labor. The labor itself, like Marx's unalienated labor, is thought both to exemplify a relation to the natural world ("Creation"), and to reproduce itself through a practice of expressive self-formation. But the task at hand would take Winstanley into any of a number of different practical and, as it were, signifying directions. As Winstanley attempted to adjust his perceptions and desires to events and to complete the work of disseminating the truth of communist policy, he was again and again abutting against the constraints not only of his actual social circumstances – these constraints go without saying – but also of the languages available to him, the modes of the speakable and writable. Millenarian or messianic invocation, the Jeremiad, the call to meditation and "seeking," the direct call to action, the petition, the open letter, the complaint, the justification of *fait accompli*, the homily, the appeal to charity and right, and finally the invention of a program still to be legislated into existence, a utopian platform or "blueprint," as critics now call it – all these rather different ways of going about framing a single revolutionary project, of putting that project into language and communicating its power, jangled together in his work, clashing with one another but also chiming together in unexpected ways, at once inadvertently betraying the problems and opening the opportunities of the drive he is trying to come to terms with. Winstanley pushed and pulled against the discursive formats available to him in the attempt to pass

beyond them and empower the unstably situated subjects of his project with the “universall power” he saw unfolding: “this universall power of a righteous law,” as he wrote, using a characteristic metaphor, which “shall be so plainly writ in every ones heart, that none shall desire to have more then another, or to be Lord over other, or to lay claim to any thing as his” (183). But who was to do the writing? Or rather, how was Winstanley to do that writing? How was his own capacity as an agent of social transformation to be adapted into a language capable of writing a revolution not only in the outward frame of legal structures but within the hearts of people behaving freely and willingly within the frame of the new law? How, in other words, was he to transmit his look of power, the vision first breaking upon him and then breaking forth from his language? How was he to move the vision into the hearts of the subjects who were to inhabit the world of the vision? Whatever other limits Winstanley’s project would face in its encounter with the real world, the limits of language itself, so far as it is conceived of as a tool through which revolutionary transformation can be effected, had to be surmounted too. And, of course, they could not be surmounted.

If one considers *The New Law of Righteousnes* as a whole, for example, although one may well find the kind of coherent doctrine of mystic materialism that historians have admired, one will not find a coherent discursive strategy. Winstanley’s idea of a new society is articulated primarily in the form of an unlocalized, unsituated prophecy. The new society will arrive, Winstanley usually insists; but how and when and where, and what Winstanley’s readers are to do in the meantime is not an issue. The public is alerted and a certain state of affairs “shall be.” But in this same text Winstanley will also shift from messianic invocation to the Jeremiad, exhorting his audience into repentant or reparative behavior. “Let every one leave off running after others for knowledge and comfort, and wait upon the spirit Reason,” Winstanley writes as he turns to what he calls (localizing his program) the “three doors of hope for *England*.” “Let every one open his bags and barns, that all may feed upon the crops of the earth, that the burden of povertie may be removed: Leave off this buying and selling of Land, or of the fruits of the earth . . .” Lest there be any confusion whether Winstanley is actually challenging the people of England to implement this program, previously attributed to the impersonal agency of God, Winstanley adds, “Well: If every one would speedily set about the doing of these particulars I have mentioned, the Creation would thereby be lift up out of bondage, and our Maker would have the glory of the works of his own hands” (200–1).

Thus a prophecy is caused to shift into an imperative; an unsituated prediction, at best a hope, is merged into an unrealistic but immediate demand for action, not unlike Coppe's "give, give, give, give up . . ." And yet, in the end, Winstanley switches once again, away from demands for action to the somewhat hazier and certainly quieter call for what his contemporaries knew as Seeking.⁴⁵ "For the time to come," he writes, "wait upon the rising of the Second *Adam*, the Law of Righteousness within you" (212). "O my dear friends in the flesh, despise not this word I speak: wait upon the Lord for teaching; you will never have rest in your souls till he speak in you" (243). Winstanley speaks as someone who has been called to enlightenment, iterating what Hill calls the "doctrine of Sonship":⁴⁶ "it pleased the Father to reveal his Son in me, and cause me to speak what I know from an inward light and power of life within" (243). But in keeping with his doctrine of Sonship, Winstanley settles in the end with having made a prediction whose truth and whose inherent imperatives for action he wants others to seek by waiting for the Son to rise within them too.

The uncertainty of Winstanley's position was in part a consequence of his epistemology; if all true learning was experiential, the result of a "testimony within," to teach a doctrine to others could only take the form of encouraging others to learn it – to experience it – for themselves. But the uncertainty was also a consequence of Winstanley's political disposition, which had been educated in the democratic discourses of the Levellers, and which was always inclined toward a kind of universal voluntarism. The total transformation that Winstanley was counting on, in matters both spiritual and political, required the spontaneous self-election of a freeborn people; it had to be an expression of a people's inherent freedom to choose their own laws for themselves. If it were imposed from without it would still be a species of "kinglie power," an assertion of "bondage" and its "curse." The epistemological and political terms through which Winstanley cast his project thus demanded a revolution through the agency of a general will, even though it was also designed to express a "new law" which was not yet fully declared, nor even slightly general.

Shift forward now to 1652. Winstanley had gone through a period when he had tried to approximate his program to the language of the Levellers. He has had to do so, since the Diggers have had to vindicate themselves against the complaints of their opponents. Winstanley has had to defend what the Diggers have done; falling back on many of the commonplaces of Leveller self-defense,⁴⁷ he had perhaps hoped

to appropriate the cultural authority that still adhered to the Leveller cause, even while marking the differences between the two movements and only while really attempting to defend the Diggers. And after the quasi-Leveller period – devastation. The Digger colony at Surrey was overwhelmed by force, the men, women, and children of the small settlement being harried, harassed, and finally driven off the land. The handful of other Digger colonies cropping up would soon meet similar fates.⁴⁸ Where the Diggers saw themselves making a declaration to Creation, their neighbors only saw them making a nuisance, and their neighbors had both the legal and extra-legal means for violently terminating the Digger experiment. So now Winstanley has to come to terms with the fact that acting upon his drive toward communism is not simply going to unfold into reality as a matter of course within the space of a propitious fold in history, if only “every one would speedily set about the doing of these particulars I have mentioned.”⁴⁹ The decisive act had failed. The declaration to Creation has not been heeded. The new age, evidently, simply could not be “declared” any longer.

Hence, in 1652, Winstanley writes *The Law of Freedom in the Platform*, where the whole project is framed in a different way, according to different principles. In this text he creates a more complete picture than ever before of the society toward which he had been aiming. Here more than ever he shows himself engaged in creating the poetics of a new society. But he also testifies to his own estrangement from his new society, the distance between himself, his ideals, and the power to make the latter an expression of the former. Writing and publishing now in relative isolation from the main political currents of the day, he has to find a way to get his countrymen to reconstitute themselves – to remake themselves by *themselves*. But how, again, could that be, given the fact that so far, for all of his inspirational language, the people of England have turned their backs, and allowed him and his fellows to be driven off the common land?

An attempt at an answer is made on the first page of the text. *The Law of Freedom* is addressed “To his Excellency Oliver Cromwel, General of the Commonwealths Army in England, Scotland, and Ireland,” whom “God hath honored . . . with the highest Honor of any man since *Moses* times, to be the Head of a People” (501). What follows is a rhetorical dance that Cromwell himself would no doubt have appreciated, if he had ever read the treatise. On the one hand Cromwell is Moses; he has led his people out from tyranny, and he possesses the power of handing down a new law. Cromwell is the modern lawgiver, the instrument

of the Great Action upon which traditional political thought depended as far back as Plato and Plutarch: the lawgiver as demiurge, the one creator whose constructive power is really such as to construct, and remake society in a new image. But on the other hand, Cromwell's power derives from the people whom he leads; or, more precisely, it derives from God for the sake of the people whom he leads, and only for their sake. "Now you know Sir," Winstanley adds, using the familiar language of popular sovereignty, rights, equity, and vindication, "that the Kingly Conqueror was not beaten by you onely as you are a single man, nor by the Officers of the Army joyned to; but by the hand of and assistance of the Commoners . . ." And so, "Whatsoever is recovered from the Conqueror, is recovered by a joynt consent of the Commoners: therefore it is all Equity, That all the Commoners who assisted you, should be set free from the Conquerors power with you" (501). Indeed, if God "would not spare Kings, who have sat so long at his right hand, governing the world, neither will he regard you, unless your ways be found more righteous then the Kings" (502). Having established this set of rhetorical steps, where the power concentrated in Cromwell turns out to be power concentrated in the people, Winstanley can then rehearse a series of complaints about the inertia of Parliament and the grievances of the Commoners – the persistence of hierarchy in the churches, the survival of Anglican practices in some of the parishes, the burden of tithes, the remaining complexities and inequities of law and the lawcourts. Winstanley can also slide, as if he were still writing on the same subject, and as if the conventional grievances against the state church and the legal system were of the same order and had the same popular support as his ideas about the community of property, to the question of what the English Revolution is finally all about, and to the demand that the revolution be about the institutionalization of communism. So Winstanley wants Cromwell to play the part of a classic lawgiver and remake society in a new image, as Lycurgus was said to have entirely recast the constitution of Sparta. But Winstanley also insists that the part of a classical lawgiver, which Cromwell seemed to have been assuming, was already organically connected to the instrumentality and the demands of "the people." And Winstanley argues that the law which Cromwell will give to the nation has to be a law which undoes kingly power altogether by returning the treasury of the earth to the people.

Yet here Winstanley encounters yet another set of obstacles, rhetorical and real. What does he want Cromwell actually *to do*, and how does he expect Cromwell to go about doing it? Winstanley equivocates on how

his plan is supposed to participate in history. At some points he implies that this plan of his is a final solution to the problem of kingly power in England and ultimately the world. But at other points he demurs. "I have set the candle at your door," he says to Cromwell, "for you have the power in your hand . . . I have no power" (510).

"I have no power": a statement with many nuances of meaning, coming at a pivotal moment in Winstanley's attempt to create a new society. One of them is that the intentional document itself, *The Law of Freedom in a Platform*, is devoid of power; it is at best the written work of a council of state, as if it were an old-fashioned text of advice to a prince, with power to institute major reforms. But another meaning is that *no one* has the power to do what needs to be done, since what needs to be done needs to be done by the people, all of them, voluntarily, acting out of the dictates of their own inner lights, responding to a truth that cannot be legislated in advance by the state. So if Winstanley has no power, it is in part because his own project places him in a double bind, where someone with greater authority (and military might) than Winstanley has to take action, and where at the same time individuals on their own, irrespective of people like Cromwell and Winstanley, will have to take action. As for what Winstanley imagines might be the result of his advice to the prince, this too turns on what it might mean to have power, or not to have it:

I do not say, nor desire, That every one shall be compelled to practice this *Commonwealths Government*; for the spirits of some will be Enemies at first, though afterwards will prove the most cordial and true friends thereunto.

Yet I desire, That the *Commonwealths* land, which is the ancient Commons and waste Land, and the Lands newly got in, by the Armies Victories, out of the oppressors hands, as Parks, Forests, Chases and the like, may be set free to all that have lent assistance, either of person or purse, to obtain it; and to all that are willing to come in to practice this Government, and be obedient to the Lawes thereof.

Here Winstanley implies, again, that the new society is to be an entirely voluntary association. Those who are "willing" – and Winstanley imagines that a great many people would find themselves in this condition of willingness were they given the chance – may at once take possession of the common land as members of a national collective. All Cromwell has to do is free up the land for this use. Those who remain in the old ways of private property will eventually come around, also voluntarily. But Winstanley also argues that there is something to be done right now,

by Cromwell and his associates; and this is not, curiously, to establish a law of freedom once and for all in England, but more simply to turn over the "joynt stock" of public property to all comers, and let historical inevitability take care of the rest.

So Winstanley has no power, and does not need any. Cromwell has the power, and Cromwell will "suck out the honey" from Winstanley's ideas (510), and do what he will with the commonwealth of England. But Cromwell does not have the power either. If he will only set free what it already in principle set free, if he will only exercise the prerogative that is really already the prerogative of the people, the people themselves will voluntarily take up the Great Action, and establish a law of freedom. Still, one has to wonder about the law of freedom itself. What is it? And how is this *law* exercised? How is it exercised as an expression of *freedom*? And if it is a law which will be found written in the hearts of true believers, why does it need to be written up in a laborious "platform"? In fact, to explain the law of freedom, as well as to promote it, Winstanley has to adopt a stance which he claims not to be adopting: he has to imagine a whole commonwealth, believers and non-believers alike, operating on his principles of communism; and he has to speak in the voice of a universal surveyor of the law, as someone who sees it, all of it, from the outside, and who can therefore also show others what it looks like – showing them that truth which elsewhere he insists must come from inner revelation. In other words, he has to formulate his society as a phenomenon that can be written down, not only declared but prescribed, not only invoked but dictated in advance, made to answer to a system of inscription stemming from universal, disembodied laws. If previously the rising will of the people was the agency through which revolutionary transformation was to declare itself throughout the nation, now the disembodied will of communist doctrine takes command, and the language of juridical truths and regulations overtakes the language of exhortation, inner testimony, and the power of the heart.

When he comes to describe his ideal society Winstanley indeed begins with axioms, assuming that they specify universal propositional truths; he lays down the axioms of law upon which the society is to be constructed, drawing consequences from those axioms as he goes along, and then works out some of the details, anticipating complexities and objections. The voice of disembodied authority assumed by this surveyor of the law is unmistakable. "*Pure Commonwealths Freedom lies in the free Enjoyment of the Earth,*" he declares (519). "Commonwealths Government governs

the Earth without buying and selling" (533). "The Original Root of magistracy is *common Preservation*" (536). Winstanley is frequently imitating the style of traditional, programmatic political philosophy, taking as a model, he says, texts like Hugh Peters's *Good Work for a Good Magistrate*⁵⁰ (509). He may have had *The Poor Mans Advocate* in mind as well, and he echoes Hobbes's *Leviathan* from time to time.

The framework Winstanley lays down, to be sure, is more comprehensive and systematic than that of any other political document of its kind up to the publication of Harrington's *Oceana* in 1656. What Winstanley invents is a total system of sociality impervious to both attack from without and subversion from within. He is striving to make his new society generate and regenerate out of itself, out of its own fundamental substance and structure, as determined by the axioms, laws, and regulations he establishes for it. The fundamental material structure of his new society is an institution of public storehouses or depots, whose operations will obviate the need for buying and selling commodities in markets. All surplus commodities are to be deposited or withdrawn from these storehouses, as need be, by individuals freely working at their trades and freely participating in a system of producing and pooling an abundance of commodities. The system will thus make it possible for individuals to provide for themselves freely, according to their needs, while still pursuing their individual trades and producing goods in keeping with their vocations and talents. Once a system like this is in place, the material basis of mine and thine, the competitive market, should indeed be "swallowed up," and what men have seen in their hearts, the universal law of equity, will be matched by what they experience in the pursuit of their callings and the production and consumption of goods.

But Winstanley's system then takes up the matter of establishing institutions for promulgating an ideology of public economy, especially among the young, and for preventing the subversion of its communal system by reprobates and foreign enemies. And it is at just this point, when Winstanley is trying to imagine how life in his new society would be perpetuated indefinitely, that Winstanley's system hardens. On the one hand, Winstanley summons a vision of social life governed by internalized codes of unalienated behavior, codes he has been gradually adding to his vision of the good life since first taking up his pen: codes such as the rule of law and non-violence and Christian charity. But Winstanley never lets go of the idea that this society is also always communistic, free of markets, money, "mine and thine," and material and social inequality. And he is concerned to determine the limits of a civil

society where such a structure of life is permanently in place; he wants to determine exactly how such a society might be organized on a macro level, and how it might be protected and sustained. And despite his determination to undo the principles of mine and thine he thus has to devise a system of impediments, a system of barriers that cannot be crossed, a system of procedures that have to be followed, of mechanisms of sovereignty, education, training, and punishment, and even disenfranchisement, if need be, that have to be endlessly reproduced if kingly power is to be kept at bay and "Freedom in the earth" is to be assured. The more he thinks about what self-perpetuated communism would look like, the more dangers to it Winstanley can imagine, and the more lines he has to draw between what is permissible and what impermissible: the more his promotion of a certain form of sociality becomes the prohibition of other forms of behavior, and legalisms overtake the rhetoric of liberation.

"Hereafter followes," Winstanley writes at one point, "what those particular laws may be, whereby a commonwealth may be governed in peace, and all burdens removed: which is a breaking forth of that law of liberty, which will be the joy of all Nations, when he arises up, and is established in his brightness" (589). As he prepares to dictate certain laws, he is clearly setting the framework for what is to be a gradualist, voluntary, universal society. He is fitting a political system on a framework of a communist economy which is well within the limits of liberal jurisprudence and Leveller democracy. Open elections, universal manhood suffrage (above a certain age), rotated offices, open public deliberations, guarantees of equal treatment before the law – most of the prominent features of nascent liberal doctrine are incorporated in Winstanley's vision of the future, designed as correlatives to the fundamental rule of communist equality and freedom. But as he goes on with his project, having begun with visions of setting a universally free society in motion, Winstanley frequently, while filling in the details, comes up against the limits that would make his subjects universally free. And in the course of a litany of laws from the pen of someone who had earlier urged authorities to "Leave off imprisoning, whipping and killing; which are but the actings of the curse," one comes upon such statutes as the following:

6. He who strikes his Neighbor, shall be struck himself by the Executioner blow for blow, and shall lose eye for eye, tooth for tooth, limb for limb, life for life: and the reason is, that men may be tender of one anothers bodies, doing as they would be done by. (591–92)

17. If any refuse to learn a trade, or refuse to work in seed-time, or harvest, or refuse to be a Waiter in Store-houses, and yet will feed and clothe himself with other mens labors; the Overseers shall first admonish him privately; if he continue idle, he shall be reprov'd openly before all people by the Overseers; and shall be forbore with a moneth after his reproof; if he still continues idle, he shall then be whipt, and be let go at liberty for a moneth longer; if still he continue idle, he shall be delivered into the taskmasters hand, who shall set him to work for twelve months, or till he submit to right Order. (593)

28. If any do buy and sell the Earth or fruits thereof, unless it be to, or with strangers of another nation, according to the Law of navigation, they shall both be put to death . . . (595)

In attempting to imagine a whole society where alienation and domination have been abolished once and for all, Winstanley has been led by his own logic to rehearse what might be called a *fall into law*, a fall into a discourse of laws where the rhetoric of communist liberation finds the limits of its creative capacities, finds itself duplicating systems of power which are already in place (in Winstanley's own psyche and private life, for example) and which in other contexts it had wanted to abolish. Or rather, Winstanley has been led by the requirements of the moment to shift from a poetics where the effects of revolution are always only shattering, liberating and rewarding to a poetics where the effects of revolution must inevitably bring in the inhibitions and prohibitions of the law.

Unfortunately, Winstanley's fall into law finally left him with the death of the project itself. Once Winstanley moved from declaring the outlines of a new society to specifying its legal framework, he moved, again, from evocation to prescription, from utopian hope to utopian dictation. To imagine the actual shape of the new society to which his hopes had been attached, to venture into this new terrain – for really there is no exact precedent for this exercise of the imagination – was to be confronted with the end product of a process whose exhilarating hopes had always been centered on production in and of itself. What had been exhilarating was the *making* of the society, the summoning of the society into existence, taking up the position to “declare it all abroad.” But, just now, Winstanley no longer finds himself endowed with the kind of constructive power he needs to declare the new age into existence. If he is going to set forth the pattern of a model commonwealth, it is precisely because he is disengaged from genuine political action; he has no power save the one power of being able to imagine a different kind of society. And he is left instead with having to prescribe the laws and limits of a society which is already out of “use,” and which belongs to nothing but the imagination, and to no subject but the author attempting to imagine it.

It was not for nothing that as soon as Winstanley had diagnosed the ills of his time as a problem of alienation and domination he instantly thought not only of a "joynt stock," as so many of his contemporaries did, but also of the abolition of buying and selling, in other words of money and the market economy that the circulation of money made possible. He was seeing into the problem of the quantified expression of what Marx would call labor power, the symbolization that enabled labor to be turned into something else (a quantity of money), alienated from itself, and hence subjected to domination. But Winstanley was seeing into the problem in his own way, from the standpoint of several intersecting early modern mythologies. The myth of Paradisal plenitude, along with the doctrine of Sonship and the millennial heaven on earth, was combined in Winstanley's mind first of all with a folk tradition of common labor, based in the system of feudal agrarian practices which was not yet entirely effaced, and secondly with the post-Reformation ideal of what might be called total community – such community as Puritan leaders from Bradford and Winthrop to John Dury had been extolling, and which lay at the heart of sectarian society: community which was founded on the patriarchal family and its various systems of hierarchical government, but which was nevertheless embraced as if it were a form of communion, of unalienated togetherness. Mythical plenitude, mythical labor, mythical community – *Worke together, Eate Bread together* – were superimposed upon what was actually an emergent society of petty farmers and petty bourgeois, finding themselves in a time of scarcity and in the midst of a fantastic crisis of political and ecclesiastical authority. But the revolution itself, then, as individuals like Winstanley experienced it, was not therefore a *bourgeois revolution*; that would come later, with central banking, and the full monetarization of the English economy.⁵¹ It was rather a pre-bourgeois revolution, inspired in part by the breakdown in traditional political authority, waged against *domination in general*, and especially against forms of domination which disrupted the framework of total community; it was a revolution waged in the name "universall Love, or pure knowledge in the power."

The Levellers' solution to the problem of domination was no doubt more realistic – turning traditional privileges into contractual obligations, based on general system of rights exercised by self-possessed individuals. But the True Levellers' solution was more perspicuous. Winstanley saw through the ruse of self-possession, understanding that though to violate it was an act of destructive aggression – kingly power – to institutionalize it would not satisfy the fundamental drive of individuals like himself toward plenitude, community, and freedom. Winstanley was

able to deconstruct the ethic of self-possessed individualism by adopting its languages, and forcing them into new forms where "possession" itself became the condition most important to avoid. But Winstanley could not see his way *out* of the problem. Prophecies, warnings, seeking, collective action, appeals to right, and then finally an unlikely advice to the prince where princes, even a prince like Oliver Cromwell, would have nothing to do, and where a law of freedom frequently degenerates into social coercion – all these strategies of revolution are asserted and, ultimately, passed by. The point at which they might have come together, and might have genuinely constituted a "universall power" has not been grasped. Winstanley has been trying to alter the fundamental conditions of existence – the economy of labor. He has been trying to do this by reimagining what it means to labor, and what it means for labor, both collectively and individually, to *have* an economic truth, a truth at once material and psychic. What he finds, though, is that *imagination itself*, with its ability to alienate labor and provide conditions for domination, is part of the problem. Imagination reinvents; but what it reinvents are limits.

As he proceeds with the task of imagining his ideal society, Winstanley finds himself having to consider more and more matters of state, and to invent more and more laws for their regulation, laws regulating childbearing, servitude, apprenticeship, the establishment of households, courtship, marriage, and sexual conduct. The laws go on: "61. No Master of a family shall suffer more meat to be dressed at dinner or supper, then what will be spent and eaten by his household . . . 62. No man shall be suffered to keep house, and have servants under him, till he hath served seven years under Command to a Master himself . . ." And then, abruptly, the text comes to a close, obviously unfinished, but unfinished, it would appear, because the energy behind its production has been exhausted, because its author has found himself ensnared in an endless chain of regulations, which finally have little to do with the vision of universal love that motivated him in the beginning. Here it is that the text breaks off, and concludes in a lamenting verse. "*Knowledge, why didst thou come,*" Winstanley writes in verse at the end of *The Law of Freedom*,

to wound, and not to cure?
I sent not for thee, thou didst me inlure.
Where knowledge does increase, there sorrows multiply,
To see the great deceit which in the World doth lie.
Man saying one thing now, unsaying it anon,

*Breaking all's Engagements, when deeds for him are done.
O power where art thou, that must mend things amiss?*
(600)

Indeed, by the time Winstanley published *The Law of Freedom*, the English Revolution was in many respects already over, its utopian moment come and gone. "*O death where art thou?*" Winstanley concludes; "*wilt thou not tidings send? / I fear thee not, thou art my loving friend*" (600).

CHAPTER 5

From constitutionalism to aestheticization, 1654–1670

I. IN RETROSPECT, 1654 AND BEYOND

Ideal political speculation was again and again repudiated in England at the same time as it was achieving its greatest triumphs. Robert Burton renounced his utopianism in the same breath as he developed it. Within a page of remarking that we “had need of some general visiter in our age, that should reforme what is amis,” and outlining what would in fact become a model of the bourgeois nation-state, he ended up insisting that his utopian plans for the future were “vaine absurd, and ridiculous wishes not to be hoped: all must be as it is.”¹ The settlers of New England created their New Jerusalem, founding a good deal of the institutional and social framework of what was to become the United States, by denying that a New Jerusalem was what they were aiming to create, and insisting instead that it was the work, the process, the “wise-walking,” that was essential, and not the actual thing the work might produce. Francis Bacon realized his fantasy of a technocratic monarchy only by imaginatively renouncing his career as an imperial politician, who might among other things invent a utopia: “What? Twice paid?” The gentle reproof of the Bensalemites against their European visitors echoed as the bitter self-recrimination of a man with world historical ambitions, a man who in all seriousness could call upon the educated elite of Europe by saying, “We must begin anew from the very foundations,” but who had just been impeached and disgraced for accepting bribes for petty legal proceedings.²

In the 1640s and 1650s utopian impulses came unleashed, and an enthusiastic body of individuals began conceiving that they might refashion themselves and their nation in the image of their own ideal expectations. But impulses toward a radical transformation of the world found opposition enough in the world itself. Charles I ridiculed the Parliamentarians for “that New Utopia” they thought they were going to make out of England, and in contempt of their aspirations plunged England into not

one but two civil wars. In the very midst of elaborating his platform for a “Law of Freedom,” Winstanley broke off his labor in recognition of the fact that though he had the command of mind to see into the morals, politics, and economics of another kind of life, he was entirely powerless to do anything about it – as well he should, for the ultimate reward for his utopian hope, as it was to be in the 1650s for Levellers, True Levellers, Ranters, and Fifth Monarchists alike, was abuse, imprisonment, and humiliation.

There would be one last burst of constructive utopian energy between 1654 and 1660, the years of the Protectorate and the recall of the Rump; a period that would see the publication of at least two of the most influential political writings of the seventeenth century, Sir Henry Vane’s *A Healing Question Propounded* and James Harrington’s *Oceana* (both 1656). But compared with the 1640s and the early 1650s the utopian vistas of the late Interregnum would be decidedly pinched. After Winstanley we will not find any grand political schemes for overcoming the limits of the postlapsarian human condition; we will not find any attempts to strike down the general structures of domination and alienation. For most radicals and reformers it seemed to be enough, as many writers put it, to find the means for a satisfactory political “settlement,” although settlement itself could be an ambitiously utopian end under the circumstances of the later Interregnum. And even cultural dissidents would be more modest in their aims. In the work of sectarians like the Mennonite Peter Cornelius Plockhoy and the early Quakers – about whom space limitations prohibit further discussion – utopian impulses would be privatized; social, cultural, and religious goals would be deliberately withdrawn from the sphere of political deliberation, and utopists would bend their energies to the formation of countercultural or subcultural communities.³ In the theocratic utopics put forward by conservative Puritans like Richard Baxter and John Eliot, who blended national political ideals with goals of worldwide evangelism, as we will see, the enforcement of godly discipline took precedence, and nothing was suggested to the purpose of expanding human capacities or the scope of human freedom.

Of course, no long-term “settlement” was ever found, and after 1660 even constitutional utopianism would fade from the scene. Something new would happen: the imaginary of ideal politics would undergo a process of what I will call “aestheticization.” Though continued on a high order of literary invention, ideal political speculation would be alienated from the impulses that had been motivating it for half a century; and it would come to serve predominantly introverted, aesthetic

purposes, while leaving the real world of politics alone. "All must be as it is," Robert Burton had self-mockingly put it – meanwhile demanding dramatic social reform. But Margaret Cavendish would say of her utopian fiction *Blazing World* (1666), in effect turning Burton's conceit on its head, "I have made a world of my own; for which no body, I hope, will blame me, since it is in every one's power to do the like."⁴ On the one hand, in Cavendish's hands the principle of utopian invention seems to have become democratized: "it is in every one's power to do the like." But on the other hand, what utopian invention creates is "a world of my own." And unlike the fanciful worlds of earlier writers like Burton, this imaginary world does not even nod in the direction of progressive social reforms.

For all the limitations of the utopian mode of thought as writers of the seventeenth century had come to practice it, for all the rifts between creative subjectivity and ends-oriented objectivity that had both structured the practice of utopian discourse and hindered its usefulness, until the Restoration the utopists of the seventeenth century had all been united at least in this: they imagined that there might be a better way of life than the one they were living; they imagined that it might be possible to master domains of the natural and human world that had not been mastered before, and in mastering those domains forever to change them. It was this audacity, this "presumption," as Joseph Hall called it, this will-to-power which would at once aggrandize the precincts of the self and alter the structure of the things of the world, that the repudiators of utopianism had continually contemned. It was this same audacity that followed the unprecedented career which this study has been concerned to trace, and which, for all its underlying impracticality, both reflected and inspired fundamental, irreversible changes in the material and ideological conditions of national life. England drifted away from the sublime settlement of the Stuart monarchy and became a society more divided, more turbulent, and also considerably more powerful and ambitious than it had been – a nascent empire, a more rationally organized nation-state, and one of Europe's great intellectual capitals, where many men and even a growing number of women, from many walks of life, had come to believe in themselves and their local communities as the original vehicles of religious, scientific, and political truth, and of all the authority necessary to originate and legitimize its dissemination.⁵ The discourse of ideal politics, which inevitably accompanied and frequently governed religious and scientific speculation, had been both

an expression of England's experience of modernization and a chief influence on its development, leading its educated classes to a new understanding of what the mind of the individual and the collective mind of a society might accomplish, first of all in taking the social world as its object, and secondly in subjecting that world to its rational, deliberate control. For all the various pathways they followed and for all the contentiousness with which its adherents often engaged with them, from the time of James I's accession to the end of the Interregnum, ideas of utopian mastery had had a regulatory effect on political, social, and religious deliberation; they were a productive force in the English-speaking world's accelerated *longue durée* (as it were) of political, social, and cultural modernization.

At the same time, to be sure, and to return to a crucial point, ideal politics in seventeenth-century England had always also been doubly repudiated. Always in conflict with the real world, it was resisted by the very thing it was trying to impact. Always "situationally transcendent" (Mannheim), it was *inherently* in conflict with the world. In addition, as we have also seen again and again, ideal politics was inherently in conflict with itself: the Levellers could appeal to their right of nation-making, founded in universal principles, but only by denying that universal right to anyone else; Winstanley could unmake the repressive laws of "the curse," but only, in the end, by fashioning repressive laws of his own. We are about to examine several more specimens of this external-internal conflict, including the example of Harrington's *Oceana*, which perhaps more than any other document discussed in this study illustrates both the "ambivalence" of modernity that Habermas identifies – the combining of "emancipatory-reconciling" and "repressive-alienating" drives – as well as the peculiarities of the self-assertion utopian mastery requires. From a theoretical point of view *Oceana* illustrates both the forward-looking drives and the self-consuming pitfalls of the process of modernization in which the discourse of ideal politics was participating. In a way, the anti-utopian utopics of the Restoration would illustrate much the same thing, though in a different register, with restorative and aesthetic aims in mind. Gonzalo's Paradox may well be inescapable. We need a "general visitor" if we want to sweep away what is amiss in the world, all at once, with the efficacy of the imagination operating in the realm of the imagination: and wanting that, all must be as it is. Only, it took the conditions of the Restoration to alienate the discourse from its impulses toward overcoming its own contradictions. It took the conditions of the

Restoration for utopists to take pleasure in demonstrating, *pace* the very tradition they were following, that all must be as it is.

2. AFTER THE RUMP, THE SEARCH FOR "SUBSTANCE"

With the quashing of Levellers and Diggers and other radical groups, with the failure of the Barebones Parliament (which had strong Fifth Monarchist support), and with the disappearance therefore of many of the positive impulses of the English Revolution, what was at stake in the late 1650s was not the future direction but rather the mere survival of the new political order. Ideas about amelioration, reformation, democratic enfranchisement and distributive justice still lingered, but first the new political order – what there was of it, anyway – had to be reestablished, stabilized, reimplanted. The English people, as John Eliot wrote, were "in a capacity to chuse unto themselves a new government, and in such deep perplexity about that great Question, where to set their foot in peace."⁶ Men had been too "apt" during the revolutionary years, Nedham asserted in a pro-Cromwellian tract of 1654, "to be rooting and striking at Fundamentals," and the nation has been put in a dangerous "condition of a *Floating Island*, through neglect of any certain settlement."⁷ The "end of your meeting, the great end," Cromwell told his first Protectoral Parliament, is "healing and settling."⁸ The point was not to "overturn, overturn" anymore. It was to take what one had and settle down.

By the fall of 1654 hopes for the wholesale historical transformation were already being memorialized under the vague epithet, the "Good Old Cause." If the hopes were still in people's minds, the drive to "settle" the nation took precedence, and radicals followed the lead of more moderate reformers in taking care to grasp not the power to end all power but, less grandly, the power to normalize power.⁹ This meant that the deepest impulses toward revolutionary self-transformation were being more or less deliberately suppressed. But it also meant, to put the issue (as many contemporaries did) in Machiavellian terms, that radicals were bending their energies toward grasping "opportunity," and wresting a version of constitutional freedom out of the occasions imposed by necessity or "fortune." It meant that ideal politics was being shifted from the realm of prophetic speculation to the realm of reality politics.

The most eloquent utopic response to the new discursive imperatives of the day was Sir Henry Vane the Younger's *A Healing Question Propounded*. "The question propounded," Vane wrote in his opening statement, looking back on the successes and failures of the English revolution to date,

“is, What possibility doth yet remain (all things considered) of reconciling and uniting the dissenting judgments of honest men within the three nations, who still pretend to agree in the spirit, justice, and reason of the same good cause, and what is the means to effect this?”¹⁰ Vane claimed that “in the management” of the Civil War, by the Providence of God, the part of “honest men” had been made “absolute and compleat conquerors over their common enemy,” and that their right of conquest was added to their “natural right” of self-government. The problem was that “of late a great interruption having happened unto them,” and “this great compacted body [was] now falling asunder into many dissenting parts” (305). On the one hand, the great event of revolutionary transformation had already occurred; on the other hand, the revolution was in danger of degenerating, its course having already been interrupted by “private and selfish interest” – above all, the interest that had established the anti-democratic Cromwellian Protectorate in 1653. The task ahead was to effect reconciliation, consolidation, and settlement. But the individuals responsible for this task, the members of the army, were faced therefore with a classic dilemma of utopian-revolutionary politics. In order to perpetuate itself, a revolutionary vanguard also has to deny itself; it has to “part with” (as Vane wrote) the very sovereignty it has wrested for itself by the power of the sword, turning it over to civilian authority. But Vane is certain that a solution to the dilemma can be derived out of the circumstances giving rise to it. What Vane has in mind – and what made him something of a hero in the days of the American Revolution – is a constitutional convention. But it is a convention called by a minority for the sake of a minority, defended in the name of freedom on the basis of a “natural right,” yet preserved by the opportune application of the power of the sword, and the exclusion of a large “common enemy” from participation in the political process.

Here in a nutshell is what, thanks to the work of J. G. A. Pocock, historians are now by and large agreed to regard as the “Machiavellian moment” of Interregnum politics, when the idea prevailed that freedom (paradoxically) can only come from a grasp of the necessity of freedom, that is, from a militant exercise of *virtù* in the face of *fortuna*, with a view toward forming a free, stable, self-governing community.¹¹ But here is also, again, the quest for a “settlement.” It is not for nothing that the “good cause” Vane is espousing is in the end a “good *old* cause.” The retrospective character of his political hopes is what allows him to produce a call for action warranted by a previous action, whose effects are taken to be irreversible. Nor is it unimportant that the restatement

of this good old cause would entail, if not the revising of the good life as a whole, at least the reproduction, in the Puritan tradition, of the idea of a perfectly “compacted,” covenantal community.¹² But what was missing were the conditions for a settlement, and, as Vane and others would understand the problem, what was also fundamentally missing was a constitutive, constitutional “substance.”

The leading politicians and theorists of the day were well aware of this problem. The word itself, “substance,” makes frequent appearances in their rhetoric, as do a number of cognates, the idea of substance being a corollary to the idea of a “settlement.” Vane himself argued that the military vanguard had “that wherein the substance of all government is contained” (308). Hobbes had stressed that the product of the legitimate social contract he espoused was a “civill estate,” the “Constitution of a Civill Power.”¹³ In 1654 Oliver Cromwell had argued that the Instrument of Government which he and his allies had put into law was “the *esse*”; it was “constitutive.” The formula of the Instrument and its “government by a single person and a Parliament” – the “fundamentals” of the Instrument, as he called them – were what made his government a government; they were the *sine qua non*, the things without which both the earlier revolutionary parliaments and he himself as head of the military had been merely “arbitrary in power.”¹⁴ *Nothingness* – that euphoric place of placelessness, where radicals had been finding the power to “new model” or “overturn” – was not effective anymore. Indeed, the experience of a failed revolutionary government had proven it to be incoherent. Some *thing* was needed as a starting point, and evidently as an endpoint too, some essential reality which could consolidate revolutionary impulses and settle them into a secure, legitimate, and lasting form, even if – as some politicians were at least dimly aware – the thing itself would largely be contrived out of words, out of a document, out of a “constitution” (since it was in face a document, and not a real society) that was in some ways no *thing* at all.¹⁵

3. HARRINGTON AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA

It is in view of what seems to have been the insoluble problem of generating a constitutional substance that the political philosophy of James Harrington may perhaps be best assessed, beginning with his *Oceana*. *Oceana* is a hybrid work, partly polemical, partly philosophical, and partly fictional. Critics have by and large minimized the significance of the fictional aspects of the text, since they so transparently refer to events and

persons in England. But J. C. Davis has argued persuasively that the “utopian” characteristics of *Oceana* should not for that reason be dismissed. *Oceana* is from the outset an attempt to think past the impasses of self-interest and arbitrary exercises of power, which are taken to be givens of human nature and historical experience, and to arrive at the image of a government of republican community, framed to last in perpetuity. Seeing that “they that make the laws in commonwealths are but men,” Harrington writes, “the main question seems to be how a commonwealth comes to be an empire of laws and not of men?”¹⁶ This attempt to overcome the rule of men by devising a rule of law makes Harrington’s project “utopian” in Davis’s technical sense of the term, being an imaginary exercise attempting to replace the laws of nature with the laws of men.

The attempt also induces Harrington to revert to utopics in several other, perhaps more important senses. Like Vane, Harrington wants to see England transformed from a condition of Protectoral discontent to a condition of militant civic virtue; and since this virtue is to be not only a source of revolutionary contrivance but also the aim or *telos* of the republican “frame,” his thought depends upon the stipulation of a utopian vista, a new community of ends. Vane had called such a community “an orderly union of many understandings together,” “a like union and readinesse of will in all individuals.” The fiction of a “Commonwealth of Oceana,” which Harrington adduces not only in his fictional narrative but also in the non-fictional philosophical and polemical chapters of his book, serves to locate the frontiers of an idea; it gives a name and a provisional image to a community of ends which is entirely “anticipatory,” a wishful landscape of the Not Yet. Even more, since unlike Vane and many other progressives of his time Harrington believes that the one thing needed, the starting point of an ideal constitutional substance, is *nowhere to be found* – it is simply, at this point, non-existent – the fiction of an “Oceana” serves to identify what is required not only to wish for a condition of republican virtue but also to bring one into being. Paradoxical as this formulation may seem (this of course being the paradox of all “blueprint utopias”), it is by imagining a fictional Oceana that Harrington intends to unite the utopian imagination with the reality of reality politics.¹⁷

It should be recalled that when Vane talked about the “substance of government,” or Cromwell about an “*esse*,” they were each referring to a precedent. But in Harrington’s thought, even before the form of political society is reframed, the basic material of society has to be refashioned;

and those “materials of a commonwealth are the people” (212). Such is the crucial difference between the Harringtonian position and that of other radicals and reformers, including Vanists and Levellers: the idea that the people themselves are made, not born. For Harrington, it is the task of the political theorist to figure out not only how a state may be constituted as a body of laws, but also how a “people” may be constituted as a substance which can give itself its own laws, and then observe them. “The being of a commonwealth,” he writes, “consisteth in the methodical collection of the people” (214). Not in “a people” alone, but in the *methodical collection* of the people. But how is *that* to come about? It is to come about by way of a sequence of events in which a “superstructure” of institutions is fitted upon a methodically “collected” “foundation” of social existence. But how can such a double reinvention of the state even be imagined? Harrington’s premises compel him to anticipate a fundamental transformation in the whole apparatus of political conduct, from the materials of a people to the procedural regulations governing their conduct. Yet in imagining both the methodical making of a people and a methodical making of their laws, Harrington is led inevitably into the realm of speculative fiction.

No doubt it would be a mistake to underestimate the sheer pleasure Harrington obviously takes in literary invention, a surplus pleasure that all too frequently leads the prose of *Oceana* into excesses that can only be described as rococo. The language of *Oceana* is often forced, preciously witty and pointlessly ornate, a fact which did not escape the notice of Harrington’s contemporaries. The text dwells upon details of state formation – rituals of voting, for example, including the composition of ballots (metal balls of various types), ballot boxes (Venetian urns), and the formulas to be used for explaining their uses and tabulating and announcing their results – obsessively and compulsively, as if a preponderance of flourishes would win his point. But Harrington’s delight in artifice and literariness is not only an idiosyncratic whim. It is also an enthusiastic response to the challenge of political theory with which he is faced, a response whose very excessiveness is symptomatic of the complexities of the challenge. When Harrington dwells on the history of political settlements from the ancients to the moderns (what he calls the shift from “ancient to modern prudence”), and when he shifts from the citation of sources like Livy and Machiavelli to the recounting of events in “Oceana,” beginning with the reign of the Saxons (renamed the “Teutons”), and he leads his analysis from a retelling of thinly disguised English history to the story of how the commonwealth of Oceana

eventually reconstituted itself under the leadership of a Cromwellian “Lord Archon,” Harrington is answering a threefold challenge. In the first place, he is solving the great “perplexity” of English politics by devising a new account of the problem, an account which amounts to the invention of a materialist theory of historical novelty.¹⁸ Harrington demonstrates that the breakdown of government in “Oceana” in 1640 and the discontent of the 1650s were the result of changes in the “balance” of English society and its economic foundation, changes in the material conditions and hence in the social relations of its nobility and gentry. In the second place, Harrington is trying to solve the problem of social breakdown and discontent by narrating not only a new history of Oceana’s development up to the present but also what amounts to a preliminary history of its future. At the conclusion of the narrative of a constitutional convention that dominates most of the text, the Lord Archon abdicates his authority. In a few short concluding pages Harrington then assures his readers that for the next few years (in the future) the transition to an “equal commonwealth” went smoothly; royalists were reconciled with commonwealthmen,¹⁹ the nation’s finances were put in order, and the Lord Archon died in his bed. Harrington’s history of the future, in short, is the history of a “settlement”; it is the history of an enactment, where England is transformed from one political condition to another, largely by way of a transformation in its economic “foundation” and the structure of its social relations.

The third challenge Harrington is facing is the problem of enabling conditions; it is the challenge of the transcendental question, the question about the foundation of a foundation, which Vanists and Levellers still supposed could be solved by appeals to birthright or natural right, and which Cromwell and Hobbes alike believed could be solved by appeal to contractual obligation. As far as Harrington is concerned, such appeals are insubstantial. What is required instead is a change in what Harrington calls the “balance” of English society, and to change this is so immense a task that it requires “extraordinary means” (206–7), a means so extraordinary that it can only be accomplished by one person, acting alone, with dictatorial powers: “a commonwealth is seldom or never well turned or constituted, except it have been the work of one man.” “And whereas a book or a building,” he goes on to say, “hath not been known to attain perfection, if it had not a sole author or architect, a commonwealth, as to the fabric of it, is of the like nature. And thus it may be made at once . . .” (207). The fractious condition of Oceana is such that a single man is now able to step in and do the work at once of rectifying the

balance of society and imposing the right superstructure of laws upon it. Changes in the balance have already made it suited to be consolidated as a republic; and the concentration of power in the army, irrespective of the position of a sitting parliament – the same concentration of power upon which Vane too wanted to depend – has made it possible for that one man to be nominated and assume his society's constitutive power. In Harrington's fiction the leader of the army, "the most victorious captain and incomparable patriot Olphaus Megaletor," summons "a rendezvous of the army," deposes the Parliament, and then finds himself "created, by the universal suffrage of the army, Lord Archon, or sole legislator of Oceana" (206–7). The Lord Archon immediately sets about establishing conditions, a sequence of "orders," according to which the people may be collected, observe certain inalienable "fundamentals" (e.g., freedom of conscience), and elect representatives to a constitutional convention.

Since the person of the Lord Archon is a fiction, and a wistful fiction at that, it is not entirely clear what relation he was supposed to bear to the historical Oliver Cromwell. Pocock speculates that Harrington is joining in the debate on the side of those army republicans who respected Cromwell, who understood that Cromwell would have to be "allotted a leading role" in the reconstruction of the nation, but who were warning him that he could not do so as a king, or even as a Protector, but would have to do so as "a legislator, or a Biblical judge renewing the covenant."²⁰ Given the fact, however, that the Lord Archon is caused to argue ideas that we know the historical Cromwell never had, given the fact indeed that Lord Archon is the spokesman in the text for Harrington's own ideas, we are entitled to make another kind of interpretation. Lord Archon is a stand-in for Harrington; that is, he is a substitute for Harrington within the dreamscape of Harrington's utopian politics. The psychology of the correlation between Harrington and his Lord Archon is so obvious that the only mystery is that no one seems to have commented on it; perhaps it is just because the correlation is so obvious that no one has.²¹ We are almost certainly entitled to imagine Harrington the man, a member of the old gentry and former intimate of Charles I, a man with literary pretensions (he had translated *The Aeneid*) and of significant learning, finding himself adopting republican sympathies, poring over the literature of republican thought, and then standing by in frustration as the republic fails and fails again to establish itself.²² We may imagine him at some point becoming convinced that he had unlocked the mystery of England's discontent, that he had discovered the principles according to which republics came into being and endured, that he had discovered

in fact the historically unique principles according to which the peculiar condition of post-revolutionary England might be grasped and the old kingdom dramatically transformed into a successful republic. Since what Harrington had grasped were *first* principles, and since by his own analysis what England had failed to accomplish so far was to accommodate itself to the principles of its own history and seize the moment, Harrington was naturally led to propose a solution to England's ills which depended upon "extraordinary means," the remaking of England as a model republic "all at once." But his proposal required a pair of first-order agencies: on the one hand, the agency of the literary author, the fabricator of a new wishful landscape, who could show that nothing less than an implementation of a new set of first principles would do; on the other hand, the agency of the political author, the great man of the *vita activa* who, having grasped the principles of the new wishful landscape, could act as their delegate, their Lord of first principles, in other words their *Archon*. But the Lord Archon, then, is not only the representative of a psychological impulse. He is not only a subject taking the place of the dreamer in the dream, anchoring the dreamer's desires. He is also the representative of a certain kind of political positionality, which the project of utopian substance-making both implies and demands. He represents the positionality of the subject who finds himself in the midst of a political landscape where the power of generating the substance of political society seems to have fallen directly into his hands.

Or better yet, into his mind. Harrington's admiration for a "sole author or architect" may be derived from ideas to be found in Machiavelli; but the figure of the "sole author or architect" is Harrington's own addition to Machiavellian discourse, and his reference to the "perfection" of an artifact made by a single creator is very likely derived from the account of the image "of a human will operating according to reason," that Descartes alludes to in the opening of his *Discourse of Method*.²³ Certainly, Harrington's appeal to the extraordinary means of political invention is framed as a Cartesian moment of self-assertion, such as we have been finding again and again in the course of this study, a moment where, in the midst of confusions of politics and social conflict a theorist steps forward to say, "it would be better if we did what I think, and only what I think; it would be better if society would be recreated in keeping with the image in my own mind of a rational society; it would be better because what *I* think (when I think methodically) is what is *rational*, or, conversely, because what is rational is what *I am methodically thinking*, and it is in the very image of methodical thought that the happiness of everyone is to be found."

The impression of Cartesian self-assertion, transferred to the sphere of political architecture, is only reinforced by Harrington's later works, where the narrative apparatus, including the fiction of a Lord Archon, is dropped: *The Manner and Use of the Ballot* (n.d.), *The Prerogative of Popular Government* (1658), *Brief Directions Showing How a Fit and Perfect Model of Popular Government May Be Made, Found, or Understood* (1658), *The Art of Lawgiving in Three Books* (1659). Harrington's *Oceana* had apparently been something of a success, and in some quarters a *succès de scandale*; in the wake of its success Harrington was being consulted on affairs of state, and patronized by members of Parliament, most notably Henry Neville, as well as harried by detractors. He was now in the middle of the most pressing controversies of the day and, interestingly, he was responding at once by keeping up a polemical dialogue on the first principles of government and disavowing any "interest" in the result.²⁴ On the one hand, Harrington devotes himself to arguing strenuously on behalf of the principles first set forth in *Oceana*; on the other hand, having abandoned his narrative apparatus, having in effect succeeded in promoting a new wishful landscape of political discourse, finding himself a center of attention such as his own Lord Archon had been, he effaces himself; he claims disinterest; he argues from "reason" only. And he tries to urge a deeper truth, already implicit in *Oceana*, that objective "reason" itself is what is at stake. The first laws of government and social stability (and not simply the rhetorical posture of the politician) are what are at stake. His argument is as plain, and objective, as a natural law. "[I]f the balance or state of property in a nation be the efficient cause of government, and, the balance being not fixed, the government . . . must remain inconstant or floating, then the process in formation of a government must be first by fixation of the balance, and next by erecting such superstructures as to the nature thereof are necessary."²⁵ Harrington is now in the center of a debate, arguing in favor of a set of principles; but the point of his argument is that if he, alone in his study, can discover these principles, and understand what is next to be done, so can any man of sufficient learning.²⁶ The principles are universal, although they are also historically fortuitous, since it is just now that men like him are capable of grasping the principles of republican government and acting upon them.

If this is a return to "ancient prudence," as Harrington frequently says, it is a return to it in the sense that after centuries of what Harrington himself called a "gothic" or "feudal" condition, men like him (as he implies) were beginning to conceive of their social relations in view of

their first principles – as Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius had done – and they were finding these first principles in themselves and their powers of deduction. Harrington was arguing that since the material (if not the official) balance of power had fallen under Henry VII from the old nobility to “the people, the commonwealth (though they do not see it) is already in the nature of them” (202). There is an element of subjective idealism in this phenomenon of discovering the power of radical transformation in the power of one’s rational nature. Men find that the order of things as constituted by old laws and ideologies has been rendered insubstantial, that order instead is “in the nature” of men themselves, in their thoughts, and political tradition to the contrary is irrelevant. But there is also an element of objective pragmatism in it: if order has been transferred from the condition of the world (or a political theology of the world) to the rational but subjective nature of the men in it, the power not only of managing society but of making it, of creating its very substance, has in principle been delivered into their minds and hands. Man is a “philosophical creature,” Harrington once wrote. “Formation of government is the creation of a political creature after the image of a philosophical creature, or it is an infusion of the soul or faculties of man into the body of a multitude.”²⁷ Every man is his own Archon; and every commonwealth is the image of the Archon within. “For in the art of man,” as Harrington wrote in the conclusion of *Oceana*, “being the imitation of nature which is the art of God, there is nothing so like the first call of beautiful order out of chaos and confusion as the architecture of a well ordered commonwealth” (341).

I am not suggesting here that Harrington actually solved the problem of self-government and the constitutional substance. He left a legacy – or perhaps more accurately, participated in a “Machiavellian moment” that has left a legacy – of dealing with immediate political issues by insisting upon first principles, which are to be found at once in “nature” and in the act of introspection. (On the Continent, Spinoza’s political writings are part of this movement too.) It is this legacy which was carried over into the thought of the Enlightenment and the French and American revolutions: political reflection, in the style of “ancient prudence,” which was always in the first place an ideal politics (political science as the science of “the best”) oriented toward a horizon of utopian expectation, and the achievement of a utopian mastery.²⁸ But it is implausible to allege that Harrington has solved the structural dilemma of ideal political speculation. Clearly he has progressed further than, say, Winstanley in suiting ideal politics to practical politics, in matching the idea of self-government

with the idea of law. Harrington is content with an inequality of estates (as divided between the gentry and the yeomanry) that would have been unacceptable to Winstanley; but he has found a way of framing laws so that their constitutive value far outweighs their restrictive or prohibitive force. His political thought is universally directed toward "settling and healing" the English nation. But Harrington does not appear to have been able to solve the problem of the distance between the political architect and the political subject. The problem already appears in the curious relation between Harrington the author of *Oceana* and Lord Archon the architect of *Oceana*, where the philosopher-king is in effect broken into two personae, philosopher and king, who nevertheless mirror one another in the course of an impossible fantasy emphasizing political realism. Harrington comes no nearer, say, than Francis Bacon had in correlating the idea of the independent philosophic intelligence, surveying the whole of nature and culture, with the idea of an absolute political subjectivity, capable of actually transforming nature and culture. But the problem appears even more markedly in the contrast between the magnificent autonomy granted to the political architect and the relatively mechanical democracy actually foreseen for the subjects of the new *Oceana*. The comparatively puppet-like republican "motions" that the subjects of the new *Oceana* are to undertake has often been noted in the critical literature, and was even objected to in Harrington's lifetime. In the new commonwealth, the "scene" of republican conduct (as Kenneth Burke would put it) has been so exhaustively ritualized that there seems to be little scope for anything that a republican like Machiavelli or Milton would recognize as the exercise of freedom. Consider the case, Harrington avers, of a mummers' show he had once seen in Italy,

which represented a kitchen, with all the proper utensils in use and action. The cooks were all cats and kitlings, set in such frames, so tied and or ordered, that the poor creatures could make no motion to get loose, but the same caused one to turn the spit, another to baste the meat, a third to skim the pot and a fourth to make a green sauce. If the frame of your commonwealth be not such as causeth everyone to perform his certain function as necessarily as did the cat to make green sauce, it is not right.²⁹

If men are now finding it in their nature to be the architects of their own commonwealth, the commonwealth itself (as Harrington imagines it) is something of a machine, and the men in it something like mechanical parts.

So it is in the work of Harrington (along with some of his similarly minded contemporaries) that we find, then, not the resolution, but the most methodically developed replication of the paradoxes of political self-assertion, the most highly developed expression of that “ambivalent content of social and cultural modernity” whose advent in the realm of ideal politics this study had been trying to trace: the advent of a master discourse where man the architect tries to transform himself architectonically into a machine. The architectural autonomy of “man” is dispersed among several representatives, none of whom is ever really, except in fiction, a Lord Archon – entirely the master of his political will. And conversely, the mechanical condition of the citizens of Oceana is never really so carceral as the allegory of the mummers’ show would indicate, for Harrington does not, again, ever really represent daily life in an “equal commonwealth.” He merely dramatizes the coming into being of such conditions as would make a republican life possible, and he most certainly does not want his republican citizens to live their lives like cats in a contraption, cats whom he himself calls “poor creatures.” On the contrary: in *Oceana*, when the image of the republic forming itself is not of a military mustering or a pageant ceremony, it is of pastoral productivity.³⁰ Oceana “*is as the rose of Sharon, and the lily of the valley*,” the Lord Archon says in the end, combining various forms of Biblical and republican imagery into a fascinatingly rococo image of the commonwealth of the future. “*She is comely as the tents of Kedar, and terrible as an army with banners. Her neck is as the tower of David, builded for an armoury, wheron there hang a thousand bucklers and shields of mighty men . . .*” (333). The either/or of freedom and necessity, of autonomy and heteronomy, that historians and critics have tried to impose upon their readings of *Oceana* and related works needs to be qualified. And yet the basic binary opposition they have appealed to is nonetheless operative in Harrington’s thought. Radical transformation means that something is to be radically transformed; the agent will work upon and reproduce a patient, and though the patient will be caused to express the power and dignity of the agent, it will not itself be self-expressively empowered. The “same persons cannot be the creator and the creature, the conveyor and receivers of dominion,” the Presbyterian minister Edward Gee pointed out in 1650.³¹ We cannot *make* ourselves, if what we are to make is a substance of political society where the problem of our having to remake ourselves has been definitively resolved, for then we are making ourselves into something other than ourselves. But if we subscribe to the utopic impulses of modernity, we have to make ourselves; we have to overcome the limitations of our natures, and the

historical accidents determining our condition. We have to try to come into being as other beings.

4. FIRST PRINCIPLES AND THE CRISIS OF 1659: "UTOPIAN RAGUSA"

By 1659 the paradox at the heart of constitutional-utopian thought was the formal cause of a political crisis. The Protectorate as constituted by the Instrument of Government had given way to a Protectorate as modified by the Humble Petition and Advice, making Cromwell's powers hereditary. Then with the death of Oliver his son Richard came into power. But Richard was not able to sustain the balance between relatively conservative civilian authorities and the more radical voices whose main source of power was the leadership of the army, and when Richard tried to rein in the adversarial posturing of the military, the latter responded, in the name of the Good Old Cause, by leading a bloodless *coup d'état*, ousting Richard from office and dissolving his Parliament.³² For three weeks the officers of the General Council of the army were the *de facto* rulers of the country. Then the Army officers decided to restore the Rump Parliament of 1649–53, the same Rump which had so often been reviled, but which had at least gone so far as to declare England a republic. In August there was an abortive Royalist uprising. In October, the army once again dissolved Parliament. Then the Rump Parliament was recalled, but not without considerable controversy concerning its right to sit and govern. And General Monck, in charge of the largest military force in the country, besieged from several sides to do something to restore order, began a march with his troops from Scotland which would finally result in the rout of the General Council of the army, the humiliation of the Rump, the recall of the pre-Rump Long Parliament, and the Restoration of Charles II. Through all of these controversies and shifts of government the question of "immediate power" and its ultimate legitimacy was foremost.³³ What had seemed to happen, until the Restoration of the Stuarts brought the situation under control, was that power had been so turned against power that nothing was left in the state but a condition of unresolvable, unwarrantable contention. "All persons," the irrepressible William Prynne wrote in the late spring of 1659, "ingaged in this *whorish, bastard old cause*," ought "now seriously and sadly to consider, how their often forcing Ruptures of the Houses, Members, Privileges of Parliament; their absurd, frequent new-modelling of our government, Parliaments, according to their own whimsical fancies, present interest

and designs, carried on *with prayers, mock-fasts, and humiliations, for strife and debate, and to smite with the fist of wickednesse, most execrable unto God*, have produced these deplorable effects,” namely what amounted to the “actual levying war against the parliament itself.”³⁴ Prynne’s language deliberately recalls the discourse of parliamentary sovereignty that was foremost in political debate during the early 1640s. And it anticipates what was soon to become a victorious discourse – a discourse which would include an official mockery of the good cause, of sectarian enthusiasm, “frequent new-modelling” and “whymysical fancies,” as well as a reverence for the traditional authority of the parliament and the king. For the first time in many years the political situation had become so unstable that men who, like Prynne, were at the center of English political life were openly, unapologetically, calling for a Restoration of the Stuarts. But in fact, against appeals to traditional authority the most prevalent political discourse of the day was addressed to first principles, and the imperative of “new-modelling.” It was concerned, still, with establishing a permanent constitutional substance; and author after author can be found trying to position himself as an architect of a state where no more architects would be needed.

Pamphlets appeared in 1659 with titles like *Englands Confusion and Chaos*; and even the conservative documents, leaning toward a restoration of the Long Parliament or the monarchy, by and large grounded their arguments on the basis of appeals to first principles. A number of pamphlets appeared similar to Harrington’s *The Art of Lawgiving* in that they advertised themselves as restatements of positions previously staked out, reducing them to their first principles: *The Leveller: Or, The Principles and Maxims, concerning Government and Religion, which are Asserted by those that are commonly called Levellers*; *The Good Old Cause Dress’d In Its Primitive Lustre, and Set Forth to the View of All Men*; *The Cause of God, And of these nations, sought out, and drawn forth from the Rubbish and the Lust and Interests of Men, and lifted up into sight and view of all the upright in heart to follow it*. In *Chaos* the conceit is developed that the current anarchy of English politics is foreshadowing a new creation, where the atoms of life “in this Island of Great Britain” will be refashioned into a stable system with “one Law,” and “so disposed, as each part shall be subservient to other, and each communicative to other, and all to the whole.”³⁵ In works like *The Cause of God*, where old arguments about civil and religious liberty were being restated, the most remarkable thing to note is the mere fact that they were being written at all. Again and again the old arguments appear, winnowed down now to “principles and maxims,” or “dressed” in their “primitive lustre,” as

if all that were necessary for the settlement of England, Scotland, and Ireland were that these basic points be “lifted up into sight.”

Richard Baxter took it upon himself to “lay down a few Political Aphorismes, containing those things that are denied or passed over by some of the proud Pretenders to Politicks . . .” Deliberately opposing himself to Harrington and other secularists and democrats, like Vane, he finds himself called upon to “begin at the Bottom, and touch those *Praecognita* which the Politicians doth presuppose, because I have to do with some, that will deny as much, as shame will suffer them to deny.”³⁶ What follows is a lengthy tome of nearly four hundred “theses,” with glosses, digressions, and corollaries, including an important chapter “Of the Best Form of Government, and Happiest Common-wealth,” which William Lamont perhaps rightly calls a “love poem to Richard Cromwell.”³⁷ What Baxter wants is predominantly what England has experienced under Richard’s Protectorate – a parliamentary system guided by a benevolent executive blessed by a powerful clergy – but with some minor adjustments in its administrative apparatus. “For ought I see,” he writes, composing this part of his text while Richard is still in power, “the Government of this Common-wealth is already ballanced with as much prudence, caution, and equallity, (though with less ado) as the curiouest [*sic*] of the Models that self-conceited men would obtrude with so much ostentation” (127). But it is significant that Baxter goes to so much trouble to prove that of all possible styles of political culture the one that has emerged in the second Protectoral government is undoubtedly the best, though by appeal not to experience but to “*praecognita*.”

Baxter’s associate John Eliot takes the same position in *The Christian Commonwealth*. Eliot is much less skeptical about the ways of peaceful government than Baxter is; he has little appreciation for what Baxter calls the “conveying causes of power,” the complex mechanics by which conflicting claims and rights are balanced, and law is both disseminated and restricted.³⁸ Unlike Baxter, he inclines toward Fifth Monarchy enthusiasm, making the claim, for example, that “Lord Christ is now accomplishing” great things in “great Britain” (B), and that there exists “a Divine Platforme, taught by God himselfe,” readily accessible in the Bible, which England and its satellite states might easily adopt as a model (B2v). The model, it turns out, is theocratic republicanism, a system Eliot claims was practiced by the Jews after Moses, and which closely resembles the government adopted by the leaders of Massachusetts Bay Colony – a republic where the franchise is founded in the life of the congregation, and where open and regular elections and conciliar

deliberations are combined with a system of strict deference to authority. At times Eliot elaborates rather extensively on how his system of government would work, drawing a picture of a justice in motion, a picture of decision-making being passed from one civic body to another, from one elective authority to another. But again, what is remarkable about Eliot's text is the fact that it is being written and published at all, the fact that an educated but isolated individual is taking it upon himself to resolve the controversies of English political life ("all hearts" being "perplexed," as he writes, "sighing up to heaven for direction what to do" [C]), by asserting the first principles of government, and drawing the picture of a model government commensurate with those principles.

Again and again, the occasion of national perplexity, of an unresolved legitimation crisis, is taken up as an opportunity for "new-modelling," for fastening upon the first principles of civil society, for lifting them "into sight," for constructing models of government upon the basis of those principles and, ultimately, for asserting at once the dignity of the political architect and the serenity of the object that the architect is determined to create: a political society whose operations would be as substantial, stable, and predictable as those of a machine.

Monarchists, Presbyterians, and others – even republican-leaning thinkers – were meanwhile developing an anti-utopian discourse, perhaps most notably in Nedham's arch series of "letters from Utopia."³⁹ But apart from those detractors who had come to the conclusion that the practice of "new-modelling" itself was to blame, the main point of controversy had to do less with whether ideal political speculation was a suitable mode of thought than with whether it could be developed to the point where it could discover the conditions of a lasting settlement. Even the first official Acts of the Restoration, the Declaration of Breda, and the Act of Oblivion, contain a good deal of language which is dependent upon ideal notions of the first principles of civil peace and justice, as when the Declaration calls for "a full and entire administration of justice throughout the land."⁴⁰ But the stumbling block continued to be the question of constitutional substance. Baxter's main objection to Harrington's politics was that "the people" as such were incapable of self-government; in Baxter's eyes the people were an inherently "ignorant and ungodly rabble," and there was nothing to be done with them without the sure hand of God.⁴¹

John Milton would belatedly enter the dispute and focus on that one thing which would make for a constitutional *esse* that would at the

same time preserve civil liberty and sustain its people in a condition of virtue. "Now is the opportunitie," he wrote, writing in fact at a time (the winter and spring of 1660) when the opportunity had already passed, "now the very season wherein we may obtain a free Commonwealth and establish it for ever in the land, without difficulty or much delay."⁴² "[A] Commonwealth," he wrote, "is held immortal; and therein safest and most above fortune" (436). The point then was to provide England with what even Milton is now willing to call first the "foundation" and second the "structure" of a commonwealth. The "work is don" already, he argues, as soon as an appropriate elective body is chosen, and that body is warranted to sit in perpetuity and manage the affairs of state. "For the ground and basis of every just and free government . . . is a general council of ablest men, chosen by the people to consult of public affairs from time to time for the common good" (432). Milton is so committed to the doctrine of liberty as the exercise of civic virtue that no mere contract or stipulation, not even a *Magna Charta*, can provide for its enactment, since a contract is already a limitation, a restriction. But now, although critics are by and large agreed that Milton takes up the topoi of utopian politics in this tract only for the most part to repudiate them, there are in fact a number of wistful if not wishful images of an ideal polity in the back of Milton's mind as he is writing; and the tract is pervaded by a longing for a kind of perpetual, self-generating, self-constitutive and collective exercise of liberty. For Milton no government comes closer to Christ's socio-political precepts than "a free Commonwealth; wherein they who are greatest, are perpetual servants and drudges to the public at thir own cost and charges, neglect thir own affairs; yet are not elevated above thir brethren; live soberly in thir families, walk the streets as other men, may be spoken to freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration" (425). The commonwealth he imagines is to be organized as a federation of local polities, supervised by a national, central standing senate or "Grand Council," where "the sovrantie" is "as it were deposited" (432). Authority is to be delegated by free elections, but awarded only to men of outstanding merit. The people themselves are to be made "fittest to chuse, and the chosen fittest to govern" by a system of reformed, state-sponsored education (433). Freedom itself consists first in "liberty of conscience," which the state will guarantee, and secondly "in the civil rights and advancements of every person according to his merit"; and this pure meritocracy is to be guaranteed by the federalist structure of the state as well (456-58). So Milton anticipates at least to some extent a superstructure which will assure the foundation of the state, and he

imagines, however wistfully, a democratic community, where all men are equal in dignity, but men rise to assume responsibility for government on the basis of merit – rising to positions of responsibility, indeed, not as a reward for their merit, but as an expression of it, as a continued, socially facilitated exercise of liberty, virtue, and merit. But the foundation of the state can be composed for Milton only out of the exercise of liberty itself. And that is why he puts little stock in written constitutions or other forms of “new injunctions,” which can only serve to “manacle the libertie of mankinde; turning all vertue into prescription, servitude, and necessitie” (445). That is why the substance of his state can only be found in men themselves, and sovereignty at best be “deposited” in a council of its members. That is why, despite all the objections that could be raised against his scheme simply by appealing to the example of recent history, Milton insists on a standing senate. It is only by the perpetual diligence of a body of men raised by merit and nominated by meritorious elections that a commonwealth can perpetuate itself. A free commonwealth for Milton – and there is no other way to convey the force of the idea, except by way of a tautology such as this – is the perpetual exercise of freedom perpetually practiced by a free body of men.

The problem Milton leaves unresolved – where does freedom come from, or how, in other words, are men to arrive at a condition of freedom such that they can fashion themselves as an association of free men? – is the Harringtonian problem. From a certain point of view Milton’s strategy for dealing with the problem – leaving it unresolved – may in fact be the right one. Freedom comes from freedom, or the necessity of freedom. Which is to say, as Baxter, Milton, and even Harrington at some points is given to say, it comes from Providence, and the recognition of one’s “nature” with respect to Providence’s ends; or, from a secular point of view, it comes from history, and a recognition of how will and reason can grasp opportunities for an escape from history. But Milton cannot answer the question as to why, even if this is so, England has been unable to arrive at a republican settlement up to now. If “Now is the opportunitie,” why is it “now”? Why has it not arrived sooner? If now is “the very season wherein we may obtain a free Commonwealth and establish it for ever in the land, without difficulty or much delay,” why have there been so many difficulties and delays? How in fact can Milton be making claims about the “ready and easy way” to settle England as a republic when it is clear, even to him, that the cause is lost, that he is actually speaking what he says may well be “the last words of our expiring libertie” (463)?

Problems of this kind were posed and reposed by Harrington too. "My work," he wrote in his dedication to his late short dialogue, *Valerius and Publicola*, "is the same with, or nearest, that of the nation; and the work of the nation, being not understood, is in horrid danger of utter ruin."⁴³ But the problem of the failure of republican government had already found a splendid, if somewhat naive formulation in the spring of 1659, by a sometime disciple of Harrington's, John Streater. Streater had been a New Model Army officer during the Civil Wars, and had served in the Commonwealth Army in Ireland during the early 1650s. He was tried for "seditious libel" in 1653 because of his objections to the dissolution of the Rump Parliament, lost his military commission in 1654, and in April of that year went into business as a printer. Two years later he was the primary printer of Harrington's *Oceana*.⁴⁴ In the spring of 1659 Streater came out in support of the military's *coup* and the recall of the Rump in a pamphlet entitled *A Continuation of this Session of Parliament Justified*. There he rehearsed many of the commonplaces of the Good Old Cause, going back to the justification of the war against the king; but he also deliberated on the reasons for the commonwealth's setbacks, placing a good deal of the blame on Cromwell and the seductive logic of Protectoral government. And he concluded by justifying the army *coup* and the appointment of the Rump as a "great Action" on the order of "Solon at Athens, and Lycurgus at Sparta."⁴⁵ When the army leaders saw that many of the original hopes and legal protections of the English people had miscarried, Streater wrote, they "had great reason, seeing these things, to return to their first principles, in which work they will have *Peace of Conscience*, and the praise of the whole Nation; when they shall see the End at first pretended to, and now intended to be attained" (14).

A few weeks later Streater published *Government Described. Viz. What Monarchie, Aristocracie, Oligarchie, And Democracie Is. Together with a Brief Model of the Government of the Common-Wealth, or, Free-State of Ragouse. Fit for View at This Present Juncture of Settlement*. In *Government Described* Streater begins by presenting a kind of primer on government, defining what he takes to be its four forms. Streater's fundamental point is that the four forms of government each follow from different principles, and that "democracy," "a Government, where the Governours are Elected by the People out of themselves," and where the "Magistrates . . . continue in power but one year, or less," is unquestionably the best. But instead of elaborating on why democracy is superior to other forms of government, the document breaks off its exposition, and proceeds to give the reader "a brief Modell

of the government of the Common-Wealth or Free-State of *Ragouse*.” By *Ragouse* (more commonly spelled *Ragusa*) the pamphlet means the town we now know by its original Slavic name *Dubrovnik*, which through most of the early modern period was the seat of an independent, prosperous, and influential city-state, a maritime power. The document describes the constitution and history of *Ragusa* with reasonable accuracy, emphasizing its stability and prosperity, as well as the framework of its system of representative government, which included a complex scheme of “rotation.” The *Ragusans* continually shifted the responsibilities of government from one person to another; no one was allowed to hold any office for more than a single term of “but one year or less.”⁴⁶ This was the secret of their success, Streater maintains, and the English would do well to emulate the “modell” *Ragusan* government provides. “*Reader*,” the author says, “here take notice, That a Common-wealth thus Constituted, though small, is able to preserve itself against the most powerful Princes . . . This Common-wealth or Free-State maintaineth its self by its Just Impartial Policy, in Perfect Freedom and Strength . . .” (5). The future of England indeed depends on what the author is describing. “*England* yet was never a Free-State,” he says in his conclusion; “but it will be” – provided, that is, that its leaders follow the example of the *Ragusans*, and establish a *Ragusa*-like constitution.

The simple point that Streater wants to make is that a republic can both have its substance and act responsibly too. It can be balanced, as someone like Harrington would insist it be balanced, and it can also be perpetually diligent, virtuous, free. The substance of the state can also be the substance of vigilant freedom, so long as what the constitution stipulates is on the one hand a standing council and on the other a system of perpetual rotation. A member of the Council who is one year a judge, the next year an ambassador, and the third year a consultant or committee-member would remain part of the government, part of its *esse*, helping to guarantee its stability, but he would not have the opportunity of undermining the public interest by pursuing his self-interest. But Streater is also calling attention to a more complex, troubling point. Once again, in order to make themselves into the material of a free republic, the people have to *make themselves*. This is what the *Ragusans* actually accomplished, long ago:

Ragouse hath not always been a Common-Weal, for it hath obeyed divers Lords at divers times; sometimes *Grecians*, sometimes *Albanians*. But since it hath embraced this kind of government [i.e. “democracy”], they have been in some reputation. The *Ragusans*, when as they sought to reduce the Town to a Common-Weal,

followed (for the most part) the order of the State of *Venice*. Being thus resolved, they first instituted a Great Council, knowing, that it was the foundation of a Commonweal, and as it were the same Basis or Ground-work of their City. (6)

At a certain point in its history a group of the town's citizenry, resolving to constitute it as an independent republic, began by forming a governing body to which all of the qualified citizens were automatically inducted. And ever since then Ragusa has operated as an independent republic.

Here is a solution midway between Harrington's "extraordinary means" and Milton's "ready and easy way." Yes, the people have to be made; they are not simply born. Yes, in order for the people to be made a "great Action" has to be undertaken. It is the failing of sectarian republicans, Streater implies, to assume that the substance of a free state is already within the body of self-elected saints, that the "Free-born people of *England*," as one document put it, need only "rouse your selves . . . and make it appear that *de jure*, the Original of all just Power and Government, is and ought to be in you."⁴⁷ It is not at all self-evident, as Vane had claimed it to be, that the revolution had already occurred, that the military already possessed the right to assume power, and "that wherein the substance of all government is contained." What Streater points out is that although the revolution had already begun, and the Good Old Cause was already in place, the essential step had yet to be taken; and that is why the revolution had so far failed. The people had not yet made themselves into a People – Milton's community of virtuous men of merit. They had not yet made *themselves* into the substance of which a constitutional republic might be made. This is what the people of England shall have to do, Streater understands; they shall have to transform themselves. And they shall have to accomplish this task without the assistance of a great man, a Lycurgus or a Solon or Lord Archon; *they* shall have to do it acting by and for *themselves*.

In Streater's treatise on Ragusa we find the most vigorously drawn out statement of the implications of the Machiavellian moment of the 1650s. Here finally is a recognition that democracy is made, not born, and that if a democracy is to be fashioned, it has to be fashioned by the demos itself, acting collectively, the people making themselves into a People. Is that not what Milton's Israelites had done? Is that not what the Ragusans had done?

The answer to the latter question is of course considerably more complex than Streater allows, since if one looks into the history of Ragusa itself one finds, among other things, that a system of disenfranchisement

was put in place at the same time that the system of the “Great Council” was initially codified.⁴⁸ The Ragusan “democracy” operated as an electoral oligarchy. But the objections that might be raised against Streater’s model of utopian politics will inevitably revolve upon the very fact of the model, the very practice of its *having been written*. There in the midst of one of England’s greatest constitutional crises, when the Good Old Cause was already all but lost, at least one man rose to see and point out to the English public that the project of political self-fashioning demanded not only a political architecture, but a *collective* architecture, a collective state-building. But Streater himself in the end could only see this, and put it “into sight” for a public clamoring for political vision, in the context of what was, to all intents and purposes, little more than a political fairy tale: the story of a remote republic of six thousand inhabitants, smaller than some of London’s parishes:⁴⁹ the story of a town of substance, to be sure, which had managed to survive for hundreds of years, but whose model the three nations of England, Scotland, and Ireland, had as little likelihood of adopting as that of Harrington’s Oceana, Baxter’s Holy Commonwealth, or Milton’s republic of virtue.

“England was never yet a Free-State,” Streater concludes; but it will be, when “its Legislators can hit upon the mark of denying themselves, in Perpetuating their Power” (8). But it was not to be, and how should it? How will a people form themselves, by denying themselves, by not being what they already are? It had happened long ago in Ragusa, a small town of excessive wealth and power, where a rigid caste of nobles had recast themselves into a conciliar demos. But it was not to happen in England. At least not yet.

5. RESTORATION AND AESTHETICIZATION

Of the Antillian Society “the smoke is over, but the fire is not altogether extinct,” Hartlib wrote somewhat despondently in 1661. “It may be it will flame in due time, though not in Europe.”⁵⁰ The first decade of the Restoration saw the publication not only of *Paradise Lost*, with all its overtones of regret and its expressions of despair at wasted efforts, but also of the odd fantasy of a lost south-sea paradise by Harrington’s friend and patron, Henry Neville; this was the sometimes violent romance about the invention and inevitable breakdown of law and order, *The Isle of Pines* (1668).⁵¹ As Christopher Hill has so tellingly shown, a pall of defeat hung over a great many individuals during the Restoration, and a

sense of defeat continued to qualify various forms of nonconformist and republican subculture to the end of the eighteenth century.

But the aestheticization of the ideal political imagination – the great achievement of the Restoration in this regard – was the result as much of the success of utopian agitation as of its failure. When the ideal political imagination was aestheticized, it was taken out of the realm of political practice. It was transformed from a tool of contestatory discourse to a device of compensatory diversion, becoming one of the first victims, as it were, of that long transition of poetic sensibilities that Eagleton and others have identified as the development of an “ideology of the aesthetic.”⁵² The utopian imagination was becoming autonomous; and it was becoming autonomous as the recognition and articulation of a realm of feeling which existed *apart* from political action, or *against* political action. And this transformation, again, was in large part a consequence of the success that utopias had previously had in stirring political waters. The exercise of the ideal political imagination as it had appeared on the scene in the 1620s had become a danger to the Stuart state; it had already been successful in calling the dogma of Stuart society into question, and in changing the structure of political reflection.⁵³ As a result, if the utopian mentality had room to develop at all once Charles II was in power, it could only be in a fundamentally depoliticized mode – or, better, in a mode of thought where the utopian imaginary could have no real political effects apart from accommodating individuals to the facts of the reigning political order, accommodating them in a newly valorized realm of feeling.

The change is immediately apparent in a document published in 1660 by a still unidentified author, *New Atlantis. Begun by the Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Albans: And Continued by R.H. Esquire*. On the surface the continuation is a plausible extension of Bacon’s narrative, and Hartlib himself understood it so. “I suppose you have heard of a Nova Atlantis in print,” he wrote to Worthington, “by way of Supplement to that of Lord Verulam’s. And although it be far inferior to his grave and judicious contrivances, yet such as it is it would make a noble alteration, if it were practiced in all human affairs.”⁵⁴ But Hartlib does not quite get it right; he is too literal-minded. R.H. plausibly completes Bacon’s narrative, and elaborates its ideas, imitating Bacon’s style and tone, and explaining the political ideas of Bacon’s Bensalem or Salomona – those ideas which Bacon’s narrative most significantly omits – in a way consistent both with the narrative framework and with what was known of Bacon’s own political position. But R.H. has entirely transformed both the significance of Bacon’s

politics and the impact of the narrative's utopian context. For men like Hartlib the story of *New Atlantis* had served as an inspiration. But as R.H. picks up the thread of the narrative, he emphasizes the experience of the European travelers in Bensalem, beginning with their difficulty in adapting to its rigorous, evidently perfect system of administrative and distributive justice. He shows that Bacon's Europeans would have had some trouble accommodating themselves to the systematic absolutism of society in Bensalem. In R.H.'s hands, Bacon's Europeans have become deeply psychological beings, and for that reason not entirely suited to the absolutist yet wholly rational way of life being pursued in the utopia they are visiting. R.H. shows that the system of government in Bensalem, admirable though it may be in the abstract, is unsuited to the European character, as it really is. As individuals, who bear certain unimprovable habits, dispositions, and failings, Europeans simply cannot satisfy the demands of perfection such a system would place on them.

R.H. is unambiguous about this.⁵⁵ What is good for the people of Bensalem need not necessarily be good for Europeans, and may well be deleterious. "For Laws should be fitted to the temper and *Genius* of the climate; each Nation labouring with his peculiar vices . . ." (15). R.H. states in his Preface that it was Bacon's ultimate purpose "doubtless to have framed & moulded such a scheme of Lawes as was most consonant to such a happy *Monarchical government* as he lived in, and died under. But [the modern reader] may look on it as calculated for the Meridian of *Bensalem* only." Indeed, Bacon's narrative was written, R.H. asserts, "as but a meer Fiction, airy speculation, or golden dream: For such golden things in this Iron age we may rather wish then hope to see wholly effected" (n.p.). The point of continuing the narrative has thus become not only to finish off the story of those "golden things" for the sake of the pleasure of imitating a master, but also to demonstrate the difference between a golden thing and the real thing, and show that here "in this Iron age" golden things are *not for us*. R.H. tells his readers that he is pledged to monarchy as it has been reestablished in England, and even adverts to figures of speech that had been commonly applied to the reign of James I. But he also openly supports a "mixed monarchy," where Parliament plays a regular role in government. He underscores his preference for mixed government by having one of his characters comment on how in Bensalem no Parliament is necessary, since Bensalem is an absolutist society, and its people are given to absolute assent and cooperation. In England and France, on the other hand, the character states, "where the people are more difficult, jealous, and stubborn," the

calling of regular parliaments is a necessity; government cannot function without regular parliaments, however benevolent the king may be, since only popularly elected assemblies can secure popular support for national policies (21).

Adopting the framework of Baconian utopianism, continuing its story in a plausible manner, R.H. in effect argues against Baconian utopianism. Or rather, he coopts it; he bridles it; he aestheticizes it. He uses Baconian utopianism as a pretext for telling a story which highlights the psycho-political condition of the non-utopian Europeans who are its chief characters. He calls attention to the structure of feeling which underlies the Baconian-utopian impulse, the feeling of inadequacy, of discontent that ultimately underlies it, but which its advocates took pains to discountenance. Andreae, it will be recalled, one of Bacon's models as a utopist, could show a visitor to utopia undergoing a conversion, and thus emphasize not the European's estrangement from utopia but rather the possibility of his adopting and obeying its imperatives. And so we might imagine Bacon having concluded his own utopian romance, with his visitors becoming Bensalemites, since the point of political fantasy for men like Andreae and Bacon was precisely to think through the problem of radical transformation. But now the point of political fantasy seems to serve the opposite purpose; its purpose is to think through the problem of being reconciled to things the way they already are. It is to use the golden world of utopia as a vehicle for appreciating the ways of the iron age, of understanding why they have to be the way they are and adapting to their limits.

6. MARGARET CAVENDISH AND THE BLAZING WORLD

R.H.'s support for a mixed government, with a strong parliamentary element, helps to explain why utopia has suddenly become a pretext for being non-utopian. The Restoration was initially framed by Charles II and his councilors as an occasion for what Charles called the "quiet and peaceable possession of that our right."⁵⁶ But the idea of a king's "right" in relation to his people had by now undergone a sea change. Theories of divine-right monarchy would continue to circulate, to be sure, the most famous of those theories, Filmer's *Patriarcha*, being only a recent creation, and left unpublished until 1680; but support for them had been undermined by the experience of the Interregnum. James I had descended onto England like a latter-day Moses, or at least a latter-day "Solomon," coming down from the mountain top. The people received him with

their “hearts and voices,” their loving assent. James was bringing the law with him – the very principle of generative law, of “speaking law” – unto the nation as the representative of a mystical, masculine, godly calling. Of course, the mysticism of James’s accession, as I have argued, was largely a product of the mystification that was necessary in order to legitimate what was by many measures an illegal power grab; but for all its ideological complexity and excessiveness, James’s accession was nevertheless successful as a semiotic event. Power came from the top down. The only absolute, self-created subject was God. The closest approximation to absolute subjectivity on earth (this in a Europe which had frequently rebelled against its Pope, and was now busy even in Catholic areas secularizing its national governments) were his princes, his lieutenants on earth, each “given” to his nation as an expression of divine, Providential will. The prince might thus descend upon his people, as James had descended upon the people of England, not only by way of a legal right, as determined by constitutional precedent, but also by way of an extra-legal mystical process, where the prince conferred subjectivity on his people, making them into something more than themselves – making them into something they could not be without him, which is to say the “subjects” of a sovereign nation.

By 1660, however, though divine-right theory was still in the air, this mythology in effect was dead.⁵⁷ The Restoration itself had come about because the people of England whose voices counted had wanted it to come about. As Hutton has remarked, “The direct cause of the Restoration was that the enfranchised public mandated a parliament to produce one, after fierce agitation against the existing regime.”⁵⁸ Although Charles II was by no means prepared to play the role of the citizen-king, and a citizen-king was not yet what the English people were prepared to accept in an occupant of the throne, in an important sense that was what Charles II already was. He was a creature rather than a creator of the people; he was in effect their representative – their Leviathan, perhaps, and the fountain of the new English peace, but first of all a product of historical struggle, where what was probably a sizable majority of the English people found themselves provisionally triumphant, their wills being *expressed* through the outcome of struggle and the settlement of their king, and their political community *represented* by him. Corns has referred to this phenomenon as “a radical decentering.” Taking royal panegyric as his evidence, Corns finds that the best of it, “that of Dryden, is premised not on the notion of Charles II’s undisputed centrality, but rather upon the recognition that his reign replaces that of others and that it has been

established after defeat and suffering and largely through the efforts of others.”⁵⁹ Whether or not one supported the Restoration of the king, it was hard not to see that it was the support itself, and the historical struggle out of which that support emerged, that was primarily responsible for the hegemony of the Stuart monarchy. The monarch ruled from above, and perhaps “by right,” but he derived his power from below, from an outcome of events and a consent of the people over which he had little direct control.

In the hands of R.H., this decentering is accomplished through the aestheticization of Baconianism, and most especially in the argument that the absolute, “golden” society that Bacon had begun to recreate was a reflection of an earlier period’s aspirations, and out of keeping with what we have come to know about the “difficult, stubborn, and jealous” nature of the English people. But the decentering received an even more stunning, imaginative and original reflection in the utopian fantasies of Dryden himself, and of the writer whose husband was one of Dryden’s greatest patrons, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle.

What we hear in Cavendish’s writing above all in this regard is the voice of exile. It is an exile doubly inflected, since Cavendish understands herself to have experienced her life in alienation not only from the political culture of England, but also from the world of letters and science, a world all but entirely of men, by men, and for men. She is a gentlewoman torn from her home at the age of twenty, her family estate having been despoiled by a hostile citizenry at the outbreak of the first Civil War.⁶⁰ She is the wife of one of the leading peers in England, a man of enormous wealth, culture, and reputation, a model cavalier, who has nevertheless had to live for years with the humiliation of defeat in war, the loss of much of his property and influence, and even the loss of his country, the Marquis (and later Duke) of Newcastle having been banished from England in 1644 by parliamentary edict. Margaret is also a woman who keenly feels her exclusion from the institutions of intellectual life of Europe. She knows that she has been deprived of a classical education and banished from the tables of the great, but she feels in herself a talent and a quality of self-awareness which is the equal of any man’s. “I am very ambitious,” she writes.⁶¹ In Margaret Cavendish’s mind the two forms of alienation, on the one hand from her country and on the other hand from the world of letters and fame, are inevitably coupled. Living in exile from 1645 to 1660, she understands herself to be doubly estranged; and when she returns to England at the Restoration, she finds herself still to be estranged, in the first place because the England of her

childhood and her husband's prime is not what is really restored, and in the second place because, come what may, however accomplished she strives to be, she is still a woman, living on the margins of intellectual society and political culture.

The emotional duress Cavendish suffered needs to be qualified. She was, after all, whatever her sense of alienation, one of the wealthiest women in the world. Even in exile in Antwerp, when she and her husband were uncomfortably supporting themselves on credit, she was occupying the palatial residence that Peter Paul Rubens had designed for himself (now a museum and one of Antwerp's great landmarks) and living in a manner befitting the station of a Marchioness, surrounded by servants and retainers. Yet if duress can be qualified, it cannot be quantified; and what Cavendish suffered was emblematic of the strains of a whole era. To the extent that she identified with her husband – and all the evidence indicates that hers was a passionate, intimate, mutually supportive marriage, such that even her feminism was supported rather than hindered by an identification with and deference to her husband's social position – she experienced the convulsions of her age as what Bacon, in another context, called the “humiliation of the spirit.” Her husband had been Charles I's most self-sacrificing supporter, raising an army for Charles's defense at his own initiative and expense. He had proved himself to be a capable commander. But it had been his misfortune to be in joint command of one of the royal army's two most disastrous defeats, the famous Battle of Marston Moor, and then to have responded to his defeat by immediately resigning his office and fleeing to Flanders. Though historians have long since agreed that the blame for the royalist casualties cannot be laid entirely at Cavendish's feet, they have also been united in the judgment that Cavendish's abrupt resignation and flight was unnecessary, possibly cowardly, and at the very least irredeemably embarrassing.⁶² “This may be said of it,” Clarendon wrote soon afterwards, “that the like was never done or heard or read of before,” with the result that “the whole country [was left] as a prey to the enemy.”⁶³

The Marchioness, to be sure, tried to frame the matter somewhat differently. In what many readers still consider her most successful piece of writing, *The Life of the Thrice Noble, High, and Puissant Prince, William Cavendish* (*sic*), Margaret is constantly admonishing us not to understand events as they are obviously given to be understood. “[I]t is remarkable,” she writes, “that in all actions and undertakings where my Lord was in Person himself, he was always Victorious, and prospered in the execution

of his designs; but whatsoever was lost or succeeded ill, happen'd in his absence, and was caused either by the Treachery, or Negligence and Carelessness of his Officers."⁶⁴ The obvious fact that Cavendish was defeated by his enemies is turned into the "remarkable" fact that Cavendish instead had always been victorious, and his losses were rather the losses of his allies and subordinates. And then, after the defeat which was not a defeat, she adds somewhat torturously,

Having nothing left in his power to do his Majesty any further service in that kind; for he had neither Ammunition, nor Money to raise more Forces, to keep either *York*, or any other towns that were yet in His Majesties Devotion, well knowing that those which were left could not hold out long, and being also loath to have aspersions cast upon him, that he did sell them to the Enemy, in case he could not keep them, [the Marquis] took a Resolution, and that justly and honourably, to forsake the Kingdom . . . desiring His Highness [Rupert] would be pleased to give his true and just report of him to his Majesty, that he had behaved himself like an honest man, a Gentleman, and a Loyal subject. (64–65)

The obvious fact that Cavendish resigned his commission in the face of a humiliating defeat is turned here into an improbable story of gallantry, honesty, truth, justice, and loyalty. Even the obvious fact that Cavendish had lost a major battle is turned here into an account according to which Cavendish had to resign and flee lest, in continuing his commission, he should be the one to do the king the dishonor of losing the war.

Here as elsewhere in Margaret's writing we encounter a will to transmute drastically the ugly facts of reality into sublime self-congratulation. Clarendon had added sympathetically to his "character" of the Marquis that the latter's hopes for the royalist cause were "in a moment cast away and destroyed" by the rout at Marston Moor; Cavendish had become "so transported . . . with passion and despair, that he could not compose himself to think of beginning the work again . . ." (3:384). But there is no such open acknowledgment of the reality of disappointment in Margaret's writing, with respect either toward her husband or herself. Instead, there is an obstinate will to transform disappointment into its opposite, a will to write disappointment out of existence and replace it with a haughty assertion of self-satisfaction.⁶⁵ The disappointment is there. Cavendish even openly confesses to having a melancholic disposition.⁶⁶ And when discussing the experience of living through civil war and exile she does not spare her reader details of humiliating deprivation, dissociation, and isolation. "I was like one that had no Foundation to stand on, or Guide to direct me . . .," she says of herself in the aftermath of the

first Civil War. “I knew not how to behave myself” (278). “Not onely the family I am linkt to is ruin’d, but the Family from which I sprung, by these unhappy Wars” (281). But if writing captures disappointment, it also trumps it, and indeed this is what writing for her is all about: “I write it for my own sake,” she says about her autobiography, the first secular autobiography ever published in English by a woman; “neither did I intend this piece to delight but to divulge; not to please the fancy, but to tell the truth, lest after-ages should mistake” (310). She writes for her own sake, not for the sake of her readers, she insists, or for any purposes extrinsic to the act of writing itself; but in writing for her own sake her motive is first of all to construct a satisfactory alternative version of herself for the sake of “after-ages,” for the sake of her fame, for the sake of what others will think of her, or perhaps more accurately for the sake of that mirror-image of herself which she supposes her writing will provide her by reaching, on her own narcissistic terms, the notice of a general public. Her husband is not what he is supposed to have been; nor is she. Writing not only compensates for this deficiency; it even annuls it.

When Margaret, now the Duchess of Newcastle, finally turns to writing the utopian fantasy which has recently become her most widely read and discussed work, *The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World* (1666), although she has of course greatly risen in the world she is still writing from a condition of deprivation, dissociation, and isolation, and still using writing as a way of annulling the condition giving rise to the act of writing. The king has been restored. The Newcastles are not only rich now, but fabulously rich. But William has failed to achieve a position of political power, and he and Margaret perforce are living in retirement, on one of their country estates, far from London. Margaret found herself alienated now if not from wealth and position then from the center of social life in Restoration England. If she claims sometimes to prefer the retired life, clearly she also resents having retirement imposed upon her, especially since her retirement reinforces her isolation from the main venues of English cultural life, including above all the newly established Royal Society.⁶⁷ It is as if, in finally making her return to English society, and after striving mightily to play a leading role in its intellectual and political culture, she is still unable to undo the shame of exile, the pain of defeat and disappointment.

When she writes her *Blazing World*, appending her utopian fantasy to a remarkably ambitious work on natural science, *Observations On Experimental Philosophy*, she opens with a somewhat familiar trope of utopian mastery, as when, to use a case not yet cited, that earlier disappointed

courtier, Thomas Randolph had written of that “preheminence . . . more free” he enjoyed by ruling over a “Commonwealth at home,” which is to say the commonwealth of his own poetic productions.⁶⁸ But Margaret Cavendish develops the trope of utopian mastery even further, providing one of its most extreme expressions in all of English letters. “I am not covetous,” she writes in her preface,

but as ambitious as ever any of my sex was, is, or can be; which makes that though I cannot be *Henry* the Fifth, or *Charles* the Second, yet I endeavour to be *Margaret* the *First*; and although I have neither power, time, nor occasion to conquer the world as *Alexander* and *Caesar* did; yet rather than not to be mistress of one, since Fortune and Fates would give me none, I have made a world of my own; for which no body, I hope, will blame me, since it is in every one’s power to do the like.⁶⁹

Here finally we seem to come upon something like irony, something like a sense of self-satire; and we come upon it in a context which even includes a nod toward the ideology of democracy. “It is in every one’s power to do the like.” Appeals to the democracy of the utopian imagination indeed appear in the course of the narrative itself. “By creating a world within yourself,” one of the characters in *Blazing World* maintains (a “Margaret Cavendish,” as it happens!), “you may enjoy all both in whole and in parts, without control or opposition, and may make what world you please, and alter it when you please, and enjoy as much pleasure and delight as a world can afford you . . .” (186). The character making this claim does so in order to argue for the superiority of the imaginary over the real. But in the context of the history of ideal politics and utopian mastery in the seventeenth century, the claim of “Margaret I” to have discovered the power of making a world of her own must be seen as an extreme expression of two other related but contrary tendencies. It is on the one hand an expression of the autonomy of the political imagination, an autonomy that had only gradually been acquiring force as time went by, and political subjectivity came less and less to be a matter of a gift bestowed from on high and more and more a matter of voluntary participation in political culture. It is on the other hand an expression of the aestheticization that the newly autonomous ideal political imagination was undergoing.

It is only under the category of aestheticization, in any case, that we can fully appreciate the utility of the political fantasy Cavendish weaves through the text of *Blazing World*. The fantasies of power articulated in this text are at once so involuted and so grandiose that the text itself

has been described as “schizophrenic,” and compared to the delusions of Freud’s Dr. Schreber.⁷⁰ Within her world of her own, Cavendish first focuses her attention on an unnamed alter ego who upon traveling to a “Blazing World” on the moon promptly finds herself adopted as the new world’s Empress. This Empress not only controls the society of the Blazing World whose throne she occupies, but invents and communicates with still more worlds. Ultimately she intervenes in the war-torn world – the earth – occupied by her Platonic soulmate, one “Margaret Cavendish.” She violently restores the King of “ESFI” (that is, England, Scotland, France, and Ireland) to his own throne, making this cipher for Charles II (sometimes actually named as such) into “*the head monarch of all this world,*” and “*rewarded with absolute power*” (216).

In spite of the Manuels’ dismissal of the exercise, recent critics have had other ideas. Catherine Gallagher has attributed this regress of power, from Margaret I to the Empress and then back to Margaret Cavendish and Charles II, to Cavendish’s scientific theory of the infinite plurality of worlds, and her need for such a model of singular, self-contained subjectivity within this infinite plurality as only an absolute monarch could provide.⁷¹ Lee Cullen Khanna has accounted for it in relation to a fantasy of female empowerment which takes as its primary mode of operation not absolute patriarchal dominance, but rather a system of feminine “connectivity.”⁷² And Kate Lilley, in effect splitting the difference between Gallagher and Khanna, has accounted for Cavendish’s fantasy by noting that though Cavendish is striving to imagine a form of political power, she does so by empowering the realm of the personal.⁷³ But all of these interpretations, even the Manuels’, while capturing the dynamics of imaginary exchanges that empower the heroines and authoress articulated in the course of the text, conveniently omit the imperious violence that Cavendish’s alter egos attempt to exert upon reality; these interpretations thus fail to grasp the work of aestheticization through which Cavendish follows the turn of Restoration thought and turns her alienation into reconciliation.⁷⁴

Acts of transformative violence initiate the action of the narrative. A “merchant,” falling “vehemently” in love with a “young Lady” above his station, abducts her, taking her away by sea. But “Heaven,” “frowning at his theft,” raises a tempest, the effect of which is not only to transport the young lady to another world, but at the same time to put the merchant and all the crew men of his ship to death. It is as if the young lady were having her revenge upon men who had dared to displace her from her natural *lebenswelt*. And now she finds herself in an unnatural

world populated by hybrid beings – “bear-men,” “ant-men” and the like – which is also, however, astonishingly splendid, prosperous, and well governed, presided over by an Emperor “to whom they all submitted with the greatest duty and obedience” (130), where she is promptly adulated, and taken by the Emperor (for no particular reason) to be his Empress. Whereas her home world had torn her away from home, the Blazing World so makes her at home that it sets her on the throne. And there the first order of business for her is to rule over the thought of her subjects, even presiding over the disputes of the natural scientists among them.

Cavendish has appended this romance, it bears repeating, to her *Observations on Experimental Philosophy*. In the *Observations* she argued point by point against the experimental outlook being developed by members of the Royal Society (she had not yet made her famous visit to the Society’s facilities). Her main criticism was directed against Robert Hooke’s recent publication, the monumental *Micrographia* (1665). Where Hooke had insisted on a concept of science which was collaborative, cumulative, and empirical, depending on artificial instruments, experimentation, and a Baconian system of peer review, Cavendish wanted to promote a deductive science, where the natural mind took precedence over artificial instruments like the microscope, where logic and the authority of the ancients took precedence over experimental results, where the individual stood apart from collaborative enterprise, and the cohesiveness of doctrine and intuition (or “Contemplation”) took precedence over the inevitably partial, incomplete, and fragmentary findings being compiled by the new scientific communities.⁷⁵ Throughout the volume Cavendish evidently relished triumphing over what she took to be the gross mistakes of the natural philosophers. And now, appending her “fancy” to her “contemplations,” she creates a story in which her alter ego, the Empress, may exert absolute authority over the conduct of the whole business of natural science, her intellectual precedence acting as a prelude to her precedence in the affairs of state and warfare on the earth.

Compensation is the term Ernst Bloch has taught us to apply to this use of the utopian imagination, and there is perhaps no better word for the psychological dimension of Cavendish’s practice as a writer, in all her narrative and dramatic work, and especially in *Blazing World*. But if we extend our analysis of Cavendish’s work beyond the limits of the psychological – if we focus on it also as a social practice of a certain kind, responding to exigencies of a certain historical moment – we can find in it not only compensation but invention and intervention. We can find in it the articulation of an alternative strategy of utopian writing, born out of

Cavendish's experience of estrangement, but also addressed to a certain kind of political need, in view of a newly configured discursive practice. This is the practice, again, of aestheticization, of making utopian ideas into a utopian feeling, and of using this feeling not as a strategy for changing the world, but of adjusting to it.

The work of aestheticization in Cavendish's writing is not effortlessly accomplished. It demands, again, the most exaggerated expression of a system of utopian mastery, a deliberate, self-willed, and self-confirming expression of the autonomy of creative writing and the imagination giving rise to it. Not the self as such (although, psychologically, the alienated self as such is the motor impulse for the practice), but the *self in writing*, the self as that which produces a world of its own, for its own sake, becomes in Cavendish's case the ultimate authority of social value, the ultimate producer and consumer of social power. The lengths to which such a self in writing may have to go in order to achieve the nullification of reality are remarkable. When the Empress wages war in her home world to restore the King of EFSI to the throne, she amasses a vast naval expedition, equipped with extraordinary technological advantages. When the Empress first encounters the enemy, she lets them know that she is prepared to wage against them what today we would call "total war." Commanding her hybrid men, equipped with irresistible firebombs, to prepare to attack, the Empress, it is said, "sent to all the princes and sovereigns of those nations, to let them know that she would give them a proof of her power, and check their obstinacies by burning some of their smaller towns; and if they continued still in their obstinate resolutions, that she would convey their smaller loss to a total ruin" (213).

Beneath Cavendish's quarrel with modernism – with its civil wars, its ruination of great estates, its rejection of conventional authority – is an avid embrace of it, beginning with its impulses toward techno-scientific innovation and the democracy of the political imagination and ending with an imaginary, violent undoing of geopolitical disturbances for the sake of world peace. But Cavendish is forced – or chooses – to embrace modernism through aestheticization, to effect the transformatory power of the political imagination only within and through a structure of the self writing, of the self *in writing*, writing itself. In most respects this means that the political and theoretical imagination is for Cavendish doomed to that condition with respect to the world that Wittgenstein would later assign to philosophy: "It leaves everything as it is."⁷⁶ But that is Cavendish's somewhat melancholy, somewhat manic argument. The point of political fantasy, she seems to urge, is not to change the world;

the point of it is to change our relation to what it already is, by directing our transformatory impulses toward substitute, artificial worlds. "By this poetical description," she remarks in her epilogue,

you may perceive, that my ambition is not only to be Empress, but Authoress of a whole world; and that the worlds I have made, both the Blazing and the other Philosophical World, mentioned in the first part of this description, are framed and composed of the most pure, that is, the rational parts of matter, which are parts of my mind; which creation was more easily and suddenly effected, than the conquests of the two famous monarchs of the world, Alexander and Caesar. (224)

The intellectuals presiding over the Royal Society, the Church, and other social institutions were arguing now that the ability of the mind to do with its thoughts whatever it wanted was precisely what was dangerous about it. But it is just this ability that Cavendish wants to embrace. Or rather, this faculty of mental autonomy is what she wants to embrace in the mind so far as its impulses are aestheticized and, leaving the world as it is, it enthusiastically reproduces the *feeling* of power – even violently destructive power. In the realm of poetic creation she satisfies her modernist demand for self-assertion and for the perfection of the social world in the image of the self. She becomes the Margaret I she wants to be. And she makes society in the image of the Margaret I she wants to be. She even makes Charles II dependent upon her. But in fact she has left everything as it is.

7. THE TEMPEST REDIVIVUS

Other examples of aestheticization may be found in Neville's *The Isle of Pines*, in a satire by Dryden's friend Sir Edward Howard called *The Six Days Adventure; or, the New Utopia* (1670), and, perhaps most successfully, in Dryden's *Annus Mirabilis*.⁷⁷ Writers of the early Restoration were faced with a new situation. All must be as it is: that is the first law of life in the 1660s, whether one approves or disapproves of that condition. But within the socio-political context of this new England where all must be as it is, two countervailing notions are nevertheless still current. On the one hand, we still demand something more. "Methinks already," Dryden writes in *Annus Mirabilis*, striving to turn even the fact of the Great Fire into an occasion of aesthetic compensation,

from this Chymick flame,
I see a City of more precious mold:
Rich as the Town which gives the *Indies* name,
With Silver pav'd, and all divine with Gold.⁷⁸

There remains a hunger for material and social transformation that cannot be satisfied by religious devotion or the doctrine of the Stuart settlement, a persistence of what I have called “worldly hope.” The hope, as always, is at once for the thing to be possessed – the City of Gold, or for that matter the “world of one’s own” or even a “Paradise within” – and for the assertion of possession itself. “The orchard’s open now, and free,” Cowley exhorts the public, with reference to the Royal Society;

Bacon has broke that Scar-Crow Deitie;
Come, enter, all that will,
Behold the rip’ned Fruit, come gather now your Fill.⁷⁹

This hunger, this persisting anticipatory consciousness, is continually being framed, to be sure, as an enhancement to the regime of royalism. Sixty years after the publication of *The Advancement of Learning*, writers are still reverting to the Columbus topos, using it to frame the idea of a departure from the norms of the given which would nevertheless enhance the condition of the (revised) Stuart regime. Echoing Bacon, Sprat would for example promote the business of the Royal Society by remarking that “Whoever shall think this to be a desperat business, they can only use the same *Arguments*, wherewith *Columbus* was at first made ridiculous . . .” (382). But echoing Bacon in still another respect, Sprat would also argue that the project he is commending would consolidate rather than threaten the power of the state:

the most fruitful Parent of *Sedition* is *Pride*, and a lofty conceit of mens own *wisdom*; whereby they presently imagine themselves sufficient to direct and censure all the *actions* of their *Governors*. And here is it true in *civil affairs*, which I have already quoted out of my Lord *Bacon* concerning *Divine*: A little *Knowledge* is subject to make men headstrong, insolent, and untractable; but a great deal had a quite contrary effect, inclining them to be submissive to their *Betters*, and obedient to the *Sovereign Power*. (428–29)

The impulse toward utopian transformation thus persists in one of its conventional forms, and ends up being framed again as a contribution to the maintenance of the Stuart state.

But even so, the form and content of the state itself has evidently changed. People continue to demand more out of the world than Stuart doctrine would allow, but people understand that the condition of the Stuart state is something that they themselves have in large part produced. The rhetoric of “obedience” was by now something of an archaism, masking a newer reality of disciplined consent. So R.H. could write a utopia where the lesson to be learned was that successful political

systems begin on the basis of the nature of the people whom they govern; so Cavendish could devise a utopia where the exaltation of Cavendish herself, and by extension any writer capable of devising a utopia, is the final aim; so writers associated with the leading intellectual circles of the day – people like Dryden, Sprat, and the two leaders of the experimental philosophy movement, John Wilkins and Robert Boyle – could continue to exhort the citizenry to embark on projects of individual and social expansionism. “Thus to the Eastern wealth through storms we go,” Dryden wrote at the conclusion of *Annus Mirabilis*,

But now, the Cape once doubled, fear no more:
A constant Trade-wind will securely blow,
And gently lay us on the Spicy shore.

(lines 1212–16)

Wilkins, the presiding genius of the Royal Society, would put forward *An Essay Towards a Real Character* (1667) which would combine the universalist irenicism of Comenius and Dury with the scientific reformation of language, resting a hope for nothing less than “world peace” on the project of devising a more scientifically useful language.⁸⁰ And he would continue putting his *Discovery of the World in the Moon* into print, that document originally of 1638, full of the uneasy optimism of the pre-war decade, where he called for the colonization of the moon.

These impulses toward a self-assertive self-transcendence, however, had to be framed within the givens of the new Stuart state. Assertion had to lead to the state. Transcendence had to lead to the state. The experience of historical struggle, the trauma of civil war, whose importance for the people of the Restoration cannot be under-estimated – this too had to lead to the state. As many of the examples given above show, one prevalent solution, expressed through a revival of the Columbus topos, was to channel the demands of the utopian impulse into the language of imperialism, and especially of mercantile imperialism, a language which was suited as well to the old discourse of industriousness that had been so much a part of the Puritan ethic as to the newer discourses of regal power and international conflict. But whether or not imperialist expansionism was the dominant mode of any given expression of ideal politics, almost all articulations of the utopian impulse also subscribed to the conventions of aestheticization. It was through aestheticization that the utopian impulse was channeled to the individual subject, and the traumatics of autonomy registered, fixed in the structures of individual feeling where the drive toward utopian mastery could be sustained while the state, all the same, could be left as it was.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the aestheticization of ideal politics is Davenant and Dryden's revision of *The Tempest* (1667). The later *Tempest* was one of the most popular plays of the Restoration. Pepys saw it eight times.⁸¹ Its artistic merits in comparison with those of the original play are difficult to appreciate today. The revised version of the play today seems flat: its greatest poetry (passages like "We are such stuff as dreams are made on . . ."), its greatest dramatic tensions (such as Prospero's struggle with his own past), and even its funniest comedy (such as Trinculo's initial encounter with Caliban) have all been excised, and replaced with tamer language and less engaging comedy and conflict. The action turns less on Prospero and his quest for redemptive justice than on a new subplot, which today seems somewhat puerile. A new character takes center stage, one Hippolito, who has grown up on Prospero's island as Miranda's counterpart, in isolation from her (and a sister, Dorinda, also living on the island) but also under Prospero's tutelage, nevertheless a "Man who had never seen a Woman," as Dryden put it: "by this means those two Characters of Innocence and Love might the more illustrate and commend each other."⁸² In any case, however entertained Restoration audiences may have been by this simple-minded conceit, it is also clear that something besides mere entertainment was engaging their interest. As Katherine Eisaman Maus has argued, "the new play redefines the limits and uses of sovereignty."⁸³ In fact, it takes a great deal of the magic and the complex psychology of Prospero out of the play; and, to contrary effect, puts a lot more emphasis on the psychological conflicts of the secondary characters. Prospero is a less impressive figure and less of a hero; this means, among other things, that his authority is less of an *issue*, less of a question. Prospero is less interesting as a man and in some respects less powerful. He does not stage-manage the whole part of the drama as the original Prospero had done. But his authority, then, and the means by which he recovers, defends, and applies it are less subject to scrutiny. His authority exists; his right does not need to be earned; his dignity as a *homo politicus* needs to be neither celebrated by dramatic speeches nor tempered by the discovery of mercy and the experience of reconciliation. But the power, dignity, and virtue of all the secondary characters are on trial. And it is the triumph of the secondary characters in the face of their trials, and indeed their *collective* triumph, that brings the plot of the play to its happy resolution.

In comparison with the original the later version of *The Tempest* is crowded with characters. Miranda has to interact not only with Ferdinand but also with Hippolito and Dorinda. Trinculo and Caliban have to drink and conspire not only with Stephano but also with two more shipmen,

Mustacho and Ventoso. In the original version Miranda and Ferdinand are taught the ways of love by surviving the trial that Prospero has devised for them. In the new version Prospero's plans do not quite work, and Miranda, Ferdinand, Hippolito, and Dorinda have to learn predominantly on their own what it means to be in love and fulfill the obligations of romantic attachment. In fact, when the situation goes awry, and Hippolito is almost killed in a quarrel with Ferdinand, it is Ariel, acting on his own initiative, without Prospero knowing anything about it, who saves the day, flying off to obtain a magic balm that cures Hippolito of his wounds. In the original version, again, Trinculo, Caliban, and Stephano, drink themselves into a condition of "mutiny," to which Prospero puts an end simply by freezing them from action, and delivering them over to their masters. In the later version the shipmen engage in what is openly referred to as a "rebellion," and the problem of conducting a "Civil-War" is broached (2.3.141–44). They eventually establish a ludicrously democratic "government," where power is awarded to the person who controls the supply of liquor, because and only because he controls the liquor. They never, however, attempt to usurp Prospero's authority. They find it difficult to survive on their own, Ariel turning their liquor into water, and the island providing them with little to eat. And when, half-starved and discontent, they encounter Alonzo and Sebastian, they simply resign themselves to being ruled by their masters again (5.2.205–19).

There is no question but that the Davenant–Dryden *Tempest* dramatizes an allegory of the English revolution. The democratic lower classes learn that they cannot survive without their masters. The young nobles learn that they must discipline themselves and balance their desires with a sense of obligation, fidelity, deference, and honor. From beginning to end the leaders lead; their authority is secure. But their subalterns have to learn how to govern themselves and thereby allow themselves to be governed. When even this self-disciplining fails to restore the situation on the island to order, it is by the initiative of one of the subalterns – Ariel – that the day is saved. If the sovereign rulers on the island are natural rulers, it is by the initiative of their subjects that their rule is secured. The right to govern is exercised from the top down; but the felicity of government derives from the bottom up.

Howard's *The Six Days Adventure*, produced a few years later, tells a similar story. A citizenry rebels and misbehaves, its rebellion being configured in large part as a sexual disorder, with women insisting on placing themselves on equal footing with the men, and establishing a topsy-turvy sexual democracy. Order is restored when the citizenry learns how to

control itself, in large part through the dual experience of love and deference: the women-citizenry learn how to love their men, and hence to defer to them and to authority in general. When the citizenry is thus controlled, the king can be restored; and once again, the nation lives happily forever after.

The topsy-turvy “adventure” in Howard’s play serves the same function as the experience of being stranded on a desert isle in the Davenant–Dryden version of *The Tempest*. They both register the experience of the revolution. The revolution was a period of disorder and exile from which a return has been made, and continues to be made – the play itself, in performance after performance, continually reliving, re-performing that return. In this their narrative strategies, and their dramatic psychologies, differ little from those of Margaret Cavendish. They relive, alter, and celebrate the annulment of historical distress. Incidentally they demonstrate how far the political culture they inhabit has been transformed from the original model whose passage they are trying not to mourn, and they illustrate the transformation even in the utopian subjectivity that the transformed political culture has imposed upon them. In Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*, it could be argued, exile serves as a pretext for putting power on trial; it provides the dramatic conditions for constructing a laboratory of sociality, where among other things even absolute power itself – that unrepresentable entity in most Jacobean thought, that signifier without a signified – may become an object of experimental scrutiny. That absolute power in the end disappears: as Shakespeare’s Prospero prepares to return from exile, his power is reabsorbed into the natural order, dis-individuated, abnegated. Prospero forswears the momentary look of power with which his exile, his magic, and his demand for restoration, have provided him. But in the meantime he has been allowed to explore and express in his own person the utopian hope of a whole culture.

That look of power was not to be represented in English literature again. Certainly it was not to be attributed to any fictional royal figures fashioned with the example of Charles II in mind – not because Charles II as a man was less admirable than James I (on the whole, it is probably fair to say that as a man and a king he was neither more nor less admirable than his grandfather, and that like his grandfather he at the very least knew how to govern and how to let others govern for him), but because the complex of values that converge in figures like Prospero modelled with James I in mind had been definitively “decentered.” They had been displaced and scattered in different spheres of social life, many of them

being placed into the hands not of the governor but of the governed, and the disciplinary measures of corporate citizenship that were being disseminated. As for figures like Shakespeare's Gonzalo, whose momentary look of power was also unleashed by the conditions of exile on Prospero's island, ultimately to be passed over but never to be openly renounced, something else has happened. In the course of fifty years of history one element after another of Gonzalo's vision has been experimented with in real life. Between *The Tempest* and *The Tempest* a lot of would-be kings came and went, including a number of antinomians, pastoralists, communalists, communists, egalitarians, and sexual liberationists. But in the Davenant–Dryden version of *The Tempest*, if Prospero has had his wings clipped, Gonzalo has been disenfranchised altogether. Davenant and Dryden would not have Prospero put the world in question by likening it to the “baseless fabric” of a dream. And they would scarcely allow Gonzalo to say anything at all. In the world of the Restoration, young men like Ferdinand and Hippolito have to learn how to restrain themselves, how to be faithful and diligent and resourceful; and laborers like Trinculo have to learn how they depend on the guidance of their masters, ceding to their masters what is in principle their natural authority. In the world of the Restoration the citizenry has learned that it possesses within itself the capacity of drastic social upheaval. But it is also being forced to concede that its latent energies and powers have to be bridled, structured, and aestheticized. All must be as it is. So no one is wondering anymore what he would do if he were king. Kings are not the ones who make societies anymore, even if they are still their governors. And social order – even progressive social order – does not come from the desire of individuals to act like kings. Certainly the new Gonzalo does not say anything about his wanting to be king, and starting a society of his own. When the time comes in the second version of *The Tempest* (2.1.1–30) for Gonzalo to look about his surroundings and suggest a thought experiment about making a new beginning, about what he would do if he were king and “had plantation” of the isle, he says nothing. Nothing at all.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

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4. Jürgen Habermas, "The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies," in *Jürgen Habermas on Society and Politics*, ed. Steven Seidman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989).
5. Frederic Jameson, *The Seeds of Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), xii.
6. See Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994).
7. Francis Bacon, *Works*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denn Heath, 14 volumes (London, 1858–75), 6:475.
8. *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. Don M. Wolfe, 11 volumes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–82), 1:880–81.
9. Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972) and *The Experience of Defeat; Milton and Some Contemporaries* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984).
10. Nigel Smith, *Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical Religion 1640–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) and *Literature*

- and *Revolution in England, 1640–1660* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); David Norbrook, *Writing the English Republic : Poetry, Rhetoric, and Politics, 1627–1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
11. J. C. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society 1516–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); James Holstun, *A Rational Millennium: Puritan Utopias of Seventeenth-Century England and America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Amy Boesky, *Founding Fictions: Utopias in Early Modern England* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996); Marina Leslie, *Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
 12. See Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Millennium and Utopia: A Study in the Background of the Idea of Progress* (1949) (New York: Harper, 1964); Achsah Guibbory, *The Map of Time: Seventeenth-Century English Literature and Ideas of Pattern in History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986).
 13. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1990); Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Also see Timothy J. Reiss, *The Discourse of Modernism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); and Anthony Cascardi, *The Subject of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
 14. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963).
 15. Jürgen Habermas in *The Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. Thomas McCarthy, 2 volumes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984–89), 1:2.
 16. Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 338.

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1. *Letters of King James VI and I*, ed. G. P. V. Akrigg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 173.
2. See *Correspondence of King James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others in England During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth*, ed. and Introduction, John Bruce (London: Camden Society, 1861).
3. S. R. Gardiner, *History of England 1603–1640*, 10 volumes (London: Longmans, 1883), 1:85.
4. This was an important measure, since the transition of power from one monarch to another could potentially deprive local magistrates as well as the officers of the central government of their authority. See David Lindsay Keir, *The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485*, ninth edition (New York, London: Norton, 1969), 100–04. Also see Jean Bodin, *The Six Books of a Commonweale*, ed. Kenneth Douglas McRae (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 1:8.

5. *The True Narration of the Entertainment of his Royal Majestie* (London, 1603), in *The Progresses, Progressions, and Magnificent Festivities of King James the First, His Royal Consort, Family, and Court*, ed. John Nichols (London, 1828), 1:57–58.
6. *Political Works of James I*, ed. Charles Howard McIlwain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1918), 269.
7. Samuel Daniel, “A Panegyric Congratulatory, delivered to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, at *Burley-Harington* in *Rutlandshire*,” in *Progresses*, ed. Nichols, 122.
8. Thomas Dekker, *The Magnificent Entertainment*, in *Non-dramatic Works*, ed. Alexander B. Grossart (1884) (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963), 2:44.
9. John Harington, “Welcome to the King,” in *Progresses*, ed. Nichols, 49.
10. Graham Parry, *The Golden Age Restor’d: The Culture of the Stuart Court, 1603–42* (New York: St. Martins, 1981), ch. 1.
11. *Ben Jonson*, ed. C. H. Herford and Percy Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941) 3:107–8.
12. “The Apology of the Commons” (20 June 1604), in *Sources of English Constitutional History*, ed. Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham (New York: Harper and Row, 1937), 419.
13. The concept of the “social drama” is defined and developed in Victor Turner, “The Anthropology of Performance,” *The Anthropology of Performance* (New York: PAJ Publications, 1988), 72–97. Also see Clifford Geertz, “Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power,” in *Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics Since the Middle Ages*, ed. Sean Wilentz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 13–40; David M. Bergeron, *English Civic Pageantry 1558–1642* (London: Edward Arnold, 1971); Steven Mullaney, *The Place of the Stage: License, Play, and Power in Renaissance England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); and Edward Muir, *Ritual in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
14. Percy Ernst Schramm, *A History of the English Coronation*, trans. L. G. Wickham Legg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937); Keir, *Constitutional History*, 270. James himself was careful (in *The Trew Law of Free Monarchies*) to argue that the Coronation Oath was subsidiary to the unspoken legitimation established by divine right. See *Political Works*, ed. McIlwain, 55.
15. “For although the husband shall have power to his wife, to feare and obey him, yet he shall never have strength to force her to love him,” John Dod and Richard Cleaver, *A Godly Form of Householde Government* (London, 1598), 165.
16. *Sources of English Constitutional History*, 419.
17. Gardiner, *History of England* 1:148–52; Patrick Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 448–67; Timothy George, *John Robinson and the English Separatist Tradition* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1982), 69–78.
18. *Political Works*, ed. McIlwain, 272.

19. See Jonathan Goldberg, *James I and the Politics of Literature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1982), 46; Goldberg, however, does not quite pinpoint the role of proprietorship in absolutist sovereignty as I do here.
20. See Bruce Galloway, *The Union of England and Scotland 1603–1608* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1986).
21. Keir, *Constitutional History*, 154–55; Joel Hurstfield, “The Succession Struggle in Late Elizabethan England,” *Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1973), 104–36; Marie Axton, *The Queen’s Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977); and David Wooton, Introduction, *Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Writing in Stuart England*, ed. David Wooton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), 30.
22. J. P. Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640* (London and New York: Longman, 1986), ch. 1.
23. Keir, *Constitutional History*, 102–4; G. R. Elton, *England Under the Tudors*, third edition (London: Routledge, 1991), *passim*.
24. *Political Works*, ed. McIlwain, 54; 62.
25. *Correspondence*, ed. Bruce, 72. Bacon’s unpublished proclamation is reproduced in *Works*, ed. Basil Montagu, 3 volumes (Philadelphia, 1852), 2:451–52.
26. One searches in vain for language of this sort in Tudor addresses and oaths of affirmation, which are passively rather than actively constructed, and whose legitimacy is based on appeals to constitutional law and statutory precedent. In describing Henry VIII’s Act of Supremacy, Elton points out that Henry’s supremacy could *not* have been established by proclamation, since if Henry had “wished to do so he would have had to give to proclamation powers they had never had.” Elton, *England Under the Tudors*, 166.
27. On James’s notions of Providence and conscience, see Goldberg, *James I and the Politics of Literature*, 113–22.
28. Speech of 1603/4, *Political Works*, ed. McIlwain, 272.
29. *The Masque of Blackness*, Ben Jonson: *The Complete Masques*, ed. Stephen Orgel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), lines 226–27. On the masque itself see D. J. Gordon, “The Imagery of Ben Jonson’s *The Masque of Blackness* and *The Masque of Beautie*,” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 6 (1943), 122–41; Anthony Gerard Barthelemy, *Black Face Maligned Race: The Representation of Blacks in English Drama from Shakespeare to Southerne* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 18–26; Barbara K. Lewalski, *Writing Women in Jacobean England*, ch. 1; Kim F. Hall, *Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 123–40; Leeds Barroll, “Inventing the Stuart Masque,” in *The Politics of the Stuart Court Masque*, ed. David Bevington and Peter Holbrook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 121–43; and Stephen Orgel, “Marginal Jonson,” in *The Politics of the Stuart Court Masque*, 144–75.

30. See Linda Levy Peck, "The Mental World of the Jacobean Court: An Introduction," in *The Mental World of the Jacobean Court* ed. Linda Levy Peck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 1.
31. *Another World and Yet the Same: Bishop Hall's Mundus Alter et Idem*, trans. John Millar Wands (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 9–10. I have chosen with some hesitation to cite Wands's translation in place of the 1609 adaptation by John Healey, *The Discovery of a New World*, ed. Huntington Brown (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937). Healey's translation is more lively and comic, and it is an important document of the Jacobean era in its own right, but Wands's translation is much closer to Hall's Latin, which I have checked in *The Works of the Right Reverend Joseph Hall, D.D.*, ed. Philip Wynter, 10 volumes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1863), vol. 10.
32. In *Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), Marina Leslie takes Hall to task for including "Viraginia" in his *Terra Australis*, as he there "offers just one of the many examples of satirically constructed 'female utopias' in which they ladies have their day." (126) She there contradicts the argument made in John Millar Wands, "Antipodal Imperfection: Hall's *Mundus Alter et Idem* and Its Debt to More's *Utopia*," *Moreana* 18.69 (1981), 85–99 (99, n. 24), that Hall was sympathetic to feminism. The dissonance inherent in Hall's method is aptly illustrated by the conflict between these two interpretations. But both, in any case, overlook the fact that in Viraginia Hall is really satirizing Puritan separatists.
33. William Strachey, *The Historie of Travaile into Virginia Britannia* (n.d.) (London: Hakluyt Society, 1849), 13.
34. As in Jonson, Chapman, and Marston's *Eastward Ho!*, especially Act 4, in Ben Jonson, *Complete Works*, ed. C. H. Herford, Percy Simpson and Evelyn M. Simpson, 11 volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925–52), vol. 6.
35. John Smith, *Complete Works*, ed. Philip L. Barbour, 3 volumes (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 1:133; quoted in Jeffrey Knapp, *An Empire Nowhere; England, America, and Literature from Utopia to The Tempest* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 212; and see 326, n. 59.
36. *The Sermons of John Donne*, ed. George R. Potter and Evelyn M. Simpson, 10 volumes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 4:266.
37. The word "hope" is commonly encountered during the seventeenth century. Bacon devotes Aphorisms xcii to cxxix of the *New Organon* to what he calls "arguments of hope"; Francis Bacon, *Works*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denn Heath, 14 volumes (London, 1858–75), 4:102. See Michèle Le Doeuff, "Hope in Science," in *Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts*, ed. William A. Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990).
38. Michael Drayton, *Works*, 5 volumes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961), 2:363. On the tradition of golden age mythology for the period see Harry Levin, *The Myth of the Golden Age in the Renaissance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

39. Valerius Terminus, in Bacon, *Works*, ed. Spedding et al., 3:221; *The Advancement of Learning*, in *Works*, 3:321.
40. Christopher Hill, *Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 180–92, 289.
41. Keith Thomas, “The Utopian Impulse in Seventeenth-Century England,” in *Between Dream and Nature; Essays on Utopia and Dystopia*, ed. Dominic Baker-Smith and C. C. Barfoot (Amsterdam Editions Rodopi B.V., 1987), 20. On the subject of early seventeenth-century pessimism also see Victor Harris, *All Coherence Gone: A Study in the Seventeenth Century Controversy Over Disorder and Decay in the Universe* (London: Cass, 1966); and Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Millennium and Utopia: A Study in the Background of the Idea of Progress* (1949) (New York: Harper, 1964).
42. 1 John 2.15–16. Robert Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicholas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda L. Blair, 3 volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 3:335.
43. On Donne’s cooperation with the king at this time see Potter and Simpson, Introduction, *Sermons of John Donne*, vol. 4. On Donne’s absolutism in general see Goldberg, *James I and the Politics of Literature*, 210–19, and Arthur F. Marotti, *John Donne, Coterie Poet* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986). The sermon is discussed most recently in Thomas Scanlan, *Colonial Writing and the New World 1583–1671: Allegories of Desire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
44. Even Christopher Hill has endorsed this traditional view, the death of Prince Henry in 1612 being taken as the watershed event. See Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714*, revised edition (New York: Norton, 1980), 81; and *Intellectual Origins*, 219.
45. Deborah L. Shuger, *Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and the Dominant Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Lewalski, *Writing Women in Jacobean England*.
46. Roy Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales, and England’s Lost Renaissance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Malcolm Smuts, “Cultural Diversity and Cultural Change,” in *Mental World of the Jacobean Court*, ed. Peck, 99–112; Leeds Barroll, “The Court of the First Stuart Queen,” in *Mental World of the Jacobean Court*, ed. Peck, 191–208; and Lewalski, *Writing Women in Jacobean England*, 15–44.
47. John Symcotts, *A Seventeenth Century Doctor and His Patients: John Symcotts, 1592?–1662*, ed. F. N. L. Poynter and W. J. Bishop (Streatley: Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 1951); *Health, Medicine, and Mortality in the Sixteenth Century*, ed. Charles Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Harold J. Cook, *The Decline of the Old Medical Regime in Stuart London* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Nancy G. Sirasi, *Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); David Cressy, *Birth, Marriage, and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the Life-Cycle in Tudor and Stuart England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

48. See Massimo Montanari, *The Culture of Food*, trans. Carl Ipsen (Blackwell: Oxford, 1994), for a European-wide perspective on these issues. For local English conditions see *The Agrarian History of England and Wales*, ed. Joan Thirsk, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); C. G. A. Clay, *Economic Expansion and Social Change: England 1500–1700*, 2 volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
49. See Church of England, *Certain Sermons or Homilies Appointed to be Read in Churches in the Time of Queene Elizabeth* (London, 1683), 1:55.
50. Andrew Boorde, *A Compendyous Regyment; or, A Dyetary of Helth Made in Mountpyllier* (London: Early English Text Society, 1870), 300.
51. Christopher Hill, *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England*, second edition (New York: Schocken, 1967), 124–44.
52. Hall, *Works*, ed. Wynter, 9:115.
53. Richard Braithwaite, *The English Gentleman* (1630), 140.
54. A particularly interesting account of how authorities attempted to regulate social expectations is found in Leah H. Marcus, *The Politics of Mirth: Jonson, Herrick, Milton, and Marvell, and the Defense of Holiday Pastimes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.) The topic is also discussed at length in Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (New York: New York University Press, 1978); and Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England 1603–1658* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
55. Bartolomeo Platina, *On Right Pleasure and Good Health* (1450), trans. Mary Ella Milham (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1998), 468.
56. Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, 3 volumes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 1:177.
57. Bacon, *Works*, ed. Spedding et al., 4:90.
58. *Ibid.*, 4:102.
59. John Wilkins, *The Discovery of a World in the Moon* (1638), second edition (London, 1640), 2.
60. *Eastward Ho!*, 4.1.44–45; 4.1.218–21.
61. Braithwaite, *English Gentleman*, title page.
62. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), 346.
63. Richard Braithwaite, *The English Gentlewoman* (London, 1631), 223–34.
64. The complex and fascinating history of the connection between power and visibility in Western history is analyzed in Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). The relevant texts by Foucault include *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979); *The Order of Things; the Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage, 1973); “The Eye of Power,” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York, 1980); and “The Subject and Power,” in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago

- Press, 1983). Also seminal in the discussion of the exercise of vision as domination—and alluded to directly in the above remarks—is Laura Mulvey, *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); and Donna Haraway, “The Persistence of Vision,” in *Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory*, ed. Katie Conboy et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 283–95.
65. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 155.
 66. The point is stressed – somewhat over-stressed, in my judgment, since the concept of the *arcana imperium* is overlooked along the way – in Christopher Pye, *The Regal Phantasm: Shakespeare and the Politics of Spectacle* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990). Here and throughout this study quotations from Shakespeare are taken from *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York: Norton, 1997).
 67. See Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, ed. George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), and Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (London: Verso, 1992). But also see the discussion of the ideology of “psychical reality” and its “dominant fictions” in Kaja Silverman, *Male Subjectivity at the Margins* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), 15–51. On the idea of “deliberate political fantasy” and political sublimity in general see Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989), 28–33.
 68. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (1936) (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1985).
 69. Eagleton, *Ideology*, 107–10; Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology* 159–80, 269–84; Ruth Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 70–78.
 70. To be fair, Mannheim understood this problem too. A helpful discussion of these issues is found in Leslie, *Renaissance Utopias*.
 71. See Francis Bacon, *Brief Discourse of the Happy Union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland* (1603), *Works*, ed. Spedding et al., 7:46.
 72. *Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I*, ed. J. R. Tanner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), 140.
 73. The evidence cited here and elsewhere in this study stands in sharp contrast to the revisionist position according to which political opposition was all but unthinkable in the Jacobean era, such that basic political ideals “were not questions theorized or addressed by early Stuart Englishman”; Kevin Sharpe, *Politics and Ideas in Early Stuart England* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), 10. An anti-revisionist position with which this study is largely in agreement is staked out in Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology*.
 74. Gardiner, *History of England*, 1:156, quoting from William Barlow’s *Summe and Substance of the Conference* (London: 1604). Collinson cautions, however, that there are “dangers” in “attempting to sum the matter up in the more intemperate and quotable royal outbursts . . . These three days of argument in the royal presence chamber must have appeared a little more like a round-table conference, and a little less like the once-for-all confrontation

- of two embattled parties which most accounts convey, and which the radical puritans had fondly expected"; Collinson, *Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, 459.
75. Thomas More, *Utopia*, trans. and ed. Robert M. Adams, second edition (New York: Norton, 1992), 28–29.
 76. Robert Appelbaum, "Utopian Dubrovnik, 1659: An English Fantasy," *Utopian Studies* 7.1 (1996), 65–92.
 77. William Morris, *News from Nowhere*, ed. James Redmond (London: Routledge, 1970), 2.
 78. It is in view of this Marxist concept of consciousness, as well as the continuity between systems of hegemony and systems of utopian speculation that Louis Marin calls the Morean Utopia an "ideological critique of ideology." Louis Marin, *Utopics: The Semiological Play of Textual Spaces*, trans. Robert A. Vollrath (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1984).
 79. Johann Valentin Andreae, *Republicae Christianopolitanae Descriptio*, ed. Richard van Dulmen (Stuttgart, 1972). *Christianopolis*, trans. and Introduction, Felix Held (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916).
 80. René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and The Meditations*, trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 35. On Descartes and city planning see Josef W. Konvitz, *The Urban Millennium: The City-Building Process from the Early Middle Ages to the Present* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 32–59; Konvitz draws a connection between Descartes's analogy of the city on a plain with actual reforms in urban planning which were becoming prominent in the seventeenth century, particularly among military engineers. Also see Eugene Garin, "La Cite Idéale de la Renaissance Italienne," *Les utopies à la Renaissance. Colloque Internationale* (Paris and Brussels: Presses Universitaires, 1963), 13–37.
 81. Dante, *Of Monarchy*; cited in Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 175.
 82. Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 137.
 83. For further comment on the equation of the I and the eye, related to Blumenberg's analysis, see Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Timothy J. Reiss, *The Discourse of Modernism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).
 84. *Christianopolis*, trans. Felix Held, 140.
 85. Levin, *Myth of the Golden Age*, 126.
 86. *Ibid.*, 188.
 87. James Holstun, *A Rational Millennium: Puritan Utopias of Seventeenth-Century England and America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), provides an extended meditation on this problem.
 88. See David M. Bergeron, *Royal Family, Royal Lovers: King James of England and Scotland* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1992); Constance Jordan, *Shakespeare's Monarchies: Ruler and Subject in the Romances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

89. *Animadversions Upon the Remonstrants Defence Against Smectymnuus*, in *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. Don M. Wolfe, 11 volumes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–82), 1:880–81.
90. Citations from *The Alchemist* are taken from Ben Jonson, *Complete Plays*, ed. G. A. Wilkes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981–82), vol. 3.
91. Healey, *Discovery of a New World*, 100.
92. Hall, *Characters of Vertues and Vices*, in *Works*, ed. Wynter, 9:104.
93. Gardiner, *History of England*, 1:148–52; Collinson, *Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, 448–67; George, *John Robinson*, 69–78.
94. Bacon, *Works*, ed. Spedding et al. 1:241.
95. *Ibid.*, 3:220–21.
96. William Blake, *Complete Poetry and Prose*, ed. David V. Erdman (New York: Anchor Press, 1988), 632.
97. *Heaven on Earth* (London, 1606), following shortly after the publication of the *Mundus*, was Hall's first work of Protestant meditation. It embraced quietism and prayer as a means to achieve an inner "heaven" despite the anti-transcendent rhetoric permeating the rest of Hall's writings.
98. Theodore K. Raab, "Francis Bacon and the Reform of Society," in *Action and Conviction in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of E.H. Harbison*, ed. Theodore K. Raab and J. Siegel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 169–93; Robert E. Stillman, *The New Philosophy and Universal Languages in Seventeenth-Century England* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1995).
99. Joel L. Epstein, *Francis Bacon: A Political Biography* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1977); Julian Martin, *Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
100. Christopher Hill, *Intellectual Origins*, 85–130; Charles Whitney, *Francis Bacon and Modernity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Whitney, "Merchants of Light: Science as Colonization in the *New Atlantis*," in *Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts*, ed. Sessions, 255–68; Robert K. Faulkner, *Francis Bacon and the Project of Progress* (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 1993).
101. Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution*, second edition (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1990), 169–90; Merchant is followed to some extent in Reiss, *Discourse of Modernism*, 180–225.
102. Johann Mouton, "'The Summary Law of Nature': Revisiting Bacon's Views on the Unity of the Sciences," *Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts*, ed. Sessions, 139–50.
103. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1990).
104. As will be seen, my treatment of subjectivity in Bacon is related to that of Elizabeth Hanson, where the latter describes Bacon's project as "an attempt to articulate the position of the discovering subject, to make present in discourse a subject who makes a rupture with all previous discourse"; Elizabeth Hanson, *Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England* (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1998), 122. But there are also important differences between our two positions.

105. I am adopting my notion of subjectivity in part from Emile Beneveniste, *Problems in General Linguistics*, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971).
106. John Calvin, *Institutes of Christianity*, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 volumes (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1986), 2:280.
107. On “natural magic,” hermeticism, and its influence in English society see Francis Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) and John S. Mebane, *Renaissance Magic and the Return of the Golden Age: The Occult Tradition in Marlowe, Jonson, and Shakespeare* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989).

2 UTOPIAN EXPERIMENTALISM, 1620–1638

1. Sara Pearl, “Sounding Present Occasions: Jonson’s Masques of 1620–5,” in *The Court Masque*, ed. David Lindley (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984); Ben Jonson, *The Complete Masques*, ed. Stephen Orgel (New Haven and London: Yale, 1969), 447: lines 297–302.
2. Paul R. Sellin, “The Performances of Ben Jonson’s *News from the New World*,” *English Studies* 61 (1980), 491–97.
3. Joseph Frank, *The Beginnings of the English Newspaper, 1620–1660* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961).
4. Paul R. Sellin, “The Politics of Ben Jonson’s *News from the New World Discover’d in the Moone*,” *Viator* 17 (1986), 321–37.
5. Francis Yates, *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment* (London: Routledge, 1972), ch. 1, 1–29.
6. For a profile of the leaders of the Virginia Company during these years, and their conflicts with Buckingham and James, see A. L. Maycock, *Nicholas Ferrar of Little Gidding* (London: SPCK, 1963), 65–106.
7. S. R. Gardiner, *History of England 1603–1640*, 10 volumes (London: Longmans, 1883), 4:142–71.
8. He anticipates the forming of a central news bureau in London in 1622, for example. See Anthony Parr, Introduction to Jonson, *The Staple of News*, ed. Anthony Parr (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1988), 22–31; and Mark Z. Muggli, “Ben Jonson and the Business of News,” *Studies in English Literature* 32 (1992), 323–39.
9. Karl S. Guthke, *The Last Frontier: Imagining Other Worlds, from the Copernican Revolution to Modern Science Fiction*, trans. Helen Atkins (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 136. At virtually the same time, Robert Burton was entertaining the idea of travel to the moon with reference to the same body of opinion, ancient and modern, as Jonson; Burton, however, was more approving of recent speculation: “the rest of the Planets are inhabited, as well as the Moone,” *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), 326–27 (see n. 10 below on editions). On Burton’s cosmology see E. Patricia Vicari, *The*

- View from Minerva's Tower; Learning and Imagination in The Anatomy of Melancholy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 25; and Robert Browne, "Robert Burton and the New Cosmology," *Modern Language Quarterly* 13 (1952), 131–48.
10. Robert Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* (Oxford, 1621), 56. In what follows I will be citing, except where noted, from the first, 1621, edition. When occasion calls for it I will also cite the second, 1624 edition, and from the recently published, original-spelling scholarly edition based on Burton's own fifth and sixth editions, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicholas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda L. Blair (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). This chapter will not be the place to delve deeply into the complicated archaeology of Burton's text, and I will cite the last edition for the most part. But I will want to call attention to several passages whose origination either in 1621 and 1624 are suggestive of chronological, topical issues. The changes in Burton's utopia from edition to edition are discussed in some detail by J. Max Patrick, "Burton and Utopia," *Philological Quarterly XXVII* (1948), 345–58; and by J. C. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society 1516–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 85–104. In sum, Burton's utopia doubled in length from the first to the sixth edition, but most of the additions are produced for the second edition; the additions themselves clarify and elaborate but do not substantially change the utopian position sketched out in the first edition.
 11. Grant McColley, "The Date of Godwin's *Domingo Gonsales*," *Modern Philology* 35 (1937), 47–60.
 12. *A Relation or Journal of the Proceedings of the Plantation Settled at Plymouth in New England*, in *Mourt's Relation* (1622), ed. Jordan D. Fiore (Plymouth, MA: Plymouth Rock Foundation, 1985), 13–14.
 13. *The Works of George Herbert*, ed. F. E. Hutchinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 252–59.
 14. "The Pilgrimage," in *Works*, ed. Hutchinson.
 15. See Harold H. Kollmeier, "The Country Parson: *The Country Parson* in Its Time," in *Like Season's Timber; New Essays on George Herbert*, ed. Edmund Miller and Robert DiYanni (New York: Peter Lang, 1987); Christopher Hodgkins, *Authority, Church, and Society in George Herbert; Return to the Middle Way*, 103–26; Douglas Swartz, "Discourse and Direction: A Priest to the Temple, or, the Country Parson and the Elaboration of Sovereign Rule," *Criticism* 36.2 (1994), 189–212; Jeffery Powers-Beck, "'Not Onely a Pastour, but a Lawyer also': George Herbert's Vision of Stuart Magistracy," *Early Modern Literary Studies* 1.2 (1995) 3.1–25; and, for my own fuller treatment of the subject, Robert Appelbaum, "Tip-toeing to the Apocalypse: Herbert, Milton, and the Modern Sense of Time," *George Herbert Journal* 19.1–2 (1996), 27–54.
 16. *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. Don M. Wolfe, 11 volumes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–82), 1:296.

17. David Mathew calls this a “watershed” moment in English history: Mathew, *James I* (London: Eyre & Spottiswood, 1967), 289. It included the final political decline of those families and individuals, members of the late Elizabethan power elite, who had been responsible for James’s accession, and who had been the dominant caretakers of his government for nearly two decades. With decades-old channels of power and patronage disrupted, the negotiation of political interests and goals became at once more highhanded, contentious, dangerous, and public: the controversial Parliamentary sessions of the 1620s were at once an expression and a contributing cause of this “politicization.” See G. P. V. Akrigg, Introduction, *Letters of King James VI and I*, ed. G. P. V. Akrigg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 13–14; and Mark Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed; Britain 1603–1714* (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane Penguin, 1996), 91–112.
18. Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
19. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity; Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 5–6; also see Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).
20. Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1624), 8.
21. John Amos Comenius, *The Labyrinth of the World*, trans. Matthew Spinka (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1972), 6.
22. *Ibid.*, 71–2.
23. *Ibid.*, 1.
24. *Ibid.*, 5–6.
25. Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1989), 1:5.
26. Burton refers to one of those passages in Lucian: “Charon in Lucian, as he wittily faignes, was conducted by Mercury to such a place, where he might see all the World at once, after hee had sufficiently viewed and looked about, Mercury would needs knowe of him what he had observed: He told him, that hee saw a vast multitude and a promiscuous . . .” *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1989), 1:32.
27. See Devon L. Hodges, *Renaissance Fictions of Anatomy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985).
28. See above, page 45.
29. See Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), and Anthony Cascardi, *The Subject of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
30. Victor Harris, *All Coherence Gone: A Study in the Seventeenth Century Controversy Over Disorder and Decay in the Universe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Millennium and Utopia: A Study in the Background of the Idea of Progress* (1949) (New York: Harper, 1964); E. R. Chamberlin,

Antichrist and the Millennium (New York, E. P. Dutton, 1975); Charles Webster, *The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine, and Reform, 1626–1660* (London: Duckworth, 1975); Katherine R. Firth, *The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain 1530–1645* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Achsah Guibbory, *The Map of Time: Seventeenth-Century English Literature and Ideas of Pattern in History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

31. *The Fame and Confession of the Fraternity of the R: C: Commonly, of the Rosie Cross*, trans. Thomas Vaughan (1652), reprinted in *A Christian Rosenkreutz Anthology*, ed. Paul M. Allen (Blauvelt, New York: Rudolf Steiner Publications, 1981), 164, a translation of both the *Fama* (1614) and the *Confession* (1615). I will be assuming as a given the agnostic attitude toward the Rosicrucian movement that Frances Yates puts forward in her *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment*. There *may* have been a real fraternity of Rosicrucians as described in the manifestoes; there probably was not. But there were individuals for whom the fiction of the manifestoes was a convenient myth, expressive of real aspirations, and supportive of certain practices and hopes. As Yates suggests, there may have been a connection between the Rosicrucian texts and the Englishman John Dee; there was almost certainly a connection between the texts and the court of Frederick I.
32. William Perkins, *Works*, 3 volumes (1631), 2:12–13; Perry Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 48–98, citing William Preston, *The New Covenant, or the Saints Portion* (London, 1629), 434. Also see Christopher Hill, “Covenant Theology and the Concept of ‘A Public Person,’” in *The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill*, 3 volumes (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 3:300–24.
33. Milton, *Complete Prose Works*, 1:296.
34. Charles Webster takes this passage from Milton as an emblem for the revolution in science, medicine, and technology that was getting underway at about this time, but Webster misses the “as if” in Milton’s rhetoric. Webster, *Great Instauration*, 1.
35. *Reasons and Considerations*, in *Mourt’s Relation*, ed. Fiore, 78.
36. Quoted in Edmund S. Morgan, *The Puritan Dilemma; The Story of John Winthrop* (HarperCollins, 1958), 38.
37. Alexander Young, *Chronicles of the Pilgrim Fathers of the Colony of Plymouth, from 1602–1625* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1841), 438.
38. Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness*, 3–4.
39. See Theodore Dwight Bozeman, “The Puritans’ ‘Errand into the Wilderness’ Reconsidered,” *New England Quarterly*, 50 (1986), 231–51; Andrew Delbanco, “The Puritan Errand Re-Viewed,” *Journal of American Studies* 18.3 (1984), 343–60, and *The Puritan Ordeal* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 41–118; and David Cressy, *Coming Over: Migration and Communication between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

40. "Certain Useful Advertisements Sent in a Letter Written by a Discreet Friend unto the Planters in New England," in *Mourt's Relation*, ed. Fiore, 8–9.
41. William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation*, ed. Samuel Eliot Morison (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 3.
42. "The country wanteth only industrious men to employ; for it would grieve your hearts if, as I, you had seen so many miles together by goodly rivers uninhabited . . .," Edward Winslow, Letter to a Friend, in *Mourt's Relation*, ed. Fiore, 73–74.
43. On the theme of emptiness see Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonization, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: Norton, 1976); and James Holstun, *A Rational Millennium: Puritan Utopias of Seventeenth-Century England and America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
44. Letter to Sir Edwin Sandys, 15 December 1617, in *The Story of the Pilgrim Fathers, 1610–1623 A.D.; as told by Themselves, their Friends, and their Enemies*, ed. Edward Arber (London: Ward and Downey, 1897), 286.
45. *A Relation or Journal of the Proceedings of the Plantation Settled at Plymouth in New England*, in *Mourt's Relation*, ed. Fiore, 13–14.
46. The evidence of the numbers is reviewed in Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England 1603–1658* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 103–4; and Cressy, *Coming Over*, 68–70.
47. Delbanco, *Puritan Ordeal*, 74.
48. *The Winthrop Papers* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1929), 2:282–83.
49. A similar point is made by Delbanco in *The Puritan Ordeal*, where he says that "the *Arabella* sermon is, in fact, considerably more focused on what was being fled than on what was being pursued" (72).
50. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parson (New York: Scribner's, 1958); Christopher Hill, *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England*, second edition (New York: Schocken, 1967). In what is perhaps the most interesting attempt to question the Weberian hypothesis, Hugh Trevor-Roper argues that the difference between the Protestant and Catholic countries in terms of economic performance through the nineteenth century had more to do with the suppression of certain forms of behavior among Catholics than the expression of a certain ethic among Protestants. But what was being suppressed if not the free development of capitalist labor and trade and the behavior that went along with it? Hugh Trevor-Roper, *Religion, the Reformation, and Social Change; and Other Essays*, third edition (London: Secker & Warburg, 1984), 1–45.
51. Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1989), 1:76–77.
52. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, 98; Davis also makes the point about Burton's meritocracy and welfare economics that I will be developing below.
53. "Ecclesiastical Discipline, *penes Episcopos*, subordinate [to the common good]" is all Burton says about it, meanwhile calling for reforms in the

- training and use of ministers that many non-separating Puritans would approve of; *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), 90.
54. To what extent Burton's language is deliberately self-defeating, and to what extent inadvertently bewildering, as a result of the indefiniteness of learning at the time he was writing, is a question that still remains to be answered. See Stanley Fish, *Self-Consuming Artifacts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 303–52; and J. B. Bamforth, Introduction, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1989), xxv–xxvi. My own reading of the preface is in the main consistent with that of Fish, especially with regard to what Fish calls the “double-sidedness” of Burton's rhetorical strategy and to Fish's point that in *The Anatomy* “subjectivity becomes objectivity” (331). I will be quoting many of the same passages as Fish. But I take Burton's subjectivity more seriously than Fish does; I understand Burton's rhetorical strategy to be more deliberately comic than Fish does; and I believe that there are historical and cultural reasons why Burton is both serious and comic in this way.
 55. Miriam Eliav-Feldon, *Realistic Utopias; The Ideal Imaginary Societies of the Renaissance 1516–1630* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), esp. 1–15 and 28–29.
 56. *Ibid.*, 28.
 57. In his introduction to the first collected edition of James Harrington's works, the philosopher John Toland remarks that among Harrington's most important and prophetic ideas was the need to create a Bank of England; *The Oceana of James Harrington and His Other Works* (London, 1700), vii.
 58. This statement contrasts with Stanley Fish's objection, perceptive though it is, that if Burton were serious about this utopia he would not allow it to be so “bounded” by the limitations and vices of human nature; *Self-Consuming Artifacts*, 328.
 59. Pierre Mesnard, “L'Utopie de Robert Burton,” in *Les utopies à la Renaissance. Colloque Internationale* (Paris and Brussels: Presses Universitaires, 1963), 80–81.
 60. Francis Godwin, *The Man in the Moone and Nuncius Inanimatus*, ed. Grant McColley, *Smith College Studies in Modern Languages*, 19.1 (1937), 71–72. Since all modern editions of the text (one of them a facsimile of the original) retain the original spelling, and all note as well the original pagination, I cite here the original pagination as reproduced in McColley's text.
 61. Marjorie Hope Nicolson, *Voyages to the Moon* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 83; Guthke, *Last Frontier*, 158; A. G. H. Bachrach, “Luna Mendax: Some Reflections of Moon-Voyages in Early Seventeenth-Century England,” in *Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia*, ed. Dominic Baker-Smith and C. C. Barfoot (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 1987).
 62. But see Michael Winter, *Compendiarum Utopiarum* (Stuttgart, 1978), 1: 69–70; quoted in Guthke, *Last Frontier*, 158. Winter proposes that Godwin's text presents “the possibility of a human-like race which has evolved to a higher level or in a better way and which, it is suggested, may actually exist

- somewhere.” Also see Mary B. Campbell, *Wonder and Science : Imagining Worlds in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), which appeared too late for me to respond to it.
63. Francis Bacon, *Works*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denn Heath, 14 volumes (London: 1858–75), 3:473–75.
 64. The critical literature on *New Atlantis* is fairly extensive, although it is seldom as fully developed as treatments of Baconian science. Recent critical work to which my own ideas are beholden includes Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 243–60; Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, 105–37; Denise Albanese, “The *New Atlantis* and the Uses of Utopia.” *ELH* 57.3 (1990), 503–28; Charles Whitney, “Merchants of Light: Science as Colonization in the *New Atlantis*,” in *Francis Bacon’s Legacy of Texts*, ed. William A. Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 255–68; Amy Boesky, *Founding Fictions: Utopias in Early Modern England* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996); Marina Leslie, *Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Elizabeth Hanson, *Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
 65. Marshall Grossman, *The Story of All Things: Writing the Self in English Renaissance Narrative Poetry* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
 66. We are told that the sailors *speak* with the Bensalemites in Spanish; we are never told that the sailors themselves are Spanish. They may well be English traders.
 67. Karl Marx, *Capital*, 3 volumes (New York: International Publishers, 1972), 1:108.
 68. The vicissitudes of Bacon’s life are probably nowhere given a more eloquent relation than in Gardiner’s *History of England*, especially in volumes 1 and 3; Gardiner was a great admirer of Bacon, and made him one of the central characters of his narrative of early Stuart history. More recent accounts include Catherine Drinker Bowen, *Francis Bacon: The Temper of a Man* (Boston: Little Brown, 1963); Joel L. Epstein, *Francis Bacon: A Political Biography* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1977); and Jonathan Marwil, *The Trials of Council: Francis Bacon in 1621* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1976).
 69. *New Atlantis* reads, after having renounced marriages of convenience, marriages motivated by lust, and extramarital sex, “As for masculine love, they have no touch of it” (153). The Manuels comment, “Denunciations of pederasty, a classical form of sexual self-revelation, flowed from Bacon’s pen as readily as they did from James’s.” Manuel and Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World*, 245. The queering and outing of Bacon has only just begun. See Graham Hamill, “The Epistemology of Expurgation: Bacon and *The Masculine Birth of Time*,” in *Queering the Renaissance*, ed. Jonathan Goldberg (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 236–55.

70. See Hanson, *Discovering the Subject*.
71. See Robert Appelbaum, "The Imaginary Imaginary Voyage: Richard Brome's *The Antipodes*," in *Viaggi in Utopia*, ed. Raffaella Baccolini, Vita Fortunati, and Nadia Minerva (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1996), 143–52.

3 "REFORMATION" AND "DESOLATION": THE NEW HORIZONS
OF THE 1640S

1. Charles Webster, *Samuel Hartlib and the Advancement of Learning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 6–11, 75–78; Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Three Foreigners," *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change; and Other Essays*, revised third edition (London: Secker & Warburg, 1984), 251.
2. See for example John Hall, *A Modell of a Christian Society* (London, 1647), A2v.
3. G. H. Turnbull, *Hartlib, Dury and Comenius; Gleanings from Hartlib's Papers* (Liverpool and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947), 69–73. Webster, *Samuel Hartlib*, 9; Charles Webster, "Macaria: Samuel Hartlib and the Great Reformation," *Acta Comenia* 26 (1970), 147–64.
4. Trevor-Roper, "Three Foreigners," 256–57; J. R. Jacob, *Robert Boyle and the English Revolution; A Study in Social and Intellectual Change* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1977), 16–38.
5. On the pansophic movement see Webster, *The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine, and Reform 1626–1660*; and Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 309–31.
6. Trevor-Roper, "Three Foreigners," 258.
7. See for example the essays collected in *Reactions to the English Civil War*, ed. John Morrill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). Also see David Underdown, *Pride's Purge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) and *Revel, Riot, and Rebellion: Popular Politics and Culture in England, 1603–1660* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
8. See the essays collected in *The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Charles Webster (London: Routledge, 1974). The questioning of the connection between Puritanism and science continues in R. S. Westfall, *The Construction of Modern Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); A. R. Hall, *The Revolution in Science 1500–1750* (New York: Longman, 1983); and *Puritanism and the Rise of Modern Science*, ed. Bernard I. Cohen (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), a volume which traces the career of the "Merton thesis."
9. Trevor-Roper, "Three Foreigners," 248.
10. John F. Wilson, *Pulpit in Parliament: Puritanism during the English Civil Wars 1640–48* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 166–235; Peter Toon et al., *Puritans, the Millennium, and the Future of Israel: Puritan Eschatology 1600 to 1660* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1970); Bernard S. Capp, "The

- Millennium and Eschatology in England,” in *The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Webster, 386–98; Webster, *Great Instauration*, 15–31 and *passim*; Katherine R. Firth, *The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain 1530–1645* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
11. For a view of how the faith in history worked, and how a discourse of “conscience” developed in contradiction to it, see Henry Fern, *The Resolving of Conscience* (London, 1642); Francis Cheynell, *Chillingworthi novissima; or, Sickness, Heresy, Death, and Buriall of William Chillingworth* (London, 1644); and S. R. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War 1642–1649*, 4 volumes (New York: AMS Press, 1965), 1:281–85.
 12. John Archer, *The Personall Reign of Christ on Earth* (London, 1642), 44.
 13. *A Glimpse of Sion's Glory* (London, 1641), 32–33. See A. R. Dallison, “The Authorship of a Glimpse of Syons Glory,” in *Puritans, the Millennium, and the Future of Israel*, ed. Toon et al., 131–36.
 14. *A Glimpse of Sion's Glory*, 28.
 15. There is one important objection to this argument, that the sermon in its original form was probably initially delivered while Goodwin was still in Holland (see Dallison, “Authorship,” in *Puritans*, ed. Toon et al.). Nevertheless, the sermon as we have it was prepared for the English public at large; and in the well-known *Apologeticall Narration*, Goodwin and his co-authors deliberately refashion the idea of congregationalism as an intrinsic part of the general project of national reformation to which the English Parliament is devoted. Thomas Goodwin et al., *An Apologeticall Narration, Humbly Submitted to the Honourable Houses of Parliament* (London, 1643). Also see the preface to John Cotton's *The Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven* (London, 1644), written by Goodwin along with Philip Nye.
 16. *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. Don M. Wolfe, 11 volumes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–82), 1:588–89.
 17. Robert Greville, Lord Brooke, *A Discourse Opening the Nature of the Episcopacy Which Is Exercised in England* (London, 1642), 117.
 18. On Lilburne's intellectual development, see Pauline Gregg, *Free-born John; A Biography of John Lilburne* (London: George S. Harrap, 1961); Joseph Frank, *The Levellers: A History of the Writings of Three Seventeenth-Century Social Democrats: John Lilburne, Richard Overton, William Walwyn* (1955) (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969), as well as Lilburne's own autobiographical writings, especially *The Just Defense of John Lilburne* (London, 1653), reprinted in *The Leveller Tracts 1647–1653*, ed. William Haller and Godfrey Davies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 450–64.
 19. Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origin of Radical Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). Also see F. D. Dow, *Radicalism in the English Revolution* (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985); and R. J. Acheson, *Radical Puritans in England 1550–1660* (London and New York: Longman, 1990).
 20. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, revised edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 270–74.

21. Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London: Edward Arnold, 1981).
22. Webster, *Great Instauration*, 35.
23. H. N. Brailsford, *The Levellers and the English Revolution*, ed. Christopher Hill (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 8–9; Pauline Gregg, *Free-born John*, 64–66.
24. Henry Wilkinson, *Babylon's Ruine, Jeruselems Rising* (London, 1643), 21.
25. John Dury, *Israels Call to March out of Babylon* (London, 1646), 24.
26. William Sedgwick, *Zions Deliverance and Her Friends Duty: or The Grounds of Expectings and Means of Procuring Jeruselems Restauration* (London, 1642), 23.
27. *Ibid.*, 41.
28. Charles I, *His Majesties Answer to the XIX Propositions*, in *An Exact Collection of All Remonstrances, Declarations, Ordinances, and Other Passages betweene the Kings Majesty and His Parliament* (London, 1643), 314–15. The phrase has been commented on often (see for example J. C. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society 1516–1700* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 140), but it has seldom been interpreted as I am interpreting it here.
29. *The Stuart Constitution 1603–1688: Documents and Commentary*, ed. J. P. Kenyon, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 252.
30. Cheynell, *Sion's Memento and God's Alarum* (London, 1643), 1; 34; 35.
31. Wilkinson, *Babylon's Ruine, Jeruselems Rising*, 11; 19.
32. Brian Manning, *The English People and the English Revolution* (London: Heinemann, 1976).
33. John Goodwin, *Anti-Cavalierism, or, Truth Pleading as Well the Necessity, as the Lawfulness of This Present War* (London, 1642), 30.
34. Stephen Marshall, *Reformation and Desolation: or, A Sermon Tending to the Discovery of the Symptomes of a People to Whom God Will by No Meanes Be Reconciled* (London, 1642), 29.
35. *Ibid.*, 18.
36. *The Grand Remonstrance*, in *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660*, third edition, ed. Samuel Rawson Gardiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906).
37. Richard Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Also see Christopher Hill, *Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
38. See Lawrence Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), making the point that reaction and appeals to earlier traditional liberties were superimposed upon contemporary realities, which included both genuinely conservative and genuinely radical circumstances and values. “What matters, therefore,” Stone writes, “is the degree to which the reality of the present differs from the image of the past, and the degree of the determination to override all obstacles in order to make the one conform to the other” (51). This argument about the superimposition of traditionalism and innovation is in fact repeated by an important

self-professedly revisionist account, intended to contradict the Whiggism of historians like Stone: “Conventional ideas newly perceived may be the ultimate source of radical ideology and the best preconditioning of radical may be a tenacious hold on tradition”; Mark A. Kishlansky, “Ideology and Politics in the Parliamentary Armies, 1645–9,” in *Reactions to the English Civil War*, ed. Morrill, 165.

39. R. G. Young, *Comenius in England* (London: Oxford University Press, 1932).
40. See Michael Mendle, “Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Very English Absolutism,” in *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain*, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 97–119.
41. John Wildman, *Putney Projects* (London, 1 August 1647), in *Puritanism and Liberty: Being the Army Debates from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents*, ed. A. S. P. Woodhouse (1938) (London: Dent, 1990), 427.
42. Henry Parker, *The Case of Shipmony Briefly Discovered, According to the Grounds of Law, Policy, and Conscience* (London, 1640), 4–5; 7. A year and a half later, in defense of Parliament and the Triennial Act, Parker would expand on his doctrine of right to the effect that “Power is originally inherent in the people, and it is nothing else but that might and vigour which such or such a societie of men containes in it selfe, and when by such or such a Law of common consent and agreement it is derived into such and such hands.” Among the remarkable conclusions he drew from that doctrine were: “1. That the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law, So that all the right of the King and people, depends upon their pleasure”; and “2. That Parliaments are bound to no precedents.” *Observations Upon Some of His Majesties Late Answers and Expresses* (London, 1642), 1; 45.
43. Edmund Calamy, *Englands Looking-Glasse* (London, 1642), 45; quoted in Wilson, *Pulpit in Parliament*, 56.
44. The Triennial Act, in *Constitutional Documents*, ed. Gardiner, 144; 149.
45. Joseph Hall, *An Humble Remonstrance* (London, 1640), 2–3.
46. For a start, see Elizabeth Skerpan, *The Rhetoric of Politics in the English Revolution 1642–1660* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1992); Thomas N. Corns, *Uncloistered Virtue: English Political Literature, 1640–1660* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); and Nigel Smith *Literature and Revolution in England 1640–1660* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
47. See Nigel Smith, “*Areopagitica*: Voicing Contexts, 1643–5,” in *Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose*, ed. David Loewenstein, and James Grantham Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
48. William Dell, *Severall Sermons and Discourses of William Dell* (London, 1652), 103; 113. See Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 99–105; and the entry under Dell’s name in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.
49. Dell, *Severall Sermons*, 106.
50. Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England 1603–1658* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 365.

51. Hannah Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
52. On Plattes and his writings see Charles Webster, "The Authorship and Significance of *Macaria*," in *Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Webster; Webster, *Great Instauration*, 359 and *passim*; Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, 313; and the entry in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.
53. Gabriel Plattes, *A Discoverie of Infinite Treasure* (London, 1639), Dedication.
54. Joan Thirsk, "Making a Fresh Start: Sixteenth-Century Agriculture and the Classical Inspiration" and Andrew McRae, "Husbandry Manuals in the language of Agrarian Improvement", both in *Culture and Cultivation in Early Modern England: Writing and the Land*, ed. Michael Leslie and Timothy Raylor (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992), 15–34 and 35–62.
55. Gabriel Plattes, *A Discovery of Subterranean Treasure* (London, 1639).
56. Virgil, *The Georgics*, trans. L. P. Wilkinson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 4:212–19, page 131. On the science of beekeeping in the seventeenth century (which still identified the monarch as male), and the political metaphors attached to it, see Timothy Raylor, "Samuel Hartlib and the Commonwealth of Bees," in *Culture and Cultivation in Early Modern England*, ed. Leslie and Raylor, 91–129.
57. A similar point is made in Wilson, *Pulpit in Parliament*, 16.
58. Sedgwick, *Zions Deliverance*, 36.
59. Henry Burton, *The Protestation Protested* (London, 1641).
60. Stephen Marshall, *Threnodia. The Churches Lamentation for the Good Man His Losse* (London, 1644), 35.
61. Nigel Smith discusses other examples of this constructing of a public in *Literature and Revolution*, 95–200.
62. On this, both of the recent major studies of Parliament as a representative body agree, though they disagree on much else: Derek Hirst, *The Representative of the People? Voters and Voting in England under the Early Stuarts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Mark A. Kishlansky, *Parliamentary Selection: Social and Political Choice in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
63. John Amos Comenius, *The Way of Light* (1668), trans. E. T. Campagne (Liverpool and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938), 193–94.
64. Gabriel Plattes, *A Description of the Famous Kingdom of Macaria* (1641), in *Samuel Hartlib and the Advancement of Learning*, ed. Webster, 79–80.
65. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, 312–25.
66. The point is made in Amy Boesky, *Founding Fictions: Utopias in Early Modern England* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996); but Boesky takes a much more egalitarian view of what Plattes is saying about labor.
67. Brailsford, *Levellers*, 113–14.
68. Perez Zagorin, *A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1954), 70–81.
69. *Puritanism and Liberty*, ed. Woodhouse, 50.

70. *Nova Solyma, The Ideal City; Or Jerusalem Regained*, trans. Walter Begley, 2 volumes (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902). Begley saved the anonymously published text from obscurity, and translated it faithfully, if somewhat overheatedly; his substantial critical apparatus, however, is mainly devoted to proving, with a comical obstinacy worthy of a Nabokovian character, that its author was John Milton, an idea which critics of the early twentieth century promptly refuted. Contemporary criticism of *Nova Solyma* is limited to three examples, all of which, fortunately, are fine works of scholarship: J. Max Patrick, "Nova Solyma: Samuel Gott's Puritan Utopia," *Studies in the Literary Imagination* 10 (1977), 43–56; Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, 139–168; and Boesky, *Founding Fictions*, 96–100. On the date of the work see Davis, 145.
71. The honor of being the first fiction taking place in the future is usually accorded to Jacques Gottin's *Epigone, histoire du siècle futur* (1659). See Paul K. Alkon, *Origins of Futuristic Fiction* (Athens, GA and London: University of Georgia Press, 1987), ch. 1. The concept of the uchronia is given a definitive treatment in Raymond Trousson, *Voyages aux pays de nulle part: histoire littéraire de la pensée utopique* (Brussels: Presses Universitaires, 1975); it is further clarified in the essays collected in *De l'utopie à l'uchronie: formes, significations, fonctions*, ed. Heinrich Hudde and Peter Kuon (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1988).
72. Christopher Hill, "The Norman Yoke," *Puritanism and Revolution* (New York: Schocken, 1968), 50–122.
73. See Corns, *Uncloistered Virtue*, 129–46.
74. *The Writings of William Walwyn*, ed. Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 148.
75. *Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan Revolution*, ed. Don M. Wolfe (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1944), 113.
76. C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). Overton's most precise formulation of the idea of "self-proprietty" is to be found in *An Arrow against all Tyrants and Tyranny* (London, 1646): "To every individual in nature is given an individual property by nature, not to be invaded or usurped by any other. For every one as he is himself, so he hath a self propriety, else he could not be himself . . . For by natural birth all men are equally and alike born to like propriety, liberty, and freedom . . . even so are we to live, everyone equally and alike . . ."; quoted in Brailsford, *Levellers*, 140.
77. Brailsford (*Levellers*, 417–54) devotes a great deal of attention to this idea, arguing that there may have been some truth in it on some occasions. But Brailsford perhaps overstates the participation of the lower classes in the movement. Nigel Smith emphasizes that the Levellers were predominantly members of the urban "middling sort": "they were burgher Levellers"; *Literature and Revolution*, 144.
78. *Puritanism and Liberty*, ed. Woodhouse, 63.

79. The most important document in this regard is probably *A Manifestation from Lieutenant Col. John Lilburn, Mr. William Walwyn, Mr. Thomas Prince, and Mr. Richard Overton* (London, 14 April 1649), of which Walwyn is evidently the main author.
80. *A Manifestation*, in Walwyn, *Works*, 335.
81. In more conventional political language, Joseph Frank notes that at the end of the 1640s, Cromwell and Ireton played the conservatives to the Levellers' radicalism, even though in some respects Cromwell and Ireton were the more radical, since they were prepared ultimately to embrace military solutions to political problems; *The Levellers*, 135–37.
82. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War*, 4:5.
83. *Puritanism and Liberty*, ed. Woodhouse, 77.
84. *Constitutional Documents*, ed. Gardiner, 316–26.
85. *Leveller Manifestoes*, ed. Wolfe, 226.
86. Kishlansky, "Ideology and Politics in the Parliamentary Armies, 1645–9," in *Reactions to the English Civil War*, ed. Morrill, 169.
87. *Leveller Manifestoes*, ed. Wolfe, 212.
88. Brailsford, *Levellers*, 523.
89. *Leveller Manifestoes*, ed. Wolfe, 402.

4 OUT OF THE "TRUE NOTHING," 1649–1653

1. Miguel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, trans. J. M. Cohen (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1950), 471.
2. On the self-reflexivity of the novel see Robert Alter, *Partial Magic: The Novel as Self-Conscious Genre* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and Anthony J. Cascardi, *The Bounds of Reason: Cervantes, Dostoyevsky, Flaubert* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). On the novel's utopian dimension see Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, 3 volumes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 3:1035–51; and Jose Antonio Maravall, *Utopia and Counterutopia in the "Quixote,"* trans. Robert W. Felkel (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991).
3. Lucy Hutchinson, *Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson*, ed. Julius Hutchinson (London: Dent, 1908), 268.
4. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985).
5. *The Poems and Letters of Andrew Marvell*, ed. H. H. Margouliouth, third edition, revised by Pierre Legouis and E. E. Duncan-Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), lines 34–37. Marvell's Cromwellian poems have attracted a great deal of critical scrutiny. See for example Blair Worden, "Andrew Marvell, Oliver Cromwell, and the Horatian Ode," in *Politics of Discourse: The Literature and History of Seventeenth-Century England*, ed. Kevin Sharpe and Stephen N. Zwicker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987),

147–80; and Thomas N. Corns, *Uncloistered Virtue: English Political Literature, 1640–1660* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 227–31. Perhaps the most remarkable thing that criticism has brought to light is that this most public of poems was never published or even evidently circulated in manuscript during Marvell's lifetime. The poem bears comparison with the group of poems published by Thomas Manley as *Veni; Vidi; Vici. The Triumphs of the Most Excellent & Illustrious, Oliver Cromwell, &c.* (London, 1652), where in fact praise of Cromwell is mixed with praise for men like Bradshaw and Ireton, and the good of the commonwealth as a popular sovereignty is a frequent subject of concern.

6. Quoted in Gerald M. MacLean, *Time's Witness: Historical Representations in English Poetry, 1603–1660* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 216. MacLean gives other examples of royalist and republican poetry in response to the rise of the republic, and provides an interesting discussion of what he calls the problem of the “unprecedented future” posed by the execution, 212–55.
7. Marchamont Nedham, *The Case of the Commonwealth of England Stated* (London, 1650), 5.
8. *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1643–1660*, ed. C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, 2 volumes (London, 1907–11), 2:1.
9. David Underdown, *Pride's Purge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Blair Worden, *The Rump Parliament 1648–1653* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
10. Worden, *Rump Parliament*, 23.
11. Nedham, *Case of the Commonwealth*, 13. Nedham elsewhere cites both Machiavelli and Bodin as authorities for his position. See Perez Zagorin, *A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1954), 78–86 and 121–31.
12. *Originall Letters and Papers of State Addressed to Oliver Cromwell*, ed. J. Nickolls (London, 1741), 31.
13. *An Act for the Relief and Employment of the Poor* (7 May 1649), in *Acts and Ordinances*, ed. Firth and Rait, 2:104–10; Brian Manning, 1649: *The Crisis of the English Revolution* (London: Bookmarks, 1992), 95–96.
14. See for example Cromwell's dismissal of “Levelling principles” in his speech to open the first Parliament of the Protectorate, in Wilbur Cortez Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, 4 volumes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), 3:435–36.
15. The case for the “Puritan reform” of the English economy was most forcefully expressed in Margaret James, *Social Policy During the Puritan Revolution 1640–1660* (London: Routledge, 1930). But James no doubt overstated her case.
16. See, however, *A Manifestation from Lieutenant Col. John Lilburn, Mr. William Walweyn, Mr. Thomas Prince, and Mr. Richard Overton* (London, 14 April 1649), in *Writings of William Walweyn*, ed. Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1989).

17. Thomas Edwards, *Gangraena* (London, 1646) 1:34; cited in C. Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 115. *Tyrannopocrit Discovered* (Rotterdam, 1649), in *British Pamphleteers* ed. G. Orwell and R. Reynolds (London, 1948), 1:84–86; cited in Hill, *World*, 116.
18. On English Behemism and the topos of self-abnegation that Hering rehearses see Nigel Smith, *Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical Religion 1640–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 202.
19. Samuel Hering “To the representative of England, Scotland, and Ireland,” 4 August 1653, in *Originall Letters and Papers of State Addressed to Oliver Cromwell*, ed. Nickolls, 99. Little is known about Hering himself.
20. Abiezer Coppe, *A Fiery Flying Roll* (London, 1649), in *A Collection of Ranter Writings from the 17th Century*, ed. Nigel Smith (London: Junction Books, 1983), 86. On Coppe and the Ranters, see A. L. Morton, *The World of the Ranters: Religious Radicalism in the English Revolution* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970).
21. Coppe, *A Second Fiery Flying Roule* (1649), in *Collection*, ed. Smith, 100.
22. On Chamberlen’s career and writings see J. K. Fuz, *Welfare Economics in English Utopias* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 34–37; Bernard S. Capp, *The Fifth Monarchy Men* (London: Faber, 1972), 58–59 and *passim*; and J. C. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society 1516–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 324–31. Chamberlen was personal physician to both Charles I and Charles II, but he converted to Baptism in 1648, worked as the pastor of an independent church during the Interregnum, associated with a number of Fifth Monarchy men, and, during the Restoration, still publicly called for religious toleration and apparently identified himself as a non-conformist.
23. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, 331.
24. Peter Chamberlen, *The Poor Mans Advocate* (London, 1649), 20.
25. Joan Thirsk notes an anonymous pamphleteer of 1653 who “rejoiced at the idea that ‘the name of state’s land’ should be stamped upon the forests [in parliamentary hands] ‘that the state may stand as the public landlord’”; *The Agrarian History of England and Wales*, ed. Joan Thirsk, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2:315.
26. Capp, *Fifth Monarchy Men*, 63.
27. Christopher Hill, *The Experience of Defeat: Milton and Some Contemporaries* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 58–60; and see Capp, *Fifth Monarchy Men*, ch. 4.
28. William Aspinwall, *Of the Fifth Monarchy, or Kingdome, That Shortly Is To Come into the World* (London, 1653), A3.
29. Capp, *Fifth Monarchy Men*, 251; Worden, *Rump Parliament*, 331–37.
30. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, 330.
31. See Hill, *The Experience of Defeat*, 53; and Chamberlen’s own more openly militant and millenarian language in a later text, *The Declaration and Proclamation of the Army of God* (London, 1659), 3–4.

32. See Hill, *World Turned Upside Down*, 321–23; Elaine Hobby, *Virtue of Necessity: English Women's Writing 1649–88* (London: Virago, 1988), 30–31; Phyllis Mack, *Visionary Women: Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 111–24; and Kate Lilley, “Blazing Worlds: Seventeenth-Century Women’s Utopian Writing,” in *Women, Texts and Histories 1575–1760*, ed. Clare Brant and Diane Purkiss (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 106–11.
33. On the relation of nascent feminism to sectarianism and women preachers see Keith Thomas, “Women and the Civil War Sects,” *Past and Present* 13 (1958), 42–62; and Hobby, *Virtue of Necessity*, 26–53.
34. Mary Cary, *A New and More Exact Mappe, or Description of New Jerusalems Glory when Jesus Christ and his Saints with Him Shall Reign on Earth a Thousand Years, and Possess All Kingdoms* (London, 1651; bound with *Little Horns Doom*), 229.
35. Joseph Hall, *The Revelation Revealed* (London, 1650), in *The Works of the Right Reverend Joseph Hall, D. D.*, ed. Philip Wynter, 10 volumes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1863), 8:293–350.
36. See Winstanley, *A Vindication of Those, Whose Endeavors Is Only to Make the Earth a Common Treasury, Called Diggers* (169; n.s. 1650) in *The Works of Gerrard Winstanley*, ed. George Sabine (reprinted New York: Russell & Russell, 1965), 399–403.
37. On the “third stage of analysis” see Albert Saboul, *La Civilisation et la Révolution Française*, 3 volumes (Paris: Editions Arthaud, 1982), 2:17–20. Early scholarly publications on Winstanley’s work assimilating Winstanley into the socialist tradition of later periods include Lewis Henry Berens, *The Digger Movement in the Days of the Commonwealth, as Revealed in the Writings of Gerrard Winstanley* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 1906); Eduard Bernstein, *Cromwell & Communism; Socialism and Democracy in the Great English Revolution*, trans H. J. Stenning (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930); and David W. Petegorsky, *Left-Wing Democracy in the English Civil War: A Study of the Social Philosophy of Gerrard Winstanley* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1940). It is Petegorsky who remarks in his conclusion that “Babeuf is Winstanley plus a century of historical development” (245). The connection between Babeuf and Winstanley is still being reiterated in Olivier Lutard, *Winstanley: Socialisme et Christianisme sous Cromwell* (Paris: Didier, 1976), 3 and *passim*.
38. Modern debate on this issue begins with Lotte Mulligan, John K. Graham, and Judith Richards, “Winstanley: A Case for the Man As He Said He Was,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 28.1 (1977), 57–76, to which the clearest answers are Christopher Hill, “The Religion of Gerrard Winstanley,” *The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill*, 3 volumes (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 2:185–252 and G. E. Aylmer, “The Religion of Gerrard Winstanley,” in *Radical Religion in the English Revolution*, ed. J. F. McGregor and Barry Reay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 91–120. Also see Andrew Bradstock “Sowing in Hope: The Relevance of Theology to Gerrard Winstanley’s Political Programme,” *The Seventeenth*

- Century* 6.2 (1991), 189–204. Two recent book-length studies of Winstanley also incline toward a religious and localized reading of his work: David Mulder, *The Alchemy of Revolution: Gerrard Winstanley's Occultism and Seventeenth-Century English Communism* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990); and George M. Shulman, *Radicalism and Reverence: The Political Thought of Gerrard Winstanley* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). For a biographical view of these issues, see J. D. Alsop, "A High Road to Radicalism? Gerrard Winstanley's Youth," *The Seventeenth Century* 9.1 (1994), 11–24.
39. *Works*, ed. Sabine, 600; Christopher Hill, *The Experience of Defeat*, 40.
 40. *Works*, ed. Sabine, 154. The date appears in the dedication.
 41. *The New Law of Righteousnes*, in *Works*, ed. Sabine, 183.
 42. Bernard Yack, *The Longing for Total Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 9.
 43. Hill, "Religion of Gerrard Winstanley," 200; Aylmer, "Religion of Gerrard Winstanley," 99.
 44. Gerrard Winstanley, *A Watch-Word to the City of London and the Armie* (August 1649), in *Works*, ed. Sabine, 315–16.
 45. On Seeking see Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down*, 184–230; and J. F. McGregor, "Seekers and Ranters," in *Radical Religion in the English Revolution*, ed. McGregor and Reay, 121–40.
 46. Hill, "Religion of Gerrard Winstanley," 200.
 47. See Corns, *Uncloistered Virtue*, 129–46.
 48. Sabine, Introduction, *Works*, 14–21.
 49. Shulman, *Radicalism and Reverence*, 209–15; Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, 170–71.
 50. On Peters (or Peter) see Raymond Phineas Stearns, *The Strenuous Puritan; Hugh Peter 1598–1660* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1954).
 51. See Christopher Hill, "A Bourgeois Revolution?" *The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill*, 3 volumes (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 3:94–124.

5 FROM CONSTITUTIONALISM TO AESTHETICIZATION,

1654–1670

1. Robert Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicholas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda L. Blair (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 1:85.
2. Francis Bacon, *Works*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denn Heath, 14 volumes (London, 1858–75), 4:52.
3. Peter Cornelius Plockhoy, *A Way Propounded to Make the Poor in These and Other Nations Happy* (London, 1659).
4. Margaret Cavendish, *The Description of a New World Called the Blazing World and Other Writings*, ed. Kate Lilley (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 124.
5. See J. Martin Evans, *Milton's Imperial Epic: "Paradise Lost" and the Discourse of Colonialism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), ch. 1.

6. John Eliot, *The Christian Commonwealth: Or, The Civil Policy of the Rising Kingdom of Jesus Christ* (London, 1659; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1972), C1.
7. Marchamont Nedham, *A True State of the Case of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (London, 1654), 34.
8. *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, ed. Wilbur Cortez Abbott, 4 volumes, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), 3:435. See Derek Hirst, "The Lord Protector, 1653–1658," in *Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution*, ed. John Morrill (London: Longman, 1990), 119–48.
9. Barbra Taft, "That Lusty Puss, The Good Old Cause," *Journal of British Studies* 10 (1970), 30–48; John H. F. Hughes, "The Commonwealthmen Divided: Edmund Ludlowe, Sir Henry Vane and the Good Old Cause 1653–1659," *Seventeenth Century* 5.1 (1990), 43–70.
10. Henry Vane, *A Healing Question Propounded* (1656), in *Somers Tracts*, ed. Walter Scott, 13 volumes (London, 1809–15), 6:304. On Vane and his political thought see J. H. Adamson and H. F. Folland, *Sir Harry Vane: His Life and Times (1613–1662)* (Boston: Gambit, 1973); J. G. A. Pocock, Introduction, *The Political Works of James Harrington*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 38–41; Paul Harris, "Young Sir Henry Vane's Arguments for Freedom of Conscience," *Political Science* (New Zealand) 40.1 (1988), 34–48; and Hughes, "The Commonwealthmen Divided."
11. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
12. It should be recalled that Vane's first direct experience with politics was as the elected governor, at the age of 24, of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
13. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 196, 203.
14. *Writings and Speeches*, ed. Abbott, 3:456–58.
15. On the theoretical and rhetorical problems involved see Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969) 341–42; Jacques Derrida, "Declarations of Independence," *New Political Science* 15 (1986), 7–15; and B. Honig, "Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic," *American Political Science Review* 85.1 (1991), 97–113.
16. *The Commonwealth of Oceana*, in *Political Works of James Harrington*, ed. Pocock, 171.
17. See James Holstun, *A Rational Millennium: Puritan Utopias of Seventeenth-Century England and America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 166–69.
18. C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 172–73; Felix Raab, *The English Face of Machiavelli: A Changing Interpretation 1500–1700* (London: Routledge, 1965), 188; Christopher Hill, *The Experience of Defeat: Milton and Some Contemporaries* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 193–94.
19. It is of course significant that Harrington would mention this particular detail, and ignore the sticking point of lower-class discontent. For all his

advances in political theory, as Macpherson has argued, Harrington's outlook is always the outlook of the landed gentry.

20. Pocock, Introduction, *Political Works*, 38.
21. But see the account of Harrington's persona in Holstun, *A Rational Millennium*, 239–45.
22. See a related account of Harrington's psychology in Jonathan Scott, "The Rapture of Motion: John Harrington's Republicanism," in *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain*, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 139–63, esp. 148.
23. Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method and The Meditations*, trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 35. Scott suggests a Platonic and Hobbesian source for moments in the text like this, with reference both to the Platonic demiourgos and the Hobbesian Leviathan. Between Plato and Hobbes, however, comes the decisive influence of Descartes and what amounts to the Cartesian moment of early modern thought.
24. *Political Works*, ed. Pocock, 390.
25. *The Art of Lawgiving*, in *Political Works*, ed. Pocock, 609.
26. See *Prerogative*, in *Political Works*, ed. Pocock, 392.
27. *A System of Politics delineated in short and easy Aphorisms*, in *Political Works*, ed. Pocock, 838.
28. Judith Shklar, "The Political Theory of Utopia: From Melancholy to Nostalgia," in *Utopias and Utopian Thought*, ed. Frank E. Manuel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 101–15.
29. *A Discourse*, in *Political Works*, ed. Pocock, 744.
30. Holstun, *A Rational Millennium*, 185–86.
31. Edward Gee, *A Plea for Non-Scribers* (London, 1650), n.p.; quoted in Holstun, *A Rational Millennium*, 148. Also see Perez Zagorin, *A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1954), 75–77.
32. My account of the events of 1659 draws on Austin Woolrych, "Last Quests for a Settlement 1657–1660," in *The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement 1646–1660*, ed. G. E. Aylmer (London: Archon Books, 1972); Woolrych, Introduction, *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. Don M. Wolfe, 11 volumes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–82), vol. 7 (1974); and Ronald Hutton, *The Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales 1658–1667* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985).
33. *The Humble Desires of a Free Subject* (London, 1659), A2.
34. William Prynne, *The Re-publicans and Others Spurious Good Old Cause, Briefly and Truly Anatomized* (London, 1659), 14–15.
35. *Chaos* (London, 1659), 6. I am referring here to the first of two versions of this treatise, dated by Thomason 28 June 1659 (STC 208122). A second longer version (STC 208259) is analyzed at length in J. C. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society 1516–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 243–54.
36. Richard Baxter, *A Holy Commonwealth*, ed. William Lamont (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 49.

37. Lamont, Introduction, *A Holy Commonwealth*, ix.
38. Part of Eliot's credulity, or optimism, may stem from the fact that most of the tract was written in the early 1650s, before the disenchantment of Fifth Monarchist rhetoric, and the disappointments of Barebones Parliament. See Holstun, *A Rational Millennium*, 146.
39. Mercurius Politicus (April–May 1657). The letters are reproduced in *Making the News: An Anthology of the Newsbooks of Revolutionary England 1641–1660*, ed. Joad Raymond (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 369–79.
40. *The Stuart Constitution 1603–1688: Documents and Commentary*, ed. J. P. Kenyon, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 357–71.
41. Baxter, *A Holy Commonwealth*, 136.
42. Milton, *The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth*, second edition, in *Complete Prose Works*, ed. Wolfe, 7:425. I will here be commenting on the second edition only. On the tract itself see Barbara K. Lewalski, "Milton: Political Beliefs and Polemical Methods, 1659–1660," *PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association* 74 (1959) 161–202; Holstun, *A Rational Millennium*, 246–65; Laura Lungner Knoppers, "Milton's The Readie and Easie Way and the English Jeremiad," in *Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton's Prose*, ed. David Loewenstein and James Grantham Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 213–25; Mary Ann Radzinowicz, "'In Those Days There Was No King in Israel': Milton's Politics and Biblical Narrative," *Yearbook of English Studies* 21 (1991), 242–52; Amy Boesky, *Founding Fictions: Utopias in Early Modern England* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 111–14.
43. *Political Works*, ed. Pocock, 782.
44. Pocock, Introduction, *Political Works*, 9–10; Richard C. Greaves and Robert Zaller, *Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982–84), vol. 3; Nigel Smith, "Popular Republicanism in the 1650s; John Streater's 'heroick mechanicks,'" in *Milton and Republicanism*, ed. David Armitage, Armand Himy, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 137–55. Smith has established that Streater hailed from an artisanal class, and that he went on to a career of more or less underground republican agitation well into the Restoration. He has been kind enough to assist me in my own research into Streater's career, and to comment on my findings. See Robert Appelbaum, "Utopian Dubrovnik, 1659: An English Fantasy," in *Utopian Studies* 7.1 (1996), 65–92. More recent and comprehensive work on Streater's work as a printer will be found in Adrian Johns, *The Nature of the Book: Printing and Knowledge in the Making* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
45. John Streater, *A Continuation of This Session of Parliament Justified, and the action of the Army touching that affair defended: and objection to both answered* (London, 1659), 16.
46. The most succinct recent account in English of the Ragusa's complex system of government is to be found in David Rheubottom, "The Hierarchy

- of Office in Fifteenth-Century Ragusa,” *Bulletin of the John Rylands Society* 72 (1990), 155–67. Also see Frank W. Carter, *Dubrovnik: The Classic City-State* (London: Seminar Press, 1972), Barisa Krekic, *Dubrovnik in the 14th and 15th Centuries: A City Between East and West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), and Susan Mosher Stuard, *A State of Deference: Ragusa/Dubrovnik in the Medieval Centuries*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).
47. *Lilburns Ghost* (London, 1659), 1.
 48. Ragusa’s *Liber Statutorum* of 1272 in fact confirmed an existing power structure, the power of what Streater himself refers to as “the Gentry,” and excluded any new individuals from participation. Not even marriage could add to the stock of the hereditary nobility since, as noted above, the hereditary nobility observed a strict practice of endogamy.
 49. Krekic, *Dubrovnik*, 54–55.
 50. Hartlib to Worthington, 26 June 1661; in G. H. Turnbull, *Hartlib, Dury, and Comenius; Gleanings from Hartlib’s Papers* (Liverpool and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947), 73.
 51. On *The Isle of Pines* see Boesky, *Founding Fictions*, ch. 5.
 52. Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). Also see Anthony J. Cascardi, *The Subject of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 103–24.
 53. See the related remarks of Thomas Sprat: “The late times of *Civil War*, and *confusion*, to make recompense for their infinite calamities, brought this advantage with them, that they stirr’d up mens minds from *long ease*, and a *lazy rest*, and made them *active*, *industrious*, and *inquisitive*: it being the usual benefit that follows upon *Tempests*, and *thunders* in the *State*, as well as in the *Skie*, that they purifie, and cleer the *Air*, which they disturb,” *History of the Royal Society* (London, 1667), 153.
 54. Quoted in Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, 280.
 55. Curiously, J. C. Davis, the one contemporary authority on R.H., has not picked up on the irony of the text, and reads it, like Hartlib, as a literal depiction of a normatively ideal society. See Davis, *ibid.*, 277–92.
 56. *Declaration of Breda* (1660), in *The Stuart Constitution*, ed. Kenyon 357.
 57. David Ogg, *England in the Reign of Charles II*, second edition, 2 volumes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), esp. 2:450–523.
 58. Ronald Hutton, *The Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales 1658–1667* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 119.
 59. Thomas N. Corns, *Uncloistered Virtue*, 300–1.
 60. On Cavendish’s life see Douglas Grant, *Margaret the First: A Biography of Margaret Cavendish Duchess of Newcastle 1623–1673* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1957); Sara Heller Mendelson, *The Mental World of Stuart Women: Three Studies* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1987), ch. 1; Kathleen Jones, *A Glorious Fame: The Life of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle 1623–73* (London: Bloomsbury, 1988).

61. Margaret Cavendish, *A True Relation of My Birth, Breeding, and Life*, in *The Lives of William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle, and of His Wife, Margaret Duchess of Newcastle*, ed. Mark Antony Lower (London: John Russell Smith, 1872).
62. Peter Newman, *The Battle of Marston Moor 1644* (Chichester: Anthony Bird, 1981).
63. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, 6 volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 3:376–77.
64. Cavendish, *Lives*, ed. Lower 63–64.
65. See the related remarks in *Natures Pictures Drawn by Fancies Pencil to the Life* (London, 1656), C, quoted in Mendelson, *Mental World of Stuart Women*, 40: “I confess my Ambition is restless,” she writes, “and not ordinary; because it would have extraordinary fame: And since all heroick Actions, publick Imployments, powerfull Governments, and eloquent pleadings are denied our Sex in this age, or at least would be condemned for want of custome, is the cause I write so much.”
66. Cavendish, *Lives*, ed. Lower 272.
67. While Margaret was still a child, William Cavendish had been a patron of Ben Jonson, and had produced a couple of his own plays. During the Restoration he patronized Davenant and Shadwell as well as Dryden, and took credit for writing the successful *Martin Mar-All*, which was largely Dryden’s creation. Margaret herself would of course write a number of closet dramas, which would be published in the early 1660s. See Sophie Tomlinson, “‘My Brain the Stage,’ Margaret Cavendish and the Fantasy of Female Performance,” in *Women, Texts and Histories 1575–1760*, ed. Clare Brant and Diane Purkiss (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 134–63; and Susan J. Wiseman, “Gender and Status in Dramatic Discourse: Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle,” in *Women/Writing/History 1640–1740*, ed. Isobel Grundy and Susan J. Wiseman (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 157–77.
68. Thomas Randolph, *Poems with the Muses Looking-Glasse. And Amyntas*. (London, 1638), “Envoy,” n.p.
69. Cavendish, *Blazing World*, ed. Lilley, 124.
70. Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 7. The Manuels’ characterization of *Blazing World* and their rejection of it from the canon of utopian literature is vigorously attacked by Marina Leslie, *Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 127–31, who finds sexism and homophobia behind their view. Leslie avoids discussing, however, the almost dizzying splitting and multiplication of narrative egos that prompted the Manuels’ response.
71. Catherine Gallagher, “Embracing the Absolute: The Politics of the Female Subject in Seventeenth-Century England,” *Genders* 1 (1988), 24–39.

72. Lee Cullen Khanna, "The Subject of Utopia: Margaret Cavendish and Her *Blazing World*," in *Utopian and Science Fiction by Women: Worlds of Difference*, ed. Jane L. Donawerth and Carol A. Komerton (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 15–34.
73. Kate Lilley, "Blazing Worlds: Seventeenth-Century Women's Utopian Writing," in *Women, Texts and Histories 1575–1760*, ed. Brant and Purkiss, 102–33; Lilley, Introduction, *The Description of a New World Called the Blazing World and Other Writings*.
74. Of recent analyses only that in Amy Boesky, *Founding Fictions*, ch. 4, tries to come to grips with Cavendish's imperialistic will to violence.
75. See the Preface to *Micrographia* (London, 1665), where Hooke makes comments like the following: "all my ambition is, that I may serve to the great philosophers of this Age, as the makers and grinders of my glasses did to me: that I may prepare and furnish them with some *materials*, which they may afterwards order and manage with better skill, and to greater advantage . . ." (Bv). Hooke's remarks are to be compared with those like the following from Cavendish's *Observations* (London, 1666): "this Age does ruine Palaces, to make Cottages; Churches to make Conventicles; and Universities to make private Colledges; and endeavour not only to wound, but to kill and bury the Fame of such meritorious Persons as the Ancients were . . ." (Br2); "those that invented Microscopes, and such like dioptrical Glasses, at first, did, in my opinion, the world more injury then benefit . . ." (10); "the best optick is a perfect natural Eye . . ." (13).
76. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, third edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 49.
77. Worthington Chauncey Ford, *Isle of Pines, 1668; an Essay in Bibliography* (Boston: The Odd Volume Club, 1920); Michael McKeon, *Politics and Poetry in Restoration England: The Case of Dryden's "Annus Mirabilis"* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
78. *The Works of John Dryden*, ed. Edward Niles Hooker et al., 20 volumes (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956–92), 1:103, lines 1169–73.
79. Abraham Cowley, "To the Royal Society," in Sprat, *History of the Royal Society*, Bv–B2.
80. John Wilkins, *An Essay Towards a Real Character* (London, 1667). Also see Barbara Shapiro, *John Wilkins 1614–1672; An Intellectual Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Murray Cohen, *Sensible Words: Linguistic Practice in England 1640–1785* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 1977); and Robert Stillman, *The New Philosophy and Universal Languages in Seventeenth-Century England* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1995).
81. Maximillian Novak, Commentary, in *Works of John Dryden*, ed. Hooker, 10:319.
82. Dryden, *Works*, ed. Hooker, 10:4.

83. Katherine Eisaman Maus, "Arcadia Lost: Politics and Revision in *The Tempest*," *Renaissance Drama*, 13 (1982), 189–209: 190. Also see George R. Guffrey, "Politics, Weather, and the Contemporary Reception of the Dryden-Davenant *Tempest*," *Restoration: Studies in English Literary Culture, 1660–1700* 8.1 (1984), 1–9; Michael Dobson, "'Remember First to Possess his Books': The Appropriation of *The Tempest* 1700–1800," *Shakespeare Survey*, 43 (1991); and Matthew H. Wikander, "The Innocence of the Restoration *Tempest*", in *Shakespeare Survey*, 43 (1991).

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